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NSC REVIEW

August 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Joint Study Group (Recommendation No. 11 of the July 2, 1961 Report to the President by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)

The President has been advised of the recent submission of status reports on the subject by the Departments of State and Defense and by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The President has noted the view of the Secretary of Defense that implementation of many of the Joint Study Group recommendations applicable to the Department of Defense and to other organizations in the national intelligence community must await completion of studies now under way and, in some cases, the activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency on October 1, 1961.

In accordance with the foregoing, the President has directed submission of semiannual reports, beginning March 1, 1962, by the Departments of State and Defense and by the Central Intelligence Agency on the status of implementation of each of the recommendations of the Joint Study Group for which your respective agencies have primary action responsibility. Copies of the status reports should be furnished directly to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

s/

McGeorge Bundy

cc: The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Attention: J. Patrick Coyne)

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July 1, 1961

Proposed courses of action on which the views or recommendations of the Board, as appropriate, would be most helpful:

(1) Take steps to carry out the approved recommendations of General Taylor regarding paramilitary activities as they affect CIA.

(2) Extend the practice of making contingency estimates to include estimates of the probable consequences of proposed major covert activities.

(3) Elevate the Board of National Estimates by making the Chairman of the Board a Deputy Director, and by providing that the DCI, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, respectively, would appoint one or two senior Foreign Service officers, and three military officers (as at present) to the Board. Such officers should be either retired officers or should be serving on their last tour of duty, and should act in their individual capacities as do other members of the Board, and not as representatives of the respective departments from which they come.

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(4) Proceed urgently to develop a community-wide system for ensuring that collection requirements are related more effectively to priority needs, already available information, and current or potential collection resources.

25X1 NSC (6) Review present procedures for congressional appearances with a view to reducing the burden of requirements for Agency presentations without, however, changing existing procedures with respect to the special committees established by the Congress for CIA, namely, Appropriations and Armed Services.

(7) Arrange through USIB to meet any requirements for the early warning of developing "cold war" crisis situations in any area of the world. (Indications respecting hot war dangers involving the Communist bloc are covered by the National Indications Center and the Watch Committee.)

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(9) Seek the views of the President's Board with regard to the steps being taken to effect coordination of intelligence activities pursuant to the recommendations of the Joint Study Group and the NSC Action of January 18, 1961. Any Board recommendations, approved by the President, would be most important for securing the necessary cooperation of all intelligence agencies.

(10) Review the espionage laws and also the feasibility of legislation somewhat similar to the British Official Secrets Act, as further measures to protect the security of intelligence operations. 3.