

A

State Department review completed

**A PLAN
for
REDUCING
ARMAMENTS**

ADDRESS BY
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UNITED STATES

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State Department review completed

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A PLAN FOR REDUCING ARMAMENTS

The General Assembly of the United Nations is now meeting in Paris. This great town meeting of the world has assembled for its annual session. What is done there will be of vital importance to us in the United States and to all the people of the earth.

A few hours ago, the United States, Great Britain, and France announced that they would present to the General Assembly a joint proposal of great significance. This is a proposal for lessening the burden of armaments which now bears so heavily upon the world. It is a common-sense way of getting started toward the regulation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all implements of war, including atomic weapons. We hope the General Assembly will consider this proposal as an urgent and important matter.

I want to tell you something about this proposal and why we are making it. Let's begin by talking about the nature of the disarmament problem. All of us know how difficult the world situation is today. Fighting is going on in Korea, and the threat of Communist aggression hangs over many other parts of the world.

To meet this situation, the United States is now rapidly building up its armed forces. So are other free countries. We are doing this because we must. The Soviet Union and its satellites have very large military forces ready for action. The Soviet Union has a growing stock of atomic bombs. The aggression in Korea has shown that Communist imperialism will resort to open warfare to gain its ends. In these circumstances we must have strong military defenses, and we are building them.

General Eisenhower has just given me an encouraging report of the progress that is being made under his command in Europe. Serious difficulties still remain, and they will require vigorous effort from us and from our allies. But the free nations of Europe are creating effective defenses. As a result of General Eisenhower's visit, arrangements are being made to speed up the training and equipment of the combined defense forces in Europe. We shall continue to build strong defenses in Europe and in other parts of the world—just as long as that is necessary.

Our own armed forces and those of our allies are essential to the protection of freedom. They are an essential part of our efforts to prevent another world war. As they increase in size and effectiveness they make it plain to an aggressor that he can have no hope of quick and easy conquest. As the Kremlin comes to see that its aggressive policies cannot pay off, it may abandon them and join in reasonable settlements of world problems.

This build-up of the defenses of the free world is one way to security and peace. As things now stand it is the only way open to us. But there is another way to security and peace—a way we would much prefer to take. We would prefer to see the nations cut down their armed forces on a balanced basis that would be fair to all. That is the way we hoped the world would follow 6 years ago when we helped to set up the United Nations. And it is what we are still working for—an international order without the burden of tremendous armaments.

It may seem strange to talk about reducing armed forces and armaments when we are working so hard to build up our military strength. But there is nothing inconsistent about these two things. Both have the same aim—the aim of security and peace. If we can't get security and peace one way, we must get it the other way.

The way of reducing armaments—the way we prefer—can be undertaken only if there is a work-

able international system which makes reduction possible without endangering the security of any nation. No country can afford to reduce its defenses unless it is sure the other fellow is reducing his at the same time. To reduce armaments, therefore, we must have, first of all, a safe and fair procedure.

Three weeks ago, in a speech in North Carolina, I said that we are willing, as we have always been, to sit down in the United Nations with the Soviet Union, and all the other countries concerned, and work together for lessening the burden of armaments. The proposal we have announced today, along with France and Great Britain, offers a practical way to do just that.

This proposal is in the nature of a fresh approach. It has been very carefully prepared, and we believe it is an improvement over previous approaches. If it is accepted, it will open a way to reduce armaments and lessen the risk of war.

The basic principles for a real, workable system for reducing armaments are well known. I outlined them in my speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations a little more than a year ago. The General Assembly has endorsed them. They are simple. First, such a system must include all types of weapons; second, it must be accepted by all nations having substantial armed forces; and third, it must be based on safeguards that will insure the compliance of all nations—in other words it must be foolproof.

I also suggested to the General Assembly that the two United Nations commissions working on the control of armaments be consolidated into one. One of these commissions has been working on atomic energy, and the other commission on all other types of weapons and armed forces. It is clear, however, that all types of weapons and armed forces must be covered by one over-all plan and should therefore be under the jurisdiction of the same United Nations commission.

As a result of work during the past year, the General Assembly is now in a position to merge

the two commissions and to direct the new body to get to work on concrete steps for reducing and controlling all kinds of armaments. We hope the proposal we are now making will be the first order of business of this new commission. Let me tell you just what it is that we are proposing.

First, we propose that a continuing inventory of all armed forces and armaments be undertaken. This inventory would take place in every country having substantial military power, and it would be checked and verified in each of those countries by inspectors who are nationals of other countries working under the United Nations. These inspectors would have authority to find out what the real facts are.

Second, we propose that while this process of inventory and inspection is taking place the nations work out specific arrangements for the actual reduction of armed strength.

Third, we propose, on the basis of these two steps, that the reductions which are the goal of the program be made as soon as that can be done with full knowledge and fairness to all.

Such a program would have to be agreed upon by all the countries having substantial military power and ratified according to their own constitutional practices.

The key to this plan is the proposal to find out exactly and precisely what arms and armed forces each country has. This is the first essential, on which all else depends. Unless this step is taken, no real progress can be made toward regulating and reducing armaments.

Any nation which is not willing to agree to this step, and to carry it out, is not really interested in disarmament. The Soviet Government has at various times talked about reducing armaments, but they have never proposed an effective system for finding out the facts. No responsible government can agree to cut its own defenses unless it knows where such a cut will leave it in relation to the armed forces of other countries. That is why we propose the first step of an honest, continuing

inventory of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons.

Such an inventory would proceed by stages, disclosing the least vital information first, and then proceeding to more sensitive areas. Each stage would be completed before the next began, until all armed forces and armaments of every kind had been included.

There is another important point. Any program of reducing armaments will necessarily be complex and, even with the fullest cooperation of all the parties, will take quite a while to work out and put into effect. Even after it is put into effect, there will have to be safeguards against its violation. The fact finding must, therefore, be continuous. It cannot be a one-shot affair. The fact finders must know not only what the state of armament is on any given date, but how it is proceeding—whether the armed forces of the country concerned are increasing or diminishing.

As the facts are revealed, progress can be made toward working out, by mutual agreement, the exact amounts and kinds of armaments and armed forces which each country will finally be permitted to have. It might be possible, for example, to agree that each country would have armed forces proportionate to its population, with a ceiling beyond which no country could go. Furthermore, each country might be limited to using no more than a fixed portion of its national production for military purposes.

With respect to atomic weapons, the plan already approved by a majority of the United Nations fits right into this present proposal of ours for the control and reduction of armaments. Atomic weapons would be revealed at the appropriate stage in the process of disclosure. Such weapons would ultimately be prohibited, and atomic energy would be controlled under the provisions of the United Nations plan. We continue to support this plan as it now stands, but we are, of course, always ready to consider any better plan.

Let me stress that each stage of this program for

reducing armaments would be entered upon only after the previous one had been completed. And each stage would be continuously policed by inspectors, who would report any breach of faith.

If the Soviet Union and its satellites are really afraid of the intentions of any of the free countries, as they say they are, here is a plan they can adopt with safety. It would give them the same protection, every step of the way, that it gives every other country. And, on the other hand, we can afford to go into such a plan as this because we would have safeguards against bad faith. All nations would have to lay their cards on the table and keep them there at all times.

Here, then, is a real, down-to-earth approach, fair to all concerned. It would move forward step by step. Each step, when completed, would build up mutual confidence for the next step. If at any stage there were a breach of trust or an act of bad faith, all participating nations would have immediate notice and could act in time to protect themselves.

In the face of the long and gloomy history of our negotiations with the Soviet Union, there are, no doubt, many people who think that any further attempts to control and reduce armaments are a waste of time. It is true that we have experienced much bad faith, deceit, and broken promises on the part of the Soviet Union over the last 6 years. It is true that we have met rebuffs and refusal from the Soviet Government, ever since the day we offered to give up our monopoly of atomic weapons and to prohibit them under a system of international control. Nevertheless, as responsible men and women, we must try for disarmament in spite of all difficulties. We cannot permit the history of our times to record that we failed by default.

We make this proposal because it is the right thing to do. We are not making it in any sudden spirit of optimism. We are not making it as a last gesture of despair. We are making it because we share, with all the members of the United Na-

tions, the responsibility of trying to bring about conditions which will assure international peace and security. The people of the world want peace. To work in every possible way for peace is a duty which we owe not only to ourselves, but to the whole human race.

In making our proposal for reducing armaments, we are not suggesting that the crisis in world affairs has passed, or even that it has lessened. It has not. We cannot afford, for one minute, to let down our guard or falter in our defense program. We must not weaken in our firm stand to resist aggression in Korea.

While aggression and fighting continue—as in Korea—and while the major political issues that divide the nations remain unsettled, real progress toward reducing armaments may not be possible. But we cannot fail to bring before the world the problem of growing armaments, which presses so heavily on all mankind. We believe deeply that discussions of this question in the United Nations can and should begin now, even though tensions are high. Indeed, one way to reduce these tensions is to start work on such proposals as the one we are now making.

I urge the Kremlin to accept this proposal. I urge them to make it known to the people of the Soviet Union. The men in the Kremlin are responsible for the lives and the future of a great nation—of a great and creative people—a people who long for peace, even as all people long for peace. The men in the Kremlin must know how the people behind the Iron Curtain are crushed down by the burden of armaments and production for war—how they hope for release and for enjoyment of the better things of life.

And there can be a release from the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war. The nations are not helpless chips in the tide of events. They can control their destiny if they will. The burden of armaments can be lifted. It can be lifted. And if it is done, think what a prospect would open up for the future of mankind.

The United States and other countries are now helping the people of the free nations to fight against the ancient enemies of man—hunger, disease, and injustice. But what we can do now is sharply limited by the cost of maintaining defenses to prevent aggression and war. If that cost could be reduced—if the burden of armaments could be lessened, new energies and resources would be liberated for greatly enlarged programs of reconstruction and development.

New hope and opportunities would be given everywhere for better conditions of life. There would be greater freedom, greater production, greater enjoyment of the fruits of peaceful industry. Through the United Nations we could wage the only kind of war we seek—the war against want and human misery. In the lifetime of our own generation, we could bring about the greatest period of progress for the world in all recorded history.

This is our vision. This is our hope. This is what all free people have been striving for. We are determined to gain these tremendous opportunities for human progress. We are determined to win real peace—peace based on freedom and justice. We will do it the hard way if we must—by going forward, as we are doing now, to make the free world so strong that no would-be aggressor will dare to break the peace. But we will never give up trying for another way to peace—the way of reducing the armaments that make aggression possible.

That is why we are making these new proposals to the United Nations. We offer them in good faith and we ask that they be considered in good faith. We hope all other nations will accept them and will join with us in this great enterprise for peace.

TRIPARTITE STATEMENT

1. France, the United Kingdom and the United States will submit to the sixth General Assembly of the United Nations for its consideration proposals for proceeding with the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic.

2. As long as present conditions of international tension prevail, the three governments have the inescapable duty and are unshakably determined to continue their efforts to develop the strength required for their security and that of the free world, because without security there can be no peace with justice. They also believe that if all governments sincerely join in the cooperative and effective regulation and limitation of armed forces and armaments, this would greatly reduce the danger of war and thus enhance the security of all nations.

3. In any honest program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, a first and indispensable step is disclosure and verification. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing basis and reveal in successive stages all armed forces—including paramilitary, security and police forces—and all armaments, including atomic. It must also provide for effective international inspection to verify the adequacy and accuracy of this information.

4. Such a system of disclosure and verification in successive stages would be an essential part of the program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments to a level which would decrease substan-

tially the possibility of a successful aggression and thereby decrease the chance that armed aggression would be used to further national objectives.

5. The three governments believe that a workable program should include criteria according to which the size of all armed forces would be limited, the portion of national production which could be used for military purposes would be restricted, and mutually agreed national military programs would be arrived at within the prescribed limits and restrictions. The United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the atomic energy aspects of any general program for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, unless and until a better and more effective plan can be devised.

6. The three governments believe that discussion of the program should begin now. However, such a general program cannot be put into effect while United Nations forces are resisting aggression in Korea. Moreover, concurrently with the coming into effect of the program the major political issues which have divided the world can and must be settled.

7. The three governments share with all Members of the United Nations the responsibility to promote world conditions in which international peace and security are assured. They believe that their proposals offer an opportunity for the world to move forward toward that objective.

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ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY
OF STATE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE U. S. DELEGATION TO
THE SIXTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
BEFORE THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
NOVEMBER 8, 1951

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All of us are indebted to the people and the
Government of France for the excellence of the arrange-
ments for this meeting.

We meet here in Paris on her two thousandth
anniversary. We offer our congratulations and see in
the monuments of her bimillennial progress the symbol
and the promise of our United Nations which is still at
the threshold of its existence.

We, the United Nations, are young indeed, but we,
too, mark the monuments of our progress. As Paris is a
symbol of European culture and beauty, so the United
Nations is the world's symbol of peace. This city has
seen its wars, its strife, and its sorrows, as well as
its triumphs. Since we last met in this General Assembly,
there have been tensions and crises and armed conflict
in the world, but the cause of peace has prospered in
tangible ways.

We came into existence as an organization at the end
of a great war. Our business is peace. The victories of
peace are the victories of the United Nations wherever
they take place.

Since we last met, 48 nations have signed a peace
treaty with Japan. The way has been opened for other
nations to do the same. A long period of free negotia-
tion was crowned with success. For much of this
negotiation the meeting of many statesmen at the United
Nations offered fruitful opportunities.

These nations did not merely talk about peace, they
achieved it. Some prefer to mouth the word peace and to
oppose the reality. But the peace treaty has been con-
cluded. This is fact, not fiction. It is tangible
accomplishment, not mere empty protestation. The

ACHESON

- 2 -

signatures of many free nations on a just and unvengeful treaty are worth far more on the balance sheet of history than the signatures of those who by fraud or compulsion subscribe to vague slogans whose promise is belied by the deeds of those who pre-fabricate the slogans.

Those who unite for peace have also laid solid foundations in the Report of our Collective Measures Committee. The Report wisely stresses the need for a "mutually supporting relationship" between the United Nations and the regional collective defensive arrangements. This expresses well the direction in which we must work, and I strongly urge that we seek ways of translating this principle into action.

If we are to carry out the Uniting for Peace Resolution which we adopted at our last session, we must develop the capacity of the United Nations to act promptly and effectively in event of aggression. Such preparation is important. It will do much to discourage and deter potential aggressors from carrying out their evil designs.

To carry out the Uniting for Peace Resolution effectively, we must be prepared in case of need to muster our strength in various parts of the world. No area should be completely unprepared to meet aggression if it strikes.

In this part of the world where we now meet, the group of nations in the Atlantic Community, acting in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, is fast building bulwarks of peace. 1282

The Atlantic Community is building its strength in support of the principles of the United Nations. In particular, the Atlantic Community is building its armed strength so that free Europe will not be powerless in face of the armed strength of powerful and none too peaceful neighbors. We are, as I shall explain later in my speech, eager and anxious to discuss effective means of reducing the burden of armaments. But we are not willing to discuss unilateral disarmament or the holding of armaments at a level which will guarantee the existing armed superiority of the Soviet Union and leave free Europe powerless to meet aggression.

The nations who believe in peace and who support the United Nations system of collective security have now been forced to reverse their post-war programs of demobilization, not to threaten their neighbors but to protect the peace of the world. They are laying a foundation for the strength that will protect the world against a renewal of aggression.

The structure is not complete; the world is not yet secure against the danger of a third world war. But we have made a beginning. The peaceful nations of the world are more unified and better equipped to prevent aggression than would have seemed possible only a few years ago. Centers of defensive power have been, and are being, built up, not only within individual states, but to an increasing degree in mutual defense arrangements and in the United Nations.

MORE

ACHESON

-3-

This progress will in time bring us to the threshold of a new period in the affairs of the world. Then the forces of aggression and tyranny will no longer be in a position to attack free nations and find them helpless to resist.

The tasks presented by this stage in our efforts are as difficult as any that statesmanship has ever been called upon to fulfill.

They are difficult because we must at the same time build strength and work for peace. These are not contradictory; they are two sides of the same coin.

We are building strength for one reason, and one reason only --that is, because there will be no peace so long as the peaceful nations are weak and vulnerable. There is no way of escaping this requirement, as the last six years have shown.

But building arms alone is not enough. We must use our strength with moderation and restraint. We must work for peace, for understanding, for a reduction of tensions and differences. We must neglect no opportunity to reduce the danger of war in any way that is open to us, and to get on with our main job, which is to work toward the kind of a world we want to build.

While we have worked to build up the strength of the free nations, we have also been deeply concerned with the economic and social needs of the people of the world. Much has been done this year in international cooperation for economic and social well-being.

Some two billion dollars of new capital have been made available for economic and social development by private investors, the International Bank and governmental institutions. Under the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, experts are at work in 43 countries.

These are merely a beginning. They point the way in which we must move.

As President Truman has already stated, our rate of advance has been impeded by the necessity of building up the defenses of the free nations. If we can be relieved of some of this burden, the possibilities of improving the lot of mankind should be well-nigh limitless.

As for the future, we recognize that there can be no lasting peace, no real security, while hunger, disease, and despair hold millions in their grip. Every people must have a stake in peace worth defending.

By the energetic application of known techniques, and even without any great increase in expenditure of funds or resources, we can make substantial inroads against poverty and famine.

We would welcome the establishment of targets setting forth practical agricultural and industrial goals to be attained in a definite

ACHESON

-4-

In the field of agriculture, the Food and Agriculture Organization has already indicated the increase needed to provide adequate nutritional diets in the year 1960. The magnitudes required are by no means staggering, and the advice of experts is that the goals can be attained. The world has the natural resources and the technical knowledge to meet these needs, and it should be our goal to do so.

The progress which has been made during the past year in the field of Technical Cooperation should give us encouragement to go further. Time and again, there have been amazing examples of what a few technicians and a few simple implements -- like a hoe and a steel-tipped plow -- can do with a few bags of seed in countries where people have been going hungry. These examples ought to inspire us to further effort.

I am also encouraged by the attention and study which has been given over the past year to the problems concerning the ownership and use of land. The report of the Secretary-General, and the action of the Economic and Social Council point the way by which individual governments and the United Nations can provide farmers in many parts of the world with both the incentive and the means for increasing their output of food for the world.

Hand in hand with the increase in food supply must come an increase in the world's industrial output. Here, too, it is not revolutionary technological discoveries which are required. Even with the present rate of new investment, we have the means at hand to secure an enormous increase in productive output. The more efficient use of existing factories, mines, and transportation facilities could, studies indicate, boost the world's production on the order of about 10 per cent within a relatively short period of time.

At the same time, we should be on our guard to see that a fair distribution of the increased output, that would flow from this increased productivity, results in higher wages for workers, and in lower prices to consumers.

With this possible increase in productivity of existing plants, and with an emphasis on the direction of new capital toward undertakings that will add to the output of the world's supply of needed goods, it should be possible, within a decade, to increase the world's real annual income by more than 200 billion dollars. This would add to the present production in the world the equivalent of the entire productive output of the United States only four years ago. Think what this would mean in numbers of pairs of shoes, in clothes, housing, education and the other basic requirements of mankind!

This challenge, this opportunity for expanding the economy of the world, should be one of the principal concerns of this organization and all its members. And it could be, if the will to peace were universal.

-5-

ACHESON

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The great constructive accomplishments in the past five years, and those which lie before us, are the sort of international cooperative effort in which my countrymen and those of most of you here join wholeheartedly. This is the work we like-- to develop, to build, to expand opportunity for the pursuit of happiness. Our country, as its history and institutions show, is dedicated to this. But actually what has been done--and apparently what lies before us--must be done in the face of obstacles made by man and undoubtedly made to impede progress toward peace and human welfare. Again we have a symbol--Korea.

Korea was the place chosen by those who plan aggression on a world-wide scale as the scene for an imperialist blitzkrieg. The Russian state has repeatedly in modern times tried to make Korea a province. When Korea was liberated from Japanese rule and the Republic of Korea was established under the auspices of the United Nations, the Soviet Union withheld from the Republic all that part of Korea which was under communist control. The iron curtain clanked down on the 38th parallel. Suddenly, on June 25, 1950, the curtain was raised to allow Soviet-armed and Soviet-trained armies to pour across the border in their brutal assault on the free people of Korea.

With courage and determination, the Koreans resisted the alien aggression, resisted the familiar imperialist expansion. But as the aggressors knew, the young Republic was not strong enough to stand alone against an aggression so carefully planned and so thoroughly equipped.

The aggressor did not know that the young international organization, the United Nations, could act with unity, speed, and eventual military superiority. But that is how it did act.

The United States is proud to have been able to play a leading part in this great practical demonstration of collective security. Until there is peace in Korea, the United Nations will urgently need the maximum contributions--in armed forces and in other means--from every loyal member state. And when peace has been restored to Korea, the United Nations must be able to marshal the material aid of all its members in the great task of reconstruction and rehabilitation.

But when will there be peace? We all know that it depends upon the will of those who support, maintain, and defend the communist armies. At a word from them the fighting could end in Korea. Some months ago, it seemed that the word had been spoken. But has it been spoken?

The United Nations Command has been negotiating since July to try to bring about an armistice, so far without success. It is only now that the aggressors have agreed to negotiate on the basis of a military and not a political line, taking into account the current military situation.

ACHESON

-6-

We are hopeful that the achievement of an armistice in Korea might make it possible for this Assembly to bring about a final settlement for Korea -- a settlement which will be in accord with the established United Nations' objectives in Korea. A settlement such as this, if reached in good faith, could open the door to broader consultations on other aspects of the Far Eastern situation.

There are many other areas in which the Soviet Union could demonstrate its desire for peace in action, if it chooses to do so.

Another example can be found in the case of Germany.

A proposal has been submitted for inclusion in the Agenda of this Assembly for the establishment of an impartial international commission under United Nations supervision to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet zone of Germany. The purpose of this investigation would be to determine whether existing conditions there make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas.

We have consistently maintained, and we continue to maintain, that Germany should be reunified as soon as this can be brought about on democratic lines. It must be done in a way which will ensure the re-establishment of a free Germany able to play her part in the peaceful association of free European nations.

This is a constructive effort, and it presents those who claim to support the reunification of Germany with an opportunity to prove their good faith.

Austria is another example of an opportunity to demonstrate by action a will to peace.

For more than five years now, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States have been discussing the conclusion of a treaty for Austria. The Four Powers have promised the Austrian people independence. The Austrians have long ago fulfilled all the conditions for the restoration of their complete sovereignty. But the country is still under occupation. Here again, the Soviet leaders can speak the word which will fulfill their promises to Austria.

Again, in the case of Italy, the Soviet Union could fulfill its obligations and make a contribution to the international community by withdrawing the obstacles it has placed in the way of Italy's entry into the United Nations.

Another example of an area in which the Soviet Union could demonstrate its desire for peace in action is in the field of human rights, in which the Charter also expresses a profound interest.

In a large area of the world, human freedom is being crushed.

ACHESON

- 7 -

Millions of persons now work as slaves in forced labor camps, and tens of thousands of persons are being compelled to leave their homes by mass deportations.

I would like to cite one example of these brutal mass deportations, because it is important for us to remember that these are human beings and not mere statistics.

In the city of Budapest this spring thousands of innocent and helpless families were aroused by the police at dawn and given twenty-four hours in which to prepare for departure. With just a few of their belongings, these people--including infants, the sick, the aged--were transported from their homes to camps and hovels in the country.

As one of these unhappy victims wrote, in a letter which reached the outside world, "It is very bitter to have to dissolve everything in the course of twenty-four hours."

The hopes of the civilized world that the mass persecutions of the Hitler regime would never be repeated have proved to be in vain.

Culture and religion have been made the special victims of this tyranny. Scientists and scholars, artists and churchmen--all are forced to conform to the single dogma of the all-powerful state.

The result is not just sterility; it is the dangerous subservience that results from thought control and makes aggression possible.

It was a matter of proper concern to the entire world recently when a foreign correspondent, William Oatis, honestly seeking to report the news in Czechoslovakia, was thrown into prison without a fair trial and on the flimsiest of charges. This man is much more than an individual victim of tyranny. He is a reminder to the world of how free journalism is deliberately throttled by totalitarian regimes.

These calculated denials of basic human rights are a matter of concern to the world community.

Let all who desire peace and talk of their peaceful intentions demonstrate their good faith by putting an end to slavery, rather than seeking to extend it.

But the record of the past year does not reveal a single action--and I am talking about action, not words--by the Soviet Union that indicates it is willing to cooperate with the rest of the world in abating tensions and the danger of war.

Their only contribution has been an artificially created "mass movement", built around slogans of peace.

ACHESON

- 8 -

Despite these slogans, the familiar methods of threat and subversion are today used against Yugoslavia as once they were used against Turkey. The method of attack by guerilla forces to upset governments is used today in Indochina as it once was in Greece.

The Soviet Union has talked a great deal about peace, but, when it comes to achieving peace through deeds, or to uniting for peace, they obstruct. They call for a new Five-Power Peace Pact, but refuse to carry out our Sixty-Power Peace Pact - the Charter.

One of the most urgent of international problems is the level of armaments among nations.

Soviet policies have obliged the free nations to begin building up their armaments to levels necessary for their defense. But we do not want an arms race.

We are determined to do all in our power to ensure our safety, but we are no less determined to continue to explore, as we have been doing for many years, every possible way of bringing about a safe reduction of armaments.

This effort is too important to the world to leave a single stone unturned.

A year ago, before this body, the President of the United States proposed the merging of the two United Nations commissions dealing with the problem of armaments. We have before us the Report of the Committee of Twelve recommending that this be done. I hope that this Assembly will approve this recommendation.

At that time also, the President expressed the determination of the United States to find ways of bringing about control and reduction of armaments as a means of moving forward toward the ultimate goal which the United Nations has set for itself--the goal of a peaceful world in which disagreements are settled by peaceful means.

He outlined the basic principles for a real, workable system for reducing armaments and the General Assembly endorsed those principles. The principles are three in number:

1. Such a system must include all types of weapons
2. It must be accepted by all nations having substantial armed forces
3. It must be based on safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all nations -- in other words, it must be foolproof.

MORE
1282

ACHESON

-9-

The United States Government, together with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, has been studying earnestly the real problems that must be dealt with if we are to make genuine headway toward the reduction of armaments.

The world does not want catchwords and tricks. It does not want propaganda gestures. It wants an honest program which will protect the safety of free men, not a cloak for aggressive designs.

After a long period of study, we have arrived at a series of proposals for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces which meets the test of reasonableness and feasibility. Last night the three Governments announced their intention to submit such proposals to this Sixth Session of the General Assembly.

We are therefore asking that a discussion of these proposals be added to the Agenda as an item of urgency and importance.

I firmly believe that these proposals can lead to an agreed program here in the United Nations, if all nations approach them with good will and a sincere desire for peace.

Last night, the President of the United States discussed our proposals in a broadcast to the American people, and assured them that we would, for our part, approach these discussions with the most sincere desire for a successful outcome. I wish to repeat here the essential elements of the program outlined by the President.

The first element is disclosure and verification on a continuing basis. It is impossible for the nations to proceed with such a program unless each one has knowledge of what armed forces and armaments other nations possess. This knowledge must be continually up to date. It must be full knowledge and there must be guarantee that the knowledge is accurate. This in turn means that there must be a system of inspection. The national inventories of all armed forces and armaments must be checked and verified in each country by inspectors who are nationals of other countries working under the United Nations. These inspectors must have the power to find out what are the real facts.

This system of disclosure and verification must be a system which progresses from stage to stage as each one is completed.

As our three Governments have already stated, this will mean revealing in appropriate stages all armed forces whether military, para-military, security or police forces, and all armaments, whether atomic or non-atomic. The least vital information would be disclosed first, and we would then proceed to more sensitive areas. As I have said, each stage would be completed before the next began, until all arms and armaments of every kind had been included.

ACHESON

- 10 -

Since 1949, there has been before the United Nations a proposal, supported by the United States, for a census and verification to be carried out on a one-time basis. We are now moving forward from that proposal in two ways. One is that while the process of disclosure and verification is taking place, we would be working out the further steps of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction. And we are also proposing to alter the earlier proposal so as to include in the system of disclosure all of the aspects of atomic energy.

In short, the first step of the general program we are now putting forward would be the disclosure in stages of all military matters. This would enable us to work out specific arrangements for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of national military establishments, while the process of inventory and inspection is taking place.

Moreover -- and this is of the greatest importance -- the continuing disclosure and verification which we propose would provide quick and certain knowledge of any violation.

In a world charged as ours is with suspicions and dangers, our peoples want the safeguards that disclosure and verification can provide. As we move from stage to stage, we would have increasing evidence of good faith and honesty. We could not go forward without that evidence.

Of course, we have always recognized that a census or disclosure of armed forces and armaments would not by itself bring about the change in the military situation which the people of the world so eagerly desire.

This leads to the second element of our proposals which is its general application.

It is not enough that four or five states should agree to such a program. It should apply at least to all members of the international community who have a substantial military potential.

We would hope that the program would be universal.

The third element is the establishment of some sort of criteria for the balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces.

These criteria, which can be worked out, would determine the exact amounts and kinds of armaments and armed forces which each country will finally be permitted to have.

As examples of criteria that could be considered by the United Nations, the United States would suggest:

First, limiting the size of all armed forces, including paramilitary, security, and police forces, to a fixed percentage of population--with a ceiling beyond which no country could go;

Second, restricting the proportion of national production which could be used for military purposes to an amount that would bear a direct relation to what was needed for the armed forces permitted under the program; and here again, there might be a ceiling expressed in terms of a percentage of the national product; and

ACHESON

-11-

Third, developing mutual agreements as to the composition of national military programs within the over-all limitations and restrictions. Such mutually agreed programs should be developed within the framework of United Nations' principles in conferences under United Nations' auspices.

With particular respect to the control and regulation of atomic energy, we will continue to support the United Nations' plan as providing the most satisfactory basis, unless and until a better and more effective plan is devised.

These are the general outlines of our proposals. They could establish absolute limits for armed forces and armaments, adequate for defense but not enough for aggression.

We will be prepared to explain them in greater detail when the appropriate Committee of the Assembly takes them up for consideration.

We believe that discussion of the program should begin now. But no such general program can be put into effect while United Nations' forces are resisting aggression in Korea. Moreover, concurrently with the coming into effect of the program, the major political issues which have divided the world can and must be settled.

We pledge ourselves to do everything in our power to this end.

If such a program could be put into effect, the immense military expenditures which now press on nearly all peoples of the world could be largely lifted.

The Charter of the United Nations speaks of promoting "the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources."

At the present time, the demands of security, requiring the use of treasure and resources for military purposes, have necessitated in all countries the postponement of great positive programs of reconstruction and development which had been planned nationally and internationally.

If the world could use its resources, its skills and energies for non-military projects, as the United States most earnestly desires, then vast new opportunities would open up for the better and happier conditions of life which all men seek.

We could then get ahead, as President Truman said last night, with the only kind of war we seek -- the war against want and human misery. Within developed countries, new resources for peaceful production could be put to work, not only for their own benefit, but to the advantage of all.

And in other parts of the world where, as I said earlier, millions upon millions of people are struggling with poverty, hunger, and disease, the great constructive efforts of the United Nations could go forward without hindrance.

ACHESON

-12-

This is what could be done, if all of the nations here were willing to serve the cause of peace by their actions.

But so long as some nations talk of peace while their actions make for war, the free people of the world will continue with determination and steadiness to build the full programs of defensive strength which their security requires.

We must never cease trying to change this state of affairs.

That is why we are submitting these proposals now for proceeding with the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic. The United States is prepared to begin negotiations on these proposals in the United Nations at once.

We firmly believe that a workable agreement is within our reach, if all nations will approach this task with good faith and a will to peace.

* * * * *

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release 1298
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(Provisional Transcript)

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE DEAN ACHESON,
SECRETARY OF STATE AND U.S. DELEGATE TO
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN COMMITTEE ONE, ON
DISARMAMENT

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

With the permission of the Committee, I should like this morning to elaborate upon the tripartite proposals—which were put in during the general debate and which have been reduced to the form of a resolution sponsored by the three powers—which you have on your desks before you this morning.

In placing these items by general consent first on the agenda of this committee, I think the Committee has indicated the vital importance which it attaches to them. These proposals are being put forward at a time when there is in progress in the world, in the western world, one of the greatest efforts ever made in peacetime to rebuild the defenses of that part of the world in the face of very grave threats which confront it.

Therefore, in putting forward these proposals, we are doing it at a time which may seem somewhat anomalous to some of you. In my view that is not the case. In my view there never was a time in which it was more important than the present to put forward proposals such as those tabled by the three powers.

I believe that these proposals if accepted could and would produce a turning point in history, a turning point at which the world could turn back from the tensions, the dangers which confront all of us in every country, could relax the effort toward armament which is going on all over the world and by doing so could find a way to solve some of the greatest questions which divide East and West.

Therefore, the three powers attach to these proposals the very greatest importance and I am happy to see that the committee attaches the same importance to them by placing them first upon its agenda.

MORE

ACHESON

-2-

Now, in talking about these proposals, I should like to begin by very briefly putting three questions. The first question is: "In putting forward these proposals, where do we wish to go?" The second question is "Why do we wish to go there?". The third question is "How do we propose to get there?".

Where do we wish to go? We wish to go to an international system which will include the regulation and reduction of all arms and all armaments of all types. We wish to go to a system which includes all nations in the world which have substantial military forces. We wish to go to a system which prohibits and abolishes the use of atomic weapons. We wish to go to a system which includes safeguards by which all of this can be done with security to all nations involved. We wish to go to a situation in the world in which no country will be terrified that some other country or some other group of countries is proposing to attack it or to threaten it or to overawe it. We wish to reach that point by bringing about a reduction in the level of armaments, by bringing about the prohibition of the atomic bomb, by bringing about a situation where everybody knows, everybody in the world knows what the situation is in regard to armaments and keeps on knowing it.

We wish to reach a position where we have lifted from the world the fear of war. We wish to go to a point where we know more about one another, where, as Mr. Schuman referred to it, the mystery of the present situation is lifted and where there is reciprocity in knowledge so that all countries know what all other countries are doing. 1298

We wish to help meet the reasonable demand in the world for peace, meeting it by reducing the burden of armaments, the level of armaments, prohibiting atomic weapons and by providing safeguards.

Now, why do we wish to go there? We wish to go there because as I indicated a moment ago, the level of conflict and tension in the world is rising to a very dangerous extent. I have mentioned the arming of the Western world which is taking place. There is throughout the world actual fighting going on, particularly in the Far East, fighting in Korea, fighting in Indo-China, fighting in Malaya. This is not good for the prospects of peace. Therefore we wish to reach the goals that I have mentioned and we wish to reach them quickly because we believe that the tension in the world has reached a dangerous point.

Now, how do we expect to get to the point we reach? We expect to go there by producing practical proposals. We are not putting forward any easy suggestions. We are facing the complexity and difficulty of this matter squarely and we are going to go into it facing every problem of technology and political nature which is involved and laying before you the perplexities, laying before you certain directions which we believe will be profitable, but not attempting at any point to gloss over difficulties or via catchword or slogan trying to make this committee or the world believe that things can be achieved easily in this field of disarmament, because they can not. This is a difficult field. It is a field which requires practical and sensible treatment. It is a field where we get nowhere by propagandistic slogans, where we can make progress only by facing the difficulties and finding solutions to them.

Now the first thing which we suggest in attacking this problem is the need for an international mechanism. Reduction of the level of armaments, prohibition of the atomic bomb can not be brought about by mere resolutions, by a mere agreement that these things are desirable and therefore, ipso facto, they happen. That is not the way it can be brought about. It can only be brought about by patiently discussing and analyzing in a permanent body the problems which confront us.

Therefore, our first suggestion relates to item two on the agenda. Our first suggestion is that we should go forward in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Twelve to create one commission, the powers of which are outlined in the resolution which we put before you and in the recommendations of the Committee of Twelve; that we should create this commission and charge it with certain duties, giving it certain guidance, so that it may get on with its tasks, with a little more direction, as to where it is to go and how it is to get there. Therefore, we favor the merger of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Conventional Armaments Commission.

This I say quite frankly is a change in the position of the United States. For some years, we thought that this would be a mistake. We thought that it would be better to keep the two commissions separate. But last year the President announced our decision that that was no longer our view. We had thought in the first place in reaching our earlier conclusion that there were such peculiar problems connected with the control of atomic energy that it should be dealt with in a separate commission.

Those problems have been dealt with. There has been discussion in the separate commission and the report of the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1949, which you remember, has stated that it is no longer profitable to continue discussion in that separate forum because these questions now must be dealt with in a wider framework if we are ever to break the deadlock which has unhappily existed for so long.

We had hoped also that the matter of conventional armaments might find an almost automatic solution in the disarmament which took place in the West through the great demobilization of 1945, 1946, 1947, but that did not occur and therefore that hope has been frustrated and can not be relied upon.

We had also thought at one time that the Atomic Energy Commission was making such progress that its progress should not be impeded by putting new problems into the same commission.

But unhappily, as I have already stated, the six permanent members have indicated to us that that progress has stopped and that it can only be resumed by considering these questions in a wider framework.

We are now prepared to change our earlier view and have changed it and urge the consolidation of the commissions and the charging of the new commission with certain duties, goals and responsibilities.

MORE

What are the chief elements of the plan which the three powers have put forward? There are four principal elements. I shall run over them and then go into each of them in some detail.

The first is an inventory, an international inventory and check-up of arms and armaments; what is called disclosure and verification and is the first element in this program.

The second element is disarmament to agreed levels, the reduction of all arms and all armaments to agreed levels.

The third element in these proposals is the prohibition of the atomic bomb.

The fourth element is the creation of safeguards to make sure that all nations are complying with the agreements into which they would enter if these proposals are carried out and to warn the world of any nation which is not complying with its agreements.

First of all, let us discuss this matter of disclosure and verification. At the outset, I should like to say that we believe that the verification is more, infinitely more important than the disclosure. Disclosure is important but disclosure without verification is not really disclosure at all. Therefore, there must be along with disclosure a system for verifying what is disclosed and disclosing other things which have not been disclosed.

This procedure of disclosure and verification must be a continuing process. It is not enough to have it done once and then stop, because the whole program which we are outlining here will take some time. It can not be done overnight. Therefore, the disclosure and the verification of the disclosures and the knowledge of the facts must be a continuing thing so that everybody may know at all times what is happening in this field.

In talking about verification, inspection, I want frankly to meet a situation of great difficulty. This is not an easy thing. It is easy to say that there should be verification of what is disclosed, that there should be inspection, but it is not an easy thing to do and we must face that clearly and we must understand why this thing which is difficult is so necessary.

It is so necessary because we are dealing here with the very element of security of national states. We are dealing with the survival of national states. In dealing with that matter, we cannot brush important matters aside by slogans. We must understand that we are dealing with the most serious and vital matters which any statesmen around this table or elsewhere ever have to deal with, and that is the security, the survival of their countries.

Therefore, when we are discussing a program for the limitation of armaments, we are discussing this elemental central fact of national security and since we are doing that we can not rely upon the statement of any country or any statesman or any officials of any country, however friendly, however reliable they have proved in

MORE

the past. It is not a proper thing to do -- it is not a proper thing for me to ask any other country to rely upon statements or disclosures made by officials of the United States without the verification of those statements and I most certainly would be very derelict in my duty to my country, and so would every man at this table, if he put the safety of his country upon unverified statements made by nationals of other countries.

That is the situation. Those are the actual facts which we face and we must face them boldly and clearly and not be led away by some slogan which says, well we could agree to do all of this and check up on it later. We cannot do that, gentlemen. We must start at the very outset with knowledge of what is going on and it is only with that knowledge that we can be true to our own duties to our own countries and embark upon this program which holds hazards for all of us, and yet which I believe holds the greatest promises for the future. But it must be done on the basis of knowledge and not on the basis of mere faith in the words of officials of another country.

Now, that is the first element. The first element is disclosure and verification and the verification, as I have said, is the more important of those two.

The second essential element of this program of disclosure and verification is that it must apply to all arms and all armaments, all armed forces and all armaments. It cannot merely apply to what some nation wishes to describe as its armed forces.

For instance, let us take a mythical country which we call country "X". Suppose that country says that its armed forces are in the neighborhood of four million people, four million men. We believe that the so-called regular armies are somewhere in that neighborhood, perhaps we believe they are a little greater. But suppose we also have reason to believe that there are between half a million and a million people who are called either security police or border guards or customs officials and that these additional men are organized into military units; they have their own artillery; they have their own tanks; they have their own supplies; they have their own general staffs. Suppose it is an organization not unlike some of the organizations which existed in Germany prior to World War II. Are we expected to take the word of country "X" that its armed forces are only these four million people, which they classify as their regular forces and that this other group, whether it be half a million, a million, or a million and a half, are not armed forces at all? That those are just security police and they must be excluded from any system of disclosure and verification? Such an attitude, of course, is impossible.

We are not the least interested in what a country calls its armed men. It may call them an army, or a navy, or an air force, or it may call them security police or customs guards or border guards. We don't care. All of us are entitled to know how many such people there are, whatever name they go by, what their armaments are and where they are deployed.

MORE

ACHESON

-6-

That is what we call the system of verification and disclosure, and it must include everything.

Also this system of verification and disclosure is, as I have said, a difficult matter. It involves some matters which are very secret. It involves other matters which are not so secret. How do we propose to proceed? We propose to proceed by stages. We propose to proceed by taking, making disclosures and having verifications of those things which are less secret, what I called the other day in my speech, somewhat to the amusement of some in this room, those things which are less sensitive.

Now, what do I mean by least secret or least sensitive? It does very little good to joke about the word. The point is what is the basic element of this thought in this proposal.

It again has to do with the security of national states. There are some things which if disclosed will be a great deal more dangerous to the security of the state than other things. All of us know that. Everybody around this table knows that. Therefore, in starting on a program which is new, starting on a program which involves, even with all the verification in the world, a considerable element of faith, we must start with those things which if disclosed and verified will be less dangerous to the security of the national states than those things which will be most dangerous. Because we have only hope and faith to assure us that this whole system will in effect actually work and that nations, all nations, necessary to make it work will in good faith make the disclosures and in good faith permit the inspection.

It is for that reason and that absolutely sound and essential reason that we must start with those things which are less secret, those things which if disclosed are less damaging to the security of the national state and then proceed, after there has been a demonstration that the system can and will work and is working, to matters which are more secret and more damaging to the security of the national state if disclosed.

We think, therefore, that in the early stages, in the beginning of this matter of disclosure and verification, we should disclose and verify first of all all types of the armed forces of a nation, including the paramilitary, the security and police forces, and the organized reserve components of these forces together with the conventional arms and armaments which they have. By conventional I mean the least secret, the least damaging if disclosed. We believe that concurrently with that disclosure and verification there are certain parts of the atomic field which can also be disclosed and verified.

I need not dwell at great length upon that matter because in the Atomic Energy Commission many of you are very familiar with those discussions -- you know perfectly well that if one says lightly why doesn't a nation disclose how many atomic bombs it has, there is no disclosure in any such figure that might be given. The Atomic Energy Commission has made it plain over and over and over again that

ACHESON

-7-

it is not the energy which one has contained in a fabricated bomb which is the important thing. What is the important thing is the amount of fissionable material which has been produced and is being currently produced. That is the measure of atomic armament and not what has been put into a bomb. Therefore, if there is going to be disclosure in the atomic field, as in the other fields, it must begin with those things which are least secret and damaging to the security of the state and proceed to those things which are more secret. This has been gone over and over again in the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, so that you know, as well as I do, that in order to get an ultimate disclosure of these essential facts, one must begin with the raw materials and work on through the stages of disclosing the plants and the capacities of the plants to the finished matter of the material itself.

After these early stages of disclosure and verification have been completed in the least secret fields, then we would propose the disclosure and verification of more secret fields and these more secret fields include atomic energy weapons. Of course, they do; they also include all other weapons which are of a highly secret nature and your scientific and military advisors can tell you that there are many such. It is not merely a matter of atomic energy alone.

I wish to stress and say as vigorously as I can that the proposals of the United States do include in stages disclosure and verification of atomic armaments. That again is a change in the position of the United States. Before, we had taken the position that there could be no disclosure until the whole system of control had been set up. We are now changing our position and we are changing it in the hope that that change may enable the United Nations-- through this Committee and through this effort in conjunction with British and French delegations-- may enable us to make progress, successful progress toward a reduction in armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the disclosure and verification of all armaments of all sorts.

Now, there has been the suggestion made that the proposal that this should be done in stages instead of one great burst of disclosure contains some trick. It has been suggested that the United States would find some reason never to go on and get to an important part of disclosure in the atomic or secret weapon field. It has been suggested that those who control -- I think that was the phrase-- those in control of a commission would prevent in some way this happening. Now, if that is an attack upon the good faith of the three powers putting forward the proposal or if it is an attack upon the good faith of any future commission, that of course is a very serious thing indeed and that may indicate that there is not a sufficient basis of international trust even to set up a system of disarmament. I hope that that is not what is meant. I hope that the statement that this was a trick was made merely in a forensic way of saying that the proposals were not clear in certain respects and it is in the belief that that is the way in which it was meant that I am giving this explanation.

ACHESON

-8-

One provision that could be put in any international agreement which would prevent any such fear, I believe, would be that the progression from one stage to another should be an administrative matter within the control of the Commission controlling and administering the disarmament agreement. In other words, it should not be a political decision to be made by states with reserve power in the states to make that decision. But, the agreement should be contained in the document itself that when the Commission is satisfied that a stage has been successfully completed, then as an administrative decision the Commission should proceed to the next step. That, perhaps in part, would meet the difficulty which has been suggested.

Another obvious suggestion is that no Commission which is charged with the administration of something as vital to the security of every nation seated around this table as reduction of armaments, should be controlled by any nation, whether that nation is the Soviet Union, or the United States, or Great Britain, or France -- or any nation that you speak of. There should not be such a control, and, of course, none of you would agree to such control and none of us would ask for it.

Therefore, I think that this matter of stages does not contain a trick. It is a matter which can be successfully handled by a Commission clothed with appropriate powers, and it is absolutely essential, as I have said before, in beginning a vast undertaking of the magnitude that we are proposing that it should proceed with an accumulation of trust and confidence, so that when we reach the point that nations are asked to make disclosures which vitally prejudice their national security, they may have some background of successful operation of the system against which they can rely and against which they can say to their people -- this international system is actually working. Therefore, when we make a disclosure which does prejudice the security of our country, we are doing it because we are entitled to have faith that this system having worked successfully so far, will work more successfully in the future. And, we are all making these sacrifices of our national security in the great common interest of preventing the catastrophe of a war which would destroy us all.

Now, the next important element in this matter of disclosure and verification, is the establishment of an international inspection staff. The form of this inspection must be international. No one can or should rely on the nationals of a country performing the inspection in their own country. If there is to be faith that this inspection is a sound one and that the results of it can be relied upon, there must be no question of nationals of a country inspecting in their own country. That is vital and fundamental. The inspection staff must have the power and authority to find true facts. It cannot be limited to verifying any statement which has been put in or to inspecting declared plans only. Its duty must be to find the true facts and it must be able to go anywhere it has to go and look at whatever it has to look at. Therefore, there must be no limitations of any sort, both as to papers or areas, in which it may go.

MORE
1298

ACHESON

-9-

Now, this is fundamental and I think common sense to all of us here.

Most of us are familiar with the operation of the system of bank examiners which is pretty much the same in all of our countries. It would utterly absurd to set up a system of bank examination where the bank examiners were allowed to look only at the statement of the bank and only at certain boxes in the vault. You would be 100% certain that such a system of bank examination would disclose nothing whatsoever. Because, if there are any irregularities in a bank either by the company itself or by employees of the company, you may be sure that those irregularities are not going to be disclosed in the statement of the bank and not disclosed in certain identifiable places into which the examiners are restricted. If there are irregularities in a bank, the only way they can be discovered is by only the most searching examination of the bank's affairs.

Similarly, in this vitally important field of arms reduction, inspectors must be free to do what inspecting they think is necessary to determine whether the tally sheets -- whether the disclosures made by the country are complete, and whether they have covered everything within the categories to be disclosed; and, if not, then the inspectors must make the disclosures themselves. They cannot content themselves by saying this is not complete; but must say that this disclosure is not correct and here are the correct facts or the complete facts.

Then we come to the second matter in the proposal. That is the matter of the reduction and the limitation of armed forces. So far we have been discussing disclosure and verification. Disclosure and verification, as I shall come to say in a moment, is something which might be dealt with first while the rest of the proposals are being worked out by the Commission.

But, the second thing, the matter of the reduction of armed forces, again involves certain elements. Here also the reduction of all armed forces must apply to all forces, not merely to certain named categories. The same examination which I gave in the matter of disclosure and verification is due here. We cannot permit an agreement to be made which says that only regular armed forces shall be reduced or limited, and forces known as security police or border guards are not limited. They must all be included in the verification and limitation.

The second essential fact is that all countries which have any kind of substantial military or paramilitary establishment must fall within the system. It will not do to provide a system of reduction or limitation of armed forces which applies only to the so-called Big Five. There are just too many countries which have substantial military establishments to make that possible. This agreement must therefore be open to all countries and it must be entered into by all countries which have substantial military forces.

Now, how do we go about getting a reduction and a limitation of armed forces?

MORE
1298

ACHESON

- 10 -

This has been one of the thorniest problems which has confronted international bodies for the past fifty years or more. And, therefore, one of the things which we suggest in the tripartite resolution is that the Commission shall be directed to find, if that is possible, -- and we believe it is possible -- some criteria of general application which can be simply stated and understood by everybody and which can form the basis upon which the agreement shall be worked out as to the limitation of forces and the point to which they shall be reduced.

Now, we understand perfectly well that there is no formula, no matter how intricately and well one works, which can be applied to every country and bring about the magic solution. Therefore, whatever criteria are developed are general guides and the final solution must be by agreement specifically directed to the forces of each country. But, there are some criteria which we believe will reduce the solution to manageable proportions. Without such criteria one only gets into a bargaining or horse-trading position. That is a very difficult position from which to proceed.

In the past and at the present time all sorts of factors have been mentioned which bear upon the armed forces which a nation might legitimately have -- factors such as the geographical position, the area of the country, the nature of the terrain, the length of its sea coasts and borders, whether its frontiers are protected by natural barriers, and the size of its population, and the amount of natural resources, communications system, and size of industrial plants.

Now, as you see, when you begin dealing with vast factors of that sort, one results only in utter confusion. Therefore, the task is to find some criterion which has a certain general application and from which one can make specific agreements as to specific countries.

Now, in searching for the criterion, I think that we must have in mind that this is not an abstract exercise. This is not an exercise in which we ask people to be very subtle and very complex and to juggle a lot of things around and come out with a formula.

What do we have to do? First, we must look at the nature of the evil we are trying to correct and then get some criterion which will be applicable to correction of that evil. What are we worried about? What we are worried about is that large and powerful countries and their associates may so increase their armaments and armed forces that other countries will believe that aggression is threatened and then they increase their armaments and armed forces; and, in turn there is another increase. So, there is this rise in the armed forces and armaments of the various countries and an increase -- a dangerous increase in tension. That is what we are trying to deal with.

MORE
1298

ACHESON

-11-

Therefore, how do you try to deal with it? An important way to deal with it is to say what we are trying to achieve here, that is, an agreement which will restrict the forces of certain countries to what is adequate for their defense and no more. Because, if the forces are adequate for defense only there is real assurance that they are not designed and intended for aggression.

Therefore, what sort of criteria are we looking for? One not directed against the small country which is not doing any great harm in the world; but against large countries which may be raising this danger of aggression. The possibility of trouble breaking out between smaller countries is a serious one, but not to be dealt with in this way. It must be dealt with in another way. What we are now dealing with is a limitation of arms of those great countries or groupings of countries which may increase the tension.

How does one go about that? It is clear that a criterion may have some relation to population. That is clear because a great country has a great many people and therefore can afford and will have a greater army than another country. Therefore, what does population have to do with it? It may have this: There will have to be a flat limitation beyond which no country is permitted to go, no matter how vast its population is. It may be that this Committee or the Commission will find some flat limitation. Very well, that is a possible relation to population. It may be, that in regard to other countries there can be some sort of proportion to population. That will be difficult because anyone of us here can readily think of countries which are vast in territorial extent but small in population. On the other hand, one can think of countries small in area and very large in population. Therefore, the question of population is not an automatic rule at all. But it may be a help, a guide.

Therefore, there is one field in which one can search for a criterion, and that is the relation of population to the problem.

In the three-power resolution there is no reference to individual criteria. There is no reference of what I am now talking about -- some possible relation of population to criteria. We have left it out because it seemed improper at this stage of the discussion to ask this Committee to commit itself to any criteria. The Committee should now consider, I believe, the possibility of finding some basis for the discussion of this problem. Therefore, in its debates and discussions it should indicate to the Commission, which we hope will be established the direction in which to look.

Now, may I add something else. One does not solve the problem of the numbers of armed forces even if one establishes a criterion which has some relation to population, because there always will be ingenious people who try to get around whatever rule is set up. All of you will remember that under the Treaty of Versailles there was a limit put upon the German army. It was set at 100,000 men and ingeniously that number of 100,000 men was revolved so that there were an increasing number of people who went into a trained reserve and thus the limitation was gotten around. So, it is not enough to say that the armed forces be limited to a certain number. And that is another area in which some criterion must be developed.

MRE
1298

ACHESON

-12-

In another field also there is a possibility of devising a criterion. That is in the amount of the national products which should go into armed forces and armaments. Here again we are considering the nature of the evil and the nature of the remedy.

Why do we suggest that the national product has something to do with it? It has something to do with it because great countries have much larger national products than small ones, and, therefore, the great country may put so much of its resources into armaments that all the rest of the world is dragged along and made to do the same thing.

Therefore, what we are seeking is a criterion which in some way will restrain countries having vast resources to put only a certain amount into defense and not cause the rest of the world to follow in this trend. One of the great problems before World War II was the degree to which Germany and Japan poured their national products into armaments. They were building up such reserves of war materiel that the security of the rest of the world became dangerously undermined and led to the disaster of World War II. It is that which we are trying to prevent.

In the area of national product, we believe that some kind of ceiling must be proposed in terms of critical materials -- steel, aluminum, etc. -- which may limit to the amount necessary for defense that proportion of the national product which goes into armed forces and armaments. Again, it is a very difficult matter because one must draw a line between a sensible limitation here and interference with every kind of industrial activity of a whole nation. That would be untenable and no one would suggest that.

But there are undoubtedly some criteria in this field which will give assurance that no more than a necessary amount of certain important materials of the national product are going into armaments and armed forces.

Then there is a very important additional matter. I think the Commission, when it studies this matter, will discover that even though it evolves limitations on the number of people which go into the armed forces of each one of the countries sitting around this table -- even though it evolves the limitation of national products which go into this field -- there is still something left open. That something is: how this is used within the armed forces. There will always be ingenious people who will try to evade any kind of system. It has happened in the past and will happen in the future. Therefore, I believe it will be necessary to have limitation on the number of people, and, in addition, in the amount of materiel which each of us may put into our armed forces; there also must be agreement on the nature of these armed forces. In other words, we cannot leave this to a system of chance in which a group of nations might get together and say: "Very well, we have agreed not to have more than so many men and so much materiel in our armed forces. How can we use this so we can be quite a menace to the rest of the world? Shall we do this by putting it all in long-range bombers? Or, all of it in a highly mobile armored outfit? Shall we put all of it into submarines?"

MORE
1298

ACHESON

-13-

That should not be permitted. Therefore, when the limitations have been evolved, each nation should be required to submit what it proposes to do with it so that it is subject to international scrutiny. So, that if a trick is about to be developed by any group, the rest of the nations can say: "No, you cannot do that. That is not necessary for your defense. We object to that, and, therefore, it cannot be a mutually agreed upon program." What we mean by that is a scrutiny under the aegis of the Commission of what is proposed to be done, and that agreement is in accordance with the purposes of the treaty.

So much for the reduction and limitation of armaments. The proposal also involves the prohibition of the atomic bomb. And I think there should be no question and no doubt about that. The resolution which you have before you, introduced by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, begins by saying:

"Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war, and to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,

"Believing that the necessary means to this end is the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and coordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction to levels adequate for defense but not for aggression of all armed forces and all armaments, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,"

and further on:

"3. Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. The Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

"(a) It is a primary objective of the United Nations to bring about the limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments to levels adequate for defense but not for aggression and to achieve effective international control to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons."

Now, that is a flat, direct, and clear statement. That is the purpose and should be the result of the efforts of the Commission proposed in this resolution to prohibit atomic weapons.

There has been in speeches before the General Assembly, a statement made that the plan -- the majority plan of the United Nations -- and the various proposals and plans of the United States have not had for their purpose the

MORE
1298

ACHESON

-14-

abolition of atomic weapons -- the prohibition of atomic weapons. That statement is wholly untrue and therefore I shall spend only a few moments here in demonstrating that that is the case. I should like briefly to go over the various statements and proposals which have been made to indicate as clearly as I can both the attitude of the United States and the attitude of the United Nations.

We begin with the statement which was made by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada and by the President of the United States on November 15, 1945. That, you will remember, was a proposal which was to be made to the United Nations to set up the Atomic Energy Commission. It said that the Commission would be expected to make specific proposals -- a, b, c, and d. Proposal "c" was: "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." That was the statement made by the three heads of governments. It is a statement which later on was joined in by Generalissimo Stalin on behalf of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I think we may assume that statement of policy that there should be the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. That is the first statement on this subject, the lead being taken in this case by Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. It was joined in by the Soviet Union and it was laid before the United Nations and the United Nations established the Atomic Energy Commission for the purposes outlined in the Declaration.

The next document that I should like to refer to is a letter of my own which has been the subject of gross misrepresentation. The Secretary of State directed that a Commission should study the practical methods for bringing about the elimination from armaments of the atomic weapon. I was made the Chairman of that Commission and we made our report to the President in March, 1946. At that time I wrote a letter which has been much misquoted. That letter transmitted our report and pointed out certain things about it. It has been said that in this letter I stated that the plan did not require the United States to discontinue the use of atomic weapons. I should like to read you what I said and I shall not after that characterize the misrepresentation of my remarks, but I shall leave that to you. What has been quoted from my remarks are the following:

".....The plan does not require that the United States shall discontinue such manufacture (of atomic weapons) either upon the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency. At some stage in the development of the plan this is required. But neither the plan nor our transmittal of it should be construed as meaning that this should or should not be done at the outset or at any specific time. That decision, whenever made, will involve considerations of the highest policy affecting our security, and must be made by our government under its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of the world situation."

MORE
1298

ACHESON

-15-

I think it is plain as any words can be that what my letter of transmittal said was that if the United States enters into an agreement embodying this plan, the time will come when atomic weapons cannot be manufactured and are prohibited. But, my transmittal of this proposal does not mean that the United States should unilaterally do that, nor the United Nations members must unilaterally do it.

Following that proposal, the plan which the Commission of which I was the Chairman worked upon, was turned over to other authorities in the government for the purpose of making certain proposals to the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations. These proposals were made by Mr. Baruch on June 14, 1946. Mr. Baruch said the following before this Commission:

"When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon has been agreed upon and put into effective operation, and condign punishment set up for the violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that:

- "1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
- "2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty; and
- "3. The Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy."

That is the proposal of the United States in 1946 and it involves, as you see, that the manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop when you have an effective system for assuring that it shall stop, and existing arms shall be disposed of in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

On July 2, 1946 another memorandum was presented by the United States, and according to this memorandum the treaty itself should set out certain specific provisions. The fourth of those provisions was this:

"A provision specifying the time when and the conditions under which national and private possession, manufacture and use of atomic weapons shall be outlawed. "

That was on the 2nd of July. Shortly after that the United States submitted provisions for a suggested Charter to the Atomic Development Authority, and it said that the Charter should contain the following purposes:

MORE
1298

ACHESON

-15A-

"1) To prevent possession, manufacture, or use of atomic weapons for mass destruction."

That is the record of the United States in this matter.

In 1948 the majority plan of the United Nations was put forward. It has been stated that that plan did not provide for the abolition of atomic weapons. Nothing could be further from the fact. The summary of that plan which is published by the United Nations in a document entitled: "Atomic Energy Commission Official Records, Third Year, Special Supplement", contains the official summary of the majority plan. On page 17 of the document, the official summary states:

"As an integral part of such a comprehensive system for control, the treaty would:

"1. Prohibit the manufacture, possession, and use of atomic weapons by all nations being a party thereto and by all persons under their jurisdiction.

"2. Provide for the disposal of any existing stocks of atomic weapons and for the proper use of nuclear fuel adaptable in weapons."

That is the United Nations statement of the proposals of its own majority report.

MORE
1298

ACHESON

-16-

Finally, in 1949, as a result of General Assembly action, the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission were asked to meet and consider what would be done to bring about the effective control of atomic energy. It was within that report that the six permanent members stated, as I said earlier, that it was of no use going forward in the Atomic Energy Commission, that this discussion would have to be conducted in a wider frame. They repeated that the majority of the commission had attempted to bring about the prohibition of atomic weapons, and they say the following:

In their view, the Soviet proposals would not only fail to provide the security required but they would be so inadequate as to be dangerous. They would delude the people of the world into thinking that atomic energy was being controlled when in fact it was not. On the other hand, under the approved plan the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons would rest not only on the pledge of each nation but no nation would be permitted to possess the means with which weapons could be made. Furthermore, the government of the Soviet Union took an improbable stand as regards the question of timing or stages by which prohibition and control could be brought into effect.

Now, I go into this recitation of past history because what I wish to say is that not only did the United States proposals provide for the prohibition of the atomic bomb, but the United Nations proposals did so also, and the proposals which are before this committee now also make that provision. I wish to prove what I have said is correct and not rely upon any forensic distortions of the record to make what I say appear to be true. It is true. It is true that the United States proposals have from the start attempted to bring about the prohibition of the atomic bomb. It is true that the proposals of the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations did the same thing. It is true that the proposals made by the three powers here today are to bring about the prohibition of the atomic weapon. Those are facts.

We have talked about verification and disclosure. We have talked about reduction and limitation of armed forces. We have discussed the prohibition of the atomic weapon, all of which are contained in these proposals. It remains to speak briefly about the necessity for safeguards.

Many of the observations which I made in connection with inspection under verification and the verification of the disclosures is true here. The same principles apply. The same principles that these safeguards require the inspection of men who are nationals of countries other than the one being inspected. It requires also that all nations must come into this agreement and that the inspection must take place in every nation. It is true also that this must be done through and by the United Nations. It is a United Nations function and it can be done best by and under the aegis of the United Nations.

MORE

ACHESON

-17-

I shall not repeat all the things that I have said under the heading of verification, but they are all of the most vital importance and we go back again to one idea with which I began and which must run all through our discussion, that is, that we are dealing with matters of the most vital importance to our national security.

We cannot, therefore, rely on promises. That is not to disparage a promise, but it is to say that we can not rely upon anything except the knowledge of fact. Therefore, if we put into effect, all of us put into effect, a system of reduction and limitation of armaments we must have safeguards. We must know that this is being done in every country. We must know if any country violates what it is supposed to do because we will be required to take immediate steps either to bring about a correction of the transgression or to look to our own security. Therefore, this matter of safeguards is absolutely essential and is basic, fundamental in any proposal which we would support.

Well, how, then can these proposals be worked out and put into effect? On this there may be many ideas and the views of my own government and its representatives here are very flexible, indeed, and will be very influenced by the discussion and the ideas of other members of this Committee.

The Commission which is spoken of in these proposals will have, of course, the same main elements of its work that we have already been discussing. It will have to work out provisions for disclosure and verification. It will have to work out provisions for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons. It will have to work out criteria or provisions for limiting armed forces and armaments, attaching schedules and details of that. It will have to work out provisions for a continuing international agency for the supervision of the work which it will have established.

There are two main ways in which the commission might conceive of its task and either one of these ways would be wholly agreeable to the United States. One way might be to say that the Commission might say let us put our energies first upon the establishment of a system of disclosure and inspection, disclosure and verification. Let us get that work out and let us get that into operation and that in turn will greatly help the subsequent steps of limitation and prohibition of atomic weapons.

That is one way the Commission might go about it. Or the Commission might say it is better to do all of this at one time, that is, to work out the system for inspection, disclosure, work out the system for reduction of armaments, work out the system for the prohibition of atomic weapons and work out the continuing safeguards--do that all at once in a series of treaties, perhaps, and then ask the nations to act upon them all at the same time.

That might be the way to do it. As I say, it is satisfactory to the United States to do it either way.

MORE

ACHESON

-18-

In some ways it seems preferable to put into effect the system of disclosure and verification first, but that is a matter in which we will adjust our views to the views of others.

When the Commission has reached its conclusions on this and when it has formulated proposals which could be put into treaties of this sort, then we contemplate that the United Nations would call a conference or conferences of all nations who would be involved in this matter -- all of them -- to consider the proposals elaborated by the Commission. All nations must be in. There can not be any nations with important military establishments which are left out because the system will not work if that is so. It would be, in our judgment, quite futile to call a conference of some 50, 60, 70, 80 nations with no proposals of any sort elaborated for their consideration. That would just create a tower of Babel. Nothing would be accomplished.

If this Commission will go ahead painstakingly and work out proposals then these can be considered either seriatim or altogether, so that the nations involved with the proposals before them can sit down in a conference and work out treaties to put these into effect.

Quite clearly that conference will have to establish, perhaps, a series of bodies. It will certainly have to establish one continuing international body to carry on the various inspections and provide the safeguards and also to continually review the agreements which have been reached on the limitation of armaments. Some of these agreements may turn out in practice to be wrong one way or another. They may turn out to be too large or too small and there should be some machinery for the adjustment of this matter upon proper showing.

One such body will be necessary. It may be that several will be necessary. Perhaps one to conduct the verification of the disclosures and another to supervise the reduction of armaments or perhaps those two could ultimately become one. But, that is the method by which this would be put into effect.

Now, what is the relation between these proposals and other events which go on in the world? There is, of course, a very close relation.

It is quite clear, for instance, that there can be no system, no general treaty for the reduction of armaments can go on and be put into effect while fighting is going on, for instance, in Korea. It is utterly absurd to think that it makes any sense for nations to be saying well we must reduce our armaments when we are trying to conduct this resistance to aggression in Korea. It is quite obvious that no plan can be put into effect while that situation continues, but perhaps that is not a practical difficulty because we are all hopeful that that fighting will be over much sooner than any of these difficult questions can be worked out. But, that would be fundamental.

MORE

ACHESON

-19-

There is a relation between putting into operation some of these matters and the solution of other problems. That is obvious. Any sensible man must see that. There is no reason in the world why we can not begin at once to work out all these treaties and all these proposals. There is no reason if actual fighting can be stopped why the system of disclosure and verification cannot be put into effect. When it comes to reducing armaments, there must obviously be some connection between the solution of great problems, the reduction of tensions and the reduction of armaments.

That does not mean that we are suggesting that there are any unexpressed conditions that this problem or that problem or some other problem must be solved before this goes into effect. But, it is saying that if we are honest, if we are stating what is true and if we are not making slogans or not making propaganda we will say that if, at the time this system of reduction of armaments is worked out, we are in a period of highly mounting tensions and additional frictions throughout the world; it is highly unlikely that nations would enter into a system of armaments reduction.

On the other hand, the very working out of such a system, the very working out and implementation of disclosure and verification will in itself help to reduce these tensions and help us to find solutions for problems which now seem very difficult to us.

So what I say is, in candor and in honesty we must say that there is a direct relation between the ability to put into effect a system of disarmament and the international temperature. If the international temperature is approaching the boiling point, few things are possible. If it has reduced so that solutions of problems are on the way and are quite possible, then disarmament becomes a wholly different thing so far as the immediate future is concerned.

I believe, my country believes, our delegation believes that the inauguration of such a system will in and of itself, as I said at the outset of my remarks, furnish a turning point in history, a point from which the world can turn away from tension and the danger of war and turn toward cooperation for the establishment of peace.

Gentlemen, I have taken perhaps too much of your time to outline these proposals. I wish to say to you in concluding that these proposals are not ends in themselves. There is no magic in them which by itself can solve the troubles of this very grievously stricken world. They are proposals which may be a key to solutions in the future. They are proposals which in my estimation open up a broad highway along which we can all march together to find solutions to our problems, to reduce the tensions and difficulties between us, to move toward peace, toward cooperation and away from the very dangerous rapids which all of us can see before us. We can follow that broad, clear path, or we can turn aside into the dark and noisesome alleys of propaganda and bickering and assertion

MORE

ACHESON

-20-

and counter-assertions. We can fritter away the hope of the world. We can fritter it away into little small advantages that are taken of one another here and there for minor and really silly purposes. Or we can seize this great opportunity before us. My country is willing to seize it. Our colleagues in France and Great Britain are willing to seize it with us. I believe that around this table there are scores of delegates who are willing to seize it.also. The great question is are all of us ready to do this? Are there enough of us to seize this opportunity, to turn from the dangers of the world into a path of peace? That is what this debate will disclose.

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LIMITED

A/L.25
12 January 1952

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Sixth session
Agenda items 66 and 16Dual DistributionREGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL
ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS; INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGYResolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 358th
plenary meeting on 11 January 1952(adopted on the report of the First Committee (A/2025))The General Assembly,

Moved by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war,

Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world this burden and this fear, and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,

Reaffirming its desire that the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,

Believing that a necessary means to this end is the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

Recognizing that a genuine system for disarmament must include all kinds of armed forces and armaments, must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system, and must include safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all such nations,

P/52-198

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A/L.25

A/L.25
Page 2

Noting the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve established by resolution 496 (V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments,

1. Establishes under the Security Council a Disarmament Commission. This Commission shall have the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and shall function under the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission with such modifications as the Commission shall deem necessary;

2. Dissolves the Atomic Energy Commission and recommends to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

3. Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces - including para-military, security and police forces - and all armaments including atomic;

(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established;

(c) The Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

(d) There must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament programme, so as to provide for the prompt detection of

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violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country;

(e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all States for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what States must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force;

4. Directs the Commission, when preparing the proposals referred to in the preceding paragraph, to formulate plans for the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty (or treaties). The functions and powers of the control organ (or organs) shall be defined in the treaty which establishes it;

5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the out-set plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution;

6. Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;

(a) To determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the over-all limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments;

7. Directs the Commission to commence its work not later than thirty days from the adoption of the present resolution and to report periodically, for information, to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, or to the Members of the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission shall submit its first report not later than 1 June 1952;

/8. Declares

A/L.25
Page 4

8. Declares that a conference of all States should be convened to consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Commission as soon as the work of the Commission shall have progressed to a point where in the judgment of the Commission any part of its programme is ready for submission to governments;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to convene such a conference when so advised by the Commission;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff and facilities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes of the present resolution.

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UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

GENERAL

A/2068

18 January 1952

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

Sixth session
Agenda item 67Dual DistributionMEASURES TO COMBAT THE THREAT OF A NEW WORLD WAR
AND TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG THE NATIONSUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft resolution

1. The General Assembly declares participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the creation by certain States, and primarily by the United States of America, of military, naval and air bases in foreign territories incompatible with membership of the United Nations.

2. The General Assembly recognizes it to be essential that:

(a) The countries taking part in the Korean war should immediately end military operations, conclude an armistice and withdraw their forces from the 38th parallel within a period of ten days;

(b) All foreign troops and also foreign volunteer units should be withdrawn from Korea within a period of three months.

3. The General Assembly, considering the use of atomic weapons, as weapons of aggression and of the mass destruction of people, to be at variance with the conscience and honour of peoples and incompatible with membership of the United Nations, proclaims the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, it being understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control shall be put into effect simultaneously.

The General Assembly instructs the Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit to the Security Council not later than 1 June 1952, for its consideration, a draft convention providing measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use of already-manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the above-mentioned convention.

A/2060

Page 2

4. The General Assembly recommends the permanent members of the Security Council -- the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- to reduce the armaments and armed forces in their possession at the time of the adoption of this recommendation by one-third during a period of one year from the date of its adoption.

5. The General Assembly recommends that forthwith, and in any case not later than one month after the adoption by the General Assembly of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers, all States should submit complete official data on the situation of their armaments and armed forces, including data on atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories. These data shall be submitted with reference to the situation obtaining at the time when the above-mentioned decisions are adopted by the General Assembly.

6. The General Assembly recommends the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ, the functions of which shall be to supervise the implementation of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to verify the data submitted by States regarding the situation of their armaments and armed forces.

With a view to the establishment of an appropriate system of guarantees for the observance of the General Assembly's decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments, the international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis; but it shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

7. The General Assembly calls upon the governments of all States, both Members of the United Nations and those not at present in the Organization, to consider at a world conference the question of the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also the question of practical measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control over the observance of such prohibition.

The General Assembly recommends that the above-mentioned world conference should be convened at the earliest possible date and in any case not later than 15 July 1952.

8. The General Assembly calls upon the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union to conclude a peace pact, and to combine their efforts for the achievement of this high and noble aim.

The General Assembly also calls upon all other peace-loving States to join in the peace pact.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



LIMITED

A/L.57
21 January 1952

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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Sixth session
Agenda item 67

MEASURES TO COMBAT THE THREAT OF A NEW WORLD WAR
AND TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG THE NATIONS

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 363rd
plenary meeting on 19 January 1952

[adopted on the report of the First Committee (A/2067)]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution adopted at its 358th plenary meeting on 11 January 1952^{1/}, which established a Disarmament Commission and authorized it to consider all proposals designed to achieve the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, including effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons,

1. Decides to refer to the Disarmament Commission the proposals contained in paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive of document A/C.1/698, together with any other proposals which may be made during the present session of the General Assembly on matters falling within the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission;
2. Decides also to transmit to the Disarmament Commission for its information the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which this item was discussed.

^{1/} Document A/L.25.

B



UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION



GENERAL

DC/6

28 March 1952

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: FRENCH

PROGRAMME OF WORK ADOPTED BY THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AT ITS EIGHTH MEETING ON 28 MARCH 1952

- A. Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments, and of all armed forces.
- B. Regulation of all armaments and armed forces, including:
 - 1. Elimination of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy with a view to ensuring their elimination;
 - 2. Elimination of weapons of mass destruction and control with a view to ensuring their elimination;
 - 3. Limitation and balanced reduction of all other armaments and of all armed forces, and control of this limitation and reduction.
- C. Procedure and timetable for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

Points A and B to be studied concurrently in the first stage of the Commission's work.

IDC

UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION



GENERAL

DC/C.2/1
5 April 1952

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Committee 2

WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNITED STATES ON 5 APRIL 1952

Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and
Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments

INTRODUCTION

The General Assembly resolution calling for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments directs that the Commission be guided by a number of principles, including the following:

(Operative paragraph 3)

"(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces - including para-military, security and police forces - and all armaments including atomic;

"(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established."

Operative paragraph 5 of the resolution reads as follows:

"5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution".

It is therefore apparent that the General Assembly resolution contemplates that the newly created Disarmament Commission should as a matter of priority deal with the problem of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments.

DC/C.2/1
Page 2

A. Extent of Disclosure and Verification

1. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing basis. Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one time basis" and subsequent verification of such disclosure would not meet the requirements of a continuing programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces. Therefore it is contemplated that the machinery which will be set up should be on a permanent or at least a long term basis, since the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments will be on a continuing basis.
2. The disclosure must cover all armed forces of every kind including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic.
3. The verification of armed forces and armaments must likewise cover all armed forces of every kind including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic.
4. The permanent machinery to be established must provide adequate safeguard under a competent international authority having appropriate status, rights and powers.

DC/C.2/1
Page 3

B. Stages of Disclosure and Verification

5. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step by step with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step when and only when previous steps have been satisfactorily completed. The reasons for proceeding by stages are two:

(a) In the existing state of international tensions all states must be protected in the event of a serious violation or collapse of the system of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments. The existence of stages gives all states the opportunity over a period of time to test the good faith of all other states. The mere agreement to enter into a system for disclosure and verification would give no assurance that the parties thereto would actually carry it out in full or at all. With disclosure and verification in several stages and with each step of one stage completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, all States have the opportunity at periodic intervals of checking the good faith of other States through review of the information theretofore disclosed.

(b) It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification would proceed from the less secret areas which would be disclosed and verified in early stages to the more secret areas. A phasing of this nature in addition to furnishing the best test of the good faith of all States would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country, since the less sensitive information can in fact be more readily verified, and would, in cases of differences or delays, prevent premature disclosure of information which many States would like reserved until substantial co-operation and good faith has been demonstrated.

6. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the United States had as its objective the full implementation of the programme of disclosure and verification as rapidly as feasible in the light of the existing state of international tensions. An excessive number of stages, each of which must be completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, would unduly delay not only the programme of disclosure and verification but also the entire programme for regulation limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. With this in mind, the United States concluded and is proposing that the number

/of stages

DC/C.2/1
Page 4

of stages of disclosure and verification should be five - a figure which represents the minimum number consistent with the considerations set forth in the previous paragraph. In each stage, the disclosure and verification processes will go forward simultaneously on a wide variety of items in order to accelerate the successful completion of the programme.

7. Annex I sets forth in outline the extent of armed forces and armaments (excluding atomic) to be disclosed in the respective stages and the manner of verification of the information required to be disclosed. Annex II sets forth the same information with respect to atomic armaments. The proposals with respect to atomic weapons are presented in a separate annex solely in the interests of clarity of presentation. Both the problems involved and the appropriate terminology with respect to atomic weapons differ so greatly from the problems and terminology with respect to other weapons that a single annex comprehending both might be confusing. It is contemplated that all stages of disclosure and verification cover both atomic and non-atomic weapons. In other words, the first stage includes the items set forth both in Annex I and in Annex II for disclosure and verification in that stage, and the same is true as to all succeeding stages.

8. Without commenting in detail at this point on the specific items subject to disclosure and verification in the respective stages, it should be noted that the armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the first stage have three general characteristics:

- (a) They should prove to be the least secret items.
- (b) In the main, they are most susceptible of verification by periodic visits of inspection and through reference to statistical records - with the result that verification can take place with the minimum of interference in the internal life of the respective countries. Some resort would nevertheless be required to "on-the-spot" inspection, and aerial reconnaissance would be required in all stages to assist in checking the adequacy of the disclosure.
- (c) At the same time, these items reveal so vast a segment of the military potential of all States that their disclosure and verification as provided in this stage in and of itself would act as an indication of

/good

DC/C.2/1
Page 5

good faith and would thus greatly facilitate progress towards the ultimate goals of the entire programme of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments.

9. The armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the second, third, fourth and fifth stages are progressively more secret and more difficult to verify except through "on-the-spot" investigations in conjunction with extensive aerial reconnaissance.

10. The character of the items to be disclosed and verified in the five stages as outlined in Annexes I and II can in general be summarized as follows:

- Stage I. A quantitative count in the nature of a report on existing strength levels of all armed forces and of the location of installations and facilities concerned with armaments of all types including atomic.
- Stage II. Detailed disclosure of organization of armed forces and of installations and facilities concerned with the basic materials required for production of all armaments including atomic.
- Stage III. Detailed disclosure of armaments (except novel armaments), fissionable material and installations and facilities utilized in their production.
- Stage IV. Detailed disclosure of installations and facilities utilized in the production of novel armaments including atomic (armaments not in general use by the end of the second World War but in volume production today).
- Stage V. Detailed disclosure of novel armaments including atomic.

11. The information to be disclosed and verified in all stages - and particularly in the early stages - is so vast that there appear to be advantages in disclosing material only at the rate at which it can be processed.

Therefore, in general within each stage, disclosure should proceed progressively step by step in accordance with an agreed plan from the less sensitive information to that which is more sensitive.

/s. Inspection

DC/C.2/1
Page 6

C. Inspection

12. The system of disclosure and verification is an integral part of the system of safeguards which must be established to ensure observance of the overall programme of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country. It will not be adequate to provide merely for the verification of disclosed information. In addition, provision must be made for determining the adequacy of the disclosed information, through broad general powers of "on-the-spot" inspection, through access to statistical data permitting independent confirmation of required reports and through aerial surveys.

13. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essential to the verification procedure in order completely to determine the adequacy of disclosed information. It will be obvious that aerial reconnaissance furnishes the easiest method of determining the existence of large undisclosed facilities and installations. Aerial survey will be essential in all stages of the disclosure and verification procedure.

14. It is contemplated that "on-the-spot" inspection will take place in all stages as a part of the verification procedure. Its use, however, will be less extensive in the first than in the later stages because of the greater ease of verification through other methods of the items disclosed in the first stage. It will of course be necessary at each stage to regulate inspection in such a way as to prevent disclosure of information which is to be withheld from disclosure and verification during the particular stage. Certain principles governing limitations on the right of "on-the-spot" inspections in early stages are set forth in Annexes I and II.

15. Each state at the commencement of each stage should submit to the Commission a general description of the nature and location of facilities falling within the terms of reference for that stage. Access to such locations, reasonably sufficient to verify the information disclosed should be granted to inspectors. Inspection in each stage should proceed in accordance with a previously accepted plan.

16. It is essential to an effective system of verification that the international inspectors, in addition to examining declared installations and
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/facilities

facilities be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire national territory in order that the Commission may determine within reasonable limits the accuracy and adequacy of the information disclosed. Accordingly, each State should be required during each stage of the process of disclosure and verification to permit the international inspectors such freedom of movement and to give them access to such installations and facilities, records and data as may reasonably be required, including the right to inspect physical dimensions of all facilities and installations wherever situated.

17. Each state should facilitate the activities of the international inspectors and furnish to them such assistance as they may reasonably require.

18. Procedure should be set up in order to permit a determination by the Commission of the necessity for inspection of any facilities or installations access to which is denied to the inspectors and where in the judgment of the inspectors such inspection is required.

19. The inspectors should report to the Commission any information indicating a major violation of any provisions of the treaties or agreements respecting disclosure and verification. In the event of a Commission determination confirmed by the Security Council, by the affirmative vote of any seven Members of such a major violation during any stage and the failure of the state guilty of violation to repair the same within a reasonable specified period, other states should be free to suspend the operations of the disclosure and verification system.

20. The first stage of disclosure and verification should commence upon (a) the entry into force of the treaties dealing with the programme of disclosure and verification and referred to in operative paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution, and (b) the establishment pursuant to such treaties of international machinery responsible for carrying out the programme of disclosure and verification including the portion of such machinery located within the territory of states adhering to the programme.

21. Disclosure and verification in all stages subsequent to the first stage could commence upon a Commission determination that the previous stage has been satisfactorily completed.

/D. Miscellaneous

DC/C.2/1
Page 8

D. Miscellaneous

22. The United Nations should establish concurrently with and at the time of the adoption of the general principles governing this programme the necessary inspection machinery to ensure effective verification of the armed forces and armaments, including those involving atomic energy, disclosed pursuant to the programme. In establishing this machinery, consideration should be given to its subsequent utilization to supervise the programme for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces. The machinery recommended in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan would presumably be utilized in connexion with the disclosure and verification of armaments involving atomic energy. The problem of appropriate United Nations machinery both for purposes of the system of disclosure and verification and for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments is the subject of a separate study.

23. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification processes with respect to all adhering states should begin simultaneously and should go forward at approximately the same tempo.

24. The draft treaties or agreements bringing into effect the disclosure and verification system should specifically provide for adherence of states in accordance with the principles set forth in paragraph 5 of the Preamble and paragraph 3(e) of the General Assembly Resolution of 11 January 1952, the relevant portions of which are as follows:

Paragraph 5 of Preamble

"Recognizing that a genuine system for disarmament ... must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system ..."

Paragraph 3(e)

"The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all states for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what states must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force."

- /ANNEX I

ANNEX I

Proposed Stages of Disclosure and Verification
Armed Forces and Non-Atomic ArmamentsStage I

- Disclose (a) Over-all manpower strength of regular and reserve military forces and para-military organizations, including training establishments and security and police forces, broken down into each category.
- (b) Location of all operational military installations.
- Verify (a) By examination and cross-checks of central records to include personnel, disbursement, medical and procurement supplemented by access to and spot checks of records at selected installations.
- (b) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations.
- (a) and (b) - inspectors will have access to entire national territory to extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations have been declared. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same extent.

Stage II

- Disclose (a) Organization, composition and disposition of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage I.
- (b) Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.
- Verify (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel, movement of units and administrative support supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
- (b) By cross checks of pertinent statistics and employment records access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to materials used.
- (a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

Stage III

- Disclose (a) Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stages I and II except units equipped with novel weapons.)

/(b) Production

DC/C 2/1
Page 10

- (b) Production facilities for manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stages I and II (excluding novel weapons), giving location, type and capacity.

Verify

- (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table of organization and equipment, and repair and overhaul of equipment supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
 - (b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
- (a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

Stage IV

Disclose

- (a) Information as to equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological warfare and atomic weapons.
- (b) Installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel weapons.

Verify

- (a) By cross checks with Stages I and II and quantitative inspection of units disclosed.
 - (b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
- (a) and (b) by aerial survey as set forth in Stage I.

Stage V

Disclose

- (a) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types.

Verify

- (a) By physical count of stockpiles of finished novel weapons cross checked with information disclosed in Stages I, II, III and IV.

/ANNEX II

ANNEX II

Proposed States of Disclosure and Verification Atomic Armaments

Stage I

- Disclose (a) Location of all installations directly concerned with production of atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power input of each installation. (Excluding weapon storage sites).
- (b) Uses or functions of these installations. This should be confined to a statement giving the input material, the produce material and the process used in each instance.
- Verify (a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations. (Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine through such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations have been declared).
- (b) Uses and functions insofar as revealed by external examination of all structures and unhoused equipment. Detailed interior inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of the plant. (Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial verification of plant use or function).
- (a) and (b) - by aerial survey in all stages for same purposes and to same extent as permitted with armed forces and non-atomic armaments. (See Annex I).

Stage II

- Disclose (a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output, of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with preparation of atomic energy raw or feed materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water and beryllium), from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable material.

/Verify

DC/C.2/1
Page 12

- Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stage I.

Stage III

- Disclose (a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output of all those atomic energy installations, or parts of installations, concerned with the conversion of feed materials to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation of radioactive materials in large quantities.
- (b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on hand or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand or in process.
- (c) General design and operational characteristics of research laboratories involving reactors operating at a power level of 1 MW or more, including amounts of radioactive, or fissionable or fusionable materials produced.

- Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I and II.
- (b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations for production thereof, and appropriate records.
- (c) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by detailed inspection of reactors themselves.

Stage IV

- Disclose (a) Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials.

- Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III.

Stage V

- Disclose (a) Location, numbers and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand. Weapon storage sites.

- Verify (a) By direct inspection. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III and (a) above.

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DISARMAMENT - BOOK II

Introductory Papers

Document Symbol

Suggestions re Problems to be Considered.

"General Views of the U.S. "

RAC (NS) D-1a

U.S. Position on Soviet Proposals for
Prohibition of BW

RAC (NS) D-2a

**I - Armed Forces and
Non-Atomic Armaments**

A. Types, Definition and Lists

(None)

B. Limitation and Allegation

View of US Concerning Determination of Over-all
Limits and Restrictions on all Armed Forces
and All Armaments, Including Atomic Weapons

DAC D-6

Proposals for Numerical Limitation of
Armed Forces

DAC D-8

C. Reduction

(None)

D. Controls, Safeguards and Machinery

The Establishment of International
Control Organs

DAC D-3a

II - Atomic Energy

(None)

III - General Questions

1. Further Research needed.

(None)

2. Timing and Synchronization of Plans.
Procedure and Timetable for Giving Effect to
Disarmament Program

DAC D-7

3. Separability of Elements

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SUGGESTIONS RE PROBLEMS TO BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH ELABORATION
OF COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION
OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS (REFERENCE: RAC (NS) D-1a)

I - Armed Forces and Non-Atomic Armaments - [Bio & Chem]

A - Types of forces, armaments and materials:

1. Armed forces- inclusion of para-military, security and police forces, trained reserves, definition of mass armies;
2. Definition or list of standard armaments;
3. Definition or list of other weapons;
4. Definition or lists of basic materials useable exclusively, primarily or substantially for the manufacture of armaments.

B - Limitation and Allocation of Armed Forces and Armaments:

1. Determination of maximum permitted levels of national armed forces: (Reference: DAC D-6)

(a) Criteria and factors to be considered and relative weight to be given them;

(1) Factors relating to the country- population, size, geographical features, etc.;

(2) Relationship of country to regional and other political groupings;

(3) Defense by metropolitan powers of their non-self-governing and trust territories;

(b) Methods of adjustment of permitted levels to reflect changes in conditions.

2. Determination of maximum permitted levels and kinds of armaments (Reference: DAC D-6)

(a) Criteria

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-2-

(a) Criteria for determining maximum permitted levels of standard armaments-- relationship to permitted levels of armed forces;

(b) Criteria for determining maximum permitted production of standard armaments-- relationship to gross national product-- adjustment for production for permitted export to other countries;

(c) Limitation of army, naval and air bases, facilities and installations.

3. Allocation of armed forces and armaments within permitted national levels.

4. Treatment of non-atomic weapons other than permitted standard weapons.

C. Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments

Determination and synchronization of stages to reach permitted levels.

D. Controls and Safeguards and Enforcement Machinery

1. Disclosure and verification (both a safeguard and a partial precondition to the institution of a control system); (Ref: DC/C.2/1).

2. Nature of other controls-- supervision, management, ownership, destruction;

3. Points in the economy at which controls must be applied-- stages in the processing of essential basic materials and stages in the manufacture of armaments;

(4) Controls

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-3-

4. Controls over international commerce in armaments and in materials used exclusively, primarily or substantially for armaments.

5. International organs for implementation-- nature, composition, size of personnel, location, financing, methods of reaching decisions, relationship to existing US organs; (Ref: DAC-D3a).

6. Determination of what constitutes minor and major violations; methods of reaching decision on violations and punishment; types of punishment to be imposed.

II- Atomic Energy

Reappraisal of UN atomic energy plan to determine possible improvements and degree of flexibility in details. (First, Second and Third Reports of UN AEO).

III- General Questions

1. What further information and research is necessary to provide adequate basis for intelligent resolution of the above problems?

2. How should the elements of the disclosure and verification system, the UN atomic energy plan, and plans for limitation and control in the non-atomic field be synchronized, i.e., what is the desirable time-table and what flexibility is possible in the sequential relationships? (Ref: DAC-7)

3. What segments (if any) of a comprehensive plan can be segregated and put forward in the Disarmament Commission separately at least in general terms in the immediate future? (Ref: DAC D-8)

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CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION
RAC (NS)-D-1a
DAC D-4a
April 11, 1952

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

General Views of the United States Concerning Regulation,
Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments

The attached paper contains the following revisions:

1. Paragraph 4(a) has been rewritten to conform to suggestions made at the first RAC meeting on April 9. The language is now in substantial conformity with that used in the United States proposals to the British and French made last October which have been approved by the President.
2. An additional clause has been added to paragraph 4(b) to make the language conform to that used in the original United States disarmament proposals of last October.
3. The language of paragraph 6 of the Annex has been slightly amended in accordance with suggestions of the Department of Defense.
4. Certain extremely minor word changes have been made.

It is understood that upon informal clearance of this paper by Mr. Nash of the Department of Defense and Mr. Hickerson of the Department of State, it will become a cleared RAC paper to serve as general guidance for the U. S. representative on the Disarmament Commission.

Leonard J. Horwits
Secretary of DAC

General Views of the United States Concerning Regulation,
Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments*

In broad outlines the United States views are as follows:

1. An open and disarmed world.

The ultimate objective of the United States in making proposals for reduction of armed forces and armaments is an open and relatively disarmed world.

By an open world we mean one where all States will have sufficient knowledge of the actions of other States so that successful aggression against another State would be impossible.

By a relatively disarmed world, we mean one where armed forces and armaments are by international agreement reduced to levels:

(a) Necessary for the maintenance of internal order.

(b) Appropriate for individual and collective action in accordance with the United Nations Charter, in such an open and relatively disarmed world.

The first and fundamental step in the attainment of an open world is the establishment of a system for the disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments - which is the subject of specific U. S. proposals.

2. Effective control of atomic energy and elimination of atomic weapons.

The attainment of a relatively disarmed world will require effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for

peaceful

*Note: This paper is intended as general guidance for the U.S. Representative on the Disarmament Commission, and not for submission as a U. S. position in the Commission.

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

peaceful purposes only. To accomplish this aim, the United States will continue to support the UN plan for control of atomic energy unless and until a better or no less effective plan is devised.

3. Effective elimination of weapons capable of mass destruction.

The attainment of a relatively disarmed world will require effective elimination from national armaments of all weapons capable of mass destruction with adequate safeguards to ensure that such elimination will in fact take place.

4. Effective limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all other armaments.

The attainment of a relatively disarmed world will require effective limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all other armaments to those necessary in an open and relatively disarmed world as here defined. This will require all the great powers to reduce materially and some drastically their armed forces and armaments, thus precluding mass armed forces. This should involve a reduction much more comprehensive in its scope than a proposal for a one-third reduction limited to the Great Powers. The first steps towards reduction in armed forces and armaments (other than atomic weapons and weapons adaptable to mass destruction) should be:

(a) Agreement to limit the size of armed forces, including paramilitary and security forces, for each country to an agreed maximum figure beyond which that country cannot go but to which it need not necessarily raise its armed forces. In determining such maximum figures consideration might

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

-3-

might be given to limiting armed forces to a fixed percentage of population. Such agreed maximum figures for the Great Powers and possibly for other States should be radically less than their present armed forces, and within these limits the levels of the armed forces of all States should be calculated in such a manner as to prevent imbalances of power in areas of possible tension.

(b) Agreement that the armaments of the allowed armed forces should be confined to those reasonably required for such armed forces in an open and relatively disarmed world as defined in paragraph 1 above, thus resulting in limitations of armaments comparable to those of armed forces.

Attached as Annex A are certain general principles concerning limitation and reduction heretofore presented to the United Nations, which support and expand the views set forth above.

5. Foolproof safeguards.

While principles relating to the reduction of armed forces and armaments should be considered immediately and, if possible, agreement on principles should be obtained as expeditiously as possible, progress in the implementation of such agreements depends upon the establishment of foolproof safeguards which will ensure that the agreements will in fact be carried out. The most important of those safeguards presently proposed are:

- (a) The progressive and continuing disclosure and verification system, covering all armed forces and all armaments;
- (b) The UN plan for control of atomic energy.

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

ANNEX A

General Principles

1. Any system for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments must embrace all kinds of armed forces, including para-military and security forces, and all armaments, including atomic. General Assembly Resolution A/L.25, 12 January 1952, Preamble paragraph 5 and Operative paragraph 3

2. This system must be accepted by all States whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system. The States falling within this category should be determined in the treaty (or treaties) which put into effect the disarmament system and which should provide that the treaty will not enter into force until these nations are designated therein. General Assembly Resolution A/L.25, 12 January 1952, Preamble paragraph 5, Operative paragraph 3(e)

3. The principal objective of the system for regulation and reduction should be to bring about balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. By "balanced reduction" is meant reduction which (i) applies to all States with substantial military power, not merely to a few great powers, and (ii) which seeks to reduce armed forces and armaments in such manner as to make remote the possibility of successful aggression by any State or grouping of States. General Assembly Resolution A/L.25, 12 January 1952, Preamble paragraphs 4 and 5, Operative paragraph 3; Tripartite Statement, 7 November 1952, paragraph 1

4. Reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments should proceed by progressive stages, with adequate safeguards at each stage to ensure

-2-

ensure that the agreements reached are in fact observed and to provide for the prompt detection of violations, while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each State.

General Assembly Resolution A/L.25, 12 January 1952, Preamble paragraphs 3 and 5, Operative paragraph 3(d)

5. The concepts upon which the system for limitation and reduction is based should be as simple and practicable as possible. Statement by Secretary of State of the U.S., in Political Committee of the General Assembly, 19 November 1951, Department of State Bulletin Vol. XXV, No. 649, December 3, 1951, p. 884

6. Disarmament proposals cannot be considered in isolation, apart from the major international tensions existing in the world. There is an obvious connection between the solution of current major political issues, the reduction of tensions, and the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments. Consequently, concurrently with coming into effect of the disarmament program, the major political issues between the Great Powers should be settled. However, agreement upon plans for a system of limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments should measurably reduce these major political issues and facilitate their solution. Tripartite Statement, 7 November 1951, paragraph 6; Statement by President Truman, 7 November 1951, Department of State Bulletin Vol. XXV, No. 647, November 19, 1951, pp 801-802

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Six Principles Proposed by the United States as the Essential Principles of an Effective Disarmament Program (Submitted to the Disarmament Commission, April 24, 1952).

1. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war by reducing the tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter, impossible as a means of settling disputes between nations.

2. To achieve this goal, all states must cooperate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world,

- (a) in which armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no state will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war, and
- (b) in which no state will be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other states having knowledge of such preparations long before an offending state could start a war.

3. To reach and keep this goal, international agreements must be entered into by which all states would reduce their armed forces to levels, and restrict their armaments to types and quantities, necessary for

- (a) the maintenance of internal security,
- (b) fulfillment of obligations of states to maintain peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

4. Such international agreements must ensure by a comprehensive and coordinated program both

- (a) the progressive reduction of armed forces and permitted armaments to fixed maximum levels, radically less than present levels and balanced throughout the process of reduction, thereby eliminating mass armies and preventing any disequilibrium of power dangerous to peace, and
- (b) the elimination of all instruments adaptable to mass destruction.

5. Such international agreements must provide effective safeguards to ensure that all phases of the disarmament program are carried out. In particular, the elimination of atomic weapons must be accomplished by an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only.

6. Such international agreements must provide an effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic, to achieve the open world in which alone there can be effective disarmament.

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Security Information

RAC (NS) D-2a

(FINAL)

April 10, 1952

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS (RAC)

Analysis of the Question of an American Position Regarding Soviet
Proposals to Draft a Convention "Prohibiting" Bacteriological Warfare

The attached paper, a redraft of RAC (NS) D-2, was cleared at the meeting of RAC on April 9th and is being transmitted to the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission for general guidance.

Leonard J. Horwitz
Secretary

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Security Information

ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTION OF AN ALL-STATE CONVENTION REGARDING SOVIET
PROPOSALS TO DRAFT A CONVENTION "PROHIBITING" BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

The Soviet Union hopes to force consideration in the Disarmament Commission of "the question of violation of the prohibition of bacteriological warfare (BW), the banning of the use of bacteriological weapons and the calling to account those who violate the ban on bacteriological warfare." Regardless of the appropriateness of these questions for consideration by the Disarmament Commission, we can expect continuing Soviet references to the subject in future Commission meetings. Furthermore, it seems apparent that the Soviets are making the question of a "prohibiting convention" on BW the theme of their major propaganda effort for this year, and that they will use the World Peace Council meetings in Oslo to further their objectives as they have in the past in connection with their cry for a "prohibiting convention" for atomic weapons. In their propaganda attacks the Soviets can be expected to point to such facts as the United States refusal to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological weapons of warfare. They will continue to say that they are willing to "prohibit" such "ghastly" weapons now but that the United States, though denying its use in Korea, is unwilling to state that it opposes the use of BW. The Soviets will undoubtedly constantly repeat the charge that the past and present position of the United States with respect to BW shows that the American government is preparing to use it.

The Soviets will make an all-out effort in the Commission to force the United States - as well as the other Commission members - to take a position on the question of a convention "prohibiting" BW. It is therefore necessary to decide what our position should be and upon what grounds we should take our stand. Because of the nature of the Soviet approach to the subject, consideration in this paper has been centered on the propaganda advantages and disadvantages of the available alternative positions and on the tactical implications of each in the Disarmament Commission discussions.

The subject of elimination of BW will certainly be raised in the Commission under item B2 of the plan of work, entitled: "Elimination of weapons of mass destruction and control with a view to ensuring their elimination". The United States has consistently taken the position that the subject of BW could appropriately be considered under such a heading.

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SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

There would seem to be two general positions that the United States might take:

1. Agree to the drafting of a convention providing for the immediate "prohibition" of BW without safeguards;
2. Agree to the elimination of BW as a part of an effective general programme of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, including atomic.

Alternative I - Agree to the drafting of a convention providing for the immediate "prohibition" of BW, without safeguards.

Apart from the probable vital security implications of this alternative - with which we do not deal in this paper - we must recognize the fact that this position could and unquestionably would be used as a tactic to undermine seriously our position on atomic energy control in particular, as well as our general position that safeguards must accompany any programme of armament control. We have insisted that provisions for adequate safeguards must accompany any agreement in the atomic energy field. In advocating a program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, we are taking the same general position in the non-atomic field. If we were to agree to a "prohibiting treaty" on BW without insisting on adequate safeguards, the Soviets undoubtedly would pose the question of why we are unwilling to agree to the same procedure for atomic energy or for chemical warfare or for the reduction of armed forces. It would lend immeasurable support to the general Soviet contention that paper prohibitions, which we believe to be worthless, should precede efforts to achieve agreement on effective safeguards. This would not only prejudice our position on atomic energy and on our general approach to the problems of disarmament, but would also tend to delude the world with the misconception that real progress was being made.

Alternative II - Agree to the elimination of BW as a part of an effective program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, including atomic.

An essential aspect of this position - as with other parts of the general program of regulation and control - is the institution of adequate safeguards. The technical safeguards connected with BW would differ from those of atomic energy in that different materials and techniques would be involved. However, the first and all important safeguard for BW, as for most non-atomic weapons, must be an open world.

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SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

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-3-

The establishment of the system of disclosure and verification is the initial step in the field of armaments control in an open world. Other feasible safeguards, such as industrial control, could be desirable and can be developed.

In addition, the second alternative would avoid the propaganda and tactical disadvantages presented by Alternative I.

At the same time, it is consistent with the general position of the United States on disarmament and would leave us in a reasonably strong position with respect to future Soviet propaganda efforts.

Under the United States disclosure and verification proposals, significant data relating to BW would be disclosed only in the fourth and fifth stages. If the disclosure and verification system actually survived until the later stages, the international atmosphere would be so improved that we could reasonably anticipate that states would live up to their obligations. Furthermore - and this is essential - the fact that the world would be so much more open would make it possible to establish the necessary safeguards.

This position remains susceptible to the Soviet propaganda charge that the United States is in fact postponing the "prohibition" of BW. In general the best defense against this would be to emphasize the difference between the Soviets' proposal for "prohibition", which is a paper promise, and the United States proposal for "elimination", which is concerned with obtaining safeguards and effective prohibition. In this connection, the United States could point to the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission: "The new patterns of international cooperation and the new standards of openness in the dealings of one country with another that are indispensable in the field of atomic energy might, in practice, pave the way for international cooperation in broader fields, for the control of other weapons of mass destruction, and even for the elimination of war itself as an instrument of national policy". The point we should emphasize is that the period of disclosure and verification, which would occasion the postponement, would be necessary in order to determine the relevant facts and to achieve the open world necessary for effective safeguards. In addition, we should continue to stress the fact that, without the necessary safeguards, no nation can be expected to abandon research in BW, for such research is the only means by which nations can devise defenses against its use by possible aggressors.

With regard to the tactical situation in the Commission, the second alternative is in accord with our general thesis that the various issues connected with disarmament and armament control must be treated as inter-related elements of a single problem.

Conclusion:

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~~SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

-4-

Conclusion:

The United States should reject the approach involved in Alternative I and should agree to the elimination of BW as a part of a general program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, including atomic. As in the case of atomic weapons, the "prohibition" of BW, as proposed by the Soviet Union, could take place only when elimination is in fact possible through the establishment of an effective system of safeguards to ensure that an agreement will be more than a paper promise.

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DAC D-6
14 April 1952

WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

Draft Paper on General Views of the United States Concerning
Determination of Over-All Limits and Restrictions on all Armed
Forces and All Armaments, Including Atomic Weapons

The Attached draft paper is distributed for the information of members of DAC, for the purpose of considering the paper at a future meeting of the Working Group. Written comments should be directed to Howard Meyers, UNP, Room 6104 New State Building.

Leonard J. Horwits
Secretary

Attachment

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DAC --D-
April 14, 1952

GENERAL VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING DETERMINATION
OF OVER-ALL LIMITS AND RESTRICTIONS ON ALL ARMED FORCES AND
ALL ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING ATOMIC WEAPONS

I. Atomic Energy Control.

1. There should be effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

2. While not prejudging any proposals which may be presented, the United States believes that, unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

II. Limitation and Reduction of all Armed Forces and Armaments.

A. General Principles.

1. Any system for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments must embrace all kinds of armed forces, including para-military and security forces, and all armaments, including atomic.

2. This system must be accepted by all states whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system. The states falling within this category should be determined in the treaty (or treaties) which put into effect the disarmament system and which should provide that the treaty will not enter into force until these nations are designated therein.

3. The principal objective of the system for regulation and reduction should be to bring about balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. By "balanced reduction" is meant reduction which (i) applies to all states with substantial military power, not merely to a few great powers, and (ii) which seeks to reduce armed forces and armaments in such manner as to make remote the possibility of successful aggression by any state or grouping of states.

4. Reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments should proceed by progressive stages, with adequate safeguards at

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CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

each stage to ensure that the agreements reached are in fact observed and to provide for the prompt detection of violations, while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each state.

5. The concepts upon which the system for limitation and reduction is based should be as simple and practicable as possible.

6. Disarmament proposals cannot be considered in isolation, apart from the major international tensions existing in the world. There is an obvious connection between the solution of current major political issues, the reduction of tensions and the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments. Consequently, concurrently with coming into effect of the disarmament program, the major political issues between the Great Powers should be settled. However, agreement upon plans for a system of limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments should measurably reduce these major political issues and facilitate their solution.

B. Specific Considerations.

1. The concept of "qualitative disarmament" (limitation as to form or functional characteristics, or qualities) does not appear to be a practicable area of examination when taken by itself. The principal characteristic of this concept is an attempt to draw a distinction between "aggressive" or "offensive" weapons of greater utility to attack and "defensive" weapons of great utility to defense. In fact, the principal element in the concept of qualitative disarmament would seem to be the intent with which such weapons are used, and not the inherent nature of the weapons. Any weapon can be employed either offensively or defensively, depending upon whether the nation using such weapons is mounting or is resisting aggression.

2. Similarly, demilitarization of specified areas or zones ("geographic disarmament"), control of private manufacture and sale of armaments, and limitation as to the necessity or desirability of use do not appear practicable approaches when considered by themselves. They form part of the general question, and if considered in isolation tend to complicate the problem of finding simple and generally applicable means to limit and reduce armed forces and armaments.

3. Armed Forces.

The key factor in the problem of reduction and limitation appears to be the size of armed forces available to states. If these forces are reduced on a balanced basis in such way as to make the possibility of successful aggression remote then it should be correspondingly easier to limit and reduce the armaments supporting these armed forces. Accordingly, the following approach might be practicable:

(A) Powers

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- 3 -

(A) Powers Possessing Great Military Strength. China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR should be in one category. It is recognized that a bewildering number of factors must be considered -- such as length of sea-coast, terrain, length of common border with other states, strategic position, area, whether frontiers are protected by natural barriers, natural resources, industrial plant, etc. These factors, although they may be considered to a greater or lesser degree in agreeing upon the permitted levels of armed forces, are all subordinate to one principal element but will prevent use of that principal element as the sole basis for an automatic formula. That principal element is population. Accordingly, a percentage of the total population of a state would be the starting-point in determining the permitted level of armed forces. In arriving at this population figure, non-self-governing territories administered by the metropolitan power should be included, since the defense of these territories is a responsibility of the metropolitan power. When such territories become self-governing, their population need no longer be included with that of the metropolitan area as they will probably provide their own defense.

Accordingly, it is suggested that the two following formulae might be considered as bases for discussion:

(1) The armed forces of the Great Powers might be limited initially by taking such a percentage as, say, 1% of the total population. However, there should be a maximum limitation on such forces, in order to ensure that there is an actual reduction in size and in order to strive for that balanced reduction which is an objective set by the General Assembly. Therefore, the maximum limit of these armed forces might be set as, for instance, 1,500,000.

(2) Alternatively, in order to recognize the differences between the population of the metropolitan and non-self-governing territories with regard to their role in the defense of the interests of the metropolitan power, it is suggested that the population of the non-self-governing areas might be given a different percentage weight in estimating the size of armed forces. Thus, the armed forces permitted because of this population might be, as an example, $\frac{1}{4}$ of 1%.

On this basis, a formula which might be considered for discussion in reducing the armed forces of the Great Powers is to take 1% of the total metropolitan population and $\frac{1}{4}$ of 1% for the population of the non-self-governing territories administered by the metropolitan power.

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CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- 4 -

However, there should be a maximum limitation on such forces, in order to ensure that there is an actual reduction in size and in order to strive for that balanced reduction which is an objective set by the General Assembly. Therefore, the maximum limit of these armed forces might be set as, for instance, 1,500,000.

To illustrate concretely the difference in armed forces under the two formulae, the following chart may be useful:

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- 5 -

<u>Country</u>	<u>Estimated Population</u>	<u>(Total)</u>	<u>Permitted Armed Forces</u>	
			<u>Alternative (1)</u>	<u>Alternative (2)</u>
a. China		463,493,418	1,500,000	1,500,000
b. USSR (including Ukraine and Byelor-Russia)		194,490,385	1,500,000	1,500,000
c. France				
Metropolitan France (plus Algeria):	50,226,000			(1½-502,260)
Overseas Territories excluding Indochina	41,456,000			
		91,682,000	916,820	(¼ of 1½-103,640)
				605,900
d. United Kingdom:				
Home Territory	50,368,455			(1½-503,684)
Non-Self-Governing Territories	88,515,511			
		138,883,966	1,388,840	(¼ of 1½-221,289)
				724,973
e. United States		151,132,000	1,500,000	1,500,000

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- 6 -

(B) To dispose of countries other than the five Great Powers, a somewhat different concept is needed to obtain a balanced reduction. For this purpose, it is suggested that the concept of regional disarmament might be the best approach. This would be directed towards obtaining a balance in a geographic region of the world, seeking to ensure that successful aggression would be most difficult if not impossible to accomplish. Accordingly, the world might be divided into the following regions:

- Europe
- Middle East
- Africa
- Far East
- North America
- Central and South America

Regional conferences might be called under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission, to work out and agree upon the limitation and reduction of armed forces in that region. At such conferences, the five Great Powers might be represented, in view of their global interests in disarmament. Such an approach would be consistent with the General Assembly direction, in paragraph 6(b) of Resolution A/L.25, 12 January 1952, to "consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the over-all limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments".

In any event, it is suggested that armed forces within each region for each country might be limited so that they would be no more than, for instance, 1% of population with a maximum of 1 million men.

Attached as Annex A is a chart showing estimated population within these regions and armed forces of these countries based on the 1%-1 million concept for each individual country.

(C) The limitations suggested above are initial targets. It is suggested that further reduction of permitted armed forces might be made when substantial progress is achieved on any or all of the following:

- (1) The program for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification;

- (2) The

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- 7 -

(2) The program for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

(3) Agreement on forces available for collective measures under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, or extension of agreements under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution (UN Doc. A/1481, 3 November 1950).

4. Allocation of Armed Forces Within National Military Establishments. On a preliminary basis, it is suggested that the Disarmament Commission should not attempt itself to allocate permitted armed forces within national armed services. However, allocation of forces to the air, naval and land establishments will be required to a certain extent in order to maintain the concept of balanced reduction, which implies prohibiting excessive concentration on any one armed service. This allocation depends on a congeries of factors so varying in the case of each country as to make the working out of a satisfactory formula exceedingly difficult if not impossible. One way of solving this problem might be for the Disarmament Commission to recommend that undue concentration of permitted armed forces in any one armed service is contrary to the concept of balanced reduction, and that national plans for allocating armed forces to the respective service establishments should be approved by the Disarmament Commission only insofar as necessary to decide that there is no undue concentration upon one or another of the armed services. Once there has been agreement on the concept of reducing armed forces, as suggested in paragraph 3 above, and once the system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification has been put into effect, then any undue concentration by a state on one armed service to the virtual exclusion of other armed services would be noted at once and would be a warning which would bring to a halt the entire system of limitation and reduction, unless a valid explanation was received. Concentration without satisfactory explanation, in other words, would be the prelude to rearmament. Under this concept, the allocation of permitted national armed forces within the respective air, land and naval establishments would be a matter to be determined by each country for itself, subject to approval by the Disarmament Commission regarding the one question of undue concentration of forces in any one armed service.

Alternately, if the Disarmament Commission does not believe that this concept should be adhered to, it is suggested that the matter of allocation be left to bilateral negotiation by individual states falling in the category of states with substantial military power. In effect, these states would have to justify their own allocation of permitted armed forces to satisfy all other states in this category.

5. Armaments

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- 8 -

5. Armaments.

The suggestions made herein precede from the presumptions that atomic weapons should be eliminated and that some satisfactory means may be found to eliminate all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, in accordance with the mandate of the General Assembly establishing the Disarmament Commission and setting forth its tasks. Thus, armaments should be keyed to permitted manpower. Further, it is assumed that an adequate system of continuing disclosure and verification will have been put into effect at the time reductions in military establishments take place, so that this system will give warning of any undue build-up of armaments. Accordingly, the following formulae are suggested as alternatives:

(a) Standard armaments sufficient to support permitted armed forces as allocated within each state, plus reserve stocks adequate for replacement under normal peace-time use. What constitutes standard armaments is to be agreed upon by the five Great Powers, and might be subject to revision periodically say every five years.

(b) A formula similar to "a" above, except that the armaments allowed should be determined by bilateral treaties between those individual states considered as having substantial military power.

6. National Industrial Production Devoted to Armaments.

It is clear that the industrial might of a country is a key factor in military strength. However, any limitation which would hamper production for peaceful purposes should be avoided. In fact, it is to be hoped that one of the benefits of a disarmament program would be the ability to devote industrial production to expanding standards of living throughout the world and to aiding distressed areas. Savings accrued from disarmament might be channeled into world-wide programs of reconstruction and development. Thus, hampering national industrial production would defeat a principal means of helping bring about conditions aiding international peace and security through creating and developing conditions of economic and social stability in the world.

Consequently, it would seem logical to limit that portion of national industrial production which supports its own armed establishments only to the extent necessary to ensure that no more armaments are produced than are needed by such national armed establishments.

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CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

- 9 -

However, in order to provide for those instances in which one state may supply armaments to other states which do not produce such armaments, a possible limitation might be to set a maximum on all national industrial production manufacturing purely military goods using a formula based on a percentage of the national product.

III. Elimination of Major Weapons Adaptable to Mass Destruction*

1. Under the provisions of General Assembly Resolution A/L.25, 12 January 1952, all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction should be eliminated if possible.

2. Exactly what constitutes such weapons appears in the first instance to involve a concept not subject to precise definition. It would seem preferable to relate this subject to the other specific tasks before the Disarmament Commission: (i) regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, (ii) prohibition of atomic weapons as the result of an effective system of international control of atomic energy. As has been suggested previously in this paper, the United States believes that the key to the problem of limitation and reduction appears to be the size of armed forces available to States; that if these forces are reduced on a balanced basis, then armaments should be keyed, in turn, to permitted manpower. On this basis, the armaments allowed to support permitted armed forces would be standardized according to a formula or formulae, and of course would exclude atomic weapons, under the assumption that such weapons would be prohibited as the result of an effective system of international control of atomic energy.

3. Consequently, it is the preliminary view of the United States that it would be more practical to examine the question of weapons adaptable to mass destruction from the presumption that these are weapons which should not be included among the standard armaments sufficient to support permitted armed forces, and that the Disarmament Commission might wish to develop a list of such weapons. On this presumption, the two types of weapons which appear at first glance to fall into this category, and are not eliminated by the prohibition of atomic weapons, are lethal lethal chemical and biological warfare agents. A definition which might serve as a basis for examination of this general topic is as follows: "Major weapons adaptable to mass destruction are all atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above." [Resolution adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 12 August 1948, S/C.3/32, Rev. 1, p.27]

177

*Note: The following views are directed toward obtaining a technically correct position, and are subject to revision in the light of propaganda consideration -- which, in this field, are of great importance.

- 10 -

4. The United States believes that lethal chemical and biological agents should be eliminated as part of the general program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons. As in the case of atomic weapons, the elimination of lethal chemical and biological warfare should take place only upon the establishment of an effective system of safeguards to ensure that agreement not to employ such means of waging war would be adhered to. The establishment of a system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification is, obviously, an essential first step in creating such safeguards. Other safeguards should be examined in the course of the Disarmament Commission's work.

UNA:UNP:HMyers:sas
April 14, 1952

ANNEX AI. Europe

<u>Country</u>	<u>Estimated Population</u>	<u>Permitted Armed Forces</u>
Albania	1,175,000	11,750
Austria	7,090,000	70,900
Belgium	8,639,000	
<u>/Congo/</u>	<u>10,804,761</u>	194,437
Bulgaria	7,160,000	71,600
Czechoslovakia	12,463,000	124,630
Denmark	4,271,000	42,710
Finland	4,064,000	40,460
Germany		
<u>/West Germany:</u>	<u>47,607,000</u>	(476,070)
<u>East Germany:</u>	<u>17,313,700</u>	(173,313)
	67,032,242	670,322
Greece	7,960,000	79,600
Hungary	9,205,000	92,050
Iceland	140,000	1,400
Ireland	2,958,878	29,588
Italy	46,424,000	464,240
Liechtenstein	13,000	130
Luxembourg	295,000	2,950
Netherlands	10,212,634	102,126
Norway	3,281,000	32,810
Poland	24,976,926	249,769
Portugal	8,618,000	86,180
Rumania	15,873,000	158,730
Spain	28,600,000	286,000
Sweden	6,986,181	69,861
Switzerland	4,700,000	47,000
Yugoslavia	16,250,000	162,500

II. Middle East

Egypt	20,045,000	200,450
Iran	18,000,000	180,000
Iraq	4,799,500	47,995
Israel	1,400,000	14,000
Jordan	1,500,000	15,000
Lebanon	1,238,000	12,380
Saudi Arabia	6,500,000	65,000
Syria	3,400,000	34,000
Turkey	20,902,628	209,026
Yemen	3,500,000	35,000

III. Africa

Ethiopia	1,072,000	10,720
Liberia	1,600,000	16,000
Libya	1,072,000	10,720
Union of South Africa	12,112,000	121,120

- 2 -

IV. Far East

<u>Country</u>	<u>Estimated Population</u>	<u>Permitted Armed Forces</u>
Afghanistan	12,000,000	120,000
Australia	8,185,539	81,855
Burma	17,000,000	170,000
Ceylon	7,193,000	71,930
*Formosa	3,760,000	37,600
[plus Nationalist Chinese from mainland]		
India	361,820,000	1,000,000
Indochina (Associated States):	27,030,000	270,300
Indonesia	78,000,000	780,000
Japan	82,525,000	825,000
Korea	29,271,000	292,710
Nepal	7,000,000	70,000
New Zealand	1,939,703	19,397
Outer Mongolia	850,000	8,500
Pakistan	75,687,000	756,870
Philippines	19,557,000	195,570
Thailand	18,313,000	183,130

V. North America

Canada	13,845,000	138,450
Mexico	25,564,218	255,642

VI. Central and South America

Argentina	17,111,000	171,110
Bolivia	3,990,000	39,900
Brazil	52,619,000	526,190
Chile	5,809,000	58,090
Colombia	11,260,000	112,600
Costa Rica	800,875	8,008
Cuba	5,348,000	53,480
Dominican Republic	2,121,000	21,210
Ecuador	3,076,933	30,769
Guatemala	2,787,000	27,870
Haiti	3,112,000	31,120
Honduras	1,534,000	15,340
Nicaragua	1,053,000	10,530
Panama	801,000	8,010
Paraguay	1,406,000	14,060
Peru	8,405,000	84,050
Salvador	1,858,000	18,580
Uruguay	2,353,000	23,530
Venezuela	4,985,000	49,850

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RAC (NS) D-4
(DRAFT)
April 30, 1952

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS (RAC)

Working Paper for Committee I of the Disarmament Commission
Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces

The attached paper is a re-draft of DAC D-8, revised in the light of the comments made by Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Nash and Ambassador Cohen at the RAC meeting on April 29, 1952.

In view of the urgency of submitting this paper in the Disarmament Commission, it should be considered simultaneously in State, Defense and AEC with a view to its clearance as a working paper only (not as a United States Government position) to be submitted to the Disarmament Commission as quickly as possible.

Howard Meyers
Executive Secretary

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RAC (NS) D-4

Working Paper for Committee I of Disarmament Commission

Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces

A. Purpose of Working Paper.

1. A comprehensive program for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments must contain many elements. One essential component of any such program is the numerical limitation of armed forces, the subject of this paper.

2. The general subject of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces covers so vast an area that simultaneous discussions of all phases of the subject would delay progress. We are submitting this working paper in order to focus attention on one important and essential component of the total program. We thus hope at least to make a start toward an agreed comprehensive program.

3. Examples of other essential components include:

a. The control of atomic energy to ensure prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,-- where the United Nations has already approved a plan;

b. The progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments,-- where the United States has already submitted a Working Paper to Committee 2;

c. Allocation of armed forces within national military establishments so as to assure balanced reduction and prevent undue concentration of permitted forces in any particular category or activity;

d. Relation of armaments to permitted manpower in order that permitted armaments should not exceed those required to support permitted armed forces, as allocated within each state, plus reserve stocks adequate for replacement under normal peace-time use.

e. Restrictions on the portion of national product which can be used for national armaments, with due care not to hamper production for peaceful purposes.

Paragraphs c, d, and e are particularly closely related to the subject of this paper.

4. Disarmament

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

4. Disarmament proposals cannot be considered in isolation, apart from the major international tensions existing in the world. There is an obvious connection between the solution of current major political issues, the reduction of tensions and the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments. Consequently, concurrently with coming into effect of the disarmament program, the major political issues between the Great Powers should be settled. However, agreement upon plans for a system of limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments should measurably reduce these major political issues and facilitate their solution.

B. Chief Factors in Determining Numerical Limitations.

5. In determining numerical limitations of armed forces, it is recognized that a bewildering number of factors must be considered-- such as length of seacoast, terrain, length of common border with other states, strategic position, area, whether frontiers are protected by natural barriers, natural resources, industrial plant, etc. These factors, although they may be considered to a greater or lesser degree in agreeing upon the permitted levels of armed forces, are all subordinate to one principal element but will prevent use of that principal element as the sole basis for an automatic formula. That principal element is population. Accordingly, a percentage of the total population of a state would be the starting-point in determining the permitted level of armed forces. In arriving at this population figure, non-self-governing territories administered by the metropolitan power should be included, since the defense of these territories is a responsibility of the metropolitan power. When such territories become self-governing, their population need no longer be included with that of the metropolitan area as they will probably provide for their own defense.

6. Accordingly, the following formula might be considered as a basis for discussion:

a. The maximum level of armed forces of a state should not exceed the lower of the following figures:--

(i) 1% of its population;

(ii) A fixed numerical ceiling,--say between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000.

b. Relatively minor adjustments upward and downward would have to be made in some areas to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace.

c. While

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

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-3-

c. While states should not be permitted to exceed maximum levels, they should not be required to raise their armed forces to such levels.

C. General Principles Governing Limitation of Armed Forces.

7. Any system for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces must embrace all kinds of armed forces, including para-military and security forces, and the formula as set forth in paragraph 6 includes all such forces.

8. Adequate provision must be made to ensure that the maximum limitation on armed forces is not circumvented through building up large forces of trained reserves.

9. This system must be accepted by all states whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system. The states falling within this category should be determined in the treaty (or treaties) which put into effect the disarmament system and which should provide that the treaty will not enter into force until these nations are designated therein.

10. The principal objective of the formula and system for regulation and reduction of armed forces should be to bring about balanced reduction of all armed forces. By "balanced reduction" is meant reduction which (i) applies to all states with substantial military power, not merely to a few great powers, and (ii) which seeks to reduce armed forces in such manner as to make remote the possibility of successful aggression by any state or grouping of states.

11. Reduction and limitation of armed forces should proceed by progressive stages, with adequate safeguards at each stage to ensure that the agreements reached are in fact observed and to provide for the prompt detection of violations, while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each state.

12. The concepts upon which the system for limitation and reduction is based should be as simple and practicable as possible.

D. Significance of Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces.

13. It is true that a nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its strength. Other factors--to name only a few--include its industrial production, with particular reference to that portion devoted to armaments, its natural resources, its population skills, and, of course, the armaments of all kinds devoted to the support of its armed forces. A program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments must deal with all of these elements of national might.

14. Nevertheless,

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SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

-4-

14. Nevertheless, a numerical limitation on armed forces is a major element in any program of balanced reduction for the following reasons:

a. All armaments programs depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces.

b. A substantial reduction of armed forces as here suggested in and of itself would minimize if not eliminate the possibility of successful aggression.

c. If armed forces are reduced on a balanced basis in such a way as to make the possibility of successful aggression remote, then it should be correspondingly easier to reduce the armaments supporting these armed forces.

E. Implementation of Proposals for Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces.

15. The implementation of agreed reductions should be closely related to progress in connection with the system of disclosure and verification. Thus the agreed reductions might commence upon the finding of the control organ with responsibility for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments that an appropriate stage of the disclosure and verification plan had been completed.

16. The reduction should be carried through in a manner and in accordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control organ and should be completed within the shortest feasible time after its commencement.

17. The implementation of the reductions should likewise be related to other phases of the program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, such as the control of atomic energy.

18. In the future, further numerical limitation of permitted armed forces would be contemplated as substantial progress is achieved towards the easing of international tensions and toward successful achievement of other phases of the program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments;--in particular the programs for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

19. The

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

-5-

19. The extent and timing of the proposed reductions, together with the general manner of their accomplishment, including their relationship to other components of the program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, should be comprehended within the treaty or treaties required under Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution of January 11, 1952.

Conclusions:

1. All States having substantial military forces should agree to reduce these armed forces to fixed maximum levels.

2. The following formula might be considered as a basis for discussion:

a. The maximum level of armed forces of a state should not exceed the lower of the following figures:--

(i) 1% of its population;

(ii) A fixed numerical ceiling,--say between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000.

b. Relatively minor adjustments upward and downward would have to be made in some areas to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace.

c. While states should not be permitted to exceed maximum levels, they should not be required to raise their armed forces to such levels.

3. The proposed agreed reduction might commence upon a finding of the international control organ with responsibility for regulation of armed forces and armaments that an appropriate stage of the disclosure and verification plan had been completed; should be carried through in accordance with the time schedule prescribed by the international control organ; and should be completed within the shortest feasible specified time after its commencement.

4. The extent and timing of the proposed reductions, together with the general manner of their accomplishment, including their relationship to other components of the program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, should be comprehended within the treaty or treaties required under Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952.

5. The initial reductions should be followed by further reductions as appropriate in the light of then existing circumstances, bearing in mind the obvious connection between the solution of current major political issues, the reduction of tensions, and the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments.

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

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DAC D-8
April 24, 1952

WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

U. S. Working Paper

Proposals for Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces

The attached is a redraft of a paper on this subject which was distributed at a meeting of the Working Group on April 22. The redraft incorporates the most important suggestions made at the April 22 meeting.

In view of the urgency of this paper, as stated in the meeting, it should be considered simultaneously in State, Defense and AEC with a view to its clearance as a Working Paper (not as a U. S. Government position) which would be submitted to the Disarmament Commission about May 5.

It is contemplated that the various comments on the paper will be considered at a meeting of RAC to take place about May 2.

Leonard J. Horwitz
Secretary

Attachment.

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U. S. Working Paper

Proposals for Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces

A. Relation of numerical limitation of armed forces and armaments to disarmament.

1. The numerical limitation of armed forces must play a major role in any disarmament program. It is true that a nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its strength. Other factors--to name only a few--include its industrial production, with particular reference to that portion devoted to armaments, its natural resources, its population skills, and, of course, the armaments of all kinds devoted to the support of its armed forces. A program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments must deal with all of these elements of national might.

2. Nevertheless, a numerical limitation on armed forces is a major element in any program of balanced reduction for the following reasons:

a. All armaments programs depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces.

b. A substantial reduction of armed forces as here suggested in and of itself would minimize if not eliminate the possibility of successful aggression.

c. If armed forces are reduced on a balanced basis in such a way as to make the possibility of successful aggression remote, then it should be correspondingly easier to reduce the armaments supporting those armed forces.

B. General principles governing programs for limitation of both armed forces and armaments.

3. Disarmament proposals cannot be considered in isolation, apart from the major international tensions existing in the world. There is an obvious connection between the solution of current major political issues, the reduction of tensions and the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments. Consequently, concurrently with coming into effect of the disarmament program, the major political issues between the Great Powers should be settled. However, agreement upon plans for a system of limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments should measurably reduce these major political issues and facilitate their solution.

SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

4. Any system for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments must embrace all kinds of armed forces, including para-military and security forces, and all armaments, including atomic.

5. This system must be accepted by all states whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system. The states falling within this category should be determined in the treaty (or treaties) which put into effect the disarmament system and which should provide that the treaty will not enter into force until these nations are designated therein.

6. The principal objective of the system for regulation and reduction should be to bring about balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. By "balanced reduction" is meant reduction which (i) applies to all states with substantial military power, not merely to a few great powers, and (ii) which seeks to reduce armed forces and armaments in such manner as to make remote the possibility of successful aggression by any state or grouping of states.

7. Reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments should proceed by progressive stages, with adequate safeguards at each stage to ensure that the agreements reached are in fact observed and to provide for the prompt detection of violations, while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each state.

8. The concepts upon which the system for limitation and reduction is based should be as simple and practicable as possible.

C. Chief factors in determining numerical limitations.

9. In determining numerical limitations of armed forces, it is recognized that a bewildering number of factors must be considered--such as length of seacoast, terrain, length of common border with other states, strategic position, area, whether frontiers are protected by natural barriers, natural resources, industrial plant, etc. These factors, although they may be considered to a greater or lesser degree in agreeing upon the permitted levels of armed forces, are all subordinate to one principal element but will prevent use of that principal element as the sole basis for an automatic formula. That principal element is population. Accordingly, a percentage of the total population of a state would be the starting-point in determining the permitted level of armed forces. In arriving at this population figure, non-self-governing territories administered by the metropolitan power should be included, since the defense of these territories is a responsibility of the metropolitan power. When such territories become self-governing, their population need no longer be included with that of the metropolitan area as they will probably provide their own defense.

10. Accordingly,

SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION

-3-

10. Accordingly, the following formula might be considered as a basis for discussion.

a. All States having a population in excess of 150 million should accept as an initial maximum level, say, 1,500,000.

b. The initial maximum levels for all other states should not normally exceed, say, 1% of their population, but relatively minor adjustments upward and downward would have to be made in some areas to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace.

c. While States should not be permitted to exceed maximum levels, they need not necessarily raise their armed forces to such levels.

d. In determining maximum levels under b, it is necessary to recognize the differences between the population of the metropolitan and non-self-governing territories with regard to their role in the defense of the interests of the metropolitan power. It is therefore suggested that states with populations of less than 150 million and with responsibilities for non-self-governing territories for this purpose might compute their population through adding (1) the metropolitan population and (2) say, 50% of the population of the non-self-governing territories for which they have responsibilities.

D. Implementation of proposals for numerical limitation of armed forces.

11. The initial agreed reductions might commence as soon as the international control organ with responsibility for regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments finds that the first stage of the plan for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments has been completed.

12. The initial reduction should be carried through in a manner and in accordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control organ, and should be completed within a specified time--say 18 months after its commencement.

13. Further numerical limitation of permitted armed forces would be contemplated as substantial progress is achieved towards the easing of international tensions and toward successful achievement of other phases of the program for regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments;--in particular the programs for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

14. The extent

SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION

-4-

14. The extent and timing of the initial reductions, together with the general manner of their accomplishment, should be comprehended within the treaty or treaties required under Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution of January 11, 1952.

E. Related factors

15. It must be recognized that these are merely initial proposals and do not purport to be a comprehensive and final plan even as regards this segment of the field of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments.

16. Among the factors most closely related to these proposals and which will require extensive study are:

a. Allocation of armed forces within national military establishments so as to assure balanced reduction and prevent undue concentration of permitted forces in any particular category or activity.

b. Relation of armaments to permitted manpower. It seems clear that permitted armaments should not exceed those required to support permitted armed forces, as allocated within each State, plus reserve stocks adequate for replacement under normal peacetime use.

c. Use of natural resources and industrial potential. It may be undesirable to permit the unlimited use of resources and industrial potential for military purposes under a plan for limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. Therefore, it might be advisable to restrict the portion of national product which can be used for national armaments, with due care not to hamper production for peaceful purposes. It may be advisable also to establish a ceiling which it might be possible to express in terms of a percentage of the national product.

17. These proposals supplement and do not replace nor modify proposals in connection with other phases of the program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments such as disclosure and verification, international control of atomic energy, and elimination of major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

Conclusions:

1. All States having substantial military forces should agree to reduce these armed forces to fixed maximum levels.

2. The initial reduction might be in accordance with the following formulae which should be considered as bases for discussion.

a. All

SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION

-5-

a. All States having a population in excess of 150,000,000 should accept as an initial maximum level, say, 1,500,000.

b. The initial maximum levels for all other States should not normally exceed say, 1% of their populations but relatively minor adjustments should be made in some areas to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace.

c. In computing, pursuant to b, the populations of States with responsibilities in connection with non-self-governing territories, such States should be permitted to add to their Metropolitan population one-half of the population of the non-self-governing territories for which they have responsibilities.

3. The proposed initial agreed reduction might commence as soon as the international control organ with responsibility for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments shall have determined that the first stage of disclosure and verification has been completed; should be carried through in a manner and in accordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control organ; and should be completed within a specified period--say 18 months--after its commencement.

4. The extent and timing of the initial reductions should be specified in the treaty or treaties for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments as provided in Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution of January 11, 1952.

5. The initial reductions should be followed by further reductions as appropriate in the light of then existing circumstances, bearing in mind the obvious connection between the solution of current major political issues, the reduction of tensions, and the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments.

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S E C R E T
Security Information
DAC D-3a
April 15, 1952

WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATION FOR DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (DAC)

Methods of Implementing and Enforcing the Disarmament Programme:
The Establishment of International Control Organs with Appropriate
Rights Powers and Functions

The attached draft is distributed to members of DAC for their consideration prior to its formal consideration by the committee at its next meeting on Tuesday, April 22, in Room 5105 New State. At this meeting DAC D-6, previously distributed, will also be considered.

It is requested that written comments on this paper be sent to Mr. Lawrence Weiler, UNP, Room 6115 New State.

Your attention is called to the bracketed sections of this paper. Brackets in the numbered paragraphs indicate sections about which some reservations have been expressed. The unnumbered bracketed paragraphs indicate alternative positions.

Leonard J. Horvitz
Secretary

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Security Information

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Methods of Implementing and Enforcing
the Disarmament Programme: The Establishment of
International Control Organs with Appropriate Rights
Powers and Functions

Introduction

The General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952 calling for regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments and for international control of atomic energy directs the Disarmament Commission, when preparing proposals, to formulate plans for the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty (or treaties).

United States Suggestions

1. The broad objectives in establishing control organs to carry out the system of disclosure and verification and the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments are:

1) to develop an open world by assuring each signatory state that other states are observing the various agreements, thereby creating a basis for mutual trust;

[2) to establish effective and suitable international controls;]

[3) to make it possible for signatory states to take rapid action to provide for their security should other states refuse to rectify violations of the agreements.]

2. The United

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

2. The United States suggests the establishment of the following organs:

1) a United Nations Disclosure and Verification Organization, the temporary body to function during the various stages of the disclosure and verification programs. The Organization would have two operating divisions:

- a) an Atomic Energy Division,
- b) a Non-Atomic Armaments Division;

2) a United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority, the permanent control organ. The Authority would also have two operating divisions:

- a) an Atomic Energy Division,
- b) a Non-Atomic Armaments Division.

alternative

[An alternative arrangement that might be considered is the establishment of the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority to carry out both disclosure and verification and the subsequent permanent system of control of armaments, armed forces and atomic energy.]

A- United Nations Disclosure and Verification Organization.

I - General

3. A United Nations Disclosure and Verification Organization should be established within the framework of the Security Council to supervise the progressive and continuous disclosure and verification of all armed forces- including para-military, security and police forces -- and all armaments, including atomic.

4. The Organization would derive its powers and authority from the

treaty

SECRET- SECURITY INFORMATION

-3-

treaty (or treaties) which would deal with other aspects of the disclosure and verification system. The United Nations would take appropriate action, in anticipation of the signing of the treaty (or treaties) establishing the system of disclosure and verification, to ensure the establishment of the Organization with its full powers immediately upon the coming into effect of the treaty (or treaties).

II - Composition and Organization.

5. The Organization should be composed of States which are Security Council Members, the non-permanent membership changing in conformity with election to and retirement from the Security Council.

6. It might be desirable to make special arrangements to permit States that are not members of the United Nations to be elected by the General Assembly to two-year terms on the Organization.

7. While it is preferable to keep the Organization to such a workable size for the sake of overall efficiency, it is recognized that it may be desirable to include as members States which have appreciable quantities of essential atomic materials.

8. Any State which is a signatory of the treaty (or treaties) establishing the system of disclosure and verification but not a member of the Organization should have the right to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Organization whenever the latter considers that the interests of that State are specially affected. Any signatory State should have an automatic right to participate, without vote, in discussions of the Organization specifically

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concerned with that State.

9. Each Member of the Organization should have one representative plus deputy representatives and technical advisors.

10. Decisions made by the Organization within its defined functions should not require unanimity. Except for this provision, the Organization should have the right to adopt its own rules of procedure.

11. The Organization should function continuously and each Member should be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

12. The Organization should be authorized to hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment would best facilitate its work.

13. It would be desirable from the standpoint of administrative efficiency and of facilitating the transfer of functions to the permanent organ to have two sections within the Organization; an Atomic Energy Division and a Non-Atomic Armaments Division. Considerable attention will have to be given to the question of the budget of the Organization. The expenses connected with the operation of an effective system of disclosure and verification will be considerable. The United States suggests, therefore, that it would be desirable to have each of the States permanently represented on the Organization bear one-eighth of the total cost of operation. The remainder of the expenses should be born by the signatory States as apportioned by the General Assembly. The Budget should be considered and approved by the Organization.

14. The Organization should appoint a Director General to be in charge of operation and administration. While the Director General should

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-5-

be subject to general direction by the Organization, he should be allowed sufficient discretion in carrying out the terms of the treaty (or treaties) and the instructions of the Organization to ensure the effectiveness of the system of disclosure and verification. The Director General should not be required to refer day-to-day routine decisions concerning the normal operations of the disclosure and verification system to the Organization. Extraordinary reports, charges of violations, complaints regarding the Director General or his staff, and other important developments would, of course, be referred to the Organization automatically.

15. It might be desirable to have the first Director General named in the treaty (or treaties) establishing the system of disclosure and verification. Should the necessity arise, successors should be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Organization.

The international Secretariat of the Organization and the Corps of Inspectors would be responsible to the Director General.

16. The Organization might have an independent Secretariat separate from the regular Secretariat of the United Nations. It should be able, however, to utilize the services of the regular Secretariat to the extent mutually agreed upon. The members of the Organization's Secretariat should be appointed by the Director General under regulations specified in the treaty (or treaties) establishing the system of disclosure and verification. Subsequent changes in the regulations should be made by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Organization.

17. The

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-6-

17. The Secretariat of the Organization should be directly responsible to the Director General.

18. Each signatory State should nominate as many inspectors as the Organization may require it to furnish, and those nominees should form a Corps of Inspectors. The Corps of Inspectors probably would be composed of two groups, one serving the Atomic Energy Division and another serving the Non-Atomic Armaments Division.

19. The necessary inspection teams would be formed from the Corps of Inspectors.

20. Each inspection team should have at its disposal a staff composed of personnel of the Secretariat of the Organization.

21. In conducting individual inspections, each inspection team should be permitted to divide into such groups as may be necessary to complete expeditiously the functions assigned to it.

22. Each signatory State should be entitled to have a representative on each inspection team, except where the signatory State is itself being inspected. The State being inspected should be obliged to appoint a Liaison officer to accompany each inspection team.

An alternative arrangement for the personnel of the Corps of Inspectors would be to staff that agency with a representative body of international civil servants. Under such circumstances, provision undoubtedly would have to be made to ensure each of the Great Powers that they would have adequate representation on the various inspection teams, even though the representation would be in the form of nationals serving as international civil servants.

III - Functions.

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-7-

III - Functions.

23. The Organization should have the responsibility for carrying out the disclosure and verification programme as agreed to in the treaty (or treaties). The United States suggestions for such a programme are set forth in the United States Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments (DC/C.2/1). The Organization's functions should include the following:

24. Make preparations, within the framework of the treaty (or treaties), for the disclosures, including the development of standardized forms, [time tables], and other organizational details;

25. Receive from each State the information disclosed. The Organization would, in accordance with the treaty (or treaties), specify the time at which information should be submitted [and, within the framework of the treaty (or treaties), the particulars of information desired from States.]

26. Conduct statistical verification;

27. Organize and conduct such field inspections and aerial surveys as may be necessary to verify information at the location of installations and to determine whether all installations and facilities have been disclosed. Inspections should be conducted in accordance with the principles listed in Section ID;

28. Maintain permanent personnel designated by the Organization to remain stationed in countries adhering to the program for the purpose of ensuring continuous verification;

29. Review

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-8-

29. Review and interpret data derived from reports of States and from its own inspections;

30. Prepare reports of the disclosures and verifications for the United Nations and for the signatory states;

31. Report to the Security Council any evasions, violations, discrepancies, or pertinent omissions by States resulting from disclosure and verification;

32. Submit such periodic and special reports to the General Assembly as may be requested by that body or any subordinate agency that the General Assembly might authorize to make requests;

33. Determine when the respective inspection and verification stages, as set forth in the United States Proposal for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments, have been completed and take the necessary action to proceed with the following stage. The Organization would also perform the same function with regard to the progressive steps to be taken within each stage;

34. Issue administrative regulations [and enter into such ad hoc agreement as may be desired to facilitate its operations];

[35. Interpret the terms of the treaty (or treaties) establishing the system of disclosure and verification];

IV - Inspections.

36. The Organization should be required to conduct such inspections as are necessary to the fulfillment of its functions. The inspections should

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SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

-9-

should be conducted in accordance with principles along the lines set forth in Section C of the United States Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments. In addition, the following principles should guide the Organization in making its inspections, and should be included in the treaty (or treaties) establishing the system of disclosure and verification.

37. The overall objective is to ensure effective, progressive and continuous verification in order to give assurance that no omissions or other violations of the treaty (or treaties) occur, and to justify advancing the disclosure and verification process to the succeeding stage.

38. The type of inspection process selected for each stage should depend on its suitability to achieve the above objective.

39. Inspections should be made of armed forces, declared plants, materials, installations, or any other items specified in the treaty (or treaties) which the Organization might desire to survey or inspect in order to determine whether all facilities have been disclosed.

40. These inspections should respect domestic laws, provided such laws do not prevent effective verification; in this connection, under certain circumstances the Organization should obtain national warrants in order to conduct investigations.

41. The Organization should request such reports and data as it might need in order to aid in inspections and verification.

42. It is

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-10-

42. It is desirable that most inspections be scheduled in advance, but the Organization might also make physical inspections without notice so long as they are appropriate for the particular phase as proscribed in the treaty (or treaties). In case of aerial surveys, the Organization should be required to give reasonable prior notification.

43. Inspections should be similar in character for Powers of similar strength.

[The above section (Inspections), with the exception of Paragraph 36, might be omitted entirely, for it is in effect merely an elaboration of Section C of the United States Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification.]

B. Transfer of Responsibilities from the United Nations Disclosure and Verification Organization to the Disarmament Authority and Atomic Development Authority.

44. Consideration should be given to instituting the atomic energy control system during the latter stages of disclosure and verification, possibly beginning with the third stage. Under this arrangement, the United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority would assume responsibility for the third, fourth and fifth stages of disclosure and verification of atomic armaments. The United States, however, is prepared to carry through all the stages of disclosure and verification before reaching agreement on international control of atomic energy.

45. At the

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-11-

45. At the time of the transfer of functions, the Atomic Energy Division of the Disclosure and Verification Organization, including the Corps of Inspectors, would be absorbed by the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority.

46. The United Nations Disclosure and Verification Organization's responsibilities for inspection and verification of non-atomic armaments and armed forces should be taken over by the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority following the completion of the fifth disclosure and verification stage.

47. At the time of the transfer of functions, the Non-Atomic Armaments Division of the Disclosure and Verification Organization, including the Corps of Inspectors, would be absorbed by the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority.

48. The Director General of the Disclosure and Verification Organization should automatically become Director General of the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority upon the constitution of the latter organ.

49. As the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority would come into being at the time of the first transfer of functions from the Disclosure and Verification Organization, if the treaty (or treaties) provides for institution of the atomic energy control system during the latter stages of disclosure and verification, the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority would assume the resulting responsibilities in connection with atomic energy before assuming responsibilities for

non-atomic

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-12-

non-atomic armaments. In such circumstances, the Director General of the Disclosure and Verification Organization would concurrently serve as Director General of the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority.

C. United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority.

I. General

50. The United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority should be established to act as the permanent organ of control for the regulation and development of atomic energy and for the operation of the general system of inspection, regulation, and balanced reduction of non-atomic armaments and armed forces. The Authority would derive its powers and authority from the treaty (or treaties) establishing the general system of control. The United Nations would take appropriate action, in anticipation of the signing of the treaty (or treaties) establishing the general system of control, to ensure the establishment of the Authority with its full powers immediately upon the coming into effect of the treaty (or treaties).

51. The membership of the Authority should be the same as that of the Disclosure and Verification Organization, with the non-permanent members selected in the same manner as those of the Disclosure and Verification Organization.

52. In general, the arrangements for the Authority concerning such questions as the place of meeting, rights of representation at

meetings

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-13-

meetings for State concerned, ~~and~~ composition of inspection teams, and powers and responsibilities of the Director General should be the same as those established for the Disclosure and Verification Organization. Arrangements concerning the budget should be similar, with the possible exception of the cost of operating the Atomic Energy Division, which in part could be borne by the Division itself as part of the expenses connected with the development of atomic energy.

53. To facilitate the execution of its responsibilities, the Authority, like the Disclosure and Verification Organization, would have two operating divisions, an Atomic Energy Division and a Non-Atomic Armaments Division. The Authority should have the right to establish such additional divisions as might be necessary to enable it to fulfill its responsibilities.

54. The Authority should be authorized to establish regional branches.

II- Functions and Powers of the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority with Respect to the Control of Atomic Energy.

55. If the treaty (or treaties) establishing the system of disclosure and verification provides that the Authority assume the responsibilities for disclosure and verification during the third, fourth and fifth stages, the Authority should have those powers granted to the Disclosure and Verification Organization.

56. As soon as practical and in any event following the completion of the fifth stage of disclosure and verification, the Authority should
function

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function in accordance with the United Nations Plan to control atomic energy, prohibit atomic weapons, and ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The Authority's functions and powers should be those set forth in the United Nations Plan. In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Plan, the Authority should have the responsibility to determine and report any violations, evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions in connection with the execution of the provisions of the treaty (or treaties) establishing the system for control of atomic energy.

III- Functions and Powers of the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority with Respect to Non-Atomic Armaments and Armed Forces.

57. The Authority should have all the powers and responsibilities with respect to receiving reports and conducting investigations relating to non-atomic armaments and armed forces that would have previously been given to the Disclosure and Verification Organization.

58. The Authority would be responsible for supervising the regulation and the balanced reduction of all armed forces - including para-military, security and police forces - and all non-atomic armaments.

59. The Authority would also have the duty of devising safeguards necessary to assure regulation without unduly interfering with domestic situations.

60. The Authority should have the responsibility to determine and report any violations, evasions, discrepancies, or pertinent

omissions in

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-15-

omissions in connection with the execution of the provisions of the treaty (or treaties) establishing the general system of control of non-atomic armaments and armed forces.

61. In addition to inspection and verification of the status of armed forces and armaments at any given time, the Authority, in accordance with the terms of the treaty (or treaties) establishing the general system of control, would have the task of determining the time and the manner of the reductions of armed forces and armaments.

IV - Relationship of the Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority to Other Organs of the United Nations and to Individual States.*

To the Security Council

62. The Authority should submit periodic and special reports to the Security Council.

63. The Authority's findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions should be immediately referred, with certification of facts, to the Security Council. Such findings should state whether the violations, evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions are of a major or minor character.

64. Such findings may be accompanied by such recommendations as the Authority may deem appropriate. In this regard, serious consideration should be given to the need to provide for specific steps that might be taken by the Security Council and/or the General Assembly to bring about rectification of violations of the terms of the treaty (or treaties). Provision should be made in the treaty (or treaties) to

*In general the relationships here set forth could be applied to the Disclosure and Verification Organization, ^{enable}

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

-16-

enable members of the United Nations to take action necessary to provide for their security in case minor violations are not rectified or in case a major violation occurs.

65. The Authority should be required to submit such special reports as might be requested by any seven members of the Security Council.

To the General Assembly

66. Under Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the Charter the General Assembly has broad authority to consider and make recommendations concerning the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. In order to assist the Assembly in the exercise of this function, the following relationships should be established:

67. The periodic reports and any findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions which are submitted to the Security Council should be transmitted to the General Assembly.

68. The Authority should be required to submit such special reports as might be requested by the General Assembly or any subsidiary body that the ^{General} Assembly might authorize to make such requests.

To the International Court of Justice

69. The Authority should be authorized by the General Assembly to request advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the Authority's activities. Proceedings before the Court, however, should not delay the taking of measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

To the Secretariat

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~~SECRET- SECURITY INFORMATION~~
-17-

To the Secretariat

70. The Authority might have an independent Secretariat separate from the United Nations Secretariat. It should be able, however, to utilize the services of the United Nations Secretariat to the extent mutually agreed upon. Reports and other communications from the Authority ^{other} to/organs of the United Nations should be transmitted through the Secretary General.

To the Economic and Social Council

71. Such relationships as may be necessary should be established between the Authority and the Economic and Social Council, its commissions and sub-commissions, and related specialized agencies.

To the Trusteeship Council

72. Such relationships as may be necessary should be established between the Authority and the Trusteeship Council.

With Individual States

73. Any findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions which are submitted to the Security Council should be transmitted to the signatory States.

74. The question of the relationship of the Authority to each participating State will require careful treaty definition, particularly as regards the extent to which the privileges and immunities accorded

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-18-

to the Authority will exempt it from the operation of national laws and the means by which individual rights and liberties will be protected against possible infringement stemming from inspections. The grant of privileges and immunities to the Authority should be based on the principle of minimum interference with the national laws of a State consistent with adequate supervision of the regulation and reduction of armaments.

75. The Authority should have no authority to issue directions or instructions to any State, except as may be provided in the treaty (or treaties) establishing the general system of control. The Authority should be authorized, however, to negotiate with each participating State such administrative agreements as may be necessary to carry out the treaty (or treaties).⁷

76. Each participating State should be obliged by the treaty (or treaties) to designate a national agency to supervise the execution of its obligations with respect to non-atomic armaments and to assist the Authority in its work.

77. The privileges and immunities of the Authority should include:

a. The right of its accredited representatives to the privileges and facilities of ingress, egress and access into and from the territory of participating States, including rights of transit for persons and equipment across or through such territory;

b. The right to the use of communication facilities adequate to the discharge of its responsibilities;

c. Such

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~~19~~

c. Such exemption from customs and immigration regulations as may be necessary to effective operations;

d. Inviolability of premises, property, and archives.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

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DAC D-7

April 18, 1952

WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

U.S. Position on Procedure and Timetable for Giving Effect
to Disarmament Program

The attached draft paper is distributed for the information of members of DAC, with a view towards a subsequent meeting to discuss this or a later draft of the paper.

Comments should be addressed to Mr. Warren Chase, UNA/P, Room 607, SA-5.

Leonard J. Horwits
Secretary of DAC

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

**US POSITION ON PROCEDURE AND TIMETABLE FOR GIVING EFFECT
TO DISARMAMENT PROGRAM**

(Item C of DC Plan of Work in UN Document DC/5)

PROBLEM

To establish a US position on Item C of the plan of work adopted by the Disarmament Commission on March 28, 1952 (UN Document DC/5). The plan is attached as Annex A.

DISCUSSION

A. Relevant sections of GA resolution.

The following paragraphs of the GA resolution of January 11, 1952, on the regulation, limitation, and reduction of armaments and armed forces are especially relevant:

"The General Assembly

* * * * *

"5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution;

"6. Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments,

(a) To determine how overall limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the overall limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments;

"7. Directs the Commission to commence its work not later than thirty days from the adoption of this resolution and to report periodically, for information, to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, or to the Members of the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission shall submit its first report not later than 1 June 1952;

"8. Declares

"8. Declares that a conference of all States should be convened to consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Commission as soon as the work of the Commission shall have progressed to a point where in the judgment of the Commission any part of its programme is ready for submission to governments;

"9. Requests the Secretary-General to convene such a conference when so advised by the Commission."

B. Timing of consideration of Item C.

In addition to adopting the annexed plan of work the Disarmament Commission on March 26, 1952, voted to consider Items A and B concurrently and to set up two committees for this purpose. Consideration of Item C was deferred. That item presumably will not be considered pending progress on Items A and B. Nevertheless, it seems desirable to outline at this time the chief issues arising under the item, since it is entirely possible that circumstances will develop requiring consideration of the item.

C. Chief procedural steps in the effort to disarmament program.

The GA resolution of January 11, 1952 contemplates a number of procedural steps in connection with the implementation of the disarmament program. These are in outline as follows:

1. Decision by Commission. Obviously all proposals will first be considered and approved by the Disarmament Commission.

2. Approval of Commission action by SC and GA. It might well be considered desirable to obtain favorable action by the SC or by the GA, or by both, on any proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Disarmament Commission before convening a conference of all states to consider them.

Although SC consideration of such proposals before their submission to such a conference is not called for by the GA resolution, and although the membership of the SC and of the Commission are the same, except for the inclusion of

Canada

- 3 -

Canada in the Commission when that state is not an SC member, SC consideration of such proposals before a conference of states might nevertheless be determined to be desirable in view of: (a) the provisions of paragraph 7 of the resolution (quoted above); (b) the fact that the Commission is established "under the SC"; and (c) the responsibilities with respect to the regulation of armaments imposed on the SC by Article 26 of the UN Charter. The existence of the "veto" in the SC should not prevent submission of proposals to the SC, since presumably no conference would be convened until the attainment of a measure of agreement among the great powers.

Although GA consideration of such proposals before their submission to a conference of all states is not called for by the GA resolution, it might nevertheless be determined to be desirable in view of: (a) the provisions of paragraph 7 of the GA resolution (quoted above); (b) the probable desirability of obtaining in this manner the reactions of most governments to the proposals before convening a conference of all states to consider them; and (c) the probable desirability of endowing the proposals with the prestige of GA approval before submitting them to such a conference. Should it appear likely that a long delay would result from awaiting GA consideration of the proposals, this Government might prefer to forego their submission to that organ.

3. Negotiations under Commission auspices. The negotiations among states under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission called for by paragraph 6 (b) of the GA resolution (quoted above) would not be part of the work either of the Commission or of a conference of all states. It may be decided that agreements on certain other matters involved in the regulation, limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces also should be negotiated elsewhere than in

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- 4 -

the Commission or in a conference of all states. For the reason given under D.2 (b) below, some of the negotiations under Commission auspices should take place prior to an international conference.

4. International conference. Paragraph 8 of the GA resolution (quoted above) provides for the convening at an appropriate time of an international conference. The chief problems concerning the convening of such a conference are dealt with in Section D below.

The procedure for giving effect to any program agreed upon in the Commission will accordingly include at least the following steps:

- 1) A decision by the Disarmament Commission that part or all of its program is ready for submission to a conference of all states, or will be ready for submission when stated conditions have been fulfilled.
- 2) A conference of all states convened by the SIG in consequence of the Commission's decision.
- 3) Negotiations among governments to reach any agreements not reached in the Commission or in an all states conference which will be necessary to give full effect to the Commission's program, such, for example, as the kind of agreement referred to in paragraph 6 (b) of the GA resolution (quoted above).

The procedure followed may include one or both of the following additional steps discussed above, to be taken before a conference of all states is called to consider Commission proposals:

- 1) SC consideration of the proposals.
- 2) GA consideration of the proposals.

D. Timing

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D. Timing of international conferences.

While the overriding consideration in determining the appropriate time for a conference of all states may well be the relationship of such a conference to our general policy towards the Soviet Union, nevertheless a number of technical factors set forth below will influence the US position on this matter.

1. The US preferred position should be to seek to have the Commission complete its work on all items of the annexed plan of work before a conference is called, unless it appears likely that to await the end of the Commission's labors on the entire program would unreasonably delay presentation to a conference of a detailed proposal covering all phases of disclosure and verification (Item A of the annexed plan of work). In that case the US should press for a conference to consider a proposal of the latter nature without awaiting Commission agreement on other proposals. The conference might also consider other Commission proposals which were ready for submission to it.

2. A conference of all states would serve no purpose:

(a) If the proposals to be considered were known to be unacceptable to any state whose ratification of a treaty embodying them would be essential.

(b) Until the governments disposing of much military power and perhaps certain other governments had reached agreement on all important matters which would be negotiated elsewhere than in the Commission or in the conference and which were closely related to the matters to be considered by the conference, e.g., the agreements in elaboration of Commission proposals which are mentioned in paragraph 6 (b) of the GA resolution (quoted above).

3. No

- 6 -

3. No purpose would be served by calling a conference to consider any proposed treaty on disclosure and verification (Item A of the annexed plan of work) which, in combination with any agreements on the subject which had been or remained to be negotiated elsewhere than in the Commission or in such a conference, would not contain sufficient detail to provide for an effective system of disclosure and verification.

Matters which would need to be covered in detail in a treaty on disclosure and verification include: (a) the staging and timing of disclosure and the attestation of completion of each stage; (b) the methods and machinery for verification, including procedures for resolving disputes between inspectors and individual states and for handling major violations; and (c) the determination of conditions governing the going into effect of the treaty, including a list of the states whose ratification would be essential.

4. Subject to the exception noted hereafter with respect to proposals for the control of atomic energy, no purpose would be served by calling a conference to consider a proposed treaty on the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces (Item B) unless in combination with previously negotiated treaties and the agreements which had been or remained to be negotiated elsewhere than in the Commission or in such a conference, the treaty would contain sufficient detail to provide effectively for the regulation, limitation, and reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including disclosure and verification, and the control of atomic energy. The matters on which agreement would be necessary for that purpose would go much beyond general principles.

Matters which would need to be covered in detail in a treaty (or treaties) for the effective regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments

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- 7 -

and armed forces include, in addition to matters necessary for the putting into effect of an effective system of disclosure and verification: (a) the program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction; (b) a system for the control of atomic energy not less effective than the UN plan; (c) criteria for limitation of armed forces and armaments; (d) national programs within these criteria, including specific ceilings for armed forces and certain armaments; (e) elimination of certain categories of non-atomic weapons; (f) establishment of international machinery to ensure effective implementation; and (g) the conditions for the going into effect of the treaty or treaties, including a list of states whose ratification would be essential.

5. In view of existing US commitments this Government could not oppose the calling of a conference of all states to consider as the sole item proposals for a treaty for the control of atomic energy. It would be necessary, however, for the proposed atomic energy treaty to: (a) ensure when operative the effective control of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purpose only; and (b) establish acceptable time and other relationships between the program for atomic energy control and the general program for the regulation, limitation, and reduction of all armed forces and all other armaments, including disclosure and verification.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. The procedure for giving effect to any program agreed upon in the Disarmament Commission will or may include the following steps:

1. It will include a decision by the Disarmament Commission that part or all of its program is ready for submission to a conference of all states or will be ready for submission when stated conditions have been fulfilled.

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2. It may include consideration of the Commission proposals by the SC, by the GA, or by both, before their submission to an all-states conference.

3. It will include negotiations among states under Commission auspices to reach all agreements ~~which are~~ needed to give full effect to the Commission's program ^{which are} to be negotiated elsewhere than in the Commission or in an all-states conference (e.g., the agreements mentioned in paragraph 6 (b) of the GA resolution of January 11, 1952, quoted in the Discussion). Some of the negotiations should take place prior to an all-states conference (see B.2 (b) below).

4. It will include a conference of all states.

B. While the overriding consideration in determining the appropriate time for an all-states conference may well be the relationship of such a conference to our general policy towards the Soviet Union, the following technical factors will influence the US position on this matter:

1. The US preferred position should be to seek to have the Commission complete its work on all items of the annexed plan of work before an all-states conference is called, unless it appears likely that to await the end of the Commission's labors on the entire program would unreasonably delay presentation to such a conference of a detailed proposal covering all phases of disclosure and verification. In that case the US should press for a conference to consider a proposal of the latter nature without awaiting Commission agreement on other proposals. The conference might also consider other Commission proposals which were ready for submission to it.

2. A

- 9 -

2. A conference of all states would serve no purpose:

- (a) If the proposals to be considered were known to be unacceptable to any state whose ratification of a treaty embodying them would be essential.
- (b) Until the governments disposing of much military power and perhaps certain other governments had reached all important agreements to be negotiated elsewhere than in the conference which were closely related to the matters to be considered by the conference.
- (c) Unless a treaty embodying the proposals to be considered by the conference, in combination with agreements negotiated or to be negotiated elsewhere:
 - (1) would provide in full detail for an effective system of disclosure and verification; or
 - (2) would provide in full detail for the effective regulation, limitation, and reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including disclosure and verification and the control of atomic energy; or
 - (3) would (i) when operative ensure the effective control of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only; and (ii) establish acceptable time and other relationships between the program for atomic energy control and the general program for the regulation, limitation, and reduction of all armed forces and of all other armaments, including disclosure and verification.

ANNEX A

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION PLAN OF WORK

- A. Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments, and of all armed forces.
- B. Regulation of all armaments and armed forces, including:
 - 1. Elimination of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy with a view to ensuring their elimination;
 - 2. Elimination of weapons of mass destruction and control with a view to ensuring their elimination;
 - 3. Limitation and balanced reduction of all other armaments and of all armed forces, and control of this limitation and reduction.
- C. Procedure and timetable for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

Points A and B to be studied concurrently in the first stage of the Commission's work.