



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM

61-9102

22 NOV 1961

00-6764-61

FOR: The Honorable
Allen Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: L. D. Battle *OK*
Executive Secretary

I enclose for your information a
copy of Ambassador Merchant's report on
his recent mission to Pakistan and
Afghanistan.

Enclosure:

Cy of Amb. Merchant's
report, 11/16/61.

(RECEIVED)

[Handwritten signature]

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TO: The Secretary
S/S
THROUGH: NSA - Phillips Talbot *(P)*
DATE: November 16, 1961
FROM: Livingston T. Merchant *LTM*
SUBJECT: Conclusions and Recommendations Resulting from my Visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan from Oct. 19 to Nov. 8, 1961, as the Personal Representative of the President of the United States for the Exercise of his Good Offices in Connection with the Stoppage of Transit Traffic to and from Afghanistan through Pakistan.

It seems to me unnecessary to summarize my numerous reports to you during the period of my mission. Accordingly, I am confining this final report to my conclusions and recommendations for the future with respect to this problem. What follows reflects my oral report to you and later to President Kennedy at the White House on the afternoon of November 10, during which call Mr. Talbot was also present.

For convenience sake I am attaching a record of my itinerary (Tab A) and a chronological listing of my reports by telegram and despatch from the area (Tab B).

Before setting forth my conclusions, I might usefully record the character of my reception in the two countries.

In Pakistan, President Ayub, Foreign Minister Qadir, and all officials with whom I talked treated me with extreme cordiality and friendliness throughout. President Ayub and Mr. Qadir, however, from the outset were frank in saying that, greatly as they appreciated President Kennedy's friendly interest in this matter, they considered the timing of the President's offer of good offices and my consequent visit to be premature. They expressed the fear that this would be interpreted by the Afghans as undue anxiety on the part of the United States and would lead to increased rather than lessened intransigence on the part of the Afghans. Nonetheless, they expressed the desire loyally to cooperate with the United States and in good faith attempt to make my mission a success.

I was received in Afghanistan by the King, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister with equal warmth and friendliness. All of them seemed genuinely grateful for this mark of President Kennedy's personal interest

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interest in Afghanistan. From the outset they made clear that whatever the outcome of my mission, they would always remember with pleasure receiving me as the President's personal representative.

I did my utmost during the course of my time spent in the two countries and in my final talks with both governments to assure that my failure to achieve any concrete result neither ended the continuing exercise of good offices in the matter by President Kennedy nor in any way diminished the understanding and friendship on the part of the United States for each country. I do not believe that my visit, in fact, worsened in any way the situation as I found it or impaired our relationship with either government.

Conclusions:

1. Wise and desirable as it was to seek to deal with the problem of transit in isolation, the fact is that the transit traffic through Pakistan and the modalities under which it moves are inextricably involved in the attitudes and policies of Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively, with regard to the "Pushtunistan" question. This fact accounts for the lack of total frankness as to underlying motives and attitudes which I found in my talks with both parties. It underlies, for example, the willingness of the Government of Pakistan to go to some inconvenience and even expense to shift physically the point of delivery for transit goods from Peshawar, the traditional railhead, to the Afghan border or at least as far as the Khyber Pass. Similarly, though for different reasons, it underlies the Afghan refusal to consider such an arrangement, notwithstanding the fact that convenience, the simplifying of paper work, and the rational operation of transit traffic through one country to another all argue forcefully for such an arrangement for shipment in bond. The Afghans regard the Durand Line as dividing Afghanistan from "occupied Pushtunistan" and not as its border with Pakistan. However, all logistic sense is on the side of a border delivery point on the Peshawar route under physical arrangements directly comparable to those already in existence on the Chaman route.

2. I do not believe that Afghanistan, either by choice or by the present degree of its exposure to Soviet infiltration and influence, has yet reached the point of no return as an independent country, free from alignment with the Soviet bloc. Neither do I believe that in a few months the Afghans will be irretrievably lost, even if the stoppage of transit traffic through Pakistan continues for that period with the resultant reduction of visible American presence and the virtual elimination of commercial contact with the free world. A permanent

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closure of the transit route through Pakistan or its blockage for a year or more would, however, give the Soviets a virtually free field in which to operate their highly sophisticated, many faceted apparatus for gaining control and, as a consequence, reduce any later chance or opportunity for us to help Afghanistan recover genuine independence.

3. Pakistan is a stout ally of the United States, effectively cooperating with us in many areas of the greatest importance to our own national security. It is consequently my strong view that we should never pursue policies with respect to Afghanistan which would undermine the loyalty and reliability of Pakistan as an ally.

4. I found, or in some cases sensed, certain miscalculations and illusions in the background of the policies of each government. These I sought to dispel, I believe with some success. With respect to Afghanistan, they were:

a. That the United States was so attached to its aid program to Afghanistan either for its own sake or because of its desire to call and raise any aid offer by the Soviets to any neutral country that it would put sufficient pressure on the Government of Pakistan to force the reopening of the transit traffic on Afghan terms;

b. That if the present prospect of no immediate reopening of the transit route through Pakistan forces the United States to reduce or eliminate its economic aid program to Afghanistan, the program could be restored, in its present form, with no difficulty and little delay at some period in the distant future when the route did reopen;

c. That historical Afghan tactics of playing the great powers off against each other can work with the same success against the sophisticated methods of the Soviet government as they did against the Czarist regime.

5. With respect to Pakistan, these miscalculations and illusions were:

a. That the United States might be contemplating placing on the Government of Pakistan unacceptable pressures to pursue a course of policy in action with respect to Afghanistan which the Pakistanis genuinely believed to be unwise and contrary to their own security interest. Such pressure by the United States would pose a basic problem to the Government of Pakistan in maintaining public support for its policies.

Moreover,

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Moreover, while the expression of public opinion is not today in Pakistan the force that it is in the United States, the Ayub government is beginning to move from an authoritarian regime toward greater freedoms under the forthcoming new constitution. To that extent, the government must take into greater account public emotions and attitudes than has been the case in the past three years. In this connection what the Pakistanis refer to as Afghanistan's "Pushtunistan stunt" has a genuine and high emotional content for many Pakistanis outside as well as in the government;

b. That if Ayub's tactics with respect to the present difficulties with the Afghans later bring the latter "to their knees," the United States would be able promptly and easily to meet an Afghan call for help by restoring a large aid program which the blockade on transit had gravely reduced or, indeed, ended.

6. Both governments are to blame for the present impasse with respect to transit traffic. The Afghans, however, must, in my judgment, bear the major share of the blame. If they have not, in fact, perversely and for reasons of face blockaded themselves, at least they have stubbornly refused to test the public assurances and protestations by the Government of Pakistan of its willingness to permit the actual movement of freight on the transit route. Moreover, I consider that the only significant concessions made with a view to arriving at a workable modus vivendi on transit came from the Pakistanis.

7. That a solution to this problem through the continuing exercise of good offices by the United States is by no means hopeless. I think that my talks sharpened the issues, improved the basis for devising an effective formula, and are currently forcing both governments seriously to re-examine their respective policies in the matter. The passage of a little time (and I am thinking in terms of three or four weeks) now seems to me an essential element in preparing the ground for the second, and, I would hope, successful effort for us to play an effective role in solving this problem.

Recommendations:

1. That our good offices in the next round be exercised through Ambassadors Rountree and Byroade in a concerted approach, each to the government to which he is accredited, along lines to be devised by the Department in consultation with our two Ambassadors.

2. That we not contemplate penalizing the Government of Pakistan in the treatment we give it in respect to aid or in any other area but

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that we continue to leave them in no doubt that we seriously disagree with the wisdom of their current tactics for dealing with Afghanistan however completely we share a common purpose and objective.

3. That we similarly continue to deal in friendly fashion with the Afghans.

4. That we promptly reach decisions with respect to the size and character of our existing economic aid program to Afghanistan on the assumption that the transit route through Karachi is unlikely to be reopened earlier than two or three months hence. I strongly believe we should keep going as much of the program as can be logistically supported, without extravagant transport costs, either by air or by the route through Iran via Meshed. This will entail a project by project review on which the recommendations of Ambassador Byroade and the USOM in Kabul will be of great value. Some projects may necessitate cancellation; others may be susceptible to mothballing; still others now in the last stages of completion might be feasibly carried to conclusion, even at considerable added transport cost. Certainly, programs such as in the educational field, where people rather than tonnage are important, should be maintained and extended as opportunities can be developed. Ambassador Byroade should be kept currently informed of decisions in process in Washington so that he is enabled to keep the Afghan Government currently apprised of the sad, progressive and inexorable consequences of the blocked transit route.

5. That we not give, under existing circumstances, consideration to the construction, at U. S. Government expense, of a new rail or road route into Afghanistan through Iran. For the decades ahead and on the twin assumptions that Afghanistan shows an effective desire to remain free and survives the dangerous phase through which it is now passing, the creation of such a third major route of access makes sense. Under current conditions, however, it would be a reckless project for the United States to support. It could neither come into operation in time to deal with the crisis now hovering over Afghanistan nor would a start on its construction contribute to putting pressure on either Afghanistan or Pakistan to get the Karachi route reopened.

6. That serious thought be given to urging the Federal Republic of Germany to use the Soviet overland transit route to Afghanistan for the shipment of materials necessary for the various German projects scheduled or underway in Afghanistan. Despite obvious unattractive political aspects of doing this, it would at least keep some substantial Western economic presence in Afghanistan.

7. That no

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7. That no Presidential message to Ayub or the King or both be sent, at least until the tactics for the next assault on the problem have been determined.

In conclusion, it goes without saying that I have been honored by the confidence you and the President have shown by having designated me for this purpose, that I am regretful that I was unable to achieve any demonstrable result, and that I am readily available to come to Washington from Ottawa at any time my presence in the Department would be considered helpful in the formulation of future moves.

Attachments:

Tab A - Itinerary

Tab B - Chronological listing of reports
(SECRET and LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

LTMerchant:paj:11/11/61

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Chronology, Itinerary and Substantive Aspects of Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (including social events of an official nature)

- 10/16/61 (Mon.) Departed Washington via National and Pan American Airways to Istanbul with Mrs. Merchant and Spengler.
- 10/17/61 (Tue.) Arrived Istanbul for day of rest.
- 10/18/61 (Wed.) Proceeded to Karachi via Pan American Airways.
- 10/19/61 (Thu.) Arrived Karachi (early morning).
Paid courtesy call on Pakistan Foreign Secretary DEHLAVI (afternoon).
- 10/20/61 (Fri.) Proceeded to Rawalpindi via PIA with Amb. Rountree, Mrs. Merchant and Spengler.
Conferred with President AYUB KHAN and members of the Pakistan Cabinet (late morning).
Conferred with Foreign Minister QADIR and colleagues (noon).
Entertained by Foreign Minister QADIR at lunch at his residence.
Prepared reports on aforementioned meetings (afternoon).
Entertained by President AYUB KHAN at small reception at his residence (evening).
Attended dinner given by Amb. Rountree for Foreign Minister QADIR and members of the Pakistan Cabinet at ICA Staff House (evening).
- 10/21/61 (Sat.) Completed reports (morning).
Proceeded to Peshawar by Consulate car with Mrs. Merchant and Spengler (afternoon).
Arrived Peshawar (evening).
- 10/22/61 (Sun.) Visited Cantonment and City railway yards and storage areas in Peshawar to inspect condition of transit goods being held there (morning). Accompanied by Deputy Director of Operations, PWR, ZAMAN and staff.
Visited Khyber Pass with Brigadier RAHMAN GUL, IGFC; Political Agent Khyber AYUB; and Consul Makepeace.
Lunched at Khyber Rifles Mess. Viewed Khyber Railway and Afghan border from top of pass (afternoon).
Gave off-the-record interview to Paul GRIMES, New York Times correspondent (evening).

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10/22/61 (Sun.) Called on Air Marshal ASGHAR KHAN, C-in-C of the PAF,
(Continued) and Begum Khan (evening).

Dined at Consulate with members of official American
community.

10/23/61 (Mon.) Proceeded to Kabul via Karachi Air Attache plane with
Mrs. Merchant and Spengler (noon). Required to fly
Peshawar-D.I.K.-Ghazni-Kabul corridor.

Arrived Kabul (afternoon). Conferred with Ambassador
Byroade and DCM Hannah.

10/24/61 (Tue.) Conferred with Afghan Foreign Minister NAIM (morning).

Audience with King ZAHIR SHAH (late morning).

Conferred with Prime Minister DAUD (afternoon).

Entertained by Foreign Minister NAIM at dinner at
Chilsatan Palace with Cabinet members and RGA offi-
cials (evening).

10/25/61 (Wed.) Prepared reports at chancery (morning).

Entertained by Deputy Foreign Minister SULEIMAN at
lunch at Paghman.

Departed Kabul for Karachi by Kabul Air Attache plane
(afternoon).

Arrived Karachi (evening).

10/26/61 (Thu.) Conferred with Ambassador Rountree and Acting DCM
Linebaugh.

Began drafting proposal to be submitted to GOP and
RGA.

10/27/61 (Fri.) Continued preparation of draft proposal.

10/28/61 (Sat.) Completed proposal and cabled text to Department for
review.

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10/23/61 (Sat.) Received Foreign Secretary DEHLAVI at Ambassador's residence for discussion of plans for proceeding with mission (evening).
(Continued)
Attended dinner by Ambassador Rountree for outgoing Pakistan Chief of Protocol, Air Commodore RABB.

10/29/61 (Sun.) Studied Department's comments and suggestions on draft proposal.

10/30/61 (Mon.) Called on Foreign Secretary DEHLAVI, accompanied by Ambassador Rountree, to inform him of draft proposal (morning).
Proceeded to Rawalpindi by Karachi Air Attache plane with Ambassador Rountree and Spengler (noon).
Re-worked draft proposal while awaiting appointments with GOP officials (afternoon).

10/31/61 (Tue.) Conferred with Foreign Minister QADIR during working lunch at State Guest House (afternoon).
Prepared re-draft of proposal (evening).

11/1/61 (Wed.) Presented revised proposal to Foreign Minister QADIR (late morning).
Discussed revised proposal with President AYUB KHAN and Foreign Minister QADIR (noon).
Discussed in further detail the revised proposal with Foreign Minister QADIR at working lunch (afternoon).
Revised proposal further in accordance with preceding discussion (evening).
Delivered revised proposal to Foreign Minister QADIR who telephoned his concurrence (late evening).

11/2/61 (Thu.) Proceeded to Kabul via Karachi Air Attache plane with Spengler; delayed due to mechanical trouble (noon).
Arrived Kabul (afternoon). Conferred with Ambassador Byroade.

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11/2/61 (Thu.) Called on Foreign Minister NAIM and presented proposal
(Continued) (afternoon).

Co-hosted dinner with Ambassador Byroade for Foreign Minister NAIM and members of the Afghan Cabinet and Government.

11/3/61 (Fri.) Holiday in Afghanistan. Prepared reports at chancery.

Entertained by USOM Director Schwartz at dinner with USOM section chiefs and other key aid program officials.

11/4/61 (Sat.) Prepared proposed departure statement and other reports at chancery, and cabled statement to Dept. (morning).

Conferred with Foreign Minister NAIM and received RCA counterproposal (afternoon).

11/5/61 (Sun.) Proceeded to Karachi via Kabul Air Attache plane (morning).

Arrived Karachi (afternoon). Prepared and cabled to Department tentative conclusions and recommendations.

11/6/61 (Mon.) Called on Foreign Minister QADIR at Foreign Office for final discussion (morning).

Prepared for departure from Karachi.

Arranged for simultaneous release of approved departure statement through USIS in Karachi and Kabul with embargo to 12:05 a.m., 11/7/61.

11/7/61 (Tue.) Received instruction from Department to delay departure pending receipt of further instructions (early morning, too late to recall departure statement).

Requested Secretary's permission to depart for Washington following day (morning). Received permission (late evening).

11/8/61 (Wed.) Departed Karachi for London by BOAC (morning).

Arrived London for day of rest and call at U. S. Embassy (evening).

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11/9/61 (Thu.) Proceeded to New York and Washington via Pan American
and National Airlines (evening).

Arrived in Washington (late evening).

11/10-11/61 Consultation in Washington. Conferred with the Presi-
dent, the Secretary, and officials of NEA. Prepared
final report.

WFSpengler:paj
11/13/61

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List of Reports Submitted to the Department by
Ambassador Merchant in Connection with his
Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan

Note: All telegrams and despatches listed
in this document are classified SECRET and
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<u>Subject</u>	<u>Report</u>
Conversation with the President, 10/16/61.	Memcon, 10/16/61.
Initial conversation with Pakistan Foreign Secretary DEHLAVI, Karachi, 10/19/61.	Karachi's Tel. 726, 10/19/61 (CONFIDENTIAL).
Conversations with GOP officials, Rawalpindi, 10/20/61.	Karachi's Tel. 735, 10/21/61 (General summary).
Conversation with President AYUB KHAN and members of Pakistan Cabinet, Rawalpindi, 10/20/61.	Karachi's Tel. 737, 10/21/61 (telegraphic summary). Karachi's D-281, 10/26/61 (Enclosure 1 - full memcon).
Conversation with Pakistan Foreign Minister QADIR, Rawalpindi, 10/20/61.	Karachi's Tel. 738, 10/21/61 (telegraphic summary). Karachi's D-281, 10/26/61 (Enclosure 2 - full memcon).
Private conversation with President AYUB KHAN, Rawalpindi, 10/20/61.	Karachi's Tel. 768, 10/26/61 (telegraphic summary). Karachi's D-281, 10/26/61 (Enclosure 3 - full memcon).
Conversations with RGA officials, Kabul, 10/24/61.	Kabul's Tel. 314, 10/24/61 (general summary).
Conversation with Afghan Foreign Minister NAIM, Kabul, 10/24/61.	Kabul's Tel. 317, 10/25/61 (telegraphic summary). Kabul's D-___, 10/ /61 (full memcon; not received in Department by 11/11/61).
Audience with King ZAHIR SHAH, Kabul, 10/24/61.	(To be reported by Ambassador Byroade by despatch).

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Conversation with Prime Minister DAUD,
Kabul, 10/24/61.

Kabul's Tel. 318, 10/26/61
(telegraphic summary)
Karachi's D-282, 10/27/61
(full memcon)

Brief report on proposed procedure
for second round of talks with GOP
and RGA.

Karachi's Tel. 771, 10/27/61.

Report on substance of proposed
approaches to GOP and RGA in second
round.

Karachi's Tel. 772, 10/27/61.

Texts of draft proposals which Ambassador
Merchant planned to present to GOP and RGA.

Karachi's D-284, 10/30/61
(transmitting texts)

Brief report of trend in second round
of talks, Rawalpindi, 10/31/61.

Karachi's Tel. 790, 11/1/61.

Telegraphic summary of second round of
talks with GOP officials, Rawalpindi,
10/31/61 and 11/1/61.

Karachi's Tel. 798, 11/2/61.

Conversations with Pakistan Foreign
Secretary DEHLAVI, Karachi, 10/28/61
and 10/30/61.

Karachi's D-296, 11/3/61
(Enclosures 1 and 2 - full
memcons).

Conversation with Foreign Minister QADIR,
Rawalpindi, 10/31/61.

Kabul's D-81, 11/4/61.

Conversation with Foreign Minister QADIR,
Rawalpindi, morning of 11/1/61.

Karachi's D-303, 11/6/61
(Enclosure 1 - full memcon)

Conversation with President AYUB KHAN,
Rawalpindi, 11/1/61 (noon).

Karachi's D-303, 11/6/61
(Enclosure 2 - full memcon).

Conversation with Foreign Minister QADIR,
Rawalpindi, afternoon of 11/1/61.

Karachi's D-303, 11/6/61
(Enclosure 3 - full memcon)

Text of letter to Foreign Minister, 11/1/61,
enclosing revised draft proposal.

Karachi's D-296, 11/3/61
(transmitting text)

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Telegraphic report of trend of second round of talks with RGA, Kabul, 11/2/61.

Kabul's Tel. 331, 11/3/61.

Conversation with Afghan Foreign Minister NAM, Kabul, 11/2/61.

Kabul's Tel. 332, 11/3/61
(telegraphic summary)
Kabul's D-80, 11/4/61
(full memcon).

Comment on Deptel 177 regarding proposed Presidential letter.

Kabul's Tel. 333, 11/3/61.

Conversation with Foreign Minister NAM, Kabul, 11/4/61.

Kabul's Tel. 336, 11/4/61
(Ambassador Merchant's assessment).
Kabul's Tel. 338, 11/5/61
(telegraphic summary).
Karachi's D-____, 11/6/61
(Enclosure 1 - full memcon; not received in Department by 11/11/61).

Brief conversation with Afghan Foreign Ministry official, Kabul, 11/5/61.

Karachi's D-____, 11/6/61
(full memcon).

Text of proposed departure statement by Ambassador Merchant.

Kabul's Tel. 337, 11/4/61
(transmitting text).

Report on proposed procedure for concluding good offices mission.

Karachi's Tel. 816, 11/6/61.

Final conversation with Pakistan Foreign Minister ADER, Karachi, 11/6/61.

Karachi's Tel. 821, 11/6/61
(brief summary).
Karachi's Tel. 830, 11/7/61
(full telegraphic summary).
Karachi's D-____, _____
(full memcon; not received in Department by 11/11/61).

Final telegraphic reports from Karachi concerning conclusion of mission and issuance of departure statement.

Karachi's Tels. 826 and 828, 11/7/61.

Conversation with the President, 11/10/61.

Memcon, 11/10/61.

Final report to the Secretary, 11/11/61.

Memorandum to the Secretary through NEA, 11/11/61.

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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
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1 - For your information.			
2 - For your information and retention.			
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