

JUL 18 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff

SUBJECT : Information Relative to NESC Activities

REFERENCE : Letter of NESC Staff Director dated 24 June 1955  
with enclosures

1. Comment on reference Enclosure 1 (Procedure) has been forwarded to the Chairman NESC by letter dated 22 June 1955 as a follow up on the discussion of procedure and the decisions taken in the 10 June meeting of the NESC in the Chairman's office.
2. Enclosure 2 (Plan "A" Surprise Attack) has been examined. This general war plan appears well presented to serve the purpose of the evaluation and to exercise initial control of the war gaming incident to the later steps of the approved procedure.
3. After completion of the war gaming, I would very much appreciate being informed by briefings or otherwise of the major conclusions reached. It would also seem to me desirable for our committee to consider these results before the final stages of the study such as damage assessments are undertaken. I suggest this primarily to avoid our being confronted at the end of the exercise with an indigestible mass of material to review.

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

ONE:

Rewritten ODDI:RAMory, Jr.:jb  
11 July 1955

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - forward  
2 - O/DCI ✓  
1 -   
2 - O/DD/I  
1 - ER

11 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

25X1 1. Attached hereto find memorandum to you from General George together with [ ] suggested draft for your signature and a revision thereof that I have prepared. My rewriting of paragraph 3 is intended to clarify [ ] point and relate it to other over-all responsibilities of the committee as such, and to stress the point that if everything is left to the end of the exercise, the chance for any wise review of the war game will be negligible. 25X1

2. I have omitted his paragraph 4 for two reasons:

(1) I disagree on technical grounds with the implied estimate that the "long end runs" would jeopardize Surprise.

(2) Since the committee has decided to present two "extreme possibilities", I believe it is right that the most pessimistic be one that deprives of the warning that would be received if our forward bases were struck first.

25X1 3. [ ] is on leave but I am prepared to discuss this with you on call.

[ ]

RAJr.

25X1 De Montague concurs in my redraft

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

*Handwritten: Bell's report*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF

SUBJECT : Information Relative to NESC Activities

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1. Comment on reference Enclosure 1 (Procedure) has been forwarded to the Chairman NESC by letter dated 22 June 1955 as a follow up on the discussion of procedure and the decisions taken in the 10 June meeting of the NESC in the Chairman's office.

2. Enclosure 2 (Plan "A" Surprise Attack) has been examined. This general war plan appears well presented to serve the purpose of the evaluation and to exercise initial control of the war gaming incident to the later steps of the approved procedure.

3. Since many major decisions having very important bearing on the over-all evaluation are to be made in the war gaming exercises, it would be helpful to me in forming my judgments on the final evaluation to be informed through briefings or otherwise of the interim assumptions or estimates and the major interim conclusions reached before proceeding with the steps necessary in final damage assessments. An example of one item is the determination of the optimum air strike as a result of war gaming various combinations of penetrations and bombing profiles.

4. Although I assume that the plans for Initial Phase A, Initial Phase B and Second Attack as set forth in Annex C will not be finalized until some preliminary war gaming has been conducted, I question the judgment that the Soviet leaders would be willing (as Plan A now indicates) to accept the risk to their security of delaying for many hours the initiation of Initial Phase B overseas attack in order to seek surprise for

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the Initial Attack Phase A. In view of the routes over busy sea lanes of the adopted flank attacks and the over-all magnitude of the Initial Phase A attack, I do not believe that the Soviet leaders would expect with confidence that the attack could reach our US contiguous or early warning radar lines without discovery prior to H hour. No doubt your preliminary war gaming will reveal the cost to the USSR under the circumstances of loss of surprise and will influence the final plan adopted.


ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

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This is an extra  
copy, since I marked  
Cij # 3 for G.H.  
Cij # 4 to DCI file  
(via heading)



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