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8 MAR 1959

Canal
Admiral Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Arleigh:

Reference is made to your letter of 8 January, 1959, enclosing a Navy staff study, together with ONI comments, on the subject of exploiting possible differences between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. I wrote you an interim reply on 12 January.

As you undoubtedly have been advised, General Erskine chaired a meeting in his office on 19 February which was attended by Admiral William Miller and Captain George Raring, both of your office, and Messrs. [redacted] of my staff. I am told that at the meeting there was a detailed discussion of the Navy suggestions, which incidentally we considered constructive and useful, and the CIA representatives indicated that they would be glad to consider and discuss any further specific recommendations along similar lines. As we pointed out, we have a number of efforts devoted to achieving the objectives suggested by the Navy study and new ideas are always welcome.

I also understand that General Erskine proposes, as a result of the discussion, to bring the Navy suggestions to the attention of Mr. Quarles in order that he can consider the possibility that U.S. policy should be amended to call for an even stronger effort toward encouraging or aggravating Sino-Soviet friction than now directed. In my opinion, no such review is necessary but I have, of course, no objection to the point being raised with Mr. Quarles. Let me, however, refer you to the recent National Intelligence Estimate on the "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-1963" (NIE 11-4-58) in which we conclude that the parallelism of material, strategic and ideological interests will continue to weigh decisively in favor of cementing the alliance between the USSR and the PRC even though frictions over a variety of questions may from time to time make the relationship a sensitive and difficult one.

STATE, NAVY review(s) completed.

At any rate, thanks again for your interest, and please let me know if you have any further comments on this matter.

Sincerely,
SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

cc: DDCI

Signature Recommended:

[Redacted Signature]

Deputy Director (Plans)

A/DD/P/ [Redacted] awn (25 Feb. *59)

[Redacted]

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WPC
DDCI
2 Mar 1959

Basic: TS 165167. A
TS 165167

Interim reply TS 165164
TS 165166

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January 12, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bissell, DD/P
Mr. Helms, COPS
Mr. Barnes, A/DD/P/P

I have sent a preliminary acknowledgment of the paper which Arleigh Burke has sent, and which is attached. I suggest that this should be looked at by FE, the PP staff, and CIO, and that their coordinated comments come back through you to me for Arleigh.

So far I have only glanced over the paper.

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Enclosure

AWD:at

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January 12, 1959

Admiral Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Arleigh:

I appreciate your note of 8 January 1959, enclosing a staff study by the Navy, together with ONI comments thereon, dealing particularly with the exploitation of inherent differences between the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China.

This is a very interesting theme and one to which we have given considerable attention. I am asking the competent people over here, on a highly classified basis, to give this paper thorough study, and I shall be in touch with you later when I have the results of their work.

I sincerely appreciate your letting us have a chance to study this paper.

Faithfully yours,

S/
Allen W. Dulles
Director

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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

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8 January 1959

PERSONAL - TOP SECRET

Dear Allen:

Enclosed is a staff study by the Navy. I am sure you are already working on many of the ideas in this paper but, perhaps, there might be something in here that will be useful to you.

This is a rough draft paper only and you will note that I enclose a statement by ONI which doesn't quite support the optimistic view contained in the paper of the results to be expected.

Warm Regards.

Sincerely,

ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable
Allen Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.

Encl.

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16-5-117/10
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30 December 1958

Subject: ONI Comments on Cold War Operation Plan

1. The following comments are submitted:

a. Intelligence:

The intelligence pertinent to this paper is contained in paragraph 2 (SITUATION) and paragraph 3 (DISCUSSION). The basic intelligence pertaining to the instability of the USSR - PRC alliance is considered to be accurate. However, ONI does not believe a split between the USSR and the PRC is as imminent as indicated. Recent events connected with the PRC communes indicate that the Soviet Union wields considerable influence in the PRC. Therefore, the major point of difference between ONI and the views presented in this paper has to do with the imminence of a real break rather than the eventuality of such a break.

b. Evaluation of the CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

The general course of action is considered to be sound. However, Communist political leaders are themselves masters of the sophisticated approach in "divide and conquer" operations. Therefore, this portion of the plan - initially at least - should not be expected to produce substantial results. It may become counter productive once the Communists realize that the U.S. (West) is employing this tactic. Should this occur it may be necessary to shift the emphasis from the Communist leaders to the peoples of the two countries.

It is believed that sufficient genuine events and statements exist as to make unnecessary the use of fictitious items. Utilization of genuine events would avoid the danger of having any portion of the overall plan discredited.

Allan L. Reed

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Appendix to
Op-60 EM 000899-58
31 DEC 1958

PSYCHOLOGICAL - DECOMMISSION COLD WAR OPERATION PLAN

1. OBJECTIVE.

To divide the Communist world into two competitive and hostile blocs by exploitation of the inherent suspicions and latent antagonisms existing between USSR and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).

2. SITUATION.

a. Russia and the PRC share the longest international boundary in the world.

b. PRC is hard pressed to feed its 650 million people. Estimates place the CHICOM population at 1 billion by 1980. The CHICOM long range planners soon must face up to the major problem of how to feed this population.

c. Eastern Russia is sparsely settled and has a relatively high percentage of arable land.

d. SE Asia can absorb only a small part of excess CHICOM population. The most natural outlet for CHICOM expansion is in the direction of historic Mongol aggression; that is westward.

Why not southward? CPC
e. PRC is an Asiatic nation with deep seated resentments against the West. Basically the Russians are included in this resentment, first because the Russian power elite is Caucasian and secondly because Russia participated in the wholesale exploitation of China during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

f. Despite its isolation Russia is fundamentally European. Its people, culture, and history are identified with the West. The CHICOM economic and population expansion should, at least to some extent, revive the "Yellow Peril" fears in the Russian people.

g. The USSR-PRC alliance is inherently unstable and unnatural. The primary bond between the two nations is a mixture of Communist dogma and a paranoid belief that only by joining together against their common enemy, the West, will they be able to survive. The nascent rivalry between USSR and the PRC, the dissimilarity of their peoples and culture, and their geographical contiguity will operate to split the alliance. Yugoslavia is one example of the fact that a common belief in Communism may not be a sufficient bond, particularly when that belief is subject to heresy. Moreover the disruptive forces that were present in the case of Yugoslavia do not appear to be nearly as strong as those latent in the USSR-PRC alliance.

h. PRC will soon be in a position of *challenging* the USSR.

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leadership of the Communist world, particularly as regards the Afro-Asian nations. These countries feel akin to the PRC since it is a non-white and a previously exploited nation. The Afro-Asian nations see the spectacular post-World War II emergence of China as the mirror image of their own ambitions.

i. Both USSR and the PRC are police states with all the associated phobias inherent in that type government. Because both nations practice deceit and intrigue in dealing with the West they are each psychologically conditioned to accept evidence that the other is scheming against it.

j. In event of an all out war Russia would be the primary target of US nuclear delivery forces and would suffer devastation to the extent that political control of the satellite nations and of Russia proper would be lost. The CHICOMs will receive much less megatons than Russia and their dispersed economy is less vulnerable. As a result and in the event the US is unable to follow up its nuclear attack by military and political actions in Eurasia the CHICOMs would emerge as the real victors. Russian planners probably are aware of this contingency.

k. Russia looted Manchuria immediately following World War II. Russia did this while simultaneously supporting the CHICOMs in the civil war against the GRC forces. The conclusion is either (1) Russia deliberately robbed its own ally or (2) it did not expect the CHICOMs to win. The first alternative is more logical and probably correct.

l. The recently constituted CHICOM "People Communes" are directly opposed to the traditionally strong Chinese family relationships. They represent a vulnerable and unstable aspect in CHICOM society.

3. DISCUSSION.

a. There is a growing world-wide appreciation of the foregoing facts. The attached clipping and dispatch are typical of this trend. Tito recently stated that the CHICOMs blasts against him were in reality directed towards Moscow. This climate of opinion provides fertile ground for artificially expediting Sino-Soviet breakup.

b. Russia and CHICOM planners alike must be aware of the growing bi-polarity of the Communist world and that sooner or later a showdown will result. Russia has the more reason to be disturbed and suspicious; first because of the population factor, secondly because of the natural bonds between the CHICOMs and the Afro-Asian nations, and finally because the Soviets know that the CHICOMs may benefit, in a relative sense, by an all-out nuclear war.

c. It is probable that CHICOM belligerency in the recent Quemoy crisis went beyond Russian planned limits and that the

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CHICOMs backed down only after the Soviets told them that they would have to go it alone in a war with US. It very well might be that the Soviets, realizing they have begot a Frankenstein, would welcome a reduction of CHICOM prestige insofar as the overall political power of the Communist bloc is not materially damaged.

d. Russian planners are probably sufficiently realistic to realize that while the West opposes their goal of world domination it is only the CHICOMs in the long term that threaten the security of the Russian heartland by unprovoked aggression.

e. It is a general rule of thumb that nations or people will most readily believe that which they fear. It is this fact plus the morbid mentality of the Soviet and CHICOM leaders that makes a combined psychological-deception program feasible of accomplishment.

4. MISSION.

Through coordinated non-US attributable psychological-deception operations generate increased distrust, suspicion, and hostility between USSR and the PRC in order to:

a. Critically weaken the political and military power of the Communist bloc.

b. Increase the deterrent to a surprise nuclear attack by USSR.

c. Reduce CHICOM and Russian cold war resources by diverting their energies and attention from the West to what seems to be a more immediate and critical threat. At the best each nation may court the free world to win allies against the other, at the least the Sino-Soviet common front and pooled resources will be reduced.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. A combination of deception and psychological operations would be employed to persuade the USSR and PRC leaders and peoples that each nation is hostile to the other and is planning against it. Sample themes of the stories and exaggerations to be passed are listed in paragraph 6. In general the deception operation would be sophisticated in nature and aimed for the political leaders while the psychological operations would be more of the non-specific or unsubstantiated type and would be directed to the people. Both the deception and psychological operations would be mutually supporting and in turn would be

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supported by covert operations.

b. The program should be initiated at a relatively slow tempo and in a low key. As the program gains credence the progress of operations can be gradually accelerated. In any case ultimate success should not be gished for quick or short term results. It is probable that implementation will require at least several years when it can be expected that it will move forward on its own momentum.

c. Detailed implementing steps can not be set forth at this time. In general such steps would depend upon actual international political developments and the nature and apparent success of the preceding phases of the program. The implementing agency should closely follow all news releases and intelligence and be quick to exploit, distort, or exaggerate actual events. The slanting of real facts to support the program will do much to establish its credibility.

d. Implementing steps will include the following categories. Other steps will suggest themselves as the problem is examined in more detail and implementation progresses.

(1) Non-US attributable press accounts of fictitious events and statements.

(2) Non-US attributable diplomatic leaks, both real and fictitious.

(3) Loss or compromise of fictitious plans, diplomatic notes, and policy statements.

(4) Leakage of real intelligence when it supports the program.

(5) Oblique direction of the press and news commentators to international developments and side aspects thereof which support the program.

(6) Covert generation of fictitious anti-Russian activities by asiatic minorities within Russia.

(7) Dissemination of news to the world audience which hints indirectly at the main objectives to be achieved by the program.

(8) Covert activities which indicate that Russia and the PRC are competing against each other for the dominating influence with neutral and Communist satellite nations.

e. Implementation would best be accomplished by a small full time Ad-Hoc Group or task force with senior representation from

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State, CIA and DOD. The members should have access to critical intelligence, have the full confidence of their agency chiefs, be empowered to carry out routine implementing steps, and have a quick means of obtaining the requisite authority to carry out steps which enter into the policy field. Continuity of effort and the capability to act quickly on favorable situations are required. Knowledge of the operation should be restricted to the minimum personnel required. USIA would participate unknowingly and indirectly. The fact that it is the US government propaganda agency limits its usefulness and cast doubt upon the credibility of any story it might attempt to disseminate. The press and Columnists would also be unknowingly manipulated through leaks and off the record discussions.

6. MAJOR THEMES

a. ANTI-CHICOM for the RUSSIAN audience.

(1) In 1990 the Chinese population will be 1 billion. Long before that figure is reached China must and will expand into Russia.

(2) The CHICOMs secretly are attempting to incite a nuclear war between US and USSR in the expectation that they will emerge as the dominant power of Eurasia. The Chinese know that Russia will absorb the bulk of the US atomic stockpile and that they stand to win in a US-USSR nuclear exchange.

(3) During the Quemoy situation the CHICOMs risked nuclear war with the US for a few small rocky islands. Although these islands were of no use or interest to the Russian people they, and not the CHICOMs, would have been killed by the tens of millions if war had resulted.

(4) Mongolian minorities in Eastern Russia are a fifth column who will support the CHICOMs in a showdown and even now are plotting with the CHICOMs against the Soviet government.

(5) The CHICOM leaders and people deep down hate the Russian people. They remember Russian exploitation of China and consider Russians with all other white nations in one category as the Boxers did under the epithet of "foreign devils".

(6) Russian leaders are blind to the safety of their own people. These leaders are more concerned with the dissemination of abstract Communist doctrine to remote parts of the world than with the protection of the lives and homes of their own people against the "Yellow Peril".

Page 5 of 7 pages

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(7) The so called Chinese Peoples Communes are in reality self sufficient military units. Each commune has its own militia and these units eventually will be established along the entire Russian border. At the proper time these commune militia units will act as the spearhead of CHICOM aggression into Russia.

(8) The primary reason why the Russian standard of living is lower than that of a German, Englishman, or American is because the fruits of Russian toil are being poured into a bottomless pit in an effort to raise the standard of living of the incompetent and shiftless CHICOMs. This is a vain and unending task because the Chinese are multiplying so fast that their demands will always be in excess of Russian productivity, leaving nothing for the Russian citizens. It is an ironic situation when it is realized the Chinese people are enemies of the Russians, their traditions, and their race.

b. ANTI-RUSSIAN for the CHICOM audience.

(1) China is so crowded that its people starve. Russia has more land than its need and fertile ground in Russia lies fallow. The Russians are hypocrites who preach Marx and sharing the wealth but in reality are selfish dogs in the manger who refuse to allow the Chinese to use the land they do not need.

(2) The Russians stripped Manchuria, the only heavily industrialized area of pre-war China. As a result the Chinese people are subject to great hardships and the commune system of living. If the Chinese still had the industrial plant of Manchuria intact they could export more finished products for the food they so badly need, Communes would not be necessary and the Chinese people could live with their wives and children.

(3) The Russians have a contempt for the Chinese. They did not care how many Chinese soldiers were killed in the Korean war which was fought for Russian national objectives and Russia today is profiting from Korea, not the Chinese people who died in defending it against aggression.

(4) The Russians mistreat and victimize the Mongolian minorities in eastern Siberia. This is but one more example of the basic Russian contempt for the Chinese and the "inferior" yellow race.

(5) The Russians forced the removal of Mao Tse Tung because he fought for the Chinese people against selfish Russian ambitions. The Russians replaced Mao with a puppet who will carry out Moscow orders enslaving the Chinese people to enrich Russia. If the Chinese people are to improve their lot, eliminate

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the necessity for the Chinese to live with their wives and children they must cast off the Russian yoke.

(6) Russia exploited the Chinese and seized territory and privileges by force under the Treaty. At that time the United States through its "Open Door" policy prevented further Russian exploitation. Moreover the United States used the indemnity it received from the Boxer Rebellion for the welfare of the Chinese people. The Russians have never changed, they are still enemies of China and now have alienated the Chinese people from their one true friend, the United States.

(7) Russia will continue to use the lives of Chinese soldiers to advance its own selfish interests. When the victory is won it is the Russians who profit, not the Chinese. The Chinese are a catspaw for the Russians.

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Mao Mystery

His Quitting as Head of the Chinese Communist Regime Sparks Speculation, But the Boss Is Still the Boss

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

While the world ponders the resignation of Mao Tse-tung as head of the Red Chinese government, it is possible to gain at least a measure of insight into the perplexities of Peiping politicians by examining the man himself and by studying the strategy which brought him to power.

Mao, of course, could not be the big cheese because he has held the chairmanship of the Chinese Communist Party. Yet it is something of a puzzle that the change was made at all and whether it means a downgrading, an upgrading or merely a meaningless transfer for the chief architect of Communism in China.

One theory has it that Mao, who apparently fancies himself as some kind of chin-in-hand Marxist philosopher, wanted to be relieved of some administrative chores in order to devote himself to theoretical labors. Philosophical learning has always been esteemed in China and Mao may very well see himself as a Marxian Confucius, laying down social and economic rules for the new China which he has done so much to create. He undoubtedly has been mulling Communist doctrine and its applicability to China since the days when he led a guerrilla resistance to the Nationalist government in the more remote areas of the mainland.

Contradicts View

When Japan launched her war against China in 1937, Mao espoused the view that occupation of ports and cities by the Japanese would mean victory for the Chinese strategy," he wrote, "should be a war of maneuver; over an extended, shifting and indefinite front: A strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. . . Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under a trial of impenetrable but indecisive battles."

General Wedemeyer points out in his "Reports!" Mao worked out a strategy of his own during this period of the Sino-Chinese struggle. While Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist units were decimated in the initial struggle with Japanese forces superior in generalship, training and weapons, the policy of the Chinese Communists was to avoid the heavy casualties, to attack only in small parties of Japanese and, while going through the motions of accepting Chiang's leadership, to work always for their own cause. Along with his love of rationalizing every step he took, instructed his followers:

"The Sino-Japanese war affords our party an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our main effort should be 70% expansion, 20%

dealing with the Kuomintang and restoring Japan."

Just as Lenin emerged as the victor in World War I between Russia and many, so Mao was the beneficiary of the long war on Chinese soil between Japan and the Chinese Nationalist government. Japan's defeat came too late to save the latter from the consequences of the shattering of its political administration and the exhaustion of its economic and financial resources.

Conflicting interpretations of Marxist-Leninist theory are as important to Communists as opposing views of religious dogma have been in times of strife between religion and science. It may be that one of Mao's new theories is to claim primacy for China as a socialist nation, on the ground that its new society into which the peasants have been taken has gone much further in eliminating private property and destroying individual families than anything attempted in the Soviet Union.

There may also be a connection between Mao's transfer and some of the more recent political developments in China. It is hard to believe that the failure to capture any serious objective by the bombardment of Quemoy has been altogether without consequence for the face of the Red government. Quemoy did not fall. There was no split, between the United States and the Chinese Nationalists. There was no internal upheaval, calculated to serve Communist purposes, in Formosa.

It may be that we have not heard the last word about the daring experiment with the communes, where husbands are separated from wives, in working gangs, parents are separated from children and everyone is dependent on the simplest necessities of food and clothing on collective organization. Chinese Communism on a scale almost unimaginable in the West was a constant asset for Communist propaganda. Yet even poor people may resent the total regimentation as that of the communes. If there have been sufficiently loud expressions of discontent, the substitution of another figure for Mao as head of the government might seem logical.

Khrushchev's Revenge?

There has been much speculation, especially in Warsaw, that Mao has been in friendly touch with some of Khrushchev's political opponents in the Soviet Union. If this is true, Khrushchev might have been able to strike back and influence the transfer of Mao Tse-tung.

The unfolding course of events will probably show more clearly whether the change in Mao's official position has affected his status as China's top Communist. But of one thing we may be sure: Political changes in Communist capitals do not occur without a reason. Now we must wait for time or Peiping to tell us what that reason is.

PEIPING LOOSENING CLOSE SOVIET TIES

Bonds Are Found Still Tight, but Red China Increasingly Takes Steps on Its Own

The following dispatch was written by Gerald Clark, who recently visited Communist China.

North American Newspaper Alliance.
HONG KONG, Nov. 23 — In a session held by the Sino-Soviet Friendship League in honor of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Speeches on the "great fraternal bond" between the two countries. Chinese orators paid tribute to Soviet technical assistance in the dramatic birth of China as an industrial power.

The next day I visited the Peiping Machine Tool Factory No. 1, a new and busy plant that employs 6,000 workers. The director, Wang Nei-feng, proudly told me: "We have done everything ourselves—not with the help of any foreigners. And we have improved on standards in the West."

Here in a capsule was the story of present-day Soviet-Chinese relationships. On one hand are formal manifestations of unshakable comradeship; and on the other is no doubt that ideological spots are closely intermingled. But at the same time the Chinese are showing open signs of confidence, an old-age confidence that they can do anything better than foreigners. Russians are still among the foreigners.

For their part the Chinese are taking a close look at the tireless giant, which has just awakened on their doorstep. By 1980 the Chinese people, now savoring for the first time the power of machinery, will number 1,000,000,000. Will they have needs or ambitions beyond their own borders? What about the potential aspirations of the kindergarten children who are now undergoing military drill?

In a rare moment of candor, one Russian said, with a combination of awe and trepidation: "There is no doubt about it. They are the people of the future."

While the Chinese allude to the outstanding example of Marxism. Mao Tse-tung is conducting people's communes. Government officials are now discreet in their movements. The Chinese gladly pay their debt to Marx, Engels, Lenin. Photos of these three, and even of Stalin, are widely displayed. But nowhere in the countryside or cities such as Peiping, Shanghai or Canton, did I see a single

of Nikita S. Khrushchev. that tomorrow the Russians and Chinese will be at one another's throats. Economically, the Chinese still need Soviet support. Politically, the Russians need the Chinese. But it does mean that the Chinese, in going their way in communism, are not meant to be regarded as subservient to anyone.

"We are partners on an equal basis," said Hsi-jo, chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

"In reverse," I said. "Some people in the West interpreted Khrushchev's visit to Mao as a sign that China is now acting the leader."

"Wishful thinking on the part of Western countries to try to show there is friction between our two countries," said Mr. Chang firmly. "We are soldiers-in-arms in the reform of human society. We have a common belief and a common strategy."

That is probably the real reason today, and it would be hardy for the West to imagine a self-protective and ideological can be easily cut. If there are internal differences between China and the Soviet Union, they are much more peculiar than differences that exist between Western partners, differences of emphasis rather than of purpose.

None the less the Chinese are pushing ahead as fast as possible on their own. In one of the most commonly heard phrases today there is a switch in the star billing: "This plant was built by Chinese engineers, with Soviet assistance."

It is perhaps this thought—that the pupils have learned unbelievably quickly from the masters—that first stimulated the Russians to take a hard look at the rising Goliath. The belief I heard expressed by the diplomats in Moscow is that the Russians are speeding up the settlement of virgin lands so that the Chinese will be able to suggest that their territory is underpopulated. It would be put to more relief, especially since the Chinese are multiplying at the rate of 13,000,000 a year.

There is little doubt about the diminishing number of Soviet technicians inside China. As recently as two years ago they were estimated in the tens of thousands. Today, according to one Western calculation, they total no more than 4,000 and their families. Aware of Chinese sensitivity, the Russians are now discreet in their movements.

A. S. Mayer Left \$1,582,264
Arthur R. Meyer, former chairman of the State Mediation Board, left a net estate of \$1,582,264 when he died Aug. 6, 1965. An estate tax appraisal filed yesterday showed gross assets of \$1,652,298, including \$21,028 in securities.

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DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED	
DOC. DATE 30 Dec 58		14 Jan 59	
COPY NO. #1		LOGGED	
NUMBER OF PAGES 10t		ER	
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS			
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OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE AND OFFICE	DATE
25X1 ER		1/14/59		1/14/59			
	Rissell, DDP					seen	
25X1						seen	
25X1	Barnes, A/DD/P 						
							

FEB 1959

to R - file AD 3/4/59

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TO	BY (Signature)	TO	
BY (Signature)	WITNESSED BY (Signature)	BY (Signature)	
DATE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

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SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY	
SOURCE DCI		CIA CONTROL NO. 165164	25X1
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 14 Jan 59	
DOC. DATE 12 Jan 59		LOGGED BY []	
COPY NO. #2			
NUMBER OF PAGES 1t			
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS 165167/a & 165167 cy #1 a, 165166 cy #1		ER	

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REFERRED TO OFFICE	RECEIVED				RELEASED		SEEN BY	
	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE AND OFFICE	DATE	
25X1 ER	[]	1/14/59		1/14/59				
Bissell, DDP						Seen		
Helms, COPS						Seen		
25X1 25X1 Barnes, A/DD/P	[]							
		9 FEB 1959						
TOP - file D.J. 3/11/59								

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DATE	DATE	OFFICE
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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY	
SOURCE DCI		CIA CONTROL NO. 165166	
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 14 Jan 59	
DOC. DATE 12 Jan 59		LOGG <input type="checkbox"/>	25X1
COPY NO. 1t			
NUMBER OF PAGES #2			
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS None	ER		

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	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE AND OFFICE	DATE
ER	1/14/59		1/14/59			
ER - Area D.G.	1/14/59					

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DATE	DATE	OFFICE
		DATE

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
TOP SECRET

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SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY	
SOURCE DCI		CIA CONTROL NO. 165192	
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 4 Mar 59	
DOC. DATE 3 Mar 59		LOGGED BY <input type="text"/>	
COPY NO. #3		ER	25X1
NUMBER OF PAGES 2t			
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS None			

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OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE AND OFFICE
25X1 ER File		3/4/59		3/4/59		
		EXHIBIT DESTROYED				

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DATE	DATE	OFFICE DATE

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