

25 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting on 23 April and Other Matters

1. I asked Mr. Vance if he had any knowledge of a plan to surface the R-12. He said he knew of none but would look into it and call me. (He subsequently called me and said that Mr. McNamara had directed Dr. Fubini, who in turn had directed Dr. McMillan, to prepare such a plan. I immediately cranked DD/S&T into the act and the matter is now under control.)

2. General Carroll and [redacted] of his shop briefed the Special Group on the results of SAC U-2 reconnaissance of Cambodia. [redacted] put on quite a floor show and was apparently reading a lot out of the picture that did not seem to be supported by collateral available to the Agency. Upon my return I asked DD/I to look into this. I subsequently called [redacted] telling him that we had some additional film in and I thought that before anybody went to press on this matter we should spend the weekend reading out the new film and compare collateral. (He was noncommittal but said he would take a look at it.) The Carroll/[redacted] briefing paper is attached. ([redacted])

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3. I then took up my proposal for assigning SAC total responsibility for all Southeast Asia overflights on a purely overt basis in military aircraft with military pilots flying out of Saigon. I had previously, the day before, broken the ground with Alexis Johnson and the staff had touched base with Vance and Bundy. There was only minor discussion and the proposal was approved in toto. The only caveat was that in overflying Cambodia beyond the 30-mile present authorization, Special Group approval would be obtained for each flight. I subsequently alerted Bundy to the fact that since higher authority had cleared NRO, NSC and USAF review(s) completed.

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the basic concept, I thought that higher authority should also clear this new change. Bundy agreed and said he would take care of it. As the matter now stands, SAC may fly all of Laos, all of South and North Vietnam up to the China border, and into Cambodia a distance of thirty miles from the border in unlimited numbers of flights as may be locally required. If Cambodian flights beyond the thirty miles are required, each such flight must be approved by Special Group. The basis of my argument was that what was really required in the entire Southeast Asia area were frequent, unprogrammed flights for tactical reconnaissance purposes and that this was really a theater of war and the flights should be done by the military.



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4. The Special Group approved the overflying of Laos for support of [redacted] into North Vietnam only for item a, "Action No. 55," and for item b, "Resupply Drops." I pressed for blanket approval for overflying Laos in these operations, but was not wholeheartedly supported by Mr. Vance. Bundy pointed out that the political sensitivities of the Geneva Accords mitigated against this type approval. I stated again that we had a single war on our hands in the entire area and we should not be so sensitive that we tied our own hands in fighting this war. They all understand the problem but are not prepared to open up the gates at this stage of the game.

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5. Special Group then approved coverage [redacted] as proposed in item 3.

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There was some discussion of omitting that portion of the flight [redacted] and Alexis Johnson said that this was giving [redacted] considerable concern. After some argumentation, Johnson acquiesced to the total coverage. The cover plan was changed from that originally proposed in the paper and will be based on the

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[redacted] This is the same idea that was used for the original test flights.

6. The Special Group was not prepared to go overboard [redacted] and in fact did not seem much interested in discussing it. [redacted]

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7. The four items brought up by Peter Jessup were handled as follows:

[redacted]

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b. Did not consider when to discuss policy [redacted] overflights. (I think we have this well enough in hand that we can let it lie dormant until SAC again rears its ugly head.)

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c. The whole question of [redacted] [redacted] seems to give State considerable trouble over and above a determination [redacted] We should prepare a full paper for justification, pulling out all the stops on COMOR and USIB, and clear it with the DCI before moving outside of the building.

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[redacted]

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8. There was no other business discussed at Special Group.

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9. I subsequently called Bundy and pointed out that I had heard rumors of proposals to surface the R-12 and also to surface some of Greer's satellite activities on the West Coast. I stated that both of these matters were of great concern to us here in the Agency and I hoped that if the Department of Defense brought either of these matters forward for approval by higher authority, he, Bundy, would keep us in mind so that we could get in the act. Bundy stated that he felt certain any such proposals would be brought to the White House for clearance and that he would certainly make sure that the Director's views were considered prior to a decision.

10. Bundy stated that the Director had asked him to contact me to develop all possible information and availabilities on equipment which might be available to prevent Cuban action against our U-2's. They were not considering the OX but were interested in all sorts of antiradar equipment and electronic countermeasures that could be used on an urgent basis to prevent Cuban shutdown. In making our study we should not be bound by any inhibitions presently placed on us by the Joint Chiefs and we should consider SAC capabilities as well as our own. DD/S&T is working on this.

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1S/

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

MSC:blp

Orig & 5 - O/DCI w/paper referred to in para 2.
1 - DDCI files

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