

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010030-1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum



THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

30 October 1962

NGA Review Completed.

DIA, NRO, NAVY and USAF review(s) completed.

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*Briefing material for
30 October*

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LAOS -- Situation more or less on dead center. Pathet Lao still very sticky on ICC inspection -- ~~however~~ latest hooker is to insist on being provided with exact location, unit designation and name of commanding officer before letting ICC team in. French military advisory role still in negotiation stage.

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SOUTH VIETNAM

No sign that enemy is being seriously hurt, despite heavy casualties. Organized Viet Cong strength now 23,000. Support from north continues --

[REDACTED]

Viet Cong are losing

fear of government aircraft and improving their antiaircraft capability.

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SINO*INDIAN WAR

~~Indians~~ Temporary lull in action -- Indians have admitted 2500
dead or missing -- Looks pretty clear that Sovs will not come through
with MIG 21's and may not deliver helicopters. Moscow also taking
public line more favorable to China. Despite India's need for
Western support, ^{no}~~no~~ sign that Nehru will fall very far off his
neutralist fence.

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The central theme of Moscow's propaganda commentary for the last 24 hours has been to portray Khrushchev's 28 October letter to the President as a new peace initiative by the Soviet leader. Specific indications as to which areas of international dispute may become the subject of new Soviet initiatives for negotiations are lacking, however,

The USSR is still attempting to broaden the President's commitment not to invade Cuba. Talk of the alleged anti-Castro activities of Cuban "counterrevolutionaries" continues to appear in bloc broadcasts, with a Soviet commentator asking whether President Kennedy, in permitting the "shady maneuverings" of these counterrevolutionaries to continue, is living up to his guarantee that Cuba will not be invaded.

Reaction from Peiping continues to be at variance with the propaganda from Moscow and Eastern Europe. Peiping yesterday carried an extensive TASS item on Khrushchev's 27 October offer to swap missiles in Cuba for US missiles in Turkey, but has played down the final agreement. An NCNA review of the October 30 Peiping press says that "top prominence" is given to Castro's "important" statement of Sunday upholding Cuba's independence and sovereignty. A Western news agency in Peiping reports that news of Khrushchev's October 28 letter was received with "surprise and disapproval," and that the highest political circles in Peiping are talking of a "Soviet Munich."

SOVIET MILITARY STATUS

No major changes have been detected in the past 24 hours in the disposition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and satellite military forces.

Surveys of rail yards, highways and airfields in the Moscow area on 28 and 29 October revealed no indication of unusual military activity. Police surveillance of the attachés was reported to be normal. The army and air attachés in Warsaw report no evidence of unusual movement by air or ground units in Poland, and have heard no rumors of troop movements as had been the case during the Berlin crisis of 1961.

There has been a relaxation of Soviet restrictions on travel by western attachés. On 29 October the Soviets telephoned permission for a trip by auto from Moscow to Leningrad the same day the request was made; such speed in granting a request is highly unusual.

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4. Restrictions on travel of Western attaches in the USSR were at least partially lifted on 29 October, but we have as yet no first-hand observations of the situation outside Moscow. No unusual activity has been observed in Moscow. Our attaches in Eastern Europe generally have not been restricted from travel, and, except in Hungary, observations have indicated little training or troop activity outside garrison areas. Checks of several rail lines in Poland have revealed no increase in rail traffic.

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5. In East Germany, there are signs of some Soviet field training, including the probable movement of elements of one division into the temporary restricted areas in southwest East Germany. Portions of one of the Soviet tactical pipelines into this general area were reported removed on 25 October.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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8. We have noted no significant civil defense preparations in the Soviet Bloc.

[Redacted]

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II. Critical Areas

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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2. Berlin and Germany: A pending change in procedures regarding rail freight traffic between West Berlin and West Germany, including that of the Allies, is suggested by the recently reported East German construction of new barbed wire train enclosures and custom barriers at two East German railroad stations. The reported newly constructed arrangements for processing at passenger crossing points at two other stations may also indicate forthcoming changes in rail passenger processing at those points. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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4. Sino-Indian Border: Further military action is believed impending in the NEFA area, while in Ladakh the Chinese have now seized virtually all the territory which they had claimed. [redacted]

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III. Bloc International Position

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[redacted]

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2. A "high" Soviet military source is quoted in the press as saying on 29 October that Castro would have to accommodate himself to Soviet-US arrangements for settling the Cuban crisis. In this connection, it is noted that Peiping has given some prominence to Cuban demands that the US must withdraw from Guantanamo, while Moscow merely printed but gave no further dissemination to Castro's 28 October statement containing this demand. Castro and Soviet Ambassador Alekseyev reportedly held a "long" conference the night of 28-29 October. [redacted]

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The same source also reportedly said that Moscow will ship no arms to India and supports Peiping's territorial claims in the Sino-Indian border dispute. [redacted] [redacted] the Soviet delivery of MIG-21s to India, scheduled for December, is off, and that the supply of Soviet HOUND helicopters may also have been held up. This further Soviet shift in favor of Communist China follows Peiping's sharp expression of dissatisfaction on 27 October over inadequate Bloc support in the Sino-Indian border dispute. [redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Mission Receipts at NPIC

<u>Time:</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Mission + Take</u>
2240	AF	part of Mission 29215 poor condition
2400	USN	5031 + 5032
0200	AF	rest of 29215 all of 29216
0530	AF	29211 (This is the film Sweeney made prints and enlargements of for direct delivery to LeMay -

2 more still to come

30 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

1. The following information obtained entirely from Lundahl and Scoville.

2. Missions are established by NRO and directed by the JRC. Naval planes fly out of Jacksonville and films are processed there. Air Force planes fly out of McDill and films are processed there.

3. Clear-cut DOD instructions ^(copy attached) to both Jacksonville and McDill require the immediate production at their photo labs of an original negative, a duplicate positive, and a duplicate negative. The first two are transmitted urgently to NPIC via Andrews Air Force Base. They are delivered to the NPIC courier at Andrews. The third (duplicate negative) is delivered directly to Suitland to NAVPIC and NAVPIC is charged with production and wholesale distribution to whomever is authorized the product. TAC does the same, but at McDill.

4. It was reported that General Sweeney saw the wet negatives of Mission 29211, noted information of interest, alerted General LeMay who in turn apparently alerted the Joint Chiefs, [redacted] and others. The film from this mission arrived at NPIC at 0530 this morning and went immediately into processing by our PI's.

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5. There were also some Navy films delivered yesterday. The Air Force film was grainy and very poorly processed. Some of this could be from the rainy conditions at exposure but probably considerable of it occurred in the developing. This, however, can only be tied down exactly by careful chemical analysis. The film delivered to NPIC was not boxed and was not titled -- both of these actions should have been done since they save a great deal of time at NPIC.

6. As to the activity last night at NPIC, our PI people were cordoned off and were not interfered with -- the voice level in the front office, however, was very high due to all the telephone calls generated by the

[redacted] is upset, and is reconstructing the scenario - [redacted] he will send us a copy later in the morning.

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- 2 -

Sweeney-LeMay play. This did not bother the photo interpreters.

7. It is difficult at this stage of the game to put the finger on the real problem. There should certainly be an immediate review taken of the capabilities at McDill to see that they are adequately staffed and equipped. Certainly General Sweeney's actions appeared to be in direct violation of a DOD/DIA directive and I am informed that DIA is incensed.

8. The Navy to date has done an outstanding job. The Air Forces need a look at their management procedures and their command relationships.



MSC

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Priority message from SSO DIA mainly to CINCLANT and TAC

1. This message supersedes all previous instruction this subject.

a. Jacksonville. Process original negative and produce one duplicate positive and one duplicate negative. Without delay forward original negative and duplicate positive to NPIC via fastest means. Without delay and via fastest means forward duplicate negative to Navy PIC Suitland. No other processing or printing of these materials authorized at Jacksonville. Navy PIC will supply photo material to LANT and TAC operational forces as required.

b. Macdill same instructions as in para 1z above except the DN will be retained at Macdill and LANT and TAC printing requirements satisfied there and expedited to Norfolk.

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OC - 1100
30 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : National Security Council Subcommittee on Communications

1. This memorandum is for information only; particular reference is made to paragraphs four and six.

2. On 24 October on instruction from the Secretaries of State and Defense and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, a National Security Council Subcommittee on communications was formed. A primary objective of this National Communications Subcommittee was the establishment of a single communications system for use by all government agencies. This Subcommittee is chaired by Mr. William Orrick of the State Department and Admiral William Irwin from the Department of Defense is vice chairman. Other members of the Subcommittee are [redacted] from CIA, Dr. Irwin Stewart of OEP and Dr. W. O. Baker from the Bell Telephone Laboratories. Dr. David Robinson from the Office of the President's Scientific Advisor is an observer.

3. The National Communications Subcommittee convened at 8 a.m. on Thursday, 25 October and is working on a full-time basis. Initially the Subcommittee undertook to determine worldwide government and commercial communications capabilities available to the government; to evaluate these capabilities to meet the present emergency and to determine steps to be taken within the next 30 days to improve deficiencies noted. This phase of the Communications Subcommittee's work has been completed and a report has been prepared for the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

4. The initial report particularly notes that Latin American communications are inadequate from a national security point of view and recommends immediate actions to improve them. [redacted]

[redacted] both State and the Department of Defense will lease extensive commercial cable facilities to Latin America to meet telephone and telegraphic needs. Actions are required for other areas of the world which are not as extensive as those for Latin America.

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SUBJECT: National Security Council Subcommittee on Communications

5. The National Communications Subcommittee next intends to determine national communications objectives for the next 18 months and to recommend actions necessary to meet these objectives. Finally the Subcommittee would explore the long term objectives of a National Communications system and recommend the actions necessary to bring such a system into being.

6. During the course of committee deliberations, the validity of CIA's requirement for privacy of communications was questioned by the chairman. It is understood that the DCI has been briefed on this subject. This matter may be brought before the Executive Committee of the NSC when the chairman of the National Communications Subcommittee presents his report.

[Redacted Signature]

Deputy Director of Communications

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