

**CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassify upon removal of enclosure**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1963

**MEMORANDUM TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP (CI)**

**SUBJECT: Investigation by House Committee on Appropriations of  
Department of Defense Special Warfare Programs**

Mr. Ferrastal requested that I send you the enclosed memorandum.  
He thought you should be aware of this investigation and that this  
might be something the Group will want to watch.

*James W. Dingeman*

James W. Dingeman  
Executive Secretary  
Special Group (CI)

**Enclosure**

*25 Oct. 1cc to L. Stevens*

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

NSC review(s) completed.

**CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassify upon removal of enclosure**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

October 23, 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Investigation by House Committee on Appropriations  
of Department of Defense Special Warfare Programs**

On Thursday, October 18, we were requested by the investigators for the above committee, Messrs. Landon L. McDowell and H. Branch Wood, to provide them with the names of the "focal points of contact" for counterinsurgency programs in the Department of State, AID, CIA, and USIA. Upon a decision not to comply directly with this request, the investigators were provided with the attached list setting forth the names of the legislative liaison officers of these agencies. This memorandum is written for distribution to the persons indicated on this list as a recapitulation and expansion of the background information furnished to them on the telephone for assistance in dealing with the investigators.

The current investigation was begun in mid-August 1963 pursuant to a letter from the committee to Secretary McNamara. That letter stated that the subject of the investigation was "the administration of special warfare programs of the Department of Defense."

Initially, at our suggestion, the investigators looked at those portions of Department of Defense special warfare activities within the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services. They were given a comprehensive briefing by a member of the staff of Major General Krulch, the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) on the Joint Staff. This briefing explained terminology ("special warfare", "counterinsurgency", and the like), delineated the responsibilities of the Joint Staff and the respective services, pointed out the "focal points" on the Joint Staff and in the services for special warfare and stated the assignment of roles and missions within the services.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

The investigators were provided with a number of JCS documents, including "Joint Counterinsurgency Concept and Doctrinal Guidance", which incorporates, among other things, the assignment of responsibilities to the various agencies as set out in "U. S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy" (which the investigators were subsequently permitted to read, but not take or copy), approved by NSAM 182. The investigators thereafter interviewed various representatives of each of the military services, and were provided with a substantial number of documents relating primarily to such matters as the assignment of roles and missions within the respective services, methods for formulation and determination of their programs and force levels, training programs, and statements of their programs and philosophy with respect to special warfare and counterinsurgency. The investigators have indicated a pronounced interest in DoD programming mechanisms -- in particular the use of the Program Change Proposal to effect changes in the Department's Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program. They looked into the level of forces of the Army and Air Force contained in the Five-Year Program and the past and pending Army and Air Force Program Change Proposals proposing expansion of force levels and programs for special warfare.

The investigators then turned to various components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as distinguished from JCS or the military services. They were briefed extensively -- by a representative of the Directorate of Organization and Management Planning, by General Krulak, by George Carroll, Chief of the Special Operations Division, ISA, and by Major General Edward Lansdale (until October 1, 1963, an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense) -- on the division of responsibilities among SACSA, ISA, and General Lansdale, and the evolution of the assignment of responsibilities which has occurred in the last few years, especially since the President's statement in early 1962 placing an increased emphasis on the development of counterinsurgency programs. The investigators also interviewed General Robert J. Wood, Director of Military Assistance.

The direction and scope of this investigation is clearly not adequately stated by the investigators' original mandate to examine "the administration of special warfare programs of the Department of Defense". In one sense, it has become narrower: the investigators

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

stated in mid-September that they would confine themselves to the military aspect of our counterinsurgency program, particularly as conducted in a Phase II or Phase III situation (in which the country experiencing the insurgency is subject to attacks by organized military forces). But the investigators have also indicated an intention to consider the handling of military counterinsurgency programs by all agencies involved, rather than just DoD, and to look into the assignment of responsibilities among these agencies, especially between the Department of Defense and State in the case where an insurgency escalates, as it did in Viet Nam. Furthermore, despite an original denial of intention to investigate the Viet Nam situation generally, there have been several indications since the McNamara-Taylor trip that this is no longer true and that the investigators are very much interested in information relating directly and primarily to Viet Nam, particularly with respect to control and direction of U. S. counterinsurgency programs, assignment of roles for counterinsurgency among the responsible agencies at both Washington and country levels, and relationships and extent of coordination and cooperation among these agencies (e. g., is there a special relationship between State and DoD in Viet Nam? was the "Hilsman telegram" coordinated with DoD?).

A related matter which the investigators have raised is the budget location of funding of the United States' overseas operations in countries experiencing insurgency, particularly Viet Nam (whether in the MAP budget, military services' budgets, or the budgets of other agencies) looking toward a comprehensive and accurate statement of the cost of the Viet Nam war to the U. S., or to a contention of concealment of such costs. They have also been interested in whether the U. S. is involved solely in support and training in Viet Nam, or also exercises a fuller "command" or combat role. Other directions the investigation has taken relate primarily to the Department of Defense; examples are the competition between the services for roles in counterinsurgency and the responsibility for and effectiveness of program formulation and direction of operations within the Department of Defense.

Our current understanding is that the investigators will visit the schools for counterinsurgency and special warfare maintained by the Army at Fort Bragg and by the Air Force at Eglin Air Force Base; will probably limit future interviews with Department of Defense

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

personnel to brief conversations to clear up doubtful points; and in the meantime will take their inquiry to the other agencies.

We have found the investigators to be both capable and persistent. They have been tenacious in pursuit of documents, although willing without unreasonable protest to accept information concerning the substance of certain documents in lieu of the documents themselves. We have followed the policy of neither providing documents originating in any other agency or discussing, except in general terms, the relevant functions and activities of other agencies. The investigators are, of course, aware in a general way of the responsibilities of other agencies and of the role and membership of the Special Group (CI).

As the representatives of the other agencies have been informed, this investigation has been commented on by Messrs. Allen and Scott in a column published 11 October 1963 in the Newport News Times Herald and probably in other newspapers.

Mr. Gregg of my office and Colonel Mahone of the Joint Staff will be available at any time to provide more details with respect to the investigation to date.

SIGNED

David E. McGiffert  
Assistant to the Secretary  
(Legislative Affairs)

cc: Mr. Dutton, State  
Mr. Miller, AID  
Mr. Warner, CIA  
Mr. Plesant, USIA

Info cys:

Mr. Gilpatric  
Mr. Forrestal ←  
Mr. Desantola

**CONFIDENTIAL**



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

October 21, 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. H. BRANCH WOOD  
L. L. McDOWELL**

**There follows a list of those persons whom you should contact with your request for the "focal points of contact" in those agencies for counterinsurgency matters:**

**Department of State**

**Mr. Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State  
for Congressional Relations  
Code 182, ext. 5395**

**Agency for International Development**

**Mr. Leigh Miller, Legislative Programs Coordinator  
Code 182, ext. 6785**

**CIA**

**Mr. John S. Warner, Legislative Council  
Code 143, ext. 6121**

**USIA**

**Mr. Stanley Plesent, General Counsel and Congressional  
 Liaison  
Code 182, ext. 4090**

SIGNED

**Charles N. Gregg, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the  
Assistant to the Secretary  
(Legislative Affairs)**