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STANDING GROUP AGENDA

18 June Mtg. : What to do about Cuba.


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WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT CUBA?



A Report From
FREEDOM HOUSE
20 West 40th Street, New York 18, N.Y.

FOREWORD

In October 1962, the world was shocked by the revelation that the Soviet Union had established a nuclear missile base in Cuba. The American people were virtually unanimous in supporting the President's decision to take prompt and effective action, regardless of the risk, to force the withdrawal of Russian missiles and troops.

The succession of events needs no recounting here. What is significant is that, as of this writing, more than a half year has gone by and the task has not been completed. In the meantime, relations between the United States government and anti-Communist Cuban exiles have deteriorated rapidly, dimming hopes for an early overthrow of the Castro regime. It is urgent, therefore, for the American people to review what has happened and to consider what ought now to be done.

To help in this process, Freedom House invited a group of prominent individuals — seasoned observers and analysts — to meet at Gould House, New York University's Conference Center at Ardsley-on-Hudson, New York, April 25-27. The sessions were conducted in association with the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba.

This report on the sessions was prepared by Freedom House; nothing in it is binding on any participant. The aim is to present the exchange of opinions among people representing different points of view, the airing of their proposals and the consensus which emerged from the deliberations.

Freedom House expresses its gratitude to the busy men and women who put aside personal interests to attend the Conference. The list of participants is as follows:

Mrs. Mariada Arensberg
Executive Director
Cuban Freedom Committee
Mr. William E. Barlow
Publisher, Vision Magazine
Mr. Murray Baron
Labor Relations
Mr. Paul Bethel
Editor, "Cuba Research Reports"
Mr. Leo Cherne
Executive Director
Research Institute of America
Mr. James Daniel
Roving Editor, Readers Digest
Mr. Roscoe Drummond
Columnist, N. Y. Herald-Tribune
Mr. Christopher Emmet
Chairman, American Friends of
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Mr. George Field
Executive Director
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Mr. Hal Hendrix
Latin America Editor
Miami Daily News
Mr. William vanden Heuvel
President,
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Mr. Daniel James
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Prof. Harry Kantor
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Military Writer and Syndicated
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Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Syndicated Columnist
Mr. William Patterson
Business Executive
Miss Virginia Prewett
Latin America Columnist,
Washington News
Mr. John Richardson, Jr.
President
Free Europe Committee

Mr. Leo Sauvage
N. Y. Correspondent
Le Figaro
Mr. John Smithies
Consultant on Latin American Affairs
Mr. Gerald Steibel
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Dr. Sig Synnestvedt
Latin America Specialist,
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Prof. Frank Tannenbaum
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Columbia University
Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn, Jr. (Ret.)
Hudson Institute
Prof. A. Curtis Wilgus
Director, School of Inter-
American Studies,
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Mr. Chester S. Williams
Assoc. Director
Freedom House

(affiliations listed for identification only)

Focus on a Problem

Americans are agreed that a Soviet Cuba is intolerable to the Western Hemisphere. The reasons bear upon our security and freedom as well as the independence and integrity of the other nations in this hemisphere.

The facts about Castro and Communist Cuba are beyond debate: Six million people who won their freedom from Batista's dictatorship found themselves betrayed into the hands of a new dictatorship. They

are denied the right to vote, to speak, to publish — to think. More than 100,000 Cubans have been jailed for refusing to accept Communism. Another 250,000 have fled, preferring exile to tyranny at home. 180,000 more are awaiting transportation and countless others dream of escaping from the terror.

Cuba has become an overt Soviet satellite — the only one in the Americas. The Castro regime deliberately

handed over the island to the Russian dictator and allowed it to be transformed into a launching pad for potential military aggression against the United States and the other countries of the hemisphere.

Present conditions do not suggest that the evil has been abated, much less eliminated. Even if we could be certain that every "offensive" military weapon has been removed from Cuba, we would still live in the presence of the twentieth century's most efficient offensive weapon — aggressive Communism itself. This time-bomb is still to be de-fused.

Fundamental Objectives

American policy must rest on three objectives:

1. The elimination of the Soviet political and military base in Cuba;
2. The halting of Castro-Communist subversion, sabotage and guerilla warfare against Latin-American peoples; and
3. The liberation of the Cuban nation from Castro's brutal police state.

Americans will unite behind any program that gives hope of achieving these goals. But what would such a program be?

Formulating it presents certain immediate difficulties. Public opinion, while it is clear on the basic objectives, does not have full access to the facts. The reasons are many. Some are founded in the requirements of security, some rest on theories of "strategy" that may or may not be sound. In the last analysis, however, whatever policy is adopted will require, for its success, the understanding of the American people and their whole-hearted support. Indeed, it is a function of alert citizenship to participate actively in the formulation of policies, even if it must do so on the basis of incomplete information.

The Conference Agenda

The mechanics of the conference were designed to facilitate a full exchange of ideas, help clarify differences in approach and substance, and pave the way for the enunciation of areas of common agreement. The agenda was divided into three parts:

1. *What We Know*: the basic facts about the situation inside Cuba and among Cuban exiles, and the views of U.S. government officials and Congressmen as well as leaders of Latin American republics.
2. *What We Do Not Know and Need to Know*: the difficulties of incomplete information about U.S. and

Latin American policies and programs. (Where possible, conferees filled in the gaps, clarified ambiguities and defined the areas of uncertainty.)

3. *Policy and Actions*: judgments on objectives and tactics, consensus on what government policy should be in the interests of the nation, Latin America and the Free World, alternative courses of action.

The Department of State had been invited to participate but found it necessary to decline because "pressure of problems relating to Cuba preclude attendance of officers of the stature which your seminar would merit." The Department, however, supplied the conference with a statement for its guidance.

In view of the consensus ultimately reached by the participants, the diversity of premises from which they started, is noteworthy. The diversities came out clearly in a formal opinion poll composed of 21 questions formulated in the light of the first day's discussion. At the time the poll was taken, 25 participants were seated at the conference table.

Some sense of the participants' initial attitudes emerges from the rather *even division* on such questions as these:

... Does the Administration *believe* that Russian troops will leave Cuba?

... Has Washington *reached* a decision *not* to act except as it is presently acting?

... Does the Administration believe that continued economic pressure *will* topple Castro?

... Does the U.S. Government have a policy for liberation of Cuba?

On the other hand, there was *fairly close agreement* on the following:

... That Castro's regime can be toppled without U.S. military action and without an invasion.

... That the hit-and-run raids of the exiles were contributing to Castro's difficulties.

... That raids *not* based on U.S. soil did not endanger the peace.

To ascertain the political bias of the conferees, they were asked to express their attitude toward the present Administration on issues other than Cuba. Of the 25 participants, 14 declared themselves "friendly", 7 said they were "opposed" and 4 abstained. (For a full appreciation of both the temper and the substance of the conference, the poll is reproduced as Appendix II to this report.) In the judgment of Freedom House, it is worth study not only as a summary of the conferees' views but as a reflection of the way qualified observers see America's current Cuban posture.

In Search of a Policy

An American's confrontation with the Cuban problem must begin with the question: What is our government's policy?

Since Castro took power in 1959, and especially since the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961, there have been many conflicts and contrasts between official pronouncement and actual performance. While no one doubts the Administration's *desire* to see Cuba liberated from the grip of Communism, there is considerable concern that far less than an all-out effort is being made in the Caribbean to *do* anything about it.

Troubling Questions

From their own specialized vantage-points, the experts at the Freedom House conference raised these troubling questions:

1. Is American Cuban policy geared to a negotiated "accord" with Khrushchev on the kind of Cuba with which the United States could "co-exist"? If this is not contemplated, why the reluctance to make public the exchange of messages and letters between the President and the Soviet Premier? The time seems overdue for a full disclosure of the agreements reached and the promises broken.

2. Under present circumstances, is the Administration reluctant to increase pressure on the Cuban regime? The East Coast longshoremen's union has been boycotting Polish and other satellite lines that use some of their ships in Cuban trade. Washington has been seeking to end the boycott. The question was asked: Why has there been no tough, iron-clad ban on the shipment of American goods in any vessel of any line that trades with Cuba? At the present time, a watered-down regulation applies only to the individual ships that deliver goods to Cuban ports, and even violations of this weak measure are reportedly permitted.

3. At a meeting in England, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., is said to have described the U.S. position on Cuba in these terms: The first objective is to clean up our own backyard in Central and South America by vigorous implementation of the Alliance for Progress, meanwhile *containing* Communist Cuba. A second objective is to bring isolated Cuba back into the Organization of American States as a chastened, cooperating member. If this is an accurate reflection of U.S. policy and not just a personal view, how long does Washington think Step One will take before action can begin on Step Two?

4. Is it possible that the humanitarian mission of James Donovan, the lawyer who negotiated the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, has become something

more? Is it also a cover for Administration-approved negotiations with Castro, looking toward some kind of reconciliation, perhaps on the basis of a Tito-type arrangement for Cuba? Castro's conspicuous entertainment of Donovan and his son in early April 1963 suggests that the Cuban dictator may be reaching for some kind of "accommodation" with the U.S., since the October events may have convinced him that the Soviets are unwilling to risk much to support him.

(Significantly, a television interview filmed on April 24th just before Castro's departure for Russia, released after the Freedom House Conference had adjourned, lent credence to this assessment of Castro's policy. Aware that he was addressing an American audience, Castro expressed appreciation that the U.S. has "taken some steps in the way of peace" such as "the stopping of piratical acts against Cuba". He indicated that these steps might be the basis for better relations. "I have looked at such steps with good eyes," he said, adding that the question of Soviet technicians in Cuba — "who would fight with us against any aggressor" — might be the subject of a three-way discussion between Cuba, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and not just between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.)

These uncertainties about the direction of American policy, whether well-founded or not, are profoundly disturbing in and of themselves. They suggest that actually there may be no master plan and that we are merely improvising on this crucial cold war front. Certainly, a coherent policy and plan of action would have to begin with an evaluation of a whole series of basic relationships, including the following:

1. The relation of the Cuban problem to the other cold war fronts.
2. Cuba's relation to the other Latin-American countries.
3. The relation of the U.S. to the other Latin-American countries.
4. Possible effects on the Sino-Russian conflict.
5. The fear that action on Cuba may escalate into global war.

Specifically, clear-cut U.S. policies are needed in these areas:

1. Exiles' activities.
2. Developments inside Cuba.
3. Post-Castro Cuba.
4. Current Russian presence in Cuba.

Virtually all the discussion on Cuba revolved around these issues. The following pages are an attempt to organize and integrate the observations.

Cuba and the Other Cold-War Fronts

Communism's conquest of Cuba must be viewed in the context of the world-wide expansionist drive conducted by the Kremlin, which has already led to totalitarian control over a third of the human race. At this point in history, simple solutions are no longer possible. The problem of resisting Communist expansionism is growing more complex and less manageable all the time. Any plan of action in the Caribbean has to take into account conditions and potential developments around the globe. Since we have committed ourselves to the defense of allies in all the continents, our Cuban policy must be consistent with those commitments, or at least must avoid jeopardizing them.

Participants in the Freedom House Conference saw this fact as a major preoccupation in the thinking of those responsible for American policy. In an effort to define Washington's current approach, several conferees used role-playing procedures to present what might be the views of high government officials. In substance, they said:

"Our policy on Cuba must necessarily fit into the larger U.S. policy of defending the free world against Communism while avoiding war. Where certain common interests are shared by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, we must press for an agreement with the Soviets. In this context, other problems may have priority — such as reconstituting the troika coalition in Laos to prevent a serious collapse that would have dire consequences for Vietnam, Indonesia and others; the urgent need for concluding a nuclear test ban in Geneva; and preventing the military use of outer space. In such a framework Cuba is not the most pressing issue. We are concerned not only with restoring freedom to Cuba but also with maintaining and enlarging freedom in Berlin. A victory on any given front would hardly be worth while if the price turned out to be the loss of Berlin, Iran, Vietnam or some other sector of the global struggle. What we do about Cuba may precipitate reactions elsewhere that could seriously injure our wider interests.

"Nor can we forget the implications of the rift between Moscow and Peking. At this juncture it would hardly be wise to increase the pressure on Khrushchev and possibly make him look worse than he did when we forced him to pack up his missiles and go home. The prospect of another such defeat might force him, for example, to move into Iran in order to salvage his already shaky position as leader of the world Communist movement.

"As realists, we know there is no automatic virtue in just doing something: consider the Bay of Pigs and the trouble we're having in Vietnam. And we have to take cognizance of the handicaps imposed by our very strength — the restraints on our freedom of action that

flow from our giant size in comparison with the Cuban pigmy. Rough action would alienate world opinion. In any case, even our friends in Latin America are opposed to what they call 'intervention.' Certainly, the reaction during the Bay of Pigs misadventure demonstrates that a program of direct action by U.S. forces would be even less palatable than action by the Cuban freedom fighters — and that would be so despite a quick success and moderate casualties on both sides.

"We are committed to getting Soviet troops out of Cuba as fast as possible. Some Sovietologists tell us we can probably do it more quickly by *reducing* rather than *increasing* the pressure on Khrushchev. Meanwhile, we are isolating Cuba from the rest of the hemisphere and discrediting its "revolutionary" image among Latin Americans. We are slowly strengthening our OAS allies and reinforcing their ability to maintain internal security. Over the long haul, we hope to achieve our goals through a successful Alliance for Progress.

"Those who demand a commitment to immediate Cuban liberation are simply ignoring the unacceptable risks that would be involved. After all, we have a commitment to the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe, but those who pledged in campaign speeches to make good on it soon found out that they couldn't fulfill this promise without risking a global war. In 1956, Radio Free Europe and even the official Voice of America were criticized for having encouraged the Hungarians to revolt under the misconception that outside help would be forthcoming.

"The risks of precipitant action cannot be dismissed. To go to the brink and then be forced to retreat rather than accept the dreaded next step would be disastrous. Even the political opposition which condemns a policy of caution, does not advocate military action in Cuba. Its leaders have been quick to disavow the few who call for blockade and invasion."

Such is the point of view apparently prevailing in Washington, as the conferees reconstructed it. It represents the considerations that seem to trouble the Administration as it picks its way across the heavily mined terrain of foreign policy.

Opinion at the conference was predominantly pessimistic that such consideration could get anywhere. As one participant put it: "The United States wants Cuba to *be* free, but does not want Cuba to *become* free. We are eager for the result that is sought; but we have no stomach for the actions needed to achieve it." Concededly, there was good reason during the first part of 1962 (before October) for U.S. officials to be apprehensive over the effect on Berlin, Laos and Vietnam if this country challenged Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. The most significant aspect of the brilliantly executed confrontation in October-November, however,

was that it did *not* trigger Soviet actions in Berlin or in other places where Soviet capability existed.

The lesson of October-November confirms the thesis that action in the Caribbean ripples out to distant shores and sensitive regions. But even more important, it emphasizes dramatically that indecisiveness in the Caribbean can have the most deleterious effects on our alliances, especially NATO and SEATO. Inaction on the Cuban front will only be taken to mean a U.S. unwillingness to run risks in defense of others. If the U.S. accepts Russian intrusion at its own doorstep, where the Soviet military posture is weakest, how can Europeans expect the U.S. to risk nuclear devastation to repel a Soviet attack in Europe where Soviet military power is greatest?

Indeed, American resistance to Soviet military penetration in the Caribbean is a prerequisite to restraining the the Soviets from an adventure in West Berlin. Defend our interests close to home, and we *reinforce* rather than endanger our outposts in more distant places. Blur our purpose and commitment in our own hemisphere, sow confusion between words and deeds about Cuba and we can only *damage* American objectives around the world.

Cuba in Context: Latin America's Future

Thoughtful observers are by now aware that Cuba is the Western Hemisphere base from which the Communist knife is aimed at the soft underbelly of the hemisphere — Latin America. A long history of economic and political errors has filled Central and South America with internal discontent, thus making it vulnerable to conquest by external forces. How many more Cubas can we sustain?

Time is a vital factor. There are hopeful, pro-democratic forces at work, but they are in a deadly race with the destructive, totalitarian forces. Decisive to the outcome will be the length of time it takes to dislodge not only the Russian troops but Communism itself from Cuba. The mere survival of the Castro regime is a factor of great importance. It strengthens the Communists in other Latin American countries and creates an image of Communist invincibility. It encourages the trend toward neutralism, already pronounced in some countries, with increasing numbers of Latin Americans saying, "If the United States is willing to tolerate or co-exist with a Communist Cuba, why shouldn't we?" It also encourages an equally dangerous trend toward extreme rightist dictatorship.

The spawning of more neutralist or militarist governments in Latin America, in reaction to the continued existence of the Castro regime in Cuba, can threaten the United States' objectives of preserving and enlarging

freedom. "Co existence," on the one hand, may lead to "coalitions" which ultimately produce one-party rule, while rightist dictatorship gives the Communists a moral pretext for carrying out their tactics of conspiracy and helps polarize public support in their direction.

History does not operate in smooth uni-directional lines. Developments are the product of a given equilibrium between rival forces. The presence of Castroism, viewed as a temporary phenomenon, has generated some wholesome reactions in Latin America, which should not be dismissed. The delivery of Cuba to Khrushchev as a military base added considerably to the disenchantment of many Latin Americans who had originally considered Castro a genuine patriot fighting foreign economic exploitation. Even before October Castro had paid some price for his betrayals — ranging from unfulfilled promises to hold elections to the public confession that he had been a Communist all along but had concealed the fact while seeking popular support. But now Soviet domination of Cuba has made it plain that Castroism is not a nationalist liberation movement. Political labor and business leaders, editors, intellectuals and students whose hostility to Batista's dictatorship made them sympathetic to Castro, have been disabused. Military officers who might have been tempted to seek a deal with "the wave of the future" have been sobered by the purges and executions that followed Castro's accession to power.

The volatility of the poverty-stricken Latin American masses is another matter. It is difficult to predict the direction in which their pent-up resentments are likely to explode in a period when old institutions are disintegrating and new claimants are demanding power. Army take-overs, like those in Peru and Guatemala, are in the historical Latin American pattern. They are the traditional response when power centers are threatened or when chaos seems imminent. To be sure, in some situations the military play a legitimate role in preventing a minority from seizing power. But U.S. policy must take into account the fact that the Communists often find oppressive rightist regimes more useful than liberal or anti-Communist leftist governments.

The ultimate success of the Alliance for Progress may hinge on whether Latin America can be persuaded that Castro is not here to stay, and Communism will not spread to other Latin republics. Unfortunately, the Communist challenge has not yet convinced a majority of the more conservative Latin Americans to accept the reforms essential to the success of the Alliance. The effect of that challenge has been, rather, to encourage a massive flight of capital from Latin America and to discourage new investment there, thus contributing to further economic deterioration and reducing the Alliance's chances of success.

American policy seems geared to the thesis that we can defeat Communism by defeating hunger, poverty and disease in Latin America, and that all we need is time to accomplish the latter. The reality is that the attainment of a higher standard of living does not necessarily preclude Communism, as demonstrated by the very case of Cuba, which before Castro was one of the two or three most advanced countries in Latin America. At bottom, we are engaged in a two-front struggle against both Communism and poverty, at the same time. If Communism remains in control of Cuba indefinitely, it will have proved its permanency in the Western Hemisphere before the reform battle can be won. On the other hand, the mere erasure of Communism from Cuba would not, by itself, automatically insure orderly social and economic progress.

U.S. Relations With Latin America

These considerations brought the conferees to an examination of American policy vis-a-vis the countries south of the border. Despite the fear of Communist expansion, Latin America still considers U.S. intervention an anathema. The question was whether this factor has not been given undue weight, distorting our relations with Latin America generally. Over-sensitivity to the charge of interventionism, based on fear of offending our friends, may now have reached the point where we are alienating support or weakening the hemisphere because of our restraint.

The conference members therefore discussed these questions in the framework of concrete situations. For example:

1. In 1947, the United States and Latin America joined in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, more popularly known as the Rio Treaty, which established a mutual-security system, based on the formulation that an aggressive act against one is an aggressive act against all, to be met by economic, political and military sanctions. At Punta del Este in 1962 — before the Russian military base in Cuba was revealed — the United States pressed for strong resolutions, which were adopted by the Organization of American States, specifically applying the Rio Treaty to the Sino-Soviet intrusion into the hemisphere. Why did not the United States rest a forthright policy of eliminating the missile bases in Cuba on those OAS resolutions? Can the U.S. entertain the idea of deals with Khrushchev and/or Castro, involving coexistence with a Sovietized Cuba or even a Titoist Cuba, without repudiating the Rio and Punta del Este positions and in effect the whole inter-American system?

2. Since December 1962, according to reliable reports, President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela has wanted

to go before the OAS to document the story of Castro-supported sabotage and terror against his country. The immediate objective would be to induce the five OAS members that still maintain relations with Cuba — Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia — to end their ties. It is reported that the U.S. has been stalling off the Venezuelan action. If the reports are not true, the question remains whether the U.S. has been using its full influence to persuade the five to break relations. The issue is a practical one. If the five states permit Cuban embassies to operate in their countries, the subversion will spread throughout Latin America under the shelter of diplomatic immunity, and subversives trained in Cuba and the Soviet bloc will be free to undermine other nations.

The Fear of Escalation

Undoubtedly, much of American policy is based on genuine fears — not only the fear of consequences in other areas of the cold war, or of the reactions in Latin American countries, but also the fear that decisive action might escalate into a global, nuclear war. This is not an irrational fear, and it cannot lightly be dismissed. But it is precisely because we are living in a world of risks that leadership is necessary. Whoever would give guidance to others must be capable of assessing the risks, and then of *acting*. In a risk-less world there would be no need for leadership.

In his speech of October 22, 1962, President Kennedy said that the greater risk lay in *not* acting. He concluded that strong action involved the lesser risk.

Whatever happens, the same task will remain: to follow the line of the lesser, more manageable risk. In evaluating the hazards of weak versus strong action, the Freedom House conferees cited the following questions as most relevant:

1. To what extent will the risk of nuclear war increase with the passage of time, in view of the relative increase of Soviet nuclear capabilities?
2. What will be the effect of American vacillation in Cuba on other sensitive fronts of the cold war?
3. What will be the world-wide psychological impact of continued taunting propaganda by Castro and the Soviets?
4. What are the probabilities that the Cuban Communist base will be used against us in the future under unpredictably changed circumstances?
5. What will be the probable effectiveness of the Cuban Communist base in undermining other Latin American governments, with a consequent spread of Communism in the hemisphere?

The net effect of examining such factors is to suggest that a simple policy of risk-avoidance can lead only to

the certainty of a worsening position for the United States. Indeed, it is more likely that an improvement of our position will occur only from a process of intelligent risk-taking.

This was demonstrated in the October confrontation. The Administration took manageable risks rather than accept the certainty that the nuclear balance would swing in Russia's direction and that Khrushchev's capabilities for blackmail and attack would be increased by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Unfortunately, while it was clearly willing to take risks in order to obtain a Soviet pledge of an inspected withdrawal of the missiles, there was no willingness to take the risk of a follow-through. Is there any practical value in running risks to gain a pledge, and running no risks to enforce it?

The fear of escalation, while it might logically deter certain types of all-out action, has distorted the judgment of our decision-makers on more limited action and narrower sectors of strategy and tactics.

U.S. Policy on Exile Activity

The conferees were especially troubled by the deterioration in the relations between the U. S. government and the Cuban exiles, whose principal concern is to find ways and means of liberating their country. Does this development foreshadow an ultimate conflict between the freedom-fighters' objective of liberation and an American policy of containment? This disturbing question underlay the discussion of American policy toward the Cuban exiles.

Arguing that there has been no consistency of purpose or action in our government's relations with Cuban activists in exile, conferees cited these specific items:

... We can understand the legal and technical reasons for withholding the use of U. S. territory as a base for launching raids against Cuba and against Soviet shipping bound for Havana. But why was it considered necessary to deprecate as "irresponsible, ineffective and dangerous" the raids and supplying missions that originated *outside* the U. S.? Is this not inconsistent with our official position that the Cubans themselves must get rid of the Castro dictatorship? Does it mean that the Administration disapproves of the rebel action in the mountains and their use of sabotage against Castro? If we favor such action, can we expect the Cubans to proceed without our help and in the face of our public condemnation? In any case, what are anti-Castro Cubans in exile or inside Cuba to conclude?

... Miro Cardona and his Council had urged

Cuban exiles to enlist in the U. S. Army for training. Thousands of young Cuban exiles, including many of the Bay of Pigs veterans, did so. Why? What official representations led them to believe that joining the U. S. Army would offer them the best way of fighting for a free Cuba?

... Reports of Central Intelligence Agency collaboration with the exiles seem to suggest a conflict of policies and activities within the Administration. Has CIA at times followed an independent line in conflict with that of the State Department?

... Attorney General Robert Kennedy appealed to the Cuban exiles to unite in one organization with which the U. S. government could consult. Does this mean that the Administration disapproves of CIA's experiment in favoring certain Cuban factions which has merely increased the disunity? Does the Attorney General's statement look towards the recognition of a government-in-exile?

The answers to these questions are uncertain, but they sustain the impression that American policy toward the Cuban exiles has lacked consistency and has not contributed toward their unity essential for the fight against Castro.

Policy on Post-Castro Cuba

American policy should not limit itself to the overthrow of Castro. The attitude of the U.S. toward the long-range future of Cuba is itself a major strategic element in the fight to end the Communist regime.

Discussion among the conferees revealed that little is known about the Administration's orientation on this question. To be sure, it would be tactically unwise for the U.S. to appear to take any action imposing or supporting a specific type of regime. The very concept of democracy held by the U.S. prohibits such a course of action. Moreover, as a practical matter, any candidate "selected" by the U.S. to succeed Castro would be rejected by Cuban public opinion long before he reached Havana.

Nevertheless, intelligent policy, used as a guide for action, must have some orientation on the possible alternatives that will be available, or probable, when Castro is driven from the scene. These possibilities, which American policy must take into account, include:

1. *A Titoist Communist State in Cuba.* There are indications that this result might be acceptable in certain American quarters. There appear to be some who even believe that a *modus vivendi* could be worked out with a Communist Castro if, like the early Tito, he

breaks all ties with the Soviet Union and ceases to be a tool of its foreign and military policy.

2. *A Democratic Socialist State.* This would be a regime in the tradition of the Western Socialist parties which are anti-Communist but seek to resolve economic problems on the basis of government planning and controls. Pressure for such a form of government might grow inside Cuba after Castro is overthrown, the objective of the people being to retain certain welfare programs and socialized industries rather than restore a free enterprise economy.

3. *A Liberal Democracy.* Another choice might be a social, economic and political system resembling that of Western democracies in its fundamentals, but adapted to Cuban conditions.

It is conceivable that Cuban exiles in the U.S. could reconcile their differences and join with the resistance forces inside Cuba to form a provisional government. Much would depend upon the composition of the forces which topple Castro.

American policy, of course, must not seek to impose any regime on Cuba as a substitute for the present one. The danger is that its actions in relation to the exiles in the U.S. will be interpreted as favoring or opposing one or more of the alternatives, when in fact no formal decision has been reached. The effect might then be to produce exactly the opposite of the one we might ultimately find preferable.

The Soviet Presence in Cuba

Despite the political retreat by Khrushchev during the October-November crisis, there is no reason to believe that the Russian dictator has abandoned his hopes of maintaining a Soviet base only 90 miles from U.S. shores. That "Fortress Cuba" is a military threat in the Western Hemisphere is beyond question: it is operating as the training ground for guerilla warfare against Latin American republics and as a center for the spread of subversion, terror and sabotage.

The latest Soviet aim in Cuba is to use the island as a base for medium-range missiles which could completely circumvent U.S. warning systems and keep a large part of the hemisphere and the U.S. under the constant threat of nuclear attack. (This subject has most recently been treated in the "Summary of Major Findings" on the Soviet build-up in Cuba by the Preparedness Investigating Sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, May 9, 1963.) In the absence of verified and precise knowledge of the conditions inside Cuba, American policy must be predicated on the assumption that the danger is real and will persist.

Other Soviet aims in Cuba have been achieved:

1. Castro has been supplied with the latest weapons to fend off an invasion from without or an uprising of the people from within. What still remains is for the Russian experts to train Cuban Communists in handling these weapons. According to some military opinion, this will take four to six years. The Castro regime argues that it has the right, as a sovereign power, to invite military assistance from a foreign country.

2. Cuba has been converted into a Communist West Point for the training of officers intended to lead military attacks on existing regimes. The island will eventually be the arsenal of Latin American revolutions, from which swift military support can be given to the creation of "new Cubas."

3. With its 150 operational jet fighter bombers, which have a substantial range, Cuba is in a position to control the air over a number of small, near-by countries. (It is reported that some policy-makers in Washington find comfort in the fact that all this lethal equipment is under the control of Soviet officers rather than the hard-core Castro-Communists who incline toward the more reckless views of the Chinese.)

American policy at the present time is focused, however, on the issue of the missile build-up in Cuba. There is little confidence that Khrushchev has actually carried out his pledge of last October-November. Russian credibility was completely destroyed by the fact that the prelude to the crisis was a direct face-to-face lie by Foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko to President Kennedy on the very subject of missiles in Cuba. In the absence of on-site inspection, there can be no certainty that all the missiles and nuclear warheads have been removed. Some could have been installed in caves from which they can be fired with perhaps as great precision as missiles from an underwater Polaris. Moreover, the Soviet troops and technical advisers, even if we accept the lowest estimate of their numbers, can accomplish significant secret preparations, partly protected by darkness, cloud formations and other similar impediments to aerial surveillance. After the Kremlin took such large risks to execute the build-up, one does not have to be of a suspicious nature to wonder what 12,500 to 30,000 Russian military personnel would be doing in Cuba.

Continuance of the status quo — the uncertainty about the missiles and the absolute certainty of the Soviet Army presence — obviously has strong implications about our global position and could lead to even more serious consequences than we have already suffered. Both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy have categorically declared that a Communist base in this hemisphere would never be tolerated. The fact that a Soviet base is now being tolerated can lead the enemy to the kind of miscalculation that might be disastrous. A misreading of our equivocation could induce probing adventures elsewhere.

Also, our acceptance of the situation could be taken as some justification for the Chinese view that strong-arm methods do work in dealing with the "degenerate democracies."

But most serious of all, the continued presence of Soviet military forces in Cuba could provide the very spark that ignites a nuclear war. The U.S. has warned that it will not stand by and allow Soviet forces to quell an uprising in Cuba as they did in Hungary. Any incident — a bar-room brawl with Soviet soldiers in Havana, a flare-up of tempers over a child run down by a Soviet

jeep — could lead to Russian shooting, even in self-defense. As long as Russian troops are in Cuba, peace is endangered by the possibility of an accident. Emotions in this country might well make it impossible for any administration to control the consequences, which could escalate into nuclear war.

Precisely because the situation endangers peace, and because it threatens Khrushchev's policy of coexistence, there is some leverage in persuading the Russians to withdraw. But this can be done only if the U.S. persists in applying pressure.

A Consensus for Action

Readers of this report are aware of the diversity of views that were brought to the conference table at Gould House. Early in the proceedings, a formal opinion survey had made the conferees conscious of their differences, the significance of which was explored thoroughly in the ensuing sessions. Ultimately, however, the incisive, and often pointed, debate revealed an extraordinary amount of agreement on fundamentals. (A listing of alternatives will be found in Appendix I at the end of this report.)

It should be underscored that the following effort to state a consensus is not intended to suggest unanimity on all its components. The task of formulating crucial policy is never really completed, and those who contribute to it render their greatest service by expressing dissents, probing for weaknesses and asserting their own personal insights.

The Lack of Public Information

It was recognized that the implementation of policy may sometimes call for a withholding of information when publication might automatically defeat the objective. But the conferees felt that the effect of current practice was to hinder the formation of American public opinion rather than obstruct the enemy. Many participants indicated their belief that some kind of negotiations were being conducted off-the-record in the effort to balance the interests of one sector of Western defense against the interests of another.

It was acknowledged that the President alone was in possession of the fullest body of information, while others who seek proposed courses of action must do so with less than complete knowledge. In a free society the concerned citizen has no other alternative but to proceed on the basis of the limited information available.

At the same time, it is a legitimate and essential de-

mand on the part of the citizen that his government clearly expound its policies and thus expose them to the wholesome influence of public debate. Such an exposition, to be constructive, must be conducted in an atmosphere of bi-partisanship which has been missing from recent discussions in which both parties have been seeking political advantage. A bi-partisan approach, of course, cannot be invoked merely for the convenience of the party in power, any more than the difficulties created by our adversaries abroad may be properly used as ammunition in political campaigns. Nor should national debate be suspended by bi-partisanship, the function of which is to nourish discussion by providing conditions favorable to intelligent appraisal. Certainly no political party has a right to utilize a period of great national anxiety and difficulty to further narrow party purposes.

Every American who ventures to suggest a policy on Cuba must recognize that there is an enormous difference between presenting the most intelligent critique of policy and actually carrying the awesome responsibility for the consequences. The effect of such awareness should be to temper forms of expression but it should not reduce the personal responsibility of the citizen to seek and advocate solutions for our national problem.

Definition of the American Commitment

Both political parties seem to be united on the objective — freedom for Cuba. To carry out appropriate measures will call for a national unity such as prevailed in the October crisis. But we must be prepared for the fact that future measures will have to be more numerous, more involved, perhaps more onerous and surely less dramatic, requiring a longer period of application than the quarantine during the Fall of 1962. Bi-partisan consultations are needed now to reach a broad, long-range understanding.

This is possible, however, only if the Administration recognizes that it is responsible for providing leadership in a national discussion of the Cuban problem. It must supply the needed facts and it must clearly articulate the country's objectives.

No responsible American doubts the desire of the Administration to see Cuba ultimately free and meanwhile to prevent Castro from spreading Communist dictatorship to other parts of the hemisphere. It can certainly be assumed that Washington is committed to eliminating the Soviet political and military base from Cuba *eventually* and to blocking Sino-Soviet ambitions in Latin America. What is needed is a commitment to urgent and immediate action, unambiguously expressed to the nation and the world. It is imperative that our people, our allies, and especially our enemies, clearly understand that this government intends to use all its power to achieve the objective.

All must know that we not only want a free Cuba but we are determined to help it *become* free — without undue delays. Any doubts on this score must be dispelled — for example, by publication of the correspondence between Khrushchev and the President during and following the October confrontation. So long as the record is withheld, there will be rumors and apprehensions, at home and abroad, about our Cuban commitment. There must be no gap between word and deed.

Providing Leadership

Because the Cuban issue deserves high priority and as an evidence of the intention to act decisively, the Administration must assign top national leadership to concentrate on this area of national concern. The appointment of an outstanding personality to a Federal post on Cuban or Latin American affairs will symbolize the importance we assign to the problem and should help to improve our performance. Arrangements should be made to call together Department of State personnel, both incumbent and retired, who know the problems and can communicate effectively with our OAS allies to win support for U.S. policies and actions.

The Alliance For Progress

Thoughtful Americans support the Alliance for Progress. Experience demonstrates that the Communists cannot be defeated in their drive for world domination by purely defensive action or negative opposition. The justification of the Free World lies in its promise of a better life to the individual. For millions of hungry, illiterate people, living in mud-huts and doomed to early death, freedom means, above all, a chance to work and live in dignity. Their yearning for escape from hardship

makes them an easy prey for the demagogue who holds out glittering prospects under Communism.

Every effort must be made, through the Alliance for Progress, to raise the living standards of Central and South America. But the program will succeed only if the people can see and feel the advances. Unfortunately, so long as Communism can use Cuba as a base for subversion, economic progress will be sabotaged by the Communists, on the one hand, or strangled by Rightists who use the threat of Communism to oppose essential reforms. Awareness of these obstacles should lead us to increase, not diminish, our zeal for strengthening the economies of our neighbors to the South. We must be prepared for an up-hill struggle against reaction, corruption and Communism — all foes of an effective Alliance for Progress.

But there may be an even more serious danger to the Alliance for Progress — our own illusion that it can succeed by itself. The Communists can destroy faster than others can build. The Alliance for Progress must therefore not be considered as a substitute for direct, militant opposition to Communism. It is but one of the weapons that must be brought into action. The Marshall Plan did not really take hold until NATO provided a shield against the military threat of Communism. So too the Alliance for Progress needs an Alliance for Freedom as a shield against Communist violence and sabotage.

The achievement of progress in Latin America will require the development of local leaders, dedicated to freedom and capable of standing as "a wall of dedicated men" against the inroads of totalitarian tyranny. Theirs will be the task of combatting the agents now being trained in Cuba and Russia. Even after the liberation of Cuba, Latin America will be confronted by a formidable disruptive force because of those who have already been taught Communist subversion and guerilla warfare in Castro's and Khrushchev's schools of revolution. They will be defeated only if the Free World is defended by trained men who possess the skills of democratic leadership.

The activities of the Alliance for Progress — such as the labor institutes now under way — must be enlarged. The OAS should be encouraged to set up additional training centers in democratic countries like Costa Rica and Venezuela, with U.S. supported facilities and teachers. We must fight Communism with trained minds as well as good hearts.

This need grows all the more urgent because Communist attacks on the weak spots in Latin America increase the danger of a resort to military dictatorships like the Peralta junta in Guatemala. Such a trend would multiply our difficulties and jeopardize the cause of freedom. We cannot afford to be caught in the cross-fire of a battle between the extremists. To escape such

a dilemma, we must take timely action in buttressing a system of inter-American democracy. Our need is for knowledgeable leadership in all our embassies and agencies in the field as well as at the top. Only by putting our best men in strategic posts can we hope to handle the explosive situations if and when they occur.

Aid to the Cuban Exiles

Cuba's proudest hope is the resistance of its patriots to Communist domination. No act of the American government should downgrade their courage; every pronouncement should aim to uplift the morale of freedom-loving Cubans everywhere.

We have a considerable responsibility for helping the exiles to achieve unity in their own ranks. We injure such unity if we play favorites among factions. We must encourage all groups to select responsible leaders with whom the U.S. government can cooperate for the common cause. Through every possible channel, we must assist the organized underground inside Cuba, bringing to bear our extensive resources and experience.

Exile and underground activity has many values. Not the least is the fact that it warns the Soviet interventionists that seizure of other men's countries will bring inevitable retaliatory action. If Communists can promote phony "wars of liberation", we can and should support real ones.

The presence of Cuban refugees in the United States, now numbering about 250,000, presents us with a rare opportunity. These men and women are the only major group of exiles since World War II who have any reasonable prospect of an early return to a liberated homeland.

Cuba's problems will not end with the overthrow of the Communists. If those problems are solved by a future democratic regime, a powerful blow will have been struck for liberation everywhere behind the Iron Curtain. Thus, we contribute to the oppressed people in Cuba and all the satellites when we provide special study opportunities to the refugees now within our shores. By training them in the fields of democratic government, public administration, industrial and agricultural management, defense, public safety and order, public education, we can lay the foundations for a wholesome future.

The Taking of Risks

Underlying the discussion of policy and action was the question: What risks are Americans willing to take in response to Communist expansionism and which policy is likely to minimize the risks?

We are most in danger of Communist attack, whether from Peking or Moscow, when our indecision suggests fear, weakness or ineptness. We are safest when our

adversary realizes that we are clear about our objectives and determined in pursuing them.

Timing is, of course, a crucial factor in assessing risk. The Freedom House conferees tended to the view that *the risks later will be more formidable than the risks now*. Even on the assumption that time is inevitably on our side, which we do not accept, one cannot be sanguine about a Sovietized Cuba that brings a large portion of the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere within easy range of Communist missiles and nuclear warheads.

The conference was aware that the major premise of present policy is the assumption that action on Cuba must be delayed because of risks to our position elsewhere in the world. But the conferees were impressed by the fact that the U.S. position in October, far from provoking Communist adventures, forced the Soviet leaders to act with greater caution everywhere. In the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, American toughness justifies Khrushchev's position of restraint, while any evidence that the U.S. is a "paper tiger" would strengthen Mao's call for aggression.

In any case, if choices must be made as to where we should take bold stands, Cuba is the most logical place. The Soviet Union has over-extended itself geographically by reaching into the Caribbean. Of all the fronts on which we face each other, Cuba is militarily Russia's weakest, and our strongest. The only Russian chance for success in such a contest would be to convert the local conflict into a general war — clearly too fearful a price for so small a prize. Moreover, military opinion considers the risk of general war in the near future relatively small because the Kremlin knows that it could not win. The record already shows that the Soviets have almost always backed away from action that might lead to general war when the U.S. has taken a firm stand, as in Cuba last October and in Berlin since Khrushchev issued his original ultimatum in November 1958.

The risks of inaction, however, must be spelled out also in terms of the impact on the non-Communist world. There is the risk — indeed, almost a certainty — that inaction will encourage neutralism. If the U.S. can accommodate itself to the indefinite perpetuation of a Communist regime in Cuba, why should not the rest of Latin America? And the consequence will be a steady seepage of Communism into the other islands of the Caribbean and the other Latin countries of the hemisphere. At the same time, in Europe and Asia, countries contiguous with the Iron Curtain will have every reason to ask: If the U.S. dare not uproot Communism from its own doorstep, how can we expect it to risk anything on our behalf?

The freeing of Cuba, not ultimately but soon, must be the aim of U.S. policy implemented by a practical program of action.

Conclusion: The People and the President

The men and women who assembled at the invitation of Freedom House were sympathetic to the heavy burden carried by the President of the United States and his advisers. Theirs is a fearsome responsibility in these days of civilization's great dilemma.

As we were meeting, Haiti became a close second in the Caribbean developments of deep concern to the United States. Southeast Asia is engaging our attention and costing American lives. Berlin is always in the wings. The complexity of these inter-related problems must not be minimized by those who seek to be helpful in the finding of solutions. Our chosen leaders should be able to count on the cooperation of all Americans in the effort to solve the gigantic problems confronting the

nation and the world. And they have a duty to do all in their power to create a spirit of national unity that will prepare us for the crises ahead.

Both the cooperation and the national unity can be achieved only if the people have access to relevant information, study every suggested solution, and develop a consensus for action. Our leaders must keep us informed of the facts and their plans for the future; we must keep our leaders informed of the people's judgment and willingness to sacrifice.

This is the discourse of democracy. Only through such an interchange between the people and their government can America find the way toward freedom and peace in the difficult days ahead.

APPENDIX I

A Panorama of Alternatives

From the vantage point of their own contact with the problems of Latin America and the cold war, the conferees attempted to formulate their personal conclusions within the framework of these parameters:

1. Questions of High Policy
 - a) What do we regard as indispensable?
 - b) What is intolerable?
2. What costs and risks are acceptable in achieving our objectives?
3. How much action, and what kind, is needed and feasible on the part of —
 - a) The United States?
 - b) Cuban exiles?
 - c) The underground in Cuba?
 - d) The Organization of American States?
 - e) NATO?
4. What mix of measures would be most effective, including —
 - a) Refugee training for service in a liberated Cuba?
 - b) Propaganda and psychological warfare?
 - c) Economic isolation of Cuba?
 - d) Support of sabotage and rebel forces?
 - e) Aid to insurrection?
 - f) Para-military and military actions?

Freedom House commends this formulation to other discussion groups as a helpful tool in studying one of our most urgent problems. Its use in the sessions of this conference proved profitable in laying out at least a partial list of alternative policies and "action points". They are listed here, not as points advocated by the conference or even by the individuals who presented

them but as evidences of the fact that a frank facing of our position reveals many directions — of varying merit, to be sure — in which we can go. Many of the proposals are contradictory in some respects or even mutually exclusive. They nevertheless help to illuminate *the areas in which decisions must be made consciously rather than by default.*

TOP-LEVEL DECISIONS:

1. Insist as a basic premise that Castro-Communism must go or be defeated.
2. Seek to co-exist with a Communist Cuba headed by Castro or some other ruler.

HEMISPHERIC POLICY:

1. Reassert the Monroe Doctrine, or a modernized version.
2. Announce U.S. support for all dedicated democrats who fight for freedom against dictatorship anywhere in the hemisphere.
3. Proclaim a hemisphere-wide right of self-determination, accepting any democratic decision on the form of government and social system so long as "human rights and fundamental freedoms" are observed.
4. Help to organize a Latin American Treaty Organization (LATO) outside the OAS, which would welcome all non-dictatorial states willing to ally themselves for purposes of military defense after the pattern of NATO. (It is assumed that several of the larger Latin American states would be

reluctant to join, and that dictatorships like Haiti, Paraguay, etc., would be barred.)

5. Rally non-governmental organizations throughout the hemisphere, including business groups and labor unions, for freedom and social justice.
6. Declare that the U.S. opposes Communist penetration but not revolutionary social change in Latin America.

DIRECT PRESSURE ON CUBA:

1. Assert a policy of collective measures against Cuba based on a rigorous implementation of the Rio Treaty, the Bogota Pact and the Punta del Este Resolutions.
2. Repeal or amend the U.S. Neutrality Acts.
3. Organize a tight OAS embargo against trade, communications and travel between member states and Cuba — any states rejecting participation to forfeit U.S. aid.
4. In cooperation with Venezuela, exert effective pressure on the five OAS members still maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba to sever their ties.
5. Withdraw U.S. recognition of the Castro government.
6. Propose an OAS study of the steps deemed necessary to achieve the objective of a free Cuba.
7. Impose comprehensive sanctions on shipping to include all vessels of any line that uses as much as one of its ships in the Cuban trade.
8. Use pre-emptive buying to tighten the noose on Castro's economy.
9. Press OAS to impose the same quarantine on Communist Cuba as it did on Trujillo's Dominican Republic.
10. Citizen groups in this country should cooperate with Free Cuba Committees in our sister republics.
11. Press NATO countries to curtail the sale of any goods to the Iron Curtain countries of the type being supplied to Cuba by the Communists.
12. Quarantine Cuba against receiving any weapons, whether called offensive or defensive.
13. Quarantine all shipments of petroleum to Cuba.

14. Promote the organization of an OAS task force and prepare an OAS invasion force to be used as a last resort.

AID TO ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS:

1. Arm and assist Cuban freedom fighters inside and outside of Cuba; encourage sabotage and raids.
2. Help establish bases for Cuban rebels outside U.S. territory.
3. Publicize the extent and character of current Cuban resistance.
4. Launch a major propaganda effort through all media, calling for public support of a Radio Free Cuba.
5. In cooperation with Cuban exiles, start OAS work on "winning the peace" in a free Cuba.
6. Help to organize a Cuban government-in-exile.

POST-CASTRO CUBA:

1. Create OAS machinery for governing liberated countries and conducting elections under pre-planned rules, to be available for action in Cuba, Haiti and elsewhere.
2. Provide opportunities for qualified Cuban refugees to receive advanced training in their fields and to conduct studies on problems they will face in a liberated Cuba.
3. Prepare plans for the political, social and economic future of a free Cuba.
4. Declare that Cubans must and will choose their own form of government.

REMOVING THE RUSSIANS:

1. Announce that the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba has first priority in America's agenda.
2. Adopt a formal decision that Soviet troops and "technicians" must be repatriated within a stated time or face measures of expulsion.
3. Impose an OAS "quarantine" or blockade if necessary to expel Soviet forces or bring down the Cuban Communist regime — any states rejecting participation to forfeit U.S. aid.
4. Establish OAS teams to inspect all ships bound for Cuba.

APPENDIX II

Opinion Survey on Cuban Policy

The following questions were formulated by a sub-committee in the light of the first day's discussion. Participants were requested to indicate their views by choosing among four possible replies: (1) Yes; (2)

Qualified; (3) No; (4) Qualified No. The qualified replies were intended to indicate the respondent's degree of conviction about his views. During the poll, 25 participants were present.

TABULATION OF RESPONSES

| Questions | Qualified | | No | Qualified | |
|---|-----------|-----|----|-----------|------------|
| | Yes | Yes | | No | Abstention |
| 1. Has Washington <i>reached</i> an agreement with the USSR on Cuba? | 0 | 7 | 9 | 2 | 7 |
| 2. Is Washington <i>interested</i> in reaching an agreement with the USSR on Cuba? | 17 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 3. Is Washington <i>fully committed</i> on a policy to bring down Castro in practical terms? | 3 | 5 | 11 | 3 | 3 |
| 4. Does the Administration <i>believe</i> that Russian troops will leave Cuba? | 5 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 4 |
| 5. Has Washington <i>reached</i> a decision <i>not</i> to act except as it is presently acting? | 6 | 6 | 9 | 2 | 2 |
| 6. Does Washington <i>wish</i> an exile Cuban government? | 1 | 1 | 20 | 2 | 1 |
| 7. Does Washington <i>hope</i> to pry Castro loose from the USSR? | 9 | 8 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 8. Does Washington have a plan on Cuba? | 1 | 5 | 13 | 4 | 2 |
| 9. Does the Administration think it runs a serious risk of losing the 1964 election if Castro remains? | 4 | 2 | 13 | 2 | 4 |
| 10. Can Castro's regime be toppled | | | | | |
| (a) <i>without</i> U.S. military action? | 10 | 11 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| (b) <i>without</i> an invasion by the U.S.? | 21 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 11. Do President Betancourt of Venezuela, former President Figueres of Costa Rica and others <i>want sterner</i> U.S. action than presently exists? | 19 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| 12. Would Brazil and Mexico be <i>ready to support</i> such action? | 4 | 13 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| 13. Can Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America be <i>contained without action larger than presently exists</i> ? | 2 | 2 | 19 | 1 | 1 |
| 14. Is it U.S. policy to <i>oppose</i> widespread and organized internal sabotage against Castro? | 0 | 7 | 12 | 2 | 4 |
| 15. Is the U.S. opposing oil refinery sabotage because former and future U.S. properties are involved? | 0 | 1 | 11 | 4 | 9 |
| 16. Were the hit-and-run raids contributing to creating difficulties for Castro? | 20 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 17. Did raids <i>not</i> based on U.S. soil endanger the peace? | 1 | 2 | 18 | 1 | 3 |
| 18. Does the Administration count on or believe it can isolate Cuba? | 10 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| 19. Does the Administration believe that continued economic pressure <i>will</i> topple Castro? | 4 | 6 | 9 | 4 | 2 |
| 20. Is Washington's concern with nuclear raids | | | | | |
| (a) a significant cause of <i>inaction</i> ? | 5 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 5 |
| (b) or is it a <i>rationalization</i> to support its present policy? | 8 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| 21. Does the U.S. Government have a policy of liberation of Cuba? | 4 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 3 |

Apart from Cuba, how many in this room are *friendly* to the Administration; or *opposed* to the Administration?

Friendly: 14

Opposed: 7

Abstention: 4