



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 APR 1959

The Vice President
United States Senate
Washington 25, D.C.

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Dear Mr. Vice President:

[redacted] has furnished information on discussions which Latin American delegates to the 21st Congress of the CPSU had with Soviet officials in Moscow and Prague and with Chinese leaders in Peiping. I am certain that this report, a copy of which is attached, will be of interest to you.

Soviet leaders showed sensitivity to Free World propaganda exposing their control of the international Communist movement. It was decided that Communist literature would no longer make reference to CPSU leadership and direction, or the need to defend the Soviet Union, although the Soviets of course remain in control.

Both Soviet and Chinese officials gave high priority to the support of Communist activities in Latin America. The Chinese, indeed, believe that Chinese tactics can be fruitfully applied to the underdeveloped countries of that area. Leaders of both nations were encouraged by the success of the Castro revolt in Cuba, but Mao Tse-tung cautioned that Castro's tactics should not be mechanically imitated. Legal tactics should be tried first, and an increased capacity to manipulate nationalist, anti-U.S. elements should be obtained.

A secret conference of Latin American Communists developed a common action program emphasizing campaigns against U. S. bases and missions. Soviet officials advocated that "U. S. imperialism" be attacked in its own backyard, and pledged continued aid.

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Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders, unlike Krushchev, found time to talk at length with the Latin American delegates. The Chinese contended that international tension benefits the Communists; exploitation of such tensions forces the "imperialists" to spread themselves thin. Chinese attacks on the offshore islands following U. S. landings in Lebanon were cited as an example of the successful diversion of "imperialist" forces. Mao claimed that the United States considered Chiang Kai-shek a liability and was ready to overthrow him.

An interesting development was Mao's request that thought be given to the union of several small Latin American countries in one national entity, in order to strengthen the fight against "imperialism". There is no indication that the Soviets raised this matter with the Latin American delegates.

Plans were made to intensify the Chinese training program for Latin American Communist leaders; tentative arrangements to establish a network of correspondents of the New China News Agency in Latin America were worked out. The Latin American delegates were favorably impressed by the Chinese, probably because of the efforts made to receive them well, and appeared receptive to Chinese advances.

I shall appreciate it if you will restrict access to this sensitive report.

A copy of this report has been furnished to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as to General Goodpaster.

Sincerely,



C. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director

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1 Attachment



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OBSERVATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN CP
DELEGATIONS TO THE 21ST CPSU CONGRESS
AND THEIR EXPERIENCES WITH CP CHINA
IN PEIPING

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SUMMARY

1. This report is extremely sensitive. It contains highlights of the observations of Latin American Communist Party delegations to the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and of experiences with the Communist Party of China in Peiping after the 21st Congress. [REDACTED]

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2. Pre-Congress Meeting on Propaganda Treatment of Soviet Leading Role. Before the Congress a ranking Soviet Central Committee member, possibly Mikhail Suslov, obtained agreement from all foreign delegates that the Soviet Union and the CPSU would no longer be depicted in Communist literature as having a directing role and that all Communist parties should be portrayed as independent and equal, in order to discredit propaganda of "the imperialist and revisionist enemies" which claimed Soviet control over Bloc states and all CP's. Cooperation and mutual assistance among Communist parties supplied or directed by the CPSU would, however, continue undiminished. At a special conference with the Latin American delegates (see below), Soviet Presidium member Otto V. Kuusinen pledged effective aid to the Communist parties. Another leader pledged "more economic aid than ever" in support of delegations to the Seventh World Youth Festival in Vienna. Intensive private discussions were held between Soviet officials and Latin American delegation leaders to iron out special problems, such as contact methods and Soviet financial aid.

3. Special Conference of Latin American CP's. Although the special (closed) conference of the Latin American delegates (9-13 February) was attended by ranking Soviet "observers," it was formally chaired by a Cuban Communist leader. The

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Soviet observers addressed the meeting only after the completion of its business, and made clear the highest priority of interest attached by the USSR and the CPSU to developments in Latin America, where "imperialism is beginning to be weakened in its own backyard." Latin American Communist parties were relieved of the need to include language about the "defense of the Soviet Union" in their programs, but were urged to "struggle for the liberation of their countries" and to take territory away from the imperialist camp as the most effective aid which could be rendered to the USSR. CP Cuba was warned that the regime may "go to the right" just like Nasser, who had betrayed the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution.

4. Action Program for Latin American CP's. The special conference of Latin American delegates agreed to make more concrete the common action program developed for Latin America in Moscow, November 1957. It was resolved to organize an "anti-imperialist" People's Congress between April and June 1959;¹ to render the tactics of the Communist labor federation, Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL) more effective by bringing together trade unions of the same type and by linking up CTAL headquarters; and to intensify the Peace Movement through mass meetings and suitable concrete actions or campaigns against military budgets, U.S. bases or missions, etc.² The tactical objective of the program was to obtain greater popular support. Concealment of Communist language and organizational controls was therefore emphasized.

5. Discussion of "Problems of Peace and Socialism". Officials of the international publication Problems of Peace and Socialism in Prague sought to interview all foreign delegates transiting en route to and from the 21st CPSU Congress, in order to fulfill the mission of the publication. Problems of Peace and Socialism is to be (a) the collective organ of all Communist

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parties and (b) a vehicle for the exchange of practical experiences of all Communist parties in solving concrete problems, especially new Communist methods to combat new forms of imperialist penetration. Representatives of Problems of Peace and Socialism levied on Latin American delegates specific requests for certain types of articles, CP documents and exchanges, and arranged legal and illegal communication channels.

6. Chinese Views on International Affairs. MAO Tse-tung, LIU Shao-ch'i and other Chinese leaders, in conversations with Latin American CP delegates in China in February and March, followed previously expressed official or unofficial lines on international affairs.

a. They stressed the affinity of the situations in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and advocated an exchange of experience among the CP's of these countries.

b. They maintained that international tensions benefit CP's and aid China because Communists, by coordinated action, are able to distract and disperse imperialist forces and to force them to spread themselves thin over a vast area. They said Communist parties should not be afraid of international tension -- "we" need more of it.

7. MAO on the Taiwan Problem. On the question of Taiwan, MAO Tse-tung explained how "Yankee imperialist aid to the Kuomintang" was useful to the Communists as a unifying issue which could be used to show up U.S. imperialism and interventionism. He claimed that CHIANG's policy of fighting the creation of two Chinas coincided with MAO's objectives of exposing the U.S. as the "principal enemy" and exacerbating "contradictions" between the British and Americans, and

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between CHIANG Kai-shek and the Americans. By preventing the creation of two Chinas, MAO stated, and by avoiding UN control of Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was able to "strike blows against the United States without engaging directly in military actions with the United States." MAO claimed that Dulles and the U.S. were aware of this, considered CHIANG a liability and held in reserve a secret provisional government to take his place by a coup.

8. MAO on the Liberation Struggle in Latin America.
MAO stated:

- a. the struggle for national liberation in Latin America had developed in a situation of international tension during the past two years;
- b. the Cuban revolution had shown that the battle could be carried to the imperialist rear and that the imperialists were paper tigers;
- c. armed action on the Cuban model should not be applied mechanically; Latin American Communist parties should try legal, peaceful means first.

9. MAO on Unification of Small Latin American Countries.
MAO asked the Latin American CP representatives to consider and to report to the CCP their views on the possibility of unifying several small Latin American countries in order more efficiently to resist imperialism.

10. CCP Training Program for Latin American CP's.
Representatives of ten Latin American CP's made arrangements for the dispatch of from two to five trainees per CP to a four to six months' practical training course for future national or regional

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CP leaders which was to be organized by the CCP and would start on 1 August. The CCP agreed to pay air transportation costs at an average of \$700 per student and gave each delegation cash in U.S. dollars for this purpose.

11. Establishment of Clandestine CP's Paralleling Publicly Known CP's. Officials of the CCP briefed Latin American CP representatives on the need to establish a truly clandestine CP functioning alongside the legal, semi-legal, or outlawed CP in the same country. Their reasoning was that a publicly known CP was vulnerable to destruction and repression. In their experience, only a truly and permanently clandestine Communist party paralleling the known CP can avoid such destruction and repression. At the same time it can function effectively and assist with the development of sources of funds and information.

12. Latin American CP's to Furnish Correspondents for New China News Agency (NCNA). The Director of the New China News Agency opened negotiations with the Latin American CP representatives to establish, with their help, correspondents for NCNA in Latin America who preferably would be CP members, or at least trusted by the CP's. NCNA would pay \$100 per month plus expenses, for news and political coverage. NCNA would also furnish radio receivers or purchase-money for same, in order to facilitate daily monitoring by correspondents of the Peking Spanish language broadcasts. NCNA desired to have "legal" correspondents where feasible, and "illegal" correspondents where the political situation was adverse. The Latin American CP representatives took the matter under consideration and promised to send a reply through participants at the training school (see para. 10).

13. Attitudes of Latin American CP Representatives to Soviet and Chinese Communists. The attitude of the Latin American CP representatives toward the Soviets was one of respect and automatic submission, but some complained about Soviet aloofness.

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arrogance, and coldness. The Latin Americans considered Chinese Communists to show less arrogance, greater kindness, greater hospitality and more humility than the Soviets. They agreed that Chinese conditions are more like those in Latin America than those of any other Bloc country, and that much could be learned from the Chinese Communists.

14. Reflections on Sino-Soviet Relations. In their talks with the Latin American CP representatives both Soviet and Chinese leaders emphasized friendship, understanding, close relations and the absence of differences between the USSR and China. Nevertheless, the impression was left that differences have existed and do exist "within the family," possibly in the ideological field. In this respect, it was significant that a majority of Latin American CP representatives vetoed the proposal of a Latin American delegate to hold a discussion with the Chinese on the subject of "different roads to Socialism." The subject was apparently considered controversial.

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I. THE LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATIONS IN MOSCOW AND PRAGUE
FOR THE 21ST CPSU CONGRESS

A. Pre-Congress Meeting on Propaganda Treatment of Soviet
Leading Role

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1. Three days before the 21st CPSU Congress, "Nikolai," an official of the department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union handling relations with foreign Communist parties, consulted secretly with delegates from all Communist parties regarding the suitability of a formulation with respect to the "leadership" role of the USSR and the CPSU which Khrushchev was to include in his report to the Congress. The document presented to the delegates for discussion and approval contained:

a. An analysis of the declaration of the twelve Bloc Communist parties at Moscow in November 1957 showing the declaration to be basically correct and to be the basis for unity of the International Communist Movement.

b. A statement of the need for clarity as to the "leadership" role of the USSR among the socialist states and of the CPSU among the Communist parties. It was pointed out that the November 1957 declaration provided the imperialist and revisionist enemies with the opportunity to charge that the USSR exploited the other socialist states and that the CPSU directed the other Communist parties. The latter point had caused problems for many Communist parties: internal problems with revisionist elements and external problems vis-a-vis the masses, the national bourgeoisie and the bourgeois governments.

c. A statement of the need for the elimination from all Communist literature of references to the "directing" role of the USSR and the CPSU; also of the need for

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emphasizing the equality and independence of all the Communist parties. This in no way diminished the "vanguard" role of the USSR as the first socialist state, and of the CPSU as the party which established that state. Likewise this did not diminish in any way coordination and fraternal aid among the Communist parties in the fight against the common enemy.

2. The document was presented as a "development" of the November 1957 formulation and specifically not as a correction. The representatives of the Communist parties of Latin America approved the "development."

B. Special Conference of Latin American Communist Parties

1. A special clandestine conference of Latin American Communist parties was held during 9-13 February 1959 in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow.

2. Representatives from CP Spain and CP Portugal were invited. They asked for fraternal support in the campaign for the release of political prisoners.

3. In keeping with the line regarding non-direction of CP's, the Soviets did not preside over the conference. Several Soviet officials, who attended as observers, addressed the conference after its conclusion. These were Otto V. Kuusinen, aged former Comintern official;⁴ the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism;⁵ the "secretary general" of the Komsomol;⁶ and a member of the Central Committee, CPSU.⁷

C. Action Program for Latin American CP's

1. Prior to the Latin American conference, a preparatory meeting of the chiefs of delegations was held on 1 February 1959. It was resolved that the conference should agree upon concrete action

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to be taken by the Latin American CP's in further development of the November 1957 action program regarding (a) an organized defense of natural resources, (b) the trade union problem in Latin America, and (c) the peace movement in Latin America.

2. Latin American People's Congress. The conference treated the agenda items in the above order of importance and resolved first to organize a "People's Congress" in April 1959 aimed ostensibly at defense of natural resources.⁹ The subject of defense of resources was treated also at the 21st Congress itself. The Communist origin of the People's Congress is to be concealed. The tactic is to have the Congress convoked by leading figures such as Lazaro CARDENAS of Mexico, Fidel CASTRO of Cuba, Romulo BETANCOURT of Venezuela, Jose FIGUERES of Costa Rica or others. All Communists are to attend as "persons" and not as CP representatives. "Anti-imperialist" language in organizing and holding the Congress is specifically to be avoided. However, the resolutions of this Congress should be anti-imperialist in content. The aim of this tactic is to win the broadest support possible. In developing this Congress, importance is to be given to the struggle against dictatorships in Latin America and the defense of the revolutions in Cuba and Venezuela, and "other democratic regimes." Fraternal delegates from Asia and Africa are to be invited. The site is to be a Latin American country where conditions are "appropriate." The Communist parties of Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and Mexico are to be in charge of the organization of this Congress.

3. Modification of Trade Union Tactics. Second, the conference resolved to modify trade union organizational tactics in Latin America so as to achieve greater unity. The aim is to seek unity in relation to specific problems of workers in accordance with actual conditions in each country. Latin American meetings of trade unions in the same field of work should be proposed. In this activity, the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL), Latin American regional affiliate of the WFTU, should develop its campaign to get closer to the

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Latin American trade union movement. To facilitate the work, it is necessary that leaders be representatives of trade union centers actually affiliated with the CTAL. For example, Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ,¹⁰ of CTAL headquarters in Mexico City, is not truly a representative in the sense cited, despite his merits as a trade union leader and Communist. Furthermore, CTAL headquarters should be located in a country where it has a large mass base. Hence the CTAL leadership should be reorganized and its headquarters transferred.

4. Strengthening of Peace Movement: Third, the conference decided that the peace movement must be strengthened. Where conditions permit, the struggle should be through peace committees. Elsewhere, the struggle should be carried out by means of concrete actions or campaigns as, for example, activities against military budgets, U.S. military missions and U.S. bases. A Latin American meeting of peace partisans should be held during the first half of 1960. In order to achieve the broadest participation in this meeting, sectarianism must be avoided. CP Argentina is charged with making preparations for the meeting.

5. Speeches by Soviet Observers after Conference

a. Remarks by Kuusinen. Kuusinen stated that the Latin American conference proved the correctness of the November 1957 declaration of the CP's, for the February 1959 conference revealed the maturity of the Latin American CP's and revealed that no one is in a better position to resolve problems and lead revolutions than the CP's of each country, because only they are in a position to know well the peculiar conditions in their countries.

He remarked that the best way to contribute to proletarian internationalism is for the CP's to struggle for liberation in their own countries, thus taking territory away from the

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imperialist camp. It is not necessary for Latin American CP's to include the defense of the USSR in their programs, because the Soviets are strong enough to defend themselves. Any revolutionary advances in other countries would aid the USSR since the common enemy would thereby be weakened.

Kuusinen asserted that events in Latin America in recent years are of great importance because they signify that imperialism is beginning to be weakened in its own backyard. The Latin American CP's should, more than ever, coordinate and unite their efforts, and maintain firmly the principles of proletarian internationalism, because imperialism will try various ways to counterattack, possibly through alliance with the national bourgeoisie on the basis of concessions, or through intervention of the Guatemala type.

Kuusinen stressed the importance of events in Cuba. He remarked that the situation must go to the left or the right; the direction would depend on the work of CP-Cuba inside the country, and on the work of the other Latin American CP's in defense of the Cuban revolution. He cited, as an example of the turn to the right, the case of Nasser, who began as the leader of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, but later betrayed the revolution and reached agreement with the imperialists. He added that the national bourgeoisie of Cuba may try to do the same.

Kuusinen concluded by remarking that recent events in Latin America reveal that it is possible to defeat imperialism on its own ground. The USSR and the CPSU pay great attention and attribute the highest importance to that fact.

b. Remarks by the First Secretary of the Komsomol on the Seventh World Youth Festival. In his remarks concerning the World Youth Festival, the First Secretary of the Komsomol stated

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that the Austrian government has denied the use of public buildings and schools. The anti-Communist organizations in Austria are developing a big campaign against the holding of the Festival in Austria and threaten to sabotage and create serious problems for it. Moreover, Austrian students are developing a campaign against the Festival, and Hungarian refugees are threatening violent measures against Festival participants and events.

The First Secretary added that in order to overcome the above obstacles, it is necessary to mobilize the maximum number of youths for the Festival. The organizing committee will give greater economic aid than ever to delegations. The committee has already determined the number of delegates per country. In order to avoid the Communist label, funds will not be channeled via the CP but will go to the local preparatory committee or youth group designated by the CP. Greatest care should be taken to avoid inclusion of provocateurs in the delegations.

D. Individual Meetings of Latin American CP Representatives with CPSU Officials

Individual meetings of Latin American Communist party representatives with CPSU officials were held before and after the special conference. All Latin American delegations or chiefs of delegations consulted privately with the CPSU regarding their problems, especially those concerning relations, channels, and forms of contact with the CPSU, and regarding CPSU aid of the type needed by a given CP. (The Soviet modus operandi in granting financial aid to CP's was not discussed during the special conference. Kuusinen pledged "effective aid" to the CP's.) These private meetings were held with Kostia, Spanish-speaking Soviet who maintained direct contact with the Latin American CP delegates, and who is an official in the CPSU's Foreign Section (International Department) with special responsibility for Latin America. Kostia discussed the problems, then referred them to the Central Committee via "Nikolai." The

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Central Committee replied via "Nikolai" and Kostia. Some Latin American CP's, for example those of Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay, and Venezuela, held several such meetings. Possibly, they talked to higher-ranking Soviets than Kostia or "Nikolai."

E. The New International Communist Publication

1. Officials of the new international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, sought to interview all foreign Communist delegates who transited Prague en route to the CPSU Congress.

2. A Soviet called "Caranov,"¹² who was said to be in charge of the new journal, made the following remarks through an interpreter to one Latin American delegation.

a. He described the journal's mission as that of becoming a collective organ for all CP's and a vehicle for the exchange by all CP's of practical experiences in solving their concrete problems. In particular, the journal wanted to include the experiences of CP's in solving new forms of imperialist penetration, including the new struggles and methods developed by CP's to combat these forms.

b. He was interviewing the delegation in order to obtain help in solving the journal's problems so that it could fulfill its mission, which had not been satisfactorily accomplished to date.

c. He noted that different reading tastes and different interests in various parts of the world had posed difficulties for the journal.

d. He stated that when articles are needed from a CP they should be written by a CP member. With respect to articles already published by non-party authors, if a CP finds one in accord with the party line the party should get the author's

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permission for publication of the article in Problems of Peace and Socialism.

3. The Latin American delegation received from "Caranov" a blind memorandum (for retention) which set forth requests for the periodic submission by CP's of data for the new journal. These requests are in addition to articles which may previously have been requested of a given CP. The new requests are related to specific regular sections of the journal.

a. For the section "In the Communist and Workers' Parties":
submit official party documents regarding the most important internal questions for the party, and also regarding problems of a type not restricted to one CP only;

provide information regarding the experience accumulated by the party in different sectors of mass work, ideological work, political training and education, press work, etc.;

send information concerning the internal life of the party.

b. For the bibliographic section:

provide notes on new Marxist works written on philosophy, economics, sociology, politics and cultural matters, citing not only the contents but also the manner in which new theoretical problems are treated;

recommend new books by "progressive" authors in the above fields which the journal should call to the attention of its readers;

make proposals and indicate needs with respect to the publication of critical notes regarding books and publications of a theoretical nature -- including anti-Marxist, revisionist books -- which defend reactionary ideology, have achieved a considerable

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distribution in the country, and which should be answered.

4. When the Latin American delegation was transiting Prague en route home from Moscow, it was again interviewed by an official of Problems of Peace and Socialism. This time the interview was conducted by another Soviet (name unknown) via an interpreter called "Simoniev," also a Soviet. The official requested that the CP submit articles for the journal on the following subjects:

- a. the organizational consequences within the CP of what had proved to be an undue reduction in the number of paid, full-time CP functionaries;
- b. information on the revision of the CP's statutes, including the reasons for the revisions, the effects, etc.;
- c. official party documents on past as well as future party Congresses.

5. In the same interview, arrangements were also made for communications between the CP and the headquarters of the journal in Prague. Because the CP involved feared mail interception, it was advised to forward three copies of all articles in the following manner: (a) one copy to the drop address of a neighboring CP; (b) one copy to the official address of the journal in Canada¹³; and (c) one copy to the official address of the journal in London.¹³ The possibility of sending a copy via the journal's office in Rome was mentioned but not agreed upon.

6. It was also agreed that a test of sending mail directly to Prague would be made. This would be done by mailing three cards directly to a personal addressee at Sadova 3, Prague 6, the journal's official address in Czechoslovakia. One card was to be sent every fifteen days. Receipt of the cards would be acknowledged.

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II. LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATES' VISIT TO COMMUNIST CHINA

A. Chinese Views on International Affairs.

In late February and early March 1959, a group of Latin American Communist party leaders travelling in Communist China after the 21st CPSU Congress was given a briefing on international affairs by MAO Tse-tung, LIU Shao-ch'i and other Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. The principal points made by the Chinese Communist leaders in these briefings follow.

1. The situation in Latin America is similar in many ways to that in the countries of Asia and Africa.

a. Latin America countries, like those in Asia and Africa, are underdeveloped economically and have been the victims of both direct and indirect intervention by the imperialists.

b. Although a certain degree of industrialization has been achieved in Latin America, this development has not been accompanied by a corresponding growth of capitalistic political and social forms. State power in these countries continues to be in the hands of feudal, comprador-bourgeois, and bureaucratic bourgeois forces.

c. Countries in these areas are often dependent upon one-product economies and have served primarily as sources of raw materials for the economies of the imperialist world.

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d. The revolution in the countries of these areas is still in its first stage, that is, the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution. The immediate task is the completion of this first stage.

e. The countries of these three areas now serve as a main support of the economy of the imperialist world. Together they represent a majority of the population of the world and control the greater part of its territory and natural resources.

2. As a consequence of these similar conditions and problems, it follows that the exchange of experience among the Communist parties of these areas is of great value to all of them. By coordinated action Communists are able to distract and disperse the imperialist forces over a vast area.

3. From this it may be seen that a policy of maintaining international tensions is beneficial to Communists. Communists should not fear tension. "We need more of it," said one Chinese Communist leader.

4. The CCP has applied the principle of tension in the case of Taiwan, Quemoy and the Matsus. When the imperialists have intervened in underdeveloped countries, the Chinese Communists have come to the aid of these countries by drawing off the imperialist forces. Lebanon is an illustration of this policy.

5. In the same way, when tension is created in other parts of the world, by events such as the stoning of Vice-President Nixon, the revolutions in Cuba and Venezuela, the expropriation of the Suez Canal, the imperialist intervention in the Middle East, and so on, it is helpful to the

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Chinese Communists. MAO Tse-tung and LIU Shao-ch'i both then added, "...and in this Mr. Dulles is our ally."

B. MAO on the Taiwan Problem.

MAO Tse-tung explained to the Latin American representatives Chinese Communist policy on the question of Taiwan.

1. The conflict over Taiwan is a continuation of the Chinese civil war. In this it is plainly different from the situations in other divided countries such as Germany and Korea.

2. Although Yankee imperialist aid to the Kuomintang has delayed the final Chinese Communist victory, that aid serves to demonstrate to the peoples of China, of Asia and of the whole world, the imperialist and interventionist character of the U. S. A. The realization of this provides the basis for unity in Asia and for the anti-imperialist struggle in the dependent countries of Africa and Latin America. It serves as a noose around the neck of the imperialists which is drawn tight by the Communists whenever it serves their purposes in the policy of world tension. Dulles, who understands this very well, would like to undo the noose, but the CCP will not permit him to do so.

3. The CCP, besides making use of the contradictions between itself and the United States, also utilizes and exploits the contradictions which exist among its enemies:

a. between British and American imperialism-- the British need to trade with China and therefore oppose the American military policy;

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b. between CHIANG Kai-shek and the U. S. A. ;

c. between the U. S. A. and countries which are peace-loving even though anti-Communist and which therefore oppose the American military policy.

4. These contradictions are exploited by the CCP with the intention of isolating the U. S. A. as the principal enemy and target for attack. Thus the CCP "joins with" the CHIANG Kai-shek clique in opposing the creation of "two Chinas" and refuses to participate in meetings and organizations such as the U. S. -controlled UN which are attended by representatives of CHIANG's clique. In this way friction is maintained between CHIANG and the U. S. A. , thus preventing the latter's escape from the noose. By this policy the CCP can ignore the decisions of the UN and enjoy complete freedom of action.

5. Communist China does not desire at this time to join the UN. The Soviet Union speaks for her there and exercises the veto in China's behalf.

6. By preventing the creation of "two Chinas" or the establishment of UN control of Taiwan and by maintaining a state of tension in the Taiwan area, the CCP is able to strike blows against the US. without engaging in direct military action with US. forces.

7. Mr. Dulles understands very well the advantages that this policy obtains for the CCP. He realizes that CHIANG Kai-shek is an obstacle to American interests. Therefore the US is planning to overthrow CHIANG through a coup to be carried out by a Chinese officer who has already been trained in the US. The U. S. A. also has

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a secret provisional government ready to take over after the coup.

C. MAO on the Liberation Struggle in Latin America.

MAO Tse-tung also analyzed the progress of the national liberation movements in Latin America during the past two years.

1. He pointed out that these movements have all developed during a period of international tension.¹⁴

2. The success of the armed revolution in Cuba showed that it is possible to carry the struggle to the imperialist rear, that notions about imperialist superiority are superstitions, and that ideas that the Latin Americans are not able to struggle against the imperialists and their puppets are incorrect. The victory of a small revolutionary force over the much larger forces of the imperialist puppets in Cuba shows again that the imperialists are "paper tigers."

3. Although the CCP approved of the armed revolution in Cuba, it was not MAO's intention to direct all Latin American Communist parties to undertake similar action. Peaceful and legal means should be tried first. The time for armed struggle will be determined by the conditions of imperialist oppression rather than by the Communists' own decision.

D. MAO on the Unification of Small Latin American Countries.

MAO Tse-tung also raised the question as to whether the division of the Latin American area into a number of small

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countries had not helped to make them easy prey for the imperialists. He asked whether the Latin American representatives had given this question any thought and whether they considered the possibility of uniting several of these small countries into one larger one which would be better able to resist the imperialists. He asked the Latin Americans to meditate on this point and to report their conclusions to the Chinese Communist Party.¹⁵

E. Chinese Communist Party Training of Latin American CP Members.

1. Representatives of the Communist parties of Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Salvador, and Venezuela individually asked Chinese Communist Party leaders in Peiping, during the last week of February 1959, to make possible the sending of party members to study under CCP direction.

2. LI,¹⁶ member of the Department of Foreign Relations of the CCP, and other officials of the CCP called the representatives of the above-mentioned parties together and advised them that the Central Committee of the CCP had decided to prepare a four to six months' course for Latin American CP students. The course will be based on practical experiences of the Chinese Revolution. Its aim will not be to teach general Marxist-Leninist theory, for that can be learned in any country. Consequently, students selected should be leadership cadres of genuine quality. The CCP will pay all costs including air transportation to China. All students should be in China by July 1959 at the latest in order to begin the course by 1 August 1959.

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3. The Latin American CP officials then asked the CCP representatives how many students each CP would send; the number stated in the reply ranged from two to five students. Each CP was required to present air-transportation "budgets," that is, the cost of travel from its respective country to Prague, from which city the students would be flown to China via Moscow. The day before the departure of the Latin American CP delegations, CCP officials gave each a sum of dollars (U. S.) in cash, without a receipt, to cover the transportation cost of each proposed student from that CP. The amount varied but the average was about \$700 per student. The Latin American CP representatives stated that they would send the following number of students: Guatemala, five; Salvador, three; Honduras, three or five; Costa Rica, three; Panama, two; Bolivia, five; and Peru, three. The number proposed by the CP's of Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, was uncertain but would vary from two to five students each.

F. Establishment of Clandestine, Illegal CP's Paralleling Overt, Legal CP's.

1. An official of the CCP spoke to the Latin American CP representatives in Peiping in late February 1959. He stressed the need for clandestine activity carried out by an illegal CP functioning parallel to a legal or semi-legal CP in the same country. The knowledge of the existence of the illegal CP must be limited to members of the Central Committee of the legal CP, and better still, to only a few of them. The illegal CP should never surface, even if conditions of legality permit. When part of the illegal CP or one of its members loses contact, by reason of investigation or repression, the "lost" unit or person should not seek to reestablish contact with the illegal CP. The latter

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will make contact at a suitable time. If a long time passes and no contact is made, the "lost" unit or individual should join the overt, legal CP without ever mentioning the illegal CP. The illegal CP should be organized in highly compartmented form to avoid destruction when part of it is discovered.

2. It was pointed out that the CCP used this system successfully, especially in Shanghai. The director of the electric power plant in Shanghai on 7 March also affirmed the necessity of having a parallel illegal CP. He stated that without it, the CCP could not have accomplished "great things." LI, member of the Department of Foreign Relations of the CCP, stated on 9 March in Peiping that a truly clandestine CP, operating alongside a legal CP, is essential to avoid disaster brought about by total repression. He added that the illegal CP is in a good position for organizing, apart from its normal tasks, financial sources for both illegal and legal CP's, and sources of information of all types.

G. Chinese Communist Offer to Finance Correspondents
in Latin America.

1. Early in March 1959, in Peiping, the Director of the New Chinese News Agency (NCNA) stated to Latin American Communist representatives that the Agency desired to establish correspondents in Latin America, and asked assistance in solving the problems involved. He described the conditions set forth by the Agency.

2. Correspondents should be persons trusted by the respective Communist party, and preferably should be members of the CP. They should be, as often as possible, journalists, persons associated with journalism,

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or at least individuals with sufficient talent for the job. The Agency will pay a salary of \$100 per month, plus the costs of dispatching the news. Correspondents would have the following obligations: 1) send to the Agency a minimum of fifteen news items per month pertaining to their country, 2) send photographs regarding important events, when possible, 3) listen daily to "Radio Peking" Spanish language broadcasts, and 4) issue a monthly information bulletin if political conditions in the country permit. The Agency is willing to supply a radio receiver, or money to purchase one.

3. The Chinese News Agency made arrangements with individual Latin American CP delegations regarding channels (forms, means) for dispatching news, salaries and expenses, since conditions in the Latin American countries were not uniform. In countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia, and Uruguay, where legal conditions exist for the establishment of correspondents openly, normal channels of communication (cables, letters) directly to and from the Agency will be used. In countries where the political situation is adverse, the clandestine correspondent of the Agency: 1) will be a CP member and 2) will send his news airmail to a "legal" correspondent in a nearby country. The latter will then cable the news to the Agency as if it were produced by him.

4. The Agency expressed willingness to advance the salaries for the correspondents to be named in Latin America. Several Latin American CP delegations indicated that a definitive reply to the Agency's proposals would be sent via the students which the CP's are to send to China next July for training.

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H. Attitude of Latin American CP Representatives toward Soviet and Chinese Communists.

1. With reference to the Soviets, the attitude of the Latin American CP representatives was one of respect and submission. They generally remained silent in the presence of high-ranking Soviet officials and approved anything said without daring to ask questions. The Latin Americans spoke well of the Soviets. They consider the USSR and the CPSU the most advanced and capable state and CP, respectively. They admire the Soviet economic and technical advances and marvel at Soviet ballets, music, and painting. In comparison with the Chinese Communists, they consider the Soviets less courteous and less well-mannered, and lacking the humility of the Chinese. They remarked about the difficulty encountered in getting to see high-ranking Soviets.

2. A number of specific cases were cited in support of the above observations. When "Nikolai" brought forth the document regarding the "leadership" role of the USSR and the CPSU for approval by the Latin American CP representatives, prior to its inclusion in the Khrushchev report, one representative said it would be difficult to give an immediate reply as the problem was profound and required deep thought. The other representatives turned and looked as if a sacrilege had been committed. In another instance, a representative from CP Brazil said in China, "The Soviets are arrogant, and lack the simplicity and humility of the Chinese." He cited the fact that LIU Shao-ch'i lit his cigarette and served him a meal, and stated, in contrast, "A Soviet marshal is a Soviet marshal." Gilberto VIEIRA White, Secretary General of CP Colombia, stated that one could respect and admire the USSR, but that one fell in love with China. Pompeyo MARQUEZ

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Rodriguez, Secretary General of CP Venezuela, stated that Chinese kindness was unlimited. They did everything well and win one completely. In China one really learned, and one felt the affection of comrades.

3. All the Latin American CP representatives agreed that the Chinese were better hosts; won the hearts of visitors; taught much; were humble; and said great things with simple words. Further, Chinese conditions were more like those in Latin America than are those of any other Socialist country; hence it was there that advantage should be taken of experience, for the benefit of Latin America.

I. Sino-Soviet Relations.

1. The Soviets constantly stressed the importance of unity of the entire Socialist camp, and of friendship and aid among the Communist parties of the world. They singled out especially the friendship, understanding, and close relations between the USSR and China, which the imperialist and revisionist enemies desired to poison.

2. Kostiā, an official of the Department of the Central Committee CPSU handling relations with foreign CP's, personally passed on to the Latin American CP delegates the CCP invitation to visit China. He recommended that they accept since the weather there was better than in Moscow at the time. He remarked that they could tour the USSR upon their return when the weather was better. Kostia himself took them to the Chinese embassy in Moscow for their visas, and spoke highly of the Chinese people, adding that one learned much from a trip to China.

3. Kuusinen spoke of the "indestructible" Sino-Soviet friendship in his address to the Latin American CP delegates.

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after the special clandestine conference during 9-13 February. Lidiya Petrovna,¹⁷ secretary to Kostia, spoke highly of Chinese painting, dances, and courtesy. Other Soviet interpreters made no mention of China.

4. Victor (Inu),¹⁸ Soviet interpreter who met the Latin American CP representatives upon their return to Moscow from China in March, queried them regarding their impressions. They replied, "Magnificent!", to which Victor said, "That is what all visitors to China say. It is a great country."

5. With reference to expressions by Chinese officials, LIU Shao-ch'i stated at a reception given by the Central Committee of the CCP for the Latin American CP representatives in Peiping on or about 23 February that the USSR was the bulwark of the Socialist camp. The CPSU was the vanguard of the International Communist Movement. The USSR had given enormous aid to China in the fields of international affairs, economy, technology and military matters. For that very reason China is obligated, as proletarian internationalism requires, to aid other countries and other Communist parties. Those who believed that differences exist between China and the USSR and that they can become enemies were mistaken. (Similar statements were made by MAO and other top Chinese officials.)

6. The directors of various factories visited in China stressed the valuable aid received from their Soviet friends. Many people in the streets, especially children, warmly greeted the Latin American CP representatives as "Soviets."

7. Despite the foregoing, it was the impression from so much talk of friendship that differences had existed and

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do exist "within the family," between the USSR and China, possibly in the field of theory. On one occasion a Latin American CP representative proposed that the Chinese be requested to discuss the concept of the "different roads to socialism," and also "peaceful means of transition"; this proposal was vetoed by a majority of the Latin American CP representatives as being a delicate matter concerning which there have been many differences.

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1.  Comment.  preparations are currently under way to organize the Congress around the issues of economic development, national sovereignty, disarmament and international cooperation.

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2.  Comment.  anti-U. S. campaigns were emphasized at this conference.

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3.  Comment. "Nikolai" was described as a Russian; member of the Central Committee of the CPSU; about 5'9"; thin build; about 50 years; blue eyes with slight oriental fold; wore oval, metal-rimmed spectacles; straight, very light brown hair parted on left; straight thin nose, flaring of nostrils; serious expression; thin lips; Slavic appearance; well-dressed; no particular distinguishing features or mannerisms. He spoke only Russian at the Latin American CP conferences, using interpreters, and appeared to be acquainted with some long-time Latin American CP leaders such as Luis CORVALAN Leppe (Chile), Pompeyo MARQUEZ Rodriguez (Venezuela), and Pedro SAAD (Ecuador).

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[redacted] Comment. Photographs of Mikhail Suslov appear to correspond to the above description.

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4. [redacted] Comment. Otto V. Kuusinen, once prominent in the Comintern, is a member of the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat. He was elected to these posts in the reshuffle of party leaders in June 1957. Since his election, he has figured prominently in meetings with foreign Communists.

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5. [redacted] Comment. This is G. D. Obichkin. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism (formerly the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin) is attached to the CC/CPSU and is the CC's leading center for research on the history of the CPSU and the international workers' movement. It collects, studies and publishes documents and materials on the founders of Communism.

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6. [redacted] Comment. Presumably at this date the Komsomol "secretary general" (actually First Secretary) was V. Y. Semichastny. Semichastny succeeded A. N. Shelepin (now head of the Committee of State Security) in the Komsomol post in April 1958. In March 1959, however, Semichastny was replaced by S. P. Pavlov as Komsomol head.

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7. [redacted] Comment. This Soviet was known as "Rumianski" and was described as follows: Sex: male; color: white, pale complexion; age: about 50; height: about 5'9"; weight: about 170 lbs.; build: robust and heavy; hair: light brown, abundant, long waves; moustache: none; eyes: color not known; did not wear glasses; features: heavy, Slavic, thick nose; voice: deep, strong; language: spoke Russian at the Latin American CP conferences.

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 Comment. Possibly identical with Aleksey Matveyevich Rumyantsev, who is Editor-in-Chief of the international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism.

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8. Comment. A Latin American regional conference held in Moscow at the time of the CPSU's 40th anniversary celebrations in November 1957 afforded a remarkable illustration of the extent of CPSU direction of the Communist movement in Latin America. The head of the Latin American sector in the CPSU's Foreign Section, who presided over the meeting, stated flatly what the Latin American CP's must do in the future. He told them that they must: (a) achieve greater interchange; (b) improve their support of each other and their "solidarity" on various issues; (c) step up the peace movement and hold a peace conference in Argentina during 1958; (d) spread anti-American sentiment in every country and "mobilize" the Latin American people against American imperialism; (e) plan to hold a conference in 1959 to coincide with a scheduled meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), for the purpose of opposing OAS resolutions; and (f) by the middle of 1958, hold a conference of the CP's of the northern portion of Latin America, to include CP's from Panama to Canada. The Mexican and Cuban CP's were given the task of organizing this conference which was to parallel a conference of the southern CP's which had been held earlier. The Latin American CP's worked hard to fulfill these directives during 1958.

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9. Comment. CP Argentina during 16-18 May 1958 sponsored a peace congress in Buenos Aires, planned previously in Moscow, under the title of the "Argentine Congress for International Cooperation, General Disarmament, and National Sovereignty." The meeting decided to sponsor a "congress of the peoples of Latin America" in Buenos Aires from 4 to 7 December 1958. This date was later changed to April 1959. Recent information indicates that suggestions are being solicited for an alternate site for the Congress because of the stiffening anti-Communist posture of the FRONDISI regime.

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10. Comment. Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, a Secretary of the CTAL, is also Secretary General of the General Confederation of Guatemalan Labor (CGTC). The CGTC was dissolved by the Guatemalan government in June 1954 following the fall of the ARBENZ regime, but maintains a nominal existence in exile.

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11. Comment. Kostia has been a CPSU contact for Latin American Communists for several years. In the summer of 1958 Kostia told a Latin American Communist that he and another Soviet were in charge of all CPSU relations with Latin America. The two men had divided the area into ten countries for each with Kostia having Mexico, Argentina, Paraguay, Panama and Central America.

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12. Comment. This may refer to Korionov, who has been reported to be the Secretary of the journal's Editorial Board after serving previously in the CPSU's Foreign Section with special responsibility for the Western Hemisphere. He may be identical with Vitali G. Korionov, journalist. The journal's Editor-in-Chief, A. M. Rumyantsev, at the time of the interview was in Moscow to attend the 21st CPSU Congress.

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13. [redacted] Comment. In both Canada and the UK, the journal is published under the name of World Marxist Review.

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14. [redacted] Comment. This point was presumably intended to tie the Latin American movement in with the principle described in A-3, above.

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15. [redacted] Comment. This is interesting in the light of the storm raised by the 2 March 1959 issue of Time, which suggested the partition of Bolivia.

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16. [redacted] Comment. The chief of the CCP liaison department for Latin America has been reported as LIU Tan-fu and also as LI Tan-fu. An interpreter with this department has been reported as LI Tong-che. LIU (LI) Tan-fu is reported to speak fluent English but it is not known whether he speaks Spanish.

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17. [redacted] Comment. Lidiya Petrovna (frequently referred to only as Lidiya) has been a contact of Latin American Communist for several years. She has been described as an interpreter/guide who works under Kostia.

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18. [redacted] Comment. His identity is not known. Kostia reportedly has several interpreter/guides working under him. Besides Lidiya, others have been identified as "Alexis" and "Vladimir".

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