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OGC 63-0944

4 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Congressional Relations - John V. Lindsay (R., New York)

1. The attached memorandum from Colonel Grogan quotes Congressman John V. Lindsay as being critical of a "briefing" by CIA. The facts are as follows:

> a. Mr. Lindsay called this office on 14 March, saying he desired (1) Agency views on the creation of a Joint Supervisory Committee of the Congress; (2) briefing on the extent the Agency is supporting the (3) the Agency regular

briefing on current activities in Cuba.

b. I took this request up at the 9 a.m. meeting a day or so later. I pointed out that Mr. Lindsay had been friendly to the Agency and that we had responded to inquiries or discussed matters with him before on a cordial basis. I felt, therefore, that we should respond to his inquiry, particularly as he had almost certainly picked up some information in New York on our con-

and it would be better for him to have an accurate story from us than for him to depend on what were probably rumors. General Carter said that in the light of recent publicity on congressional hearings we were now obligated to pull in our ears and that we should not respond to requests of individual congressmen. Specifically he directed that we should not respond to inquiries for classified information such as _______ that we did not give individual briefings on such matters as Cuba, and that we should not express views on Joint Committees, which

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was an Administration problem. General Carter said he realized this would cause us a problem in the handling of the matter but that we should respond in the negative.

c. A representative of this office saw Mr. Lindsay on 18 March and said that we did respond to our parent subcommittees in the Congress but were restricted to those subcommittees on classified matters and that as far as the Joint Committees were concerned it was our position that this was a matter of organization for the Congress to determine. Mr. Lindsay was obviously displeased by this reaction.

2. Examples of previous experience with Mr. Lindsay are:

a. Mr. Lindsay was most interested in the Tibetan
refugee problem
and gave him a general briefing on the Tibetan
situation. As a result, Mr. Lindsay said he would do all he
could to educate his fellow congressmen on the Tibetan
question and was very appreciative.

b. In May 1961 Mr. Lindsay asked for help in responding to his constituents on the Cuban situation, particularly those criticizing or mentioning the Agency and intelligence. We met with him and discussed the situation in some detail. Mr. Lindsay was most appreciative and closed with an offer to be of any assistance to the Agency in any way he could.

These are just two of a good number of situations in which Mr. Lindsay has been cooperative and helpful.

3. This is a good example of a congressional problem that arises, often daily. I think we need more flexibility than is allowed by a basically negative attitude which, as may have happened here, needlessly makes us enemies. There are certain congressmen whom we know we cannot talk to on any subject, and there are certain subjects we will not discuss outside of our subcommittees and certain selected key people, but there is a large area in-between where I believe we should be able to have some discussion and thereby improve our general congressional relationships.

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON General Coubsel 25X1

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Attachment

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63-2764

3 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The DCI

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. Murray Kempton, writing about "The Adult Congressman" in the NEW REPUBLIC, 8 April 1963 issue (attached herewith), quotes the following remarks critical of CIA's briefings to Congressmen (on pp. 12-13):

"'Everything,' says (Senator) McCarthy, 'seems to be a pilot project.' And yet we may be going through one of those periods like the late Middle Ages when the serfs were turned off the farms and into the cities with nothing to do. Automation could be that fundamental."

"If he is an outsider like John Lindsay, the adult Congressman explores dark towers of the government, like the Central Intelligence Agency, which moves and shakes outside the limits of public or Congressional knowledge. Lindsay and McCarthy and a number of Congressmen have introduced bills to set up a joint Congressional Committee to watch the CIA as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy watches the AEC.

"I called CIA one day and asked them to send down a man for a briefing. I sent them three questions. The first was whether the CIA is

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the second was to what extent Mr. McCone has established the danger in Cuba; the third was how the Central Intelligence Agency would feel if Congress set up a committee to watch over its operation.

"'Three days later, a little man appeared in my office and announced he was from the CIA and that the answer was negative.

"'"What do you mean negative?" I asked.

"'"We won't discuss your first two questions," he answered. "That is our policy. We are an arm of the President and report only to him. On the third question we have no opinion. The CIA does not take a position on legislation before Congress.""

"'And that is a CIA briefing for a Congressman, !"

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Stanley J. Crogan Assistant to the Director

Enclosure

1. <u>.</u> .

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECT Kik: Noted with interes don't mind being "Patsy" for OGC, providing I have confidence in who is quoting whom and to puppose what purpose I'll have to talk to the Corregonance myself (note IP I c !!), and The Congregements alleged conversation conversation Approved Por Release 2003/05/23 : @IA-RDP80B01676R003100210030-4

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003100210030-4



STAT

THE NEW April 6, 1903, 35 cents REPUBLIC



Containing Ourselves David Riesman

FCC vs. AT&T Dan and Diane Gottlieb Trouble in Thailand Denis Warner Mark Twain Stanley Kauffmann The Clay Report The Editors Hindemith Robert Evett

T.R.B. from Washington

Once Upon a Time

★ In Paris a hundred years ago Louis Napoleon waited for his army to capture Mexico City, which it promptly did. In Madrid a liberal wrote that the crowned heads wanted the South to win to sustain the slave state. In London young Henry Adams, who was still getting educated, watched a pro-Northern mass meeting of 3,000 trade unionists organized by a chap named Karl Marx, and wrote his father, the ambassador, "I never quite appreciated the moral influence of American democracy, nor the cause that the privileged classes in Europe have to fear us, until I saw directly how it works." After the mass meeting Marx went back to a book he was writing.

In Pittston, Maine, a boy jumped out of bed and ran into the kitchen; he had been dreaming that the ice was out of the Penobscot and that he was riding the log booms with the rivermen, but that wouldn't happen for a month yet. In the kitchen he was suddenly struck dumb because a soldier was there and he saw it was Pa, trying on his cap before the mirror over the woodbox; he gave a brush to his curly sidewhiskers just for Ma's sake, and said "Georgie" a couple of times, but the boy was struck dumb and he was travel-proud at breakfast, too.

Down at the Kennebec & Portland yards the train was late and filled with soldiers and a lot of Methodists were out to see Pa off. The boy was to go to Augusta and come back with Enoch. It was a whole lot more cheerful after they started because they didn't have to look at Ma's face; she would take the pillowcases and shirts and pick lint with the church ladies that morning. At the Capital some of the boy's shyness returned. Bustle and confusion! All about were recruiting officers, and re-enlisted soldiers claiming bounties, and teams from livery stables, and shouts of runners and the drum and fife. The three stopped instinctively before the Bartlett store in the Smith block to compare city prices of sperm and whale oil and kerosene burning fluid. The sign in the window said, "Regular Mail Steamers to California via The Panama Rail Road."

And so, let us say, that is how it was happening 100 years ago as the chess pieces were set up for one of the decisive battles of the world (the second, in America, after the capture of Quebec at the Heights of Abraham). Even then in April, great events were vaguely taking shape and the remote little capital was doing what other towns were doing – in Iowa, Wisconsin and wherever – bringing in broadshouldered farm boys – "reg'lar great big hellsnorters, same breed as ourselves" – as an admiring enemy said.

Things were grim in 1863. The 1st Maine had enlisted for only ninety days, gone to Washington and then returned, without firing a shot. An apprehended deserter from a later group told his captors back in Maine that he had been ordered to retreat at Bull Run, and nobody had ever told him to stop.

In the South, Lee looked at his splendid generals whose names sound like warcries – Jeb Stuart, Stonewall Jackson, Jubal Early – and thought of a daring plan. They had fought from Chicahominy to Shenandoah; how about invading Maryland, cutting in behind Washington and striking through Pennsylvania, to stalemate the war and bring recognition from Lord Palmerston? This was the year; now or never.

Now or never! Washington felt it, too. Men there also had great rolling, mouth-filling names – Simon Cameron, Gideon Welles, Hannibal Hamlin (a Maine man). This indeed might be the year, thought the lonely, over-advised man in the White House, if only Hooker would fight. He had tried Mc-Clellan, but the stick broke in The Seven Days; he would keep trying till he found a stick that fitted his big fist. On that April morning in Augusta even the children sensed it. They chanted,

"Eighteen hundred sixty-one, was the year the war begun;

Eighteen hundred sixty-two, was the year we'd see it through;

Eighteen hundred sixty-three, was the years the slaves got free –

Eighteen-hundred sixty-four, is the year the war'll be o'er."

Pa left them, and there was a big crowd round the soldiers, and people took off their hats and Pa said a prayer. Enoch nudged the boy and pointed out a shambling fellow hawking live hens from a stick: he had lost his front teeth. The boy understood - the draft rejected you if you couldn't bite the paper off the cartridges. Right here in Augusta there was dissension, and back in school there were sullen Democrats, too, and if you said "Copperheads" you got into a fight. The boy had never seen a Negro but knew all about them from "Uncle Tom"; more important, he was for the Union.

In London Cotton was King and the Confederates successfully floated three million sterling in bonds, redeemable in cotton at a rate that would make buyers rich. Friends of the Confederacy in Parliament got ready a motion of recognition for introduction when word came of a big Southern victory. Karl Marx went on writing his book. And here in Augusta there were commands, and the music started, and the crowd moved beside the blue line. One of the companies broke into "The Battle Hymn." The rhythm went along with the tramping feet and sent shivers up the spine.

The regiment left about four, clad in regulation blue, armed with Windsor rifles, and filling 19 passenger and four baggage cars.

And so that was what was happening, more or less, a hundred years ago, and my father came back from Augusta to Pittston with Enoch, and pretty soon went back to drilling again with the other boys with wooden guns, which they bought at Sawyer & Libby's hardware and crockery store.

In the quiet market town of Gettysburg farmers looked out at their fat pastures and waited for the mud to dry out for Spring plowing. Prices were high and they hoped for a good harvest.

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Giving and Getting

The more one studies the Clay Report on foreign aid, the more elusive it becomes. It is a little like the Bible; there is a text for almost every taste. Still, it is possible to discern a couple of themes. The first is that American business is a Good Thing ("I don't believe," said General Clay at his press conference, "any aided country can stand on its own feet without private enterprise"); the second is that the primary purpose of aid is "the curtailment of Communist efforts in all parts of the world."

The first theme is heard in the Committee's praise for the "Hickenlooper Amendment, requiring suspension of aid to countries expropriating privately owned US property without adequate compensation." It recurs in a warning that there have been "too many instances in which foreign economic aid has been given without regard to . . . the historic form, character and interest of our own economic system." The Committee also objects to helping "a foreign government in projects establishing government-owned industries and commercial enterprises which compete with existing private endeavors."

The second theme – aid as a weapon in the Cold War – is more muted. Indeed, at the end of the report, it is said that "the need for development assistance and a US interest in providing it would continue even if the Cold War and all our outstanding political differences with the Communists were to be resolved tomorrow." That comment, however, read in the context of the whole report, appears to have been an afterthought. In the main, the Committee recommends aid to "those countries, which, in their contiguity to the Communistic bloc, occupy the frontier of freedom." These countries, it notes approvingly, "are now receiving the major portion of US foreign assistance, but are also providing more than two million armed men ready, for the most part, for any emergency . . . Indeed it might be better to reduce the resources of our own defense budget rather than discontinue the support which makes their contribution possible. . ." There are, however, some countries "whose military forces presently are of value largely for internal security purposes," and others, "particularly in Southeastern and Western Asia, which are neither allies nor members of alliances with which we are associated." Military assistance to such countries, the Report says, "is not essential to our own free world security, and we cannot recommend continued supply of this equipment. . ." India and Pakistan are excepted. They are the only nations in South Asia "able to offset the Red Chinese colossus."

The Week

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When it turns to Africa, the Committee backs away: "The Western European countries should logically bear most of the necessary aid burden." Why this is so, except for the historic fact that Africa until recently was a colonial preserve of Western Europe, is not explained in the report. The Committee's assumption of adequate and continuing French and British aid, with supplemental funds (mostly from West Germany) channeled through the EEC development fund, ignores both economic and political dynamics. Nigeria and Tanganyika have both refused to accept associate status with the European Economic Community, because they do not wish to sacrifice their economic independence and flexibility, even for much-needed development funds. The only European nation that is now supplying economic aid on a scale comparable to the US (Britain can't afford it) is France. But direct French aid in grants, technicians' salaries and outright budgetary subsidies rests on a commercial quid pro quo which ties French African agricultural products and expanding consumer imports into a subsidized production-distribution system, functioning at above world prices for both exports and imports. A number of the 14 French African nations are dissatisfied with these arrangements. Yet the orderly and rapid evolution of every African state is as important to the US as it is to Europe. While this is no argument for a US-sponsored African Alliance for Progress, it is an argument (which the Clay Committee does not consider) for maintaining an active interest in the unfolding of African development plans.

The Report is not convincing either when it suggests that the US is "over-extended in resources and undercompensated in results." With a GNP of around \$560 billion, what does it mean to say that we are doing more than we ought, and what criterion are we to use in deciding whether we are being adequately compensated for help given? Foreign aid properly conceived is not comparable to a private business transaction, in which cash returns can be tidily computed.

During the past decade two general and conflicting versions of the purpose of foreign aid have emerged. One view is that the program's justification is primarily moral. From that point of view, aid is not so much a power-holding operation as it is a continuing act of faith in the human race. This is the view of Americans whose consciences are troubled by the thought that while we buy electric toothbrushes, Indians work 12 hours a day for a pittance. A very rich nation does not ask what the poor can do for it, but what it can do for them. The poverty of Asia, Africa and Latin America is, as the race to the moon seems to President Kennedy, "a challenge we cannot refuse."

The other broad view, and it is the Clay Report's, is that unless aid is a weapon in the Cold War it is of only marginal value; the test is whether a foreign aid dollar contributes more to US security than a dollar given the Pentagon or CIA.

If the Congress acts on the second of these assumptions, as it probably will, a good deal more will be cut from the requested appropriation than the \$500 million proposed by General Clay. When the Congress begins to demand some proof that these 95 countries now getting US aid are helping us fight Communism or bringing us more business, what will the Administration reply? Rep. Otto Passman, the chairman of the House Subcommittee that must first consider foreign aid, has already replied: the Clay Report is "absolutely meaningless . . . Congress cuts the President's foreign aid request an average of \$1 billion each year." And even a liberal Republican like Senator Cooper, former Ambassador to India, wants no new aid commitments until Congress undertakes a country-by-country review.

Smarting from the 1962 cut in the aid budget from \$4.9 billion to \$3.9 billion, and foreseeing Congressional demands for further economies this year, the Administration perhaps hoped, when it appointed this impeccably conservative Committee last December, that its report would provide a barricade from which to defend the program against massive assault. Perhaps this tactic will succeed in averting the worst. But it should be pointed out that there was an alternative. The President could have picked a quite different Committee, a Committee whose members were more knowing about the developing countries (only two members of the Clay Committee - Eugene Black and Professor Edward Mason of Harvard - can be termed qualified to reappraise the program). Another sort of committee, while sharply critical of what we are now doing, might have put forward a much more ambitious program, not a less ambitious one, permitting the Administration to fight from a forward position. That, in our judgment, would have been more in keeping with the best interests of both the Administration and the country.

McNamara's Doctrine

As with John Foster Dulles' "massive retaliation" speech in 1954, there has been much debate about what Mr. McNamara really meant by his "no cities" doctrine. It was not until January 31, when the Secretary testified before the House Armed Services Committee on his specific budget decisions, that the doctrine came into clearer focus. In this testimony, gradually being released to the public, and in other statements, Mr. Mc-Namara and Defense Department officials reaffirm the importance of developing nuclear weapons systems (and particularly civilian command and control under wartime conditions) which could hit Soviet strategic forces without attacking cities. They do not state that the ultimate destruction of cities is inconceivable; rather that it is the responsibility of the Administration not only to deter any kind of nuclear war, if it can, but to do what can be done to limit a nuclear war if deterrence fails.

Although some commentators have viewed the "nocities" doctrine as an alarming attempt to extend the life of "massive retaliation," it was evident from the start that the Administration conceived it as a supplement to conventional build-up, not as a substitute for it. Now Mr. McNamara has gone even further. He reveals that he has ordered studies of US combat requirements for the non-nuclear defense of various areas throughout the world. Europe aside, the Administration believes the West could "counter a wide spectrum of Sino-Soviet bloc aggressions" by conventional means. Though he stresses that the US would use whatever weapons are required to turn back a Soviet assault on Western Europe, Mr. McNamara comes as close as any high US official ever has to saying that the American aim is to have sufficient conventional forces to defend Europe against a non-nuclear assault without resort to nuclear weapons. He is confident that NATO could create and maintain such conventional forces.

On the question of what kind of strategic nuclear power the US intends to develop, Mr. McNamara replies that he is not committed to targeting every Soviet strategic delivery vehicle, as the Air Force would like him to do. For example, he notes that the US now has no way to destroy Soviet submarine forces. In addition, he points out that the Soviet Union is hardening its missile sites and that it would not be practical to build sufficient forces to destroy these sites. In effect, Mr. McNamara is saying that as long as the USSR continues to depend on soft missile sites and vulnerable aircraft systems, the US will go on manufacturing missiles to destroy Soviet retaliatory forces. Thus, money spent by the USSR on such forces is money partly wasted, since the US will keep "covering" these forces by increasing its own expenditures. If, however, the Soviets concentrate on hard, dispersed missiles and on submarines, the US cannot try to target them all.

All the evidence now available indicates that, whether we like it or not, both sides are developing second strike forces which can survive a first blow. As Stewart Alsop reported last fall in *Satevepost*, Mr. McNamara believes that when this happens the danger of nuclear war will be substantially lowered. But even if Mc-Namar's optimism is unwarranted, it is hard to refute his contention that, with our first-strike capacity vanishing or already vanished, we ought to face this fact and attempt to use it to add to our security rather than ignoring it and suddenly in some future crisis realizing that we have no acceptable means of meeting our national commitments.

Crime and Reapportionment

The Supreme Court on Monday, March 16, handed down a number of decisions that will significantly affect the administration of criminal justice by the states. The case that is likely to have the widest immediate impact is Fay v. Noia, which makes more readily available to persons held in state prisons - on convictions obtained against them as long, it may be, as a generation ago - the federal writ of habeas corpus, and thus, a fresh and independent test of the constitutionality of their detention. Before the court spoke, habeas corpus could be denied on the ground that the prisoner had failed to take advantage of a correctional procedure provided by the state, which was open at the time, but not later. The present decision gives access to the federal courts if at the time such access is sought no further state procedure is open to correct what is alleged to be a constitutional error. This will make a considerable difference.

The Supreme Court also straightened out a muchdebated prior doctrine under which the Constitution was held to require the states to provide indigent defendants with counsel in all death cases, but not necessarily in all other criminal proceedings. The states will now be required, as is the federal government, to provide counsel throughout the criminal process. The decision is important because it speaks with clarity to state judges across the country about their obligation, though not in a good many years has any criminal case in which an indigent defendant was denied counsel passed muster in the Supreme Court, even under the old doctrine.

The same decision-Monday also saw an 8-1 opinion striking down Georgia's notorious county-unit system, which Georgia had provisionally abandoned in the 1962 elections under pressure from a lower federal court. This makes it final. Few will mourn the passing of the system, though one may regret somewhat the Court's opinion, for it sheds not a ray of light on the apportionment problem in general and fails even to state a tenable principle on which to base its own decision. "One person, one vote," the opinion states in its peroration, but it will be one hundred years, if then, before any branch of American government is constituted on that basis, and many of us will be surprised how little we will like or value the result, should it come about. Earlier in the opinion, the statement is qualified. It is to be "one person, one vote" only within a given constituency from which a representative is to be chosen - once that constituency has been designated. But what is a constituency? Why must it be a geographical unit? Would it be all right if Georgia had its governor chosen by the legislature? Why are requirements imposed on the states which obviously do not obtain for the federal government?

It may be ungracious and ungrateful to ask such questions of a Court that gives us such a satisfying result. But satisfying results obtained from the judiciary are uncertain blessings if they do not rest on intelligible, let alone satisfying, reasons.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL

What's Public Property?

In the American dream, a lone inventor toils for years in a barn or attic to produce an idea like the cotton gin, the mechanical reaper, the sewing machine, the incandescent lamp; a man wins fame and fortune not by pushing others around, or outfoxing them, but by using his mind to confer a benefit. The first automated factory, a flour mill, was conceived by one man, a farm boy turned mechanic; he had it operating in the year of the Constitutional Convention and secured for it one of the earlier federal patents, in 1790. The great Edison headed what we would call today a hole-in-thewall research and development firm which created the electric power and light industry almost complete, from generators to transmission lines to switches and receptacles and electric lamps.

All that has changed. The Federal Government, once so anxious to reward successful research and development that it sanctioned the issuance of grants of monopoly to lone inventors, has had to go into business itself. The kind of inventing that needs to be done today requires funding on a scale that is beyond the reach of individuals. In fiscal 1964 the government will spend just about \$15 billion for such purposes, an increase of 50 percent over research and development expenditures in 1962. Research and development accounts for an impressive slice of the federal budget, a seventh of the whole; it is the fastest growing major enterprise in the country.

Much of this experimental work is in fields far removed from normal civilian concern. The Department of Defense will probably use up some \$7.6 billion, or about half of the federal R&D budget; another huge slice, \$4.2 billion, will be spent by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, mostly for getting to the moon and living on it for short periods.

Smaller agencies such as the Department of Agriculture spend very little on R&D, but what they do spend is of direct interest to the public, here and now. Perhaps that is why Agriculture has sensibly kept all its own patents, licensing manufacturers and others to use them freely. He who pays for R&D, so reasons Agriculture, ought to keep the fruit of it, the patents. That is the way it is done outside government; the government itself has to buy the use of patents not owned by it, like all other processors and purchasers.

The Defense Department's relatively lower yield of patentable ideas for its research dollar has led to the odd practice of allowing R&D contractors to patent for themselves whatever they can, even though the Department may have paid all of the costs of the research that preceded the invention and provided the research firm a guaranteed profit on its work as well. When one of its contractors takes out a patent on the work he has been paid to do, the Department demands a "royaltyfree license" which allows the government the free use of the idea. Everybody else then has to pay a royalty or fee, as if the patent were the product of an ordinary commercial venture.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has now proposed to follow Defense Department patent policy. Should this happen almost four-fifths of the nation's public R&D costs will be allocated to the production of new knowledge and ideas for which the public has to pay twice – first in taxes, in the form of profit-loaded research contracts; and again in the form of licensing fees or royalties which are added to the costs of the same things when produced for the market. ASHER BRYNES

FOREIGN REPORTS

ISRAEL

The Free-Booters

 \star Mrs. Meir's charges in the Knesset that German scientists have been hired by the Egyptians to help them build weapons of "mass destruction" for use against Israel are probably exaggerated, but they nonetheless throw a sinister light on the Arab-Israel arms race. By weapons of "mass destruction," Mrs. Meir, the Foreign Minister, was obliquely referring to what the Israeli press has been describing as rockets loaded with bacteriological, chemical and radiological material which, on detonation by a conventional explosive, would disperse and exterminate Israel's two-and-one quarter million people. Dr. Sanger, a leading German rocket expert who was persuaded by Bonn to leave Cairo in 1960 but whose students apparently are carrying out most of the research there now, says it will be several years before Nasser will have rockets for "military use." The Egyptians are particularly lacking in knowledge of guidance systems and warhead construction. And they are relying on the talents of only a dozen Germans, not 400 as originally reported. The latter are employed in constructing aircraft.

Yet Nasser is making a slow but sure start on his own Force de Frappe with which he can terrorize the Israelis and scare his some-time Middle Eastern allies. Faced with this Israel cannot be expected to sit tight and be silent. Israel has some ground-to-ground rockets and will purchase Hawk missiles from the US as a deterrent against Soviet Badger bombers, owned by the Egyptians. Her nuclear expertise cannot be far behind that of the Germans at work in Cairo, if at all.

There has never been any serious discussion between the US and the USSR on turning the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone, though the Soviets made the suggestion in 1958. It was regarded at the time with suspicion in Washington, for it would have been a threat to the continuance of the Baghdad pact. The idea now deserves reconsideration. In the meantime, the Bonn government is ransacking its statute books to find laws which could force its rocketeers to return from Cairo.

Moscow

Lesson in Dialectics

 \star The news from the Moscow cultural battlefield is sad. Mr. Khrushchev's speech of March 8th in which he announced the reimposition of strict controls and upbraided all those writers and composers, painters and moviemakers who had strayed from the norms of socialist realism, has now been followed up by a flood of letters and statements expressing enthusiastic support in the Soviet press. Most of the letters were written by conservatives or writers and artists from the more remote parts of the Soviet Union where de-Stalinization had been less advanced than in Moscow and Leningrad. The few prominent writers and artists who have expressed support for the new controls have done so in very general, sometimes ambiguous, terms. A few daring spirits in Leningrad even had the courage to answer back. More disturbing are the administrative measures that have been taken. Mr. Tvardovski, who edited the more liberal Novy Mir, is said to have been replaced by the conservative critic Ermilov whose primary claim to literary fame is the ignominious part he played in the attacks against Mayakovski in 1930 and against Pasternak in the Fifties. Ehrenburg will have to rewrite the last part of his memoirs if he wants them published, movies already in production will have to be adjusted, "formalist" poems, abstract pictures, serial music and a great many other things have been banned, and visits of Soviet writers and artists abroad have been severely curtailed. A very cold wind is heralding the spring of 1963 in Moscow.

The real quarrel is not, of course, about modernism or abstractionism or formalism; Mr. Ehrenburg does not really write like Joyce and Kafka, and Mr. Nekrassov (the other main culprit in Khrushchev's eyes) is not a Russian Henry James. The real issue is creative freedom for the writers and artists; what the "liberals"



The Art Critic

wanted was more latitude, more freedom to comment on Russia's past and present, more cultural exchanges with other countries. Politically, the "liberals" were very much in sympathy with most of Mr. Khrushchev's domestic and foreign policies. Yet the party leaders thought their demands potentially very dangerous and felt that unless a firm stand was taken against the ferment among the intelligentsia, the mood would spread to other sections of the population, especially the younger generation, and as a result the party leadership would soon find itself threatened. Mr. Khrushchev is not after all a hero in a 19th Century Russian novel who can afford to make all kinds of damning admissions; in view of his own involvement, he has to find excuses and justifications for much of the Stalin period.

Politically, this no doubt makes sense, but there are strong pressures in Soviet society in favor of a more radical break with the Stalinist past. Mr. Khrushchev took great trouble to deny the existence of a conflict between the generations, despite some statements to the contrary in recent novels and films. Yet what good is there in denying the obvious? The younger generation will have the last word anyway. The stronger the pressure exerted on them now, the more violent their reaction is likely to be. Mr. Khrushchev seems to have forgotten all about dialectics.

7

Underground in the Northeast

Victoria, Australia

The only remaining Western justification for the Geneva Agreement on Laos is that it bought time. "We didn't really think that we had more than about a four percent hope of making neutrality work," is the way one American official puts it, "but, having rejected the alternative, which was to fight for Laos under the most disadvantageous circumstances, this was the best we could hope for."

The statement is not mere diplomatic face-saving. Though events in Laos have followed the widely expected pattern, those who insist that Geneva bought time can still present a reasoned case. It is true, as they insist, that because of the Geneva Agreement, and in spite of its weaknesses, the Pathet Lao forces do not yet control the vital Laotian side of the Mekong valley, and that the main lines of Laotian communications along the river are still in the hands of Phoumi Nosavan's right wing. Geneva did nothing to halt or hinder the movement of cadres and supplies over the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam, yet it is patently to the Communists' disadvantage to be confined to the backbreaking and treacherous jungle trails that pass through their areas and to be denied by the Geneva Agreement what they could have picked up very quickly by force. For the moment, the large-scale movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam needed to change the balance of forces heavily in the Communists' favor cannot take place. Or this, at least, is how the argument runs.

The time bought in Laos, it is also said, is not merely working for the cause in South Vietnam but for northeastern Thailand, where for years the forces allied to, or under the control of, the Viet Minh in Hanoi have been making preparations for another "war of national liberation." Like icebergs, only a fraction of these "wars" show above the surface. They become military only in their final expression, and their success depends primarily on the hidden social, economic and ideological preparation at the village level. Incredible as it may now seem, however, for at least 10 years every Thai Government and every Western embassy in Bangkok has been aware of this underground effort in the northeast. No impending "war of national liberation" has ever cast quite such a long shadow.

As early as 1945 Prince Souphanouvong and other members of the Lao Issara forces, which were intent on preventing the reimposition of French rule in Laos, used the Mekong as a means of escape into friendly northeastern Thailand. Some of the main Lao Issara bases were in Thailand, and Souvanna Phouma in relaxed mood will tell with obvious pleasure how he stripped Vientiane of everything from its water reservoir pump to its light brackets and sold them across the river in an effort to raise funds to continue the brief revolt.

Many years earlier, before the first big Communist uprising in Vietnam in 1931, Ho Chi Minh, now the venerable leader of the Viet Minh, made his headquarters in northeastern Thailand, and even raised and trained groups of Vietnamese Communists there for service against the French. Bangkok knew little of these activities and cared less. Though the northeast now has a population of nearly nine million, it has always been Thailand's Cinderella. In race, culture and language its inhabitants are more Lao than Thai, and especially along and near the Mekong have always felt more intimately associated with their kin across the river than with remote Bangkok.

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In many places, the Thai Government's writ extends to the district level in the northeast, but not beyond, and elected village chiefs have no link with government authority. Even the policeman, that universal symbol of authority, is conspicuous by his absence. Often with no access roads, or even ox cart tracks to the nearest district center, and, in any event, cut off for months at a time by monsoon rains, lacking in even the most primitive medical facilities, sometimes even without wells for water, these northeastern peasants have been the "sea" for all sorts of "fish." Opium traders for years have hauled the Laotian crop through the northeast, with no questions asked. During the Indo-China War the Communists' external supplies of drugs and medicines originated in Bangkok and went unchallenged through the northeast to the Pathet Lao and then on to the Viet Minh.

Though an incipient separatist movement appeared to die with its leader Tiang Sirrikhan, in a police ambush early in the 'fifties, the northeast has remained a simmering center of potential dissidence. Given the Lao emphasis and orientation among so many of its people, it was obvious that the Laotian debacle would have serious repercussions here, even if only of a sympathetic nature. A further complication was the presence of a Vietnamese minority, almost all of it sympathetic to the Viet Minh, and which, at its peak, numbered about 65,000. For years the Thai Government wrestled in a half-hearted way with this aspect of the problem. Tentative plans to resettle some of the Vietnamese in less sensitive areas were abandoned a decade ago when the women, in protest against the move, lay down in the streets of a Mekong River town to bar the way for a cavalcade of cars carrying Prime Minister Pibul Songgram and his party. Pibul went home in disgust: the Vietnamese stayed.

Pibul's successor, Field Marshal Sarit, himself a northeasterner and a distant cousin of Laos' General Phoumi Nosavan, has been tougher, if not necessarily more effective, and in the past couple of years there have been repeated roundups of Communist suspects in the northeast, and thousands of Vietnamese have been repatriated to North Vietnam. The Thais were delighted that young men and women were accorded the highest priority in the Vietnamese repatriation program: they are much less enchanted now to discover that many have merely made the round trip and become indoctrinated, trained, and sometimes armed, on the way back.

Though all sorts of impressive plans have been on the drawing board for the northeast, it was not until last year – and then only under US pressure – that Bangkok really began to dig into the grass roots of the northeastern problem. Mobile teams, including Americans, went out not merely to check on Communist intrigues but to find out something of the living conditions of the people and their needs. They discovered in some areas that the only external assistance the people had ever received had come from the Communist Pathet Lao on the other side of the Mekong, and that, in addition to returning indoctrinated Vietnamese repatriation, Lao-Thais has also begun to come back from Pathet Lao training schools.

It is never easy to gauge in such a situation the extent of infiltration and penetration. Repeated stories from eyewitness sources that the Pathet Lao have even used helicopters in their own movements across the Mekong and the conspicuous, and unexplained, absence in some areas of young men, suggest that the problem is serious. It is more difficult to evaluate Thai "evidence," including the frequent rounding up of suspects and their "confessions." The opinion among those who should know, however, is that penetration is far advanced and increasing and that the translation of plans for community aid from the drawing board to the ground will need to move much more rapidly if the shadow of subversion is not to become the substance of another "liberation" war.

DENIS WARNER

THE UNITED STATES AND ADENAUER MAKE A DEAL

No Pipeline for Moscow

Bonn

The muggy air of Bonn has been heavy with drama during the past fortnight as a consequence of varying German interpretations of the Federal Republic's obligations to NATO and of outstanding bureaucratic muddling. (By a curious coincidence Professor Parkinson, perhaps the most acid critic in the world of bureaucracy, was lecturing in Bonn only a few days previously but he knew nothing of the monumental muddle right under his nose.) The dramatics began when Adenauer flew back from his Italian holiday resort on March 18, having traveled there from Bonn only two days before. He returned to face a "walkout" from the Bundestag by the Christian Democrats, which resulted in the Bundestag being unable to muster a quorum to vote on the subject under discussion.

That subject was the Government's embargo on the export of 163,000 tons of 170 millimeter steel tubes to

the Soviet Union. They were needed by the Soviet Union for the construction of the 600-mile oil pipeline from the Ukraine to the East German town of Schwedton-Oder. Contracts for delivery of these tubes had been signed with three Ruhr firms on October 5, 1962. Mannesmann undertook to deliver 80,000 tons, Phoenix-Rheinrohr 52,000 and Hoesch 31,000 tons of tubes. But on November 21 the NATO Council decided that the tubes had a potential military and "strategic" value and their export should not be allowed. On December 18, the Federal Government approved an ordinance which promulgated the embargo.

The Bundestag is allowed a statutory period of three months in which to protest a Cabinet ordinance passed without its having been consulted. The three Ruhr steel firms evidently supposed that the ordinance would in any event apply only to deliveries of tubes which might be negotiated after the NATO Council's decision on November 21. They certainly did not suppose the ordinance would be made retroactive. Moreover, on January 8, the Customs Office in Dusseldorf completed and delivered the necessary permits for the transaction. The three firms had been given – even supposing it was needed at all – the final green light. Nevertheless, they wanted to clear up all possible doubt in the matter. In the course of January and February they sent no fewer than 11 letters to the Chancellor, the Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Ministry, requesting confirmation and further information. Not one of them was answered.

"Not Exactly Elegant"

On March 18, Adenauer tried his utmost to secure the support of his Free Democratic coalition partners for the embargo - due to enter into force at midnight. He failed. The Free Democrats were ready to approve the ordinance only on condition that its implementation not be made retroactive and that contracts which were already signed should be honored. The US Embassy in Bonn took the unusual step of making its own approach to the Free Democrats, but was equally unsuccessful. In the Bundestag the Christian Democrats struggled desperatly to avoid defeat - for the Social and Free Democrats could jointly outvote them. The Chancellor's lieutenants argued that the ordinance had really gone into effect on March 17, but this was sharply denied by the President of the Bundestag, Eugen Gerstenmaier, himself a Christian Democrat. Next the Christian Democrats claimed that they were implementing a treaty by imposing the embargo, and Bundestag approval was not therefore needed. The majority of the house rejected this argument too.

Dr. Adenauer accordingly led the Christian Democrats out of the Chamber and Gerstenmaier, the only Christian Democrat who stayed, had to announce that no valid vote could be taken. The ordinance thus entered into force, and the imposition of the embargo means that the contracts entered into by the three Ruhr firms must be cancelled.

The consequences will be considerable. In the first place the three firms have lost business valued at \$28 million, and 3,000 steel tubes are lying in Bremen warehouses, awaiting shipment to the Soviet Union. One of the three firms, Hoesch, has said that it will have to put some of its workers on short time from May 1 onwards, when its steel tube factory will be operating at only two-thirds of capacity. The scale of the orders is considerable – total West German export of steel tubes to the Soviet Union averaged 200,000 tons a year during the last three years. The three firms ask why such exports were considered harmless in the past but now are regarded as so "dangerous."

The cancellation will hurt the Soviet Union considerably, for Western Germany is believed to supply between a half and two-thirds of the Soviet imports of steel tubes. This may, in turn, have an adverse effect on the Federal Republic's trading relations with Communist Bloc countries. The Social Democrats have been quick to point out that the Federal Government has only just signed an expanded trade agreement with Poland and agreed to establish a trade mission in Warsaw. It is contemplating similar arrangements with Hungary at the moment. What effect will the embargo on the export of steel tubes have on these countries? The plain fact is that contracts, which were entered into legally, are not to be honored by West Germans.

Poles, Hungarians and others may regard Ludwig Erhard's remark, made by the Minister of Economics on March 19, that the way things had been handled was "not exactly elegant" as a major understatement. West German public opinion is for the most part sharply critical of how the Bundestag has been treated. The Christian Democrats have pointed out that the Social Democrats have themselves often prevented a vote being taken by insisting that there was no quorum. But this has been a totally different matter. The Christian Democrats on March 18 artificially created the situation in which no quorum could be found. They did this only a few hours before a hotly debated ordinance was due to enter into force. The prevailing view is that this action constituted the negation of parliamentary democracy. The word has been passed around Bonn that British, Italian and Japanese firms are poised to take on the orders which the German firms are not being allowed to fulfill. In Britain, both South Durham Steel and Stewarts and Lloyds must be ready to jump at a chance like this. The British Government, moreover, has no power to prevent the export of goods which are not specifically armaments. The Soviet Union may get its tubes from another NATO country instead of from Germany and, thus, this is all that may have been achieved.

It is self-evident that the Christian Democrats acted as they did in order to please Washington. It is equally evident that they were keen to do this because American opinion has been so worried by the implications of the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation and by the breakdown of the Brussels talks between Britain and the Common Market. But has the Government's action been wise? Should the building of a Soviet pipeline come within the competence of the NATO Council? In Germany, at least, there is a growing feeling that trade should be expanded between East and West and that this is one of the most effective ways of making peaceful coexistence something more than a slogan.

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The Adult Congressman

by Murray Kempton

The long legs of George Lodge, who had been the last stepping stone to Teddy Kennedy's ascension to the Senate, were found stretched and relaxed the other day in the office of Congressman John Lindsay of New York City.

A visitor observed that the Massachusetts Senatorial election had been almost too pat an exercise in the inverse operations of the merit system in American politics. Professor Stuart Hughes, the independent and the freshest candidate, had gotten the fewest votes; George Lodge, the Republican and the best-trained candidate, had gotten the next fewest; and Teddy Kennedy, who had never taken any greater trouble than to be born, had gotten most of all.

"You know," said George Lodge, "I was sorry about Hughes. He started so well, talking about disarmament and disengagement. I thought he promised a different kind of campaign. Then – I don't know, maybe he thought he had a chance to win – he ended up sounding almost as bad as Kennedy and I did."

One leaves such men with a pang. We do not seem merely to have gained an appallingly junior Senator from Massachusetts; we very well may also have lost an adult Congressman.

Still there are more adult Congressmen than either the exterior reputation or the interior mood of their institution might condition any visitor to expect. The adult Congressman can be hopeful or disenchanted. It is useless to assay him as liberal or conservative, since these words are usable with Congressmen for describing public attitudes rather than private feelings. He can be an insider or an outsider. He can believe, as Senator Clark of Pennsylvania does, that President Kennedy has a brilliant record in office or he can wonder, as Senator McCarthy of Minnesota sometimes does, whether the Administration is not so busy taking soundings that it forgets to sail the ship.

But there is one certain test for identifying the adult Congressman whatever his party. He qualifies if, during the first half hour of any visit with him, he brings up the one text whose citation defines him. Its source, oddly enough, is Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose final words as President were a warning against the military-industrial complex the growth of which, he said, has come "to involve the very structure of our society."

Mr. Eisenhower's farewell address has a peculiar history. The liberals, who have the franchise on respectable discontent, had in the main ceased to listen to Mr. Eisenhower and barely noticed it. The Republicans quite forgot to enter it into the Congressional Record; it was finally introduced by Eugene McCarthy, a liberal Democrat. It has survived since as an underground cult work—Mr. Eisenhower would be surprised that he has been preserved as Henry Miller was—and it exists now as the ark of the doctrine which separates the adult Congressman from his fellows.

The successful Congressman, now as always, has been the one who thinks of his seat as a counsel bench for just one client, his district.

"They work their way," says Richard Bolling of Missouri, a critical adult insider, "on to those committees where they can get favors for their districts and after that they can't be beaten and they establish themselves in little enclaves of subcommittees where they are more powerful than the President."

It is this passion which John Lindsay, a Republican and an adult, parodies when he mockingly explains why he votes against bills to outlaw pornographic literature.

"Pornography is the largest industry in the Seventeenth Congressional District," Lindsay says. "Do they want to make it a depressed area?"

The \$50 billion defense budget has grown without effective resistance because it fattens on the demands of Congressmen for their districts and because it diverts private corporations from their pride in their independence and from that concern with fiscal stability, which overcomes them when they confront a child on a relief roll.

"I was complaining to a friend of mine who is in the Defense Department about the industrial-military complex the other day," Lindsay says. "He said he had heard a lot of vague talk about this sort of thing, but he just wished someone would come up with one concrete example. I told him I could give him two.

"Last year the Justice Department brought in a bill which would have given it the power to fire any employee of a defense contractor whom it judged a security risk. The Pentagon, of course, testified for it. And then every Congressman got a letter from the largest association of defense contractors urging him to vote for the Industrial Security Bill. And this would have been the first law ever written in the United States which would have given the government the power to fire people in private industry."

"Then we were debating the raise in the debt limit

from \$306 billion to \$308 billion. One Congressman took the floor to report that the chairmen of the boards of mighty corporations had called to ask him to vote to raise the debt. They freely admitted that the remagon had called and told them that, if the debt limit wasn't increased, they wouldn't get paid. 'All right,' my friend conceded; you win.' "

Gerald Ford, a Grand Rapids Republican, was the first Congressman to inject the fact of corporate pressure for a higher national debt into the debate.

"I mentioned Chrysler," says Congressman Ford. "And right away five or six other members asked me to yield so they could tell the same story about calls from their districts."

A Middle-Aged Turk

Lindsay, of course, is an outsider – a resistance Congressman familiar for his solitary dissents from particular House assaults on personal liberty; he and three Democrats stopped the Internal Security bill by joining to refuse unanimous consent for the suspension of the rules that was needed for its passage. But Ford is an archetypal insider, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee and the new chairman of the House Republican Conference. He was elected to the latter office by a caucus in revolt against Minority Leader Halleck; its impulse was more personal than political; but it still reflected the sense of an unexpected number of Republicans that their party needed some programs related to the engagement of problems.

"I'm one of those middle-aged Turks," Ford says.

"There's a speech I've been wanting to make for a long time, but, for some reason or other, there's never been an occasion," he says. "Do you remember Ike's farewell speech? Well, there's a condition around here that's bad.

"It's these military reservists. They meet here one Thursday a month for 'training.' They get allowances and pay and promotions. More than half my committee members and most of the staff are reservists. They can't be objective. There's one member of my committee who is a brigadier or maybe a major general in the Chemical Corps reserves. He sits behind our table when the Chemical Corps comes in with its budget and asks questions they've written out for him to help them make a record."

"I thank God for old John Taber. When I came here, I went on appropriations and John put me on the Army panel. I'd been in the Navy and I figured I'd know more about that, so I asked John why he hadn't put me on the Navy panel. John said he figured I'd be more objective on the Army panel."

The adult Congressman is detached about himself and modest about his powers of resistance. The Navy could hardly have neglected to invite Gerald Ford to join its reserves, and he must certainly have declined. Barry Goldwater is a reserve Brigadier General in the Air Force and the stout champion of every excess his comrades-in-arms demand from the Senate. And that is one good reason why Barry Goldwater can hardly be considered an adult Senator.

"Look what's happening to McNamara," says Gerald Ford. "I'm sorry he bought all of Max Taylor's theories of defense. But he's a hell of a good man. He's making decisions; if they're right, he will be the best Secretary of Defense we've ever had; if they're wrong he could be the worst. But he's dealing with the facts as he sees them; he can't always be thinking about these guys and their damned districts." The adult Congressman is engaged with real problems, as Taft was and the younger LaFollette was; he is a national politician. He is not without certain vanities but they are never the disabling small ones. There lurks in the back of his mind, more often than not, the dream that he could be President of the United States; it is the surrender of that dream which, more often than not, makes the adolescent Congressman turn to a career in his house and end as a committee oligarch.

The adult Congressman turns out to be surprisingly aware of problems that a liberal society and a liberal Administration have almost forgotten. If he is an outsider such as Eugene McCarthy, he is disturbed by the tiny dimensions of all remedies so far advanced by the government.

"Everything," says. McCarthy, "seems to be a pilot project." And yet we may be going through one of those periods like the late Middle Ages when the serfs were turned off the farms and into the cities with nothing to do. Automation could be that fundamental."

If he is an outsider like John Lindsay, the adult Congressman explores dark towers of the government, like the Central Intelligence Agency, which moves and shakes outside the limits of public or Congressional knowledge. Lindsay and McCarthy and a number of Congressmen have introduced bills to set up a joint Congressional Committee to watch the CIA as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy watches the AEC.

"I called CIA one day and asked them to send down a man for a briefing. I sent them three questions. The first was whether the CIA is financing a certain supposedly private organization in New York; the second was to what extent Mr. McCone has established the danger in Cuba; the third was how the Central Intelligence Agency would feel if Congress set up a committee to watch over its operations.

"Three days later, a little man appeared in my office and announced he was from the CIA and that the answer was negative.

"'What do you mean negative?' I asked.

"'We won't discuss your first two questions,' he answered. 'That is our policy. We are an arm of the President and report only to him. On the third question we have no opinion. The CIA does not take a position on legislation before Congress.'

"And that is a CIA briefing for a Congressman."

If he is an insider like Richard Bolling, he sees signs for the first time in his service that the adult Congressmen may be approaching a position of command.

Congress has never seemed more closely divided between those who are apathetic and those who are disgusted. The general mood strikes the outsider as baleful; but it seems, in point of fact, only sodden. The President has artfully avoided the one thing that might disturb the ordinary Congressman, which would be to get the country moving again.

In whatever nerve ends it has, Congress feels unmoored, drifting and with a brackish taste at the back of the mouth. It has, of course, lost those tie ropes which Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson held so tight. Rayburn held the House with a cluster of synthetic Texas ropes. John McCormack was the Boston Irish Texan; Emmanuel Celler the Brooklyn Jewish Texan; William Dawson, the South Chicago Negro Texan; and Bolling, for whom the old man had a special personal affection, an occasional Kansas City liberal Texan. In death, the old man was revealed as larger than the sum of his parts; what power there remains in the House that survived him is fragmented.

"Tad Walter is a powerful man," one veteran says, "he has control over private immigration bills. And the Un-American Activities Committee is big. Walter's a guy who can give you a clearance if they call you a Communist in your district. And I don't know anyone else but Walter who could have rescued the Administration on aid to Yugoslavia and Cuba. Then Mike Kirwan's big. He has the subcommittee on Appropriations for the Interior Department, and he has power in terms of control of boodle."

In this disorder of independent fortified towns, there are signs that a new establishment is forming. The House Republicans elected Ford against the will of their leadership and the House Democrats refused to seat Congressman Landrum of Georgia on the Ways and Means Committee after their leadership had promised him the place in exchange for Georgia's votes for an expanded Rules Committee.

"The Republicans," Bolling thinks, "are getting tired of reacting on the orders of Charley Halleck's knee jerks. But there's this terrible discouragement for the younger men. The House hasn't discovered a technique for using all its members." But Bolling concedes that it has not perhaps wanted to. "They say that 100 people do all the work of the House. A young man comes here and finds the doors closed and is compelled to discover his own ineffectiveness against the walls in front of him."

The Texas rope in the Senate, of course, went slack when Lyndon Johnson rose into the blue, although he is said to exercise some power from the spirit world through rappings to his former assistant, Robert Baker, now secretary to the Democratic policy committee.

The established Democratic family is, moreover, in danger of engulfment by an influx of Northern cousins which began to grow excessive in 1958 and now threatens to take over the whole house.

"I'm Going to Win"

Senator Clark of Pennsylvania who mounted a threeday attack on the Senate establishment last month, ended it by pointing out that, in the last five years, the Southern Democrat-Safe Republican alliance has lost control of five Senate committees, including "believe it or not" Senator Eastland's Judiciary. Senator Mansfield of Montana, Johnson's successor as majority leader, is a mild man with more bent for reconciliation than resistance and so disturbed by the factional breach that he is reported considering resignation from the leadership. There would then be the danger that Hubert Humphrey, now the party whip, would succeed Mansfield. The Southern Democrats, who distrust Humphrey's principle as whole-souledly as they cherish his person, are distressed enough at the prospect to have begun to hint to Humphrey that he really should guard his health - which is superior to Sonny Liston's - and give up the whip to some soul less restless, say Senator Pastore of Rhode Island.

Joe Clark is unconscious of these petty devices, and cheerful about the prospects that the younger Senators will take control of the party delegation and that Mansfield will go peacefully on as their leader.

"I'm going to win," he says. "If we can hold the class of 1958, nothing can keep us from organizing the Senate caucus. I feel sure that the President will step in in January of 1965. He would hardly be content to go down in history with this legislative record."

There would seem to be a little boy even in an adult Congressman. For we cannot yet say for sure whether the President's fascination with history is a thing of memory or of desire. The Congress that Bolling and Clark think to reshape is that Congress where John F. Kennedy went to school. Its old men are as dear to him as the stained walls of his old dormitory are to any true alumnus. He was a model student and properly sensitive to school traditions. The recollections of him there are pleasant, as any recollection of him usually is; but, even though he is very much the grown-up everywhere else, it is difficult to remember the President as an adult Congressman.

Containing Ourselves

Some Reflections on the Enemy Within

by David Riesman

Eric Larrabee likes to distinguish between the "Federal" and the "Confederate" styles in war. The Federal is reactive, waiting for the hotheads to begin something and then more slowly, relentlessly, and unconditionally finishing matters. Ordinarily, the Federal style comprises a cautious waiting for overwhelming logistical supremacy; it is in this respect a style befitting an industrial democracy. The Confederate style is more dashing and honorific, glorifying the military rather than seeing it as a last and punishing resort. In the Second World War, the American commanders in the European theater, save for General Patton, were characteristic representatives of the Federal style: sober, unflamboyant men like Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodge, Devers, and so on. But in the Pacific theater, General MacArthur notably harked back to the Confederate style and surrounded himself with many men who admired him and shared his values. These men constantly felt that their theater was subordinated to the fight against the Nazis; and to this day, they resent the fact that they were never able to "finish" the war in the Pacific. The unsatisfactory endings - unsatisfactory even in Federal terms - of Japan's surrender and the truce in Korea have tended to create a kind of Zeigarnik effect among many men who are today the leaders of the military right wing (General Walker, for example). Incomplete involvement in guerrilla war in South Vietnam does not satisfy such men. Pragmatic solutions seem to them unmanly and un-American.

Yet neither the Federal nor the Confederate styles is appropriate to today's nuclear world. We speak of "general war" or "all-out war" or "nuclear exchange," but even such terms simply extrapolate from traditionally destructive wars and hide from us the discontinuities created by the atom. Another semantic index of the same sort is the phrase, "finger on the trigger," which is endlessly applied to the problems of independent or coordinated nuclear forces in Europe. The effort still to find a line where quantity changes into quality is shown by the use of the word "unacceptable." Thus Herman Kahn, in effect, warns Air Force Generals of Confederate orientation that there is a point beyond which millions of American dead are "unacceptable" while at the same time he seeks vis-à-vis civilians or the ground Army to erase the distinction between nuclear and other weapons. But the question of acceptability is a political one not likely to be decided on rational grounds. In July, 1961, a friend of mine, talking to people in the Pentagon concerning the Berlin crisis, was told that the US would have to resort to nuclear weapons since we could not defend Berlin by conventional means. My friend suggested half jokingly that Dean Rusk call in the Soviet Ambassador, shoot him, put him in a box and send him back to show that Soviet behavior in Berlin was "unacceptable." People, of course, were shocked at this idea, although they were not shocked at the idea of the prospects of a duel over Berlin escalating into nuclear catastrophe. いたので

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The present civilian leadership in the Pentagon finds too dangerous the Confederate style of some of the more vocal Generals and Admirals, and too inert and simply inactive the Federal style (marred by periodic Confederate rhetoric) of the preceding Administration. But its effort to apply pragmatic logic to the enormous political tensions within NATO and within America (quite apart from the Communist world) has led to building up weapons for various contingencies to such a point that war now seems conceivably manageable and controllable; it is seriously thought about in a way that was not done under Eisenhower, where credibility rested on bluster rather than on actual preparations. Increasing our weapons-lead over the Soviet Union helps (though insufficiently) to sop up unemployment and to satisfy various Senators, but it has plainly not been a success vis-à-vis General de Gaulle, who wants his own nuclear force as a way of keeping the US within his range of influence. He is not satisfied to be told by Secretary McNamara that the American panoply of weapons can keep everything under control if only the Europeans will increase their conventional contributions to NATO. And it also seems unlikely that a Soviet society built by parvenus will find "acceptable" their present position of drastic inferiority: they may be kept in line for a while, but not indefinitely.

What I am suggesting here is that it may be easier in the short run to contain the Soviet Union than to contain our own allies or the American energies mobilized behind the Cold War. The Right Wing's rhetoric within America is a nostalgic reminder of our Confederate past. It asks for a policy of victory, not of temporizing, and charges the Administration with a "nowin" policy. And the strength of this rhetoric is such that the Administration, rather than trying to exhibit the complexity of affairs to the public, argues back that it does after all have a "win" policy: to change the rhetoric itself would be inordinately difficult. For some time I have been haunted by the probable reaction in the US if two or three more of the Latin American countries go Communist, or what we define as Communist, or if South Vietnam is overrun, especially if all this happens when we feel that we are stagnant domestically and that our leadership is in doubt as to its direction.

Under the Umbrella

Curiously, perhaps the majority of the civilian strategists who deal with these matters think in terms of deterring the Russians and not the Americans. For example, Thomas Schelling and Henry Kissinger in recent articles engage in elaborate and brilliant calculations as to how to deter the Russians, on the assumption that they are just waiting to invade Western Europe and are kept from this, not by inertia, dislike of adventure, or any factors in their own society, but only by American power. Schelling wants to be sure that we are sufficiently unsure of what we ourselves may do so as to intimidate the Soviets by an apparent willingness on our side to take risks of escalating warfare; this is his rational strategy of irrationally leaving something to chance. And while his paper shows a commendable awareness that even so-called tactical nuclear weapons are not "weapons" in any traditional sense, he shares the general American assumption that the existence or the importance of NATO need not be questioned. But NATO must be seen as a somewhat delayed reaction to the Berlin blockade and the Korean War – a means which, as so often happens in human affairs, has now become its own end under the umbrella of new rationalizations. Our retroactive thinking here, in which we worry about another Munich or Berlin blockade, resembles that of a new nation which fears with disproportionate anxiety the return of the recently expelled colonialists. Such fears then lead us to build up elaborate defenses, the provocativeness of which escapes us, since we claim that our purpose is no more than the preservation of the status quo.

DAVID RIESMAN, co-author of The Lonely Crowd, is Henry Ford II Professor of Social Science at Harvard. This article is drawn from his reflections on "Containment and Initiatives" that appeared in the February, 1963 Newsletter of the Council for Correspondence. At the same time, the focus on NATO serves as insurance against the return of domestic isolationism (which was seldom really that, so much as a dislike of *Europe's* wars, as against forays into the Pacific or Latin America) and as an incipient form of internationalism built around the ideal of Atlantic Union. But in the American forensic climate, this ideal is pursued through constant discussion of the dangers of Communist military and political power.

A large proportion of the intellectuals and strategists who deal with defense and foreign policy seems to me to have an insufficient appreciation of the cumulative impact on American public opinion of such discussion. Communist military and political power is a real danger, and reasonable insurance against the possibility of a Soviet advance in Central Europe is desirable, since Russian intentions are subject to change, just as our own, and our influence on these intentions remains very great. But a focus primarily outside America, characteristic of the Atlantic Seaboard elite which is oriented toward NATO, leads to underestimating the problem of containing American as well as Soviet bellicosity. It is plain that any political detente or major steps toward disarmament will be interpreted by large sections of American opinion as appeasement, for our own people and opinion leaders are not deterred by American nuclear credibility.



"What Are You – Some Kind of Nut or Something?"

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When the question of the Canadian border was settled, Americans neither got possession of "54' 40" nor fought, but it is difficult to think of other instances where all American political factions consented to a negotiated settlement. (The by no means auspicious settlement of the War of 1812 was in part rendered acceptable by General Andrew Jackson's stirring victory at New Orleans a few days after the signing of the peace treaty.) The Yalta and Potsdam agreements helped undo the Democratic Party, and the Korean War could only be settled by a man who was a General and a Republican, namely President Eisenhower.

As Roger Fisher has pointed out, the Cold War means that every incident abroad and at home having to do with "Communism" is pulled into a single vortex. This has happened at the same time that industrial development and social mobility within the US and the assimilation of the immigrant groups have nationalized our society as never before, so that the loss of local identities and loyalties is more than compensated for (as happens so obviously in the new nations) by a rising tide of nationalism. Or to put this in other terms, the US as a nation is the entity into which American energies are increasingly thrown, since they cannot so readily be invested in local (even Southern) loyalties which have declined in relevance: *national* unity is bought as elsewhere at the price of chauvinism.

I have been asking acquaintances in the Government whether high officials actually do fear the Soviet Union —recognizing that millions of ordinary Americans do have such fears. The range of my contacts, of course, is limited, but I have still to talk to any highly-placed person who does fear military aggression from the USSR, although officials may fear being undercut domestically, that is within America, by Soviet obstinacies or by new gambits in Cuba or elsewhere. The general view seems to be that our missile superiority is

now so great that the Soviets can move only at their peril; this is one meaning of our counterforce capability. They can escape that peril only by an aggressive rearmament effort which will cramp them economically even more than they are cramped at present; and there are plainly some in the Government who want to keep up the pressure to force the Soviet Union into a competitive arms race or possibly into giving up the race, even if this means closing the widening gap between the Soviet and Chinese leaderships. (The Cuban crisis of October may be seen in one perspective as an effort by the USSR to break out of this vise.) Thus I think those are mistaken who believe that high American policy is primarily influenced by reciprocating fear of the Soviet Union or that this is the chief reason why we do not take measures to limit armaments, although I would readily concede that popular fears of Russia and elite demands for flexibility would make disarmament difficult even if leadership were united in wanting it.

In fact, I would go further: any unilateral initiative toward disarmament within America, not coupled with domestic activities to heighten our national sense of strength and well-being, may only increase the move toward greater armament by those who think that the country is about to be given away to the Communists – or if not that, given away to indolence and stagnation.

14.

Even the top policy makers are wrong to assume that they can manage the country, that they can follow a Grand Design which can be understood by their constituencies. American leaders need the help of both allied and enemy powers to shape American policy. Tacit agreements, which is what responses to unilateral initiatives would be, are possible among a scientific or aristocratic elite who understand each other's signals and are not swayed by Populist pressures. They may not be possible in our democratic world.

Prisoner of the White House

Let me take one example. Last winter and spring when the US decided to resume bomb testing (responding in this needless way to the Soviet initiative of the previous autumn), many scientists argued that bomb testing is not really important one way or the other, and took the position that opposition to American resumption of testing would be a waste of scarce resources. For one thing, they saw bomb tests as leading to slight qualitative improvements in nuclear warheads and perhaps guidance systems, but not to a new level of military expenditure which would seriously alter "the delicate balance of terror." Such considerations pay too little attention to the political consequences within America of our renewed testing. As Urie Bronfenbrenner has observed, bomb tests can be signals to the people on the side which is testing that the other

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side must be terribly aggressive - else why would one's own honorable government expose people to the dangers of fallout. It seems to me that, in the relations of the great powers to each other, the technical arms race is important, but the psychological effects of the arms race with its different cycles and cumulative tensions are even more important. An end to bomb testing might signal to our own people that the enemy is not quite so vicious as we had supposed, and on these grounds it might be worth great efforts to reach agreement. Such a signal is relevant also to the domestic struggle within America, for it would make clear that our atomic policy is a product of compromise between different points of view and is not controlled by Dr. Edward Teller and his associates or by a faction within the AEC or within the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.

Here I recur to the great assymetry between the US and the Soviet Union, namely that while popular pressures operate there through the Party, the managerial group, and the Army and so on, there is no mass press, no Congress, no organized opposition to take advantage of foreign policy, and if not to impeach Khrushchev, then to hamstring him domestically; in contrast, President Kennedy is the prisoner of the White House, easily able to move decisively against the Communist powers, when he can mobilize nearly the whole population back of him, but able to move only marginally and erratically when he explores a detente.

This is especially so since those of our allies who require the tension of the Cold War to remain our allies are in general much less afraid of nuclear disasters than either the Americans or the Russians; they

can demand that America "stand firm" without really believing that they will suffer the consequences. They can do so in part because, except for the British, who possess the weapons and who know what this means, and the Japanese, who have suffered from atom bombs, they have not really been exposed to nuclear weapons. (The French, while they have the bomb, do not think it is very real, and moreover the importance of it has been overshadowed by the Algerian War and its domestic impact.) And it is also in part because many of our allies have a juster appraisal of the Russians than the Americans do and just see them as cautious, or despise them as Slavs and think that they can be kept in their place. But it is also true that many West Europeans, admiring President Kennedy, have a greater confidence that he is in charge of American policy than they might have if they lived in this country, read our non-elite press, or listened to our many jingo broadcasters, and came to realize that the House of Representatives is in many ways more truly representative of American opinion than is the White House itself. To be sure, for many Congressmen, issues of foreign policy, Cuba for example, are much more salient and sensitive than for their more apathetic or less aroused constituents, just as there are many Congressmen who are more enlightened, dispassionate, and courageous than their constituents "deserve." But in swing districts, it is salient issues and the ability to mobilize latent hopes and passions that decide elections (or at least Congressmen think so); hence, though Congressmen may speak louder or at times more softly than their constituents would have them do, they share a similar rhetoric, whether Federal or Confederate.

Does the FCC Have AT&T's Number?

by Dan and Diane Gottlieb

A plan to reduce rates for long distance calls after 9 PM announced recently by the Federal Communications Commission might give the impression that the public is being fully protected by that agency. This may be more illusion than reality.

The FCC's announcement of the reductions in interstate, station-to-station rates between 9 PM and 4:30 AM played down the fact that the American Telephone and Telegraph Company was being allowed, at the same time, to raise person-to-person rates for calls up to 800 miles. The net effect of the changes, the FCC said, would be an estimated \$30 million savings to the calling public. It has estimated the After – 9 plan alone will reduce phone bills by more than \$70 million

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annually within two years. Judging from past "reductions" the FCC has negotiated with AT&T, greater profits may also occur because of increased calling.

Ordinarily, this would be in the best tradition of free enterprise: lower prices, higher profits. In a regulated industry such as telephone communications, however, profits are supposed to be kept down to reasonable levels so that the public may enjoy the lowest rates possible consistent, of course, with giving the company enough money to attract capital and to provide good service.

Last year, AT&T had the biggest profits in its history: nearly \$1.4 billion. The company stood to lose about \$55 million annually (much less in profits) from the After-9 plan alone, according to FCC estimates. It occurred to at least two Senators, John O. Pastore of Rhode Island and Ralph Yarborough of Texas that with the exact results of the After-9 plan unpredictable, the FCC should wait to see whether the company benefits or loses from the lower rates, before adding increases to person-to-person calls under 800 miles (which incidentally make up more than 80 percent of all interstate person-to-person traffic). The FCC's rationale was that it did not want to risk driving company earnings below what they have been since '59. Senator Yarborough formally petitioned the FCC to suspend the increases in the new rate package (originally scheduled to go into effect last week) while it tested the effect of the reductions. At this writing, the petition was still being considered by the FCC.

Chairman Newton N. Minow of the FCC, whose probable departure in the near future from the commission will do nothing to reassure the FCC's critics, expressed genuine surprise that the Senators did not share his enthusiasm for the "package deal" with AT&T, as Senator Pastore termed it. At hearings before the Commerce subcommittee on communications late in February, Mr. Minow spoke of the benefits to families who would be encouraged to reunite via telephone after 9 and defended AT&T's profits. It would be "a very bad thing" if profits did not go up every year, he said, because the company was investing \$3 billion annually in new equipment and plant on which it "must get a return."

While it is impossible to predict the benefits to the public and AT&T from the recent rate changes, the real issue which the critics were driving at during the Pastore hearings was whether the FCC really knew enough about AT&T to regulate it effectively. The same issue was raised during the hearings and debate last year over whether communications satellites systems should be privately or government controlled. Those who feared AT&T would dominate the new Communications Satellite Corporation were then assured by the private ownership advocates that the corporation and the rates it charged for space communications services would be under the watchful eye of the FCC. The government ownership advocates replied that the past record of FCC regulation of AT&T did not inspire their confidence. This aspect of the satellite debate received scant coverage. Yet government ownership advocates were not alone in their feeling that the FCC has been doing something less than its responsibilities under the law call for.

Several independent outside studies have also raised grave doubts about the FCC's ability to come to grips with the crucial regulatory problems of the interstate telephone business, about 97 percent of which is in the hands of the Bell System. One report (by the management consulting firm of Booz, Allen & Hamilton) released last year said: "It is clear the important functions of surveillance and regulation of ... rates ... have not been adequately undertaken. These functions do not seem to have been accorded an appropriately high priority by the Commission...." Not even the method of timing and billing long distance calls has ever been adequately examined, the report said.

That the shortcomings of the FCC are not of recent origin is suggested in a study for the Hoover Commission made 15 years ago: "The Commission is primarily an agency which acts on applications for broadcast station licenses. Any real regulation of the mammoth telephone industry continues to remain a statutory hope." (The Bell System is the world's largest corporate enterprise. Its assets at the end of 1959 equalled those of the Standard Oil, General Motors and United States Steel Corporations combined.)

Today the FCC has 85 persons devoted to regulation of telephone rates and services. In contrast, AT&T has more employees than the federal government, excluding the Post Office and the military, Chairman Minow told the Pastore subcommittee, and furthermore the FCC has difficulty in attracting talented personnel. "Under the circumstances, we are doing the best job possible," he added.

Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas, a sharp critic of the FCC's record in telephone regulation, emphasized at the hearings that he did not put the blame on the Commissioners for the agency's failings. At one point, he even hinted sympathy. His state, which has so far failed even to create a regulatory commission with power over intrastate telephone rates, is "fully cognizant of the tremendous power of AT&T," he said.

If the FCC is doing "about as competent a job as can be done under the circumstances," as Senator Pastore concluded after hearing Chairman Minow's testimony, then the question still unanswered is: Is the public being protected?

Congressman Emanuel Celler of New York, whose House Anti-Trust subcommittee has interested itself in

FCC regulation of AT&T, claims that the American public, over a 7-year period, had been overcharged almost a billion dollars for interstate calls. Celler has noted that from 1955 through 1961, Bell's revenues resulted in a rate of return on investment of more than 6.5 percent, the level of earnings which the FCC, in 1953, said would be fair and reasonable. These facts were undisputed. From them, Celler reasoned that if the commission had ordered phone rate reductions to keep AT&T's earnings down to the 6.5 percent level, the savings to the public during the 7-year period would have been about \$985 million. Under this reasoning, AT&T would still be overcharging the public, since its rate of return for 1962 was about 7.5 percent. This one percent difference in the rate of return represents \$100 million in charges for interstate services on an annual basis. The FCC enters only the mildest demurrer here, pointing out that 6.5 percent is not the maximum return permissible and further, that a higher rate of earnings may be justified by present conditions.

The difficulty is that in spite of some study the Commission has not made a finding since 1953 on what the return should be. While admitting this, individual Commissioners, including Chairman Minow, have nonetheless on various occasions in the past two years defended the rate of AT&T's earnings at the particular time they were being questioned. The Booz, Allen & Hamilton report says that the Commission has not established *criteria* for judging what the rate of return should be, the controlling factor over the general level of phone rates.

Without a finding on the record based on careful evaluation of the company's current financial needs – a finding that can be used to defend any rate changes ordered pursuant thereto – the Commission is not in a position effectively to challenge the Company's point of view (in the courts, if need be). In this connection, the testimony of Commissioner Rosel H. Hyde at the Pastore hearings is revealing. Relating the company's reaction when the Commission proposed the After-9 reductions, he said that the information available indicated it would cost the company about \$55 million in revenues annually, and that "the Company ... said that they could not go into a lowering of their overall revenue at this time...." (italics supplied). The Commission, while making no formal judgment on the Company's claim, nevertheless was sufficiently impressed to look into raising the person-to-person rates. The FCC announcement of the agreement with Bell said: "The overall effect of the changes will result in substantial savings to the public while permitting the company to maintain a level of earnings on investment within the range realized by it" since late 1959. Thus, the Commission inferentially took for the time being the company's view of what overall revenues (and consequently earnings) should be.

The Commission's handling of rate of return is just one of several crucial areas where it has been criticized for not making well-informed judgments based on independent evaluation of the company's figures. Some critics have gone so far as to term the Commission's record on telephone regulation "a sad travesty on what regulation is supposed to mean." Others have contended that effective regulation of AT&T is impossible.

In defending the FCC's record, Commissioners Minow and Hyde have used a simple statistic: overall, long distance rates are 19 percent lower today than they were in 1940. This sounds reassuring, but it does not prove that today's rates are reasonable. Savings made possible by lower unit costs due to increased long distance calling and introduction of automated equipment may permit both lower rates to the public and excessive profits. It is, of course, possible to argue that the public is better served in the long run by letting the company earn enough in the short run to stimulate forward-looking planning and investment.

More Staff for the FCC

Chairman Minow read a lengthy statement to the Pastore committee explaining just what the Commission does do. He stated that on-the-spot inspections of the company's records are being made to obtain compliance with the FCC's proscribed accounting system. In answer to questions from the committee, however, he conceded that more field inspection of the company's books and records are needed. His prepared testimony said that the FCC determines what is to be allowed in calculating the company's investment in plant, equipment and other assets - a vital figure in determining the company's level of earnings. Yet the commission has not made an independent examination of the books of Western Electric (AT&T's manufacturing subsidiary, virtually its sole supplier of telephone equipment) in order to see whether the prices Western charges for equipment sold to Bell companies reflect true costs and a reasonable profit.

Chairman Minow levelled with the committee when he said that the FCC is not doing the job that "ought to be done" and that it needs at least double the present staff for telephone regulation. He has also properly reminded the Congress that the Communications Satellite Act has placed new demands upon the FCC which are "extraordinary."

In spite of this increased responsibility, the Administration has included just 28 new positions in its budget for the Common Carrier Bureau, the FCC's unit in charge of telephone work. Assuming this request is granted in full, the Bureau will have a few more people than it had in 1949 when it was regulating a telephone plant less than half the size of today's.

Mark Twain from Under Ground

by Stanley Kauffmann

Letters from the Earth, the newest selection from the immense store of unpublished Mark Twain material, was prepared for the press in 1939 by the late Bernard DeVoto, commissioned by the estate's trustees. Permission to publish it was delayed by Clara Clemens, the surviving daughter, for over twenty years. It appears at last; and if it adds little to Twain's stature, it con-

> Letters from the Earth by Mark Twain (Harper & Row; \$5.95)

tains some valuable items, and it redirects our attention to this fascinating man whose career is unlike that of any other equally prominent writer.

The book consists of the title-piece, which is unfinished, two other long unfinished pieces (Papers of the Adam Family and The Great Dark), and nineteen short pieces, some of which are in groups. The Letters are written by Satan (before his fall), reporting to his fellow-angels on a trip to the newly created earth, informing them of man's customs and religion and his curious conception of God. Twain uses the letters as vehicles for his bitterness about human cruelty, stupidity, hypocrisy, and vanity. In the fall of 1909 he wrote about the letters to a Miss Wallace: "I'll read passages to you. The book will never be published - in fact it couldn't be, because it would be felony

... [Albert Bigelow Paine] enjoys it, but Paine is going to be damned one of these days, I suppose."

Paine, companion of his last years, his biographer, literary executor and posthumous nanny, has been damned many times, with justice; but after printing "one admissible extract" from the *Letters* in his biography, Paine offers what we can now see is a sensible opinion on the remainder: "Most of the ideas presented in this his last commentary on human absurdities were new only as to phrasing. He had exhausted the topic long ago, in one way or another, but it was one of the themes in which he never lost interest. Many subjects become stale to him at last; but the curious invention called man remained a novelty to him to the end."

The judgment of ideas in this is sound enough. What is surprising is that the censorious Paine was so little disturbed (ostensibly, at least) by the frankness of parts of the material. Some of it is mere outhouse humor - attenuated jokes on a Bible verse (2 Kings, 9:8). This, like 1601, is just lodge-meeting, smoking-room stuff. But there is a comparison of male and female sexual proclivities that is astonishingly candid for its day. As a point of comparison, Stephen Crane's Maggie, a contemporary tale of a girl of the streets, contains nothing like it. Crane's book was published, Twain's pre-Kinsey report was not; still it is startling to see that he so much as set it down in careful, literary form.

I have always thought Eve's Diary tedious; the Adam papers, in the same vein, do not alter my feelings. The last long section, The Great Dark, is what we would now call science fiction. With a microscope a man sees the teeming life in a drop of water, and he and his family are magically transformed so that they can sail for months across that drop in a ship, encountering monsters. The theme behind it, now a familiar s-f one, is the blurred balance between dream and reality. (Which was the man's real existence - the previous one or this?) This theme is also familiar in Twain, developed in The Mysterious Stranger, My Platonic Sweetheart, and elsewhere. What is chiefly interesting about all the above-mentioned pieces, as well as six of the others in the book, is that they fall into two classes: Biblical material used as a medium for socially caustic, religiously skeptical comment; and material indicating a strong concern with science, reflecting the growing preoccupation of the times. The contrast between Twain's Scripture-soaked upbringing and the incipient positivism of his age shows clearly that his mind was a locus for the meeting of two centuries.

Most of the other pieces, good and bad, have obvious antecedents in Twain. A Cat's Tale is just as mawkish as the previously published A Horse's Tale. Cooper's Prose Style is just as funny as Fenimore Cooper's Literary Offenses. Parodies of a book on etiquette parallel innumerable similar sketches. Venting his persistent animus against the French in another sketch, Twain strikes out in a way that others have mimicked and none has surpassed: "There is little question, in my mind, that France is entitled to a distinguished place among the partly civilized peoples of our globe."

The foremost material for me in this book is that which helps to illuminate Twain's character: a group of three travel sketches about England, The Gorky Incident, and a comment on Zola's La Terre. The three London pieces are no better than the best in his chronicles of the Innocent or the Tramp abroad; but their special significance is that they are part of a planned book on England, for which he visited that country in 1872. He wrote hundreds of pages and then decided not to publish the book so as not to "offend those who had taken him into their hearts and homes." What is here printed could have offended no one; perhaps there is satire in the unpublished pages that might once have given offense. But as Van Wyck Brooks says in The Ordeal of Mark Twain, "Imagine Emerson having been prevented by any such consideration from writing English Traits."

The Gorky Incident is microcosmic of the morality of Twain's era. When the Russian came here in 1905 to raise funds for revolutionists in his country, Twain offered to help and to organize an authors' dinner for Gorky. Then,

when it was learned that the woman traveling with Gorky was not married to him, Twain and W. D. Howells withdrew their support. This brief article attempts to explain the impossibility of bucking local custom, without claiming that the custom is right. Twain even tries to make humor of it. It has the air of a suave vaudeville star regaining control of the audience after a small disturbance in the balcony.

The Zola comment is the saddest. La Terre gripped and shook him. He made his customary anti-French jokes about a French newspaper's objections to the book's "foulness." ("A story so foul that the French people could not stand it; why, that is like speaking of food that was so appetizing that no Frenchman would put up with it.") But it is borne in on him that Zola is writing of man, not of Frenchmen, and one sees Twain begin to question his own honesty. He does not go so far as to say that he ought to have written as realistically as Zola, but the last paragraph is pathetically revealing:

"How strange it is to reflect that the book is true. But it is. You have to confess it at last. Then you are aware of a grudge against him. Because he has exposed those odious French people to you? No; but because he has exposed your own people to you. You were asleep, and had forgotten; he has waked you up. You owe him a grudge – and will keep it."

The Zola article, like the rest of this book, was not published in Twain's lifetime.

This leads to the paramount and familiar question about Mark Twain, one which, because of its social implications, is among the important questions in American literary history. Was he a writer increasingly repressed by his era's moral conventions or was he a writer who simply became increasingly refined by experience and education? The leading exponent of the first belief was Van Wyck Brooks, of the second Bernard DeVoto. (As Dwight Macdonald has pointed out, they exchanged positions as time went on.) DeVoto's view is that Twain was a rough diamond who submitted to polishing. "He came East and accepted

tuition. That is a complete description of what happened - as it is an epitome of Western experience." It is neither one nor the other. But to disagree with DeVoto, it is not necessary to accept Brooks' glib psychoanalysis. (E.g., Twain's wife was a deliberate substitute for his mother as moral mentor; because of frustration, Twain had a subconscious wish to kill the infant son who died of pneumonia.) Facts are sufficient. Twain told Archibald Henderson: "After my marriage, [my wife] edited everything I wrote. And what is more - she not only edited my works she edited me." When it wasn't his wife, it was Howells. There was much fuss, for instance, over whether Huck Finn should say that the Widow Douglas combed him "all to hell" or "all to thunder," with Howells finally prevailing for the latter in order to protect young readers' sensibilities.

The best proof of Twain's repression – and in this he is alone among writers of the first rank – is that he divided his latter-day output in two: material written for publication and material written to be pigeon-holed, possibly for posthumous publication. In his autobiography, which appeared after his death, he says: "I am writing from the grave. On these terms only can a man be approximately frank. He cannot be

straitly and unqualifiedly frank either in the grave or out of it." (Paine evidently interfered with even that approximate frankness. One of DeVoto's recommendations was the publication of autobiographical material omitted by Paine.) All through his life, of course, Twain had discarded some material, left some unfinished, excised some. This is true of any prolific writer, although with Twain there was so much that DeVoto says, "His published works are not much greater in bulk than his unpublished manuscripts." But the salient point is that in the fifteen years before his death (1910), the years shadowed by the deaths of his wife and two of his daughters, Twain worked harder at his hidden career than his public one.

He wrote to Howells from Vienna in 1898: "I couldn't get along without work now. I bury myself in it up to the ears....It isn't all for print, by any means, for much of it fails to suit me. ..." Whether it wasn't printed because it didn't suit him or because it wouldn't have suited Howells, his arbiter, is not dependably clear; but the work poured out. "During this period," says De-Voto, "he wrote as much as in any similar length of time in his life, perhaps more, but most of it is fragmentary, unfinished. Almost all of it deals

The Lemmings

Food short against the long days' hunger, sunset a fatty morsel in the western broth, and sick of racing the birds and the tides on the sand spit for bits of edible sea wrack at which to pick,

it seems no more unreasonable one day to try at least that sea which somewhere reaches a western landfall where each footfall may fester with food, where it rolls down the beaches.

Thus their Columbus argues, convincing them, for who has the strength to discuss or even care? Slowly, like a tide, they begin to swim westward in the nobility of despair.

And if they never return, who can say the conclusion is the obvious drowning it probably all comes to, who has stared for twenty minutes the horizon where the herring silver touches the herring blue?

DAVID R. SLAVITT

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with the nature of man, man's fate, and man's conceptions of honor and morality." (Note that DeVoto's changed view of Twain – from the rough Westerner who took polishing to a prisoner of despair – came about after he had been through all the Twain papers.)

Certainly much of those writings must be fragmentary, and almost certainly much of them must be repetitious. But what has been published posthumously, particularly items like the Gorky and Zola pieces, and what we know of Twain's correspondence and conversations, all confirm that he felt he had to bury his most serious thoughts. Here we have the strange spectacle of a major writer, an oracle of his day, who, as he matured and deepened, felt that he could not reveal the whole truth of what he was thinking; but who did not dismiss that truth, who went to the trouble of writing it down as best he could, possibly against resurrection in the future. One could understand this with an obscure or struggling writer, but Twain was a demigod. Consciously or not, he became a writer living in hope of an earthly life to come.

It is easy today to say that he ought to have been fearless, candid, uncaring of consequences. He ought never to have let his wife or anyone else change a word of his manuscripts for extrinsic reasons, and in his later days, when his thoughts were sere or searing, he should have stated them completely. The fact is that Twain was an artistic genius but morally an average man. Let us posit that moral heroism means ruthless disregard for society, if necessary, in pursuit of one's art, and we can see that the union of genius with morally heroic character is not always certain. It happened with Joyce and Wagner, not with Dickens and Verdi. Nor with Twain.

There are, however, some extenuating circumstances. First, he told as much truth as any American writer of his generation, more than the vast majority. Second, his wife was not an extraordinary crank; she was typical of her society. Howells was not a nutty bluenose, he was a pre-eminent novelist, critic, editor. Twain, although he protested frequently, could easily have persuaded himself that he was being "improved" by them. Third, he would certainly have hurt deeply – in a way that we today cannot quite grasp – many people who loved him if he had published all his religious remarks in their lifetimes. And, as for the relatively mild sexual references in this new volume, no printer would have set them and no bookseller would have handled the volume, even though it was by Twain.

Writing in *The New Republic* on Twain's centennial, Newton Arvin predicted that Twain will survive less as a writer than as a folk hero, a grand half-legendary personality:

"That . . . is the role he really played in his own time. The people of his class . . . could not seriously venerate the canny iron-masters, the swindling monopolists, the dull and paltry politicians who prevailed in the public life of the country; and they turned with a deep human instinct to a man whom they did not properly value but whose essential largeness and sweetness they rightly idolized. They helped to defeat him as a writer, but it is perhaps the highest tribute that can be paid to their arid culture that it was a writer whom they spontaneously elected as

their Cid, their Robin Hood, their Barbarossa."

I doubt that millionaires lacked veneration, but otherwise this statement needs only to be amplified to say that Twain stood in this relation to others besides Americans. His European audience was tremendous. Nietzsche recommended Tom Sawyer to a friend. Leschetizky, the famous piano pedagogue, said that Viennese youth suffered from "Delirium Clemens." In 1921, when a group of young Petrograd actors and directors wanted to reform the socialist theater, they included a quotation from Twain in their manifesto. (To this day he has remained a prodigious favorite in the USSR.)

It is a curious paradox: a writer of enormous fame, celebrated by the best minds of his day (he was not a mere mass entertainer), yet who was, as Arvin says and as this new volume further substantiates, defeated. Defeated, finally, because although he could see, he did not dare; although he was a genius, he was not a great man. That was his tragedy; but like a true tragedy, it has grandeur and inevitability.

Wormwood to Our Conscience

by Charlton Ogburn, Jr.

The time is during the Civil War, the place Colorado. Major Edward Wynkoop is leading a force of 130 men to an encampment of a thousand Chey-

A Very Small Remnant
by Michael Straight
(Knopf; \$4)

enne braves whose chief, Black Kettle, has signified a wish to accept the amnesty offered by the Governor.

"The center of their line fell back as we approached," Wynkoop relates; "in classical style, their flanks closed in around us. Still moving forward, we reformed as squadrons, with our wagons and howitzers in the center."

The greatly outnumbered whites are warned that Black Kettle may not be able to control his young warriors, led by the brother of a chief whom white soldiers had shot in cold blood while his hand was raised in the peace sign. Wynkoop wonders: "are all white men responsible for one white man's folly?"

The upshot is such as to pose a far more disturbing question: is the United States as a whole to be implicated in, by condoning, a monstrous crime against Black Kettle's people; or will a few troubled men ("a very small remnant" which "the Lord of hosts had left unto us"), holding a hearing on the crime in a Denver courthouse, threatened by mob violence and hired assassins, be able to redeem the nation's honor in some measure by fixing the blame for the crime where the blame is due?

For Black Kettle's Cheyennes did not fire upon Wynkoop's force. They accepted the Governor's terms, settled down virtually unarmed under the protection of an Army fort as willing prisoners. And there, without warning, they were set upon by a regiment recruited from the saloons of Denver and butchered.

Unfortunately, A Very Small Remnant, though a novel, is not fiction. The author has resorted to imagination only upon coming to the end of the known facts. The man responsible for the massacre was Colonel John Milton Chivington, Commander of the Military District of Colorado, who needed a splashy victory to catapult him into the Senate. He is worth taking a look at as Straight presents him. A pursefighter turned preacher turned soldier, he is a giant of a man with "bearded chin thrust out; his eyes, small and fierce." Intolerant and fanatic, arrogating the mantle of a vengeful Jehovah, Chivington is in fact the recurrent evil genius of American history, an affable Uncle Sam's Mr. Hyde.

In Edward Wynkoop, Chivington's subordinate, Michael Straight has a hero who serves his purpose well. His strict regularity as an Army officer and reluctance to accept the role that fate and his inherent fairness force upon him make particularly effective his standing up to Chivington and subsequently casting away his career to become an Indian agent with the hope of ensuring just and humane treatment of Black Kettle's surviving Cheyennes – themselves a very small remnant.

Mr. Straight's preceding book, Carrington, was justifiably praised as an outstanding novel of the West, about as different from the conventional romance of the Plains as spring water from sarsaparilla. Those who read the present book will find that the moral issues of man's relations with his fellows retain their fascination for Mr. Straight. They will also find that he has lost neither his feeling for the red man and the Wyoming-Colorado country nor his ability to communicate it.

In both of Mr. Straight's novels there seems to me to be a happy marriage of style and subject. His prose is as spare as the vegetation of the country that is his second home; there is never the congestion of verbiage that would prevent the wind from sweeping through. As a storyteller he has something of the character of one of his own Indians on a trail. In the pursuit of what matters, he is undeviating and proof against distraction. The pace is steady, even and unslackening – what Ernest Thompson, I believe, called "a wolf's mile-eating lope." You see for yourself along the way how things are. In a curious way the country you traverse seems to speak for itself. The characters certainly speak for themselves, often in dramatic confrontations, for which Mr. Straight has a sound in-

Style is not the man. If it were, this would be a minor classic. Conor Cruise O'Brien can write. If that was a reason why the late Dag Hammarskjold sent him to Katanga as his chief diplomatic representative, he made no mistake. Dr. O'Brien's book will be read long after Katanga has vanished from the headlines. It is funny; it is moving; its portrayals of Katangese personalities

> To Katanga and Back by Conor Cruise O'Brien (Simon and Schuster; \$5.95)

priceless; its observations on lobbying at the UN are worth a dozen doctoral dissertations.

But this is also a disgraceful book a case of a first-class writing talent at the command of a wilful, self-centered, self-exculpatory personality. O'Brien begins with a letter from U Thant reminding him that his obligations as a former international civil servant forbade the disclosure of information gained as a member of the Secretariat. His first chapter explains why he decided to disregard U Thant and push ahead, though he knew that his book "at first sight" would seem to play into the hands of the enemies of the UN. Publication of the truth, which the Secretariat by reasons of its "servitude" could not undertake, would serve the long-term interests of the UN, O'Brien rationalized.

Perhaps. At the moment, O'Brien's book has become a handy stick with which to belabor the United Nations.

O'Brien's passion for the truth is so compelling that he puts on the record

stinct. There is no intrusion by the author, no preaching. This is how it is – how it was.

A Very Small Remnant is wormwood to the national conscience. Like Carrington, it is also a contribution to the permanent literature of the West, and a reminder that the moral salvation of the many may, and perhaps always does, depend upon the decency and courage of a very few.

Tales Out of Katanga

by Joseph P. Lash

bravura remarks by former colleagues, the sort of thing said over drinks and never intended for public print. Gustavo Duran, for example, unaware that he was talking for the record, advised O'Brien before he left for Katanga, "the Congolese? You will hate them all " Duran as this is being written is back in the Congo for the UN. O'Brien's tattling is making his job no easier. But O'Brien is guilty of more than bad taste: the remark he quotes did not, in fact, reflect the real view of Duran, who several times in my hearing has spoken warmly of such Congolese leaders as Adoula, Sendwe and Lundula.

Nothing better illustrates O'Brien's capacity for self-indulgence than his resentful comment about the people who suggested that it might have been indiscreet to invite the woman he loved and intended to marry – as soon as his divorce came through – to spend her holidays with him in Elizabethville:

"What impressed me about some of the people who most emphasized the indiscretion. . .was the complacency with which they accepted the implication regarding themselves, that they had never cared enough about anybody or anything to do something indiscreet for the sake of him, her or it."

What impresses me about this observation is the complacency with which he permits the implication that he never cared enough about the UN to avoid such indiscretion.

This story he tells is largely of the

first battle of Katanga which took place in September, 1961. Dubbed "Morthor," which is the Hindi word for "smash," the operation was a fiasco in terms of the UN attempt to end Katanga's secession, and a tragedy since Dag Hammarskjold perished while trying to negotiate its cessation.

When O'Brien first wrote about these events in the London Observer in December, 1961, there was a note of contrition, the sense that he felt he might unknowingly have let Hammarskjold down. This book, on the contrary, is devoted to the thesis that Hammarskjold let O'Brien down. It is O'Brien's opinion that the Secretary-General on his arrival in Leopoldville - confronted by "Morthor" in disarray - instead of signalling retreat by going to parley with Tshombe, should have stood firm. Even though the Secretary-General had not authorized "Morthor," he should have called for reinforcements, roused the Katangese by radio against Tshombe and resolutely pressed ahead to end Katanga's secession by force.

Whether there was a real chance of salvaging "Morthor" by the time Hammarskjold arrived in the Congo is irrelevant. O'Brien had proclaimed the purpose of "Morthor" to be the ending of Katanga's secession. That was contrary to Hammarskjold's policy, which was to rely on negotiation, persuasion and the mystique of the UN to bring about a settlement of the constitutional issue between Katanga and the Central Government.

O'Brien's suggestions that Hammarskjold abandoned this policy for one of imposing a settlement are unpersuasive. O'Brien contends there were conflicting interpretations of the February 21, 1961, Security Council resolution directing the UN to oust the Katanga mercenaries - the British stipulation that it did not authorize imposition of a political settlement, and the Afro-Asian view that it did. Hammarskjold accepted the Afro-Asian interpretation, O'Brien maintains, when he informed the Security Council he intended to be guided in implementing the February resolution by his Advisory Committee on the Congo, fifteen of whose members were from Africa and Asia.

The weak link in this chain of argument is O'Brien's claim that the Afro-Asians interpreted the February con-

sensus to mean authorization to end the secession by force. O'Brien does not document this claim.

And he couldn't. What the resolution did do, and this was the Afro-Asian understanding of it, was to direct the UN to oust the foreign political advisers and military mercenaries from Katanga. It was generally accepted that, deprived of foreign assistance, Tshombe would be disposed to negotiate a settlement with Adoula.

That this was also O'Brien's view at the time is implied by his euphoric observations on "Operation Rumpunch." This swift UN maneuver on August 28 resulted in the apprehension of 338 of the 500-odd foreign officers believed to be in Katanga. "That was a more significant contribution to the re-unification of the Congo than anything the UN had previously done," wrote O'-Brien.

"Morthor" was supposed to finish the job and while "smash" is now construed by O'Brien to mean demolishing the secession, it could also have meant cleaning up the mercenaries.

"Morthor" was set for 4 A.M. on September 3. Hammarskjold was to arrive eleven hours later. Why didn't the men on the spot wait? Did they wish to confront him with a *fait accompli*? Although none of Hammarskjold's associates contends that UN officials in Leopoldville and Elizabethville did not have the "green light" to expel the mercenaries, Hammarskjold did not approve "Morthor," presumably did not know about it, and certainly would not have sanctioned it as a plan to end Katanga's secession by force.

How far the notion of an imposed settlement was from his thoughts is suggested by the meetings he had with the Ambassadors of Canada, Norway and Ireland just before he left New York on his fatal journey. All three came away from their talks on the 38th floor with the impression that as a result of "Rumpunch," Hammarskjold was highly optimistic about the outcome of the Congo operation. He was going to Leopoldville, he told them, because he thought his presence in the Congolese capital would provide Tshombe with a golden opportunity to come there for talks with Adoula without a loss of face. Such a denouement, he indicated, would put the Secretary-General

in a strong position to meet Soviet and colonialist criticisms at the General Assembly, scheduled to meet a few days later. He also felt that a projected plea to the Assembly for a large-scale program of economic aid to the Congo would be bolstered by an on-the-spot estimate of what would be needed.

Operation smash, therefore, while it didn't smash the mercenaries, must have been a severe blow to the Secretary-General when he arrived in Leopoldville. The British threat of a withdrawal of confidence, O'Brien suggests, was the reason why Hammarskjold shrank back and agreed to fly to Ndola to arrange a cease-fire.

But this hypothesis is nasty and superfluous. "Morthor," in addition to being poorly prepared, was contrary to Hammarskjold's line. Why should he have thrown good money after bad? One of the shabbier and more sensational parts of this book is O'Brien's claim that Hammarskjold knowingly put out a false account of "Morthor." What O'Brien really means is that Hammarskjold undertook to describe and defend "Morthor" in the framework of his, rather than of O'Brien's policy. Hammarskjold described "Morthor" as a defensive reaction to the violent anti-UN campaign mounted by Tshombe after "Rumpunch." O'Brien agrees this was a major factor in the genesis of "Morthor," but the operation once begun had the added objective of ending the secession.

That, however, was O'Brien's, not Hammarskjold's policy, and the latter's silence on the subject of his subordinates having exceeded their instructions scarcely justifies O'Brien's assault upon Hammarskjold's integrity.

It still is not clear where the end-thesecession aspects of "Morthor" originated. Sture Linner, the chief UN official in the Congo at the time, told me he approved "Morthor" only as an action necessary to keep the mercenaries from overrunning UN positions. O'Brien says the more far-reaching instructions came via Mahmoud Khiary, a Tunisian who was one of Linner's top political aides.

In his Observer pieces, O'Brien wrote that when he went to Leopoldville several weeks after the windup of "Morthor" he was bewildered to learn that



A century of conflicts and crusades

ALIENS AND DISSENTERS

Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933

By William Preston, Jr. Is America's highly prized freedom of thought and expression in jeopardy? What are the origins and consequences of restraints on liberty? Analyzing the red scare of 1920 and its pre-World War I origins, Mr. Preston relates the earlier practices to recent procedures in government, concluding with an informed plea for the reversal of current policies. Center for the Study of the History of Lib-\$6.75 erty in America.



By James H. Timberlake. Contrary to general belief, the majority of the Eighteenth Amendment's strongest supporters were not wild-eyed Carrie Nations. Mr. Timberlake shows that prohibition grew out of the entire Progressive Movement, whose followers were dedicated to the dream of a better, happier America. \$5.25



nobody outside of Elizabethville except Khiary and Vladimir Fabry (Linner's legal aide who perished with Hammarskjold) had known about the broader instructions he had received. Khiary's explanation, according to O'Brien, was that he knew Hammarskjold's wishes because "he had been in personal, direct communication, by a channel unknown to anyone else, with Mr. Hammarskiold by secret unnumbered telegrams." In the book, O'Brien's instructions still come to him via Khiary, but the business about Khiary's being in secret communication with Hammarskjold is omitted. Why?

What emerges from all this is that United Nations headquarters had one policy and that some in the field, contemptuous of Hammarskjold's stress on legality and his reluctance to use force, had their own.

In the end force had to be invoked to end Katanga's secession. But that does not vindicate O'Brien. In the grim aftermath of Hammarskjold's death and Katangese violations of the "Morthor" cease-fire, the Security Council on November 24, 1961 authorized U Thant to use force to expel the mercenaries and stiffened the UN mandate to end Katanga's secession.

That resolution was not an exercise in supererogation. Its passage in itself refutes O'Brien's thesis that the February 21 mandate already had conferred that authority upon the Secretary-General.

MUSIC

Hindemith–Early and Late

During the middle of March, two of Paul Hindemith's works for the theater received their American premieres under the composer's direction. They were his new (1961) opera, The Long Christmas Dinner, and his very old (1924) ballet, The Demon, which were presented as a double bill. It is odd that a big work by a major composer would have to wait, as The Demon did, almost 40 years for an American performance. It is odder yet that the premieres, when they took place, were under the auspices not of one of the great impresarios but rather of the Juilliard School of Music. The Juilliard paid the costs of production and tapped its enormous resources of student and faculty talent for the singers, dancers and instrumental performers required. After the New York premiere, the production was moved to Washington where the deficit was met by the Washington Institute of Contemporary Arts, the Opera Society of Washington, and eleven other local organizations and institutions.

To my knowledge, only one of Hindemith's dozen-odd theater pieces has been performed before in the United States under anything approaching professional conditions. This was the

ballet *Herodiade*, in which an incompatibility between the choreographer, Martha Graham, and the music, resulted in something less than a triumph. There is an irony here: the symphonic music for which Hindemith is best known here is excerpted from his music for the theater – the symphony from his opera *Mathis der Maler* and the suite from his ballet *Nobilissima Visione*. The ballet, I believe, has been dropped from repertory, but the opera *Mathis der Maler* has, since the fall of Hitler, become a sort of old favorite in the German-speaking countries.

A reason for Hindemith's neglect by our operatic theaters can be explained by his position in the modernist movement. I don't know just what the modernist movement is, but it seems to go

Notes on Contributors

Charlton Ogburn, Jr. is the author of The Marauders. Joseph P. Lash is an editorial writer for The New York Post and author of Dag Hammarskjold, Custodian of the Brushfire Peace. David R. Slavitt is a young New York poet who makes his first New Republic appearance with this issue. back about fifty years, to Schoenberg's *Pierrot Lunaire* and Stravinsky's *Sacre du Printemps*; at any rate, to a time when new music began to sound quite different from any music that had been written before. At the time of these innovations, Hindemith was a boy (he was born in 1895), and he was writing prolifically in a manner heavily influenced by Brahms. Few composers have ever exhibited such perfection of technique and such profound sensibility in their teens as Hindemith.

At some point around 1920 – after his tour of duty with the German army -Hindemith took a long look at his musical resources and made the changes in his style which threw him from the conservative to the modern camp. During this brief second phase of his career, which was over by 1934, he wrote two works on which his early international reputation was based the song cycle, Das Marienleben, which was improved by revision in 1948, and the Third String Quartet which remains one of the most eloquent modern contributions to the repertory. In addition his second period included some other good works which have never quite caught on, and some which are now dated and dispensable.

His shift of allegiance naturally made for consternation among the conservatives. He joined the moderns about the time that the term "modern music" became, in the public mind, a synonym for ugliness and outrage. He had the luxury of being the youngest of the internationally famous moderns (being younger by at least a decade than Stravinsky, Schoenberg, Bartok and their contemporaries). But, in payment for this distinction, he became the subject of an extensive mythology which has not been dispelled to this day. Of the Hindemith myths, the silliest (and the hardest to put down) is that he was - or is! - an atonal composer. The fact is that Hindemith has always been an outspoken and deadly opponent of atonality. His enemies claim that his loathing for atonality has deafened him to much of the best music of his own time. Nonetheless, the myth remains. There is also the business of Gebrauchmusik – workaday music, music for use. When, in the late twenties, Hindemith wrote some pieces that were very easy to play, word got out

that he was interested in music as a commodity rather than as an aesthetic entity.

These and other myths would have banned him from (for instance) the Metropolitan Opera House while he was young – this, combined with the generally shortsighted view of the management of that theater. Curiously, his unpopularity with the Nazis (his music was banned in Germany as early as 1934) brought no increased popularity in Western Europe.

A further explanation may lie in the fact that by the time (the late forties and early fifties) an American public had developed for the way-out styles of the twenties, Hindemith was no longer writing way-out music. About 30 years ago, Hindemith completed his evolution. He arrived at a style which lends itself to conventional analysis and which is characterized by nobility and serenity. Within it, he can be witty and he can be tragic, but he very rarely pushes his style to these extremes. And his mature style has no shock value whatever. His new opera, *The Long Christmas Dinner*, is a substantial specimen of third-period Hindemith: poignant, lovely, subtle, but touched with greatness only three times, and then briefly. The text must have been frightfully difficult to set, and Hindemith must have enjoyed solving technical problems that are foreign to his conventional method of working.

Thornton Wilder adapted the libretto from a one-act play that he wrote in 1931 - which now looks like a fingerexercise for Our Town and The Skin of Our Teeth. In all of these plays, Wilder was concerned with the continuity of human existence. His subject was Man with a capital M, and his method was to reduce character to type. In The Long Christmas Dinner. he establishes continuity by means of a set dinner table, the places of which are occupied by succeeding generations of a single family over a period of ninety years. The original group sits down to the table. A new baby is brought in through the white door at the left of the stage and is carried off.



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Presently, the grandmother retires through the black door, which is death. Her place at the table is taken by a new character. Then the baby reappears full grown. As he matures, his bride is introduced, their children are brought in, the aging parents go through the death door, and so on.

A metaphysical conceit as elaborate as this is, of course, extreme for the operatic theater; I will never know whether a person who did not know in advance what was up would be able to follow it. The text, which Hindemith had translated into German before setting it, had to be translated back into English with some unfortunate results.

For his purposes, Wilder needed to use the simplest and most prosaic language. My heart sank when I heard the first words:

"We're ready. I reckon we're ready. Roderick! Mother Bayard! Come to dinner."

Hindemith had set this in a parlando style that, to any American listener, could only conjure up plain old Menotti pass-the-sugar. Hindemith, primarily by ingenious use of his orchestra, was able to compensate for the lack of clear thematic vocal material, but only to a degree. For almost fifty years, the theme and its development have been the central elements of Hindemith's musical thought, and in this work, the recurrent literary motives of birth, death, carving the turkey, etc., gave him an opportunity to exploit the technique that he has developed to perfection. However, at the three points where he emerged at his best, (a trio, a quintet, and a sextet) he either cleverly adapted the text or deliberately distorted it. Frequently a new opera can be dismissed because of a bad libretto. That is not true here. Wilder's libretto is a strong one, but not one to which a man of Hindemith's habits and temperament could have written a great work.

In any of the excellent opera productions of the Juilliard School, there are bound to be some undiscovered Leontyne Prices. Of the eleven good soloists in this performance, two struck me as particularly worth watching: Lorna Haywood, who, in addition to having a big and phenomenally accurate soprano voice, has some talent as an actress; and John Harris, a brilliant young baritone who, being a Negro and without sufficient makeup, created the impression that the story was really about miscegenation in 19th Century America.

As for *The Demon*, it is one of those early second period pieces that Hindemith wrote when he was young and full of beans and hadn't learned how to orchestrate very well. José Limon's choreography, though recent, is as dated and faded as the score. The piece should have been done a long time ago. Its only value now is as a compendium of the expressionistic clichés of 40 years ago. That Hindemith allowed himself to get mixed up in this performance can be charged to the justifiable vanity of an aging giant.

ROBERT EVETT

Correspondence

The New Republic welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.

Public Aid to Private Schools

Sirs:

 \star Surely you cannot intend seriously your suggestion of March 23 that federal aid to independent schools be conditioned on the use of public school textbooks? Aside from the fact that such textbooks not infrequently fail "to present the full range of academically respectable opinion on controversial issues," enforced textual conformity would tend to eliminate both diversity and freedom from the educational system. A major strength of private (including parochial) schools has been their power to vary from the currently fashionable educational curriculum. (The increasingly common practice of offering college-level courses to qualified high school students was pioneered by independent secondary schools.) To the extent that conformity is demanded, the justification for independent schools largely disappears.

The very suggestion, however, points

out the difficulty of reconciling "separationist" demands with the continued independence of the non-public school. Rather than have the federal government contribute to the schools directly, why not allow a tax credit for tuition paid to any accredited independent school (up to some maximum limit, such as \$200 per child per year)? The problems of church-state separation on the one hand and excessive government control on the other would be largely avoided. The tax burden on those who choose independent schools for their children would be reduced. Additional funds would be available to the school through increased tuition fees. The independent school's existence and strength would be governed by the willingness of parents to patronize it arguably, at least, the appropriate standard for determining education in a free society. Minot W. Tripp, Jr. Berkeley, Calif.

 \star I have been following with much interest your discussions of the past few weeks on the church and school relationship, especially since I am a student at a Protestant Christian college and went to a similar prep school.

I agree that state aid to private and parochial schools could be of great benefit; I also agree that there must be some control over this aid so that it would be spent in the public's interest and not just the church's. The main problem, then, is how to control the use of this aid so that it will serve the public's purpose without infringing on the fredom of the private school.

Consider the suggestion to limit private schools to a selected list of textbooks if they wished to receive state aid. There is a real danger, I believe, that these schools could thus eventually lose some of their freedom of education and be pressed into the same conforming mold.

Another suggestion made was that the schools should not reject any teacher solely because of his religious beliefs. . . This lack of freedom to choose one's own teachers, however, would encroach upon the aims of a parochial school. The goal, and I adhere to it completely, of the college I am attending is that of relating Jesus Christ in every aspect of education and life in general. This can be done only through

a faculty dedicated to this task. But this does not mean that I receive only one viewpoint on different issues. On the contrary, since we also have "secular" textbooks and literature along with Christian professors, we actually have a more varied range of views to choose among than the secular campus which tends to ignore the religious side. The college's choice of teachers has not prevented it from being academically better than most state universities, either.

Richard Pierce Wheaton College

★ Just a belated note to thank you for that fine editorial on aid to church-related schools. It was certainly a refreshingly sensible piece of work, considering the bombast we've been subjected to from both sides. It was calm, reasonable, and right to the point.

> Paul V. Farrell Oceanside, N. Y.

★ I call your attention to the current situation in Rhode Island. This state is now 60 percent Roman Catholic. This year, a bill has been signed into law which will permit the state to buy textbooks for Catholic schools. There's no provision made for the public supervision you recommend. The American Civil Liberties Union, various Protestant bodies, and POAU, protested in vain. Unless overturned by the courts, non-Roman Catholic Rhode Islanders will be paying for the instruction of Roman Catholics in their parochial school system.

I live in New York. An amendment to the state constitution was narrowly defeated recently which would have given the state the right to pay tuition to children going to private (mainly Catholic) schools. The Catholic argument was: we are helping the children, not the schools.

We watch Monsignor Hochwalt in action in Congress. He tells us, in effect: No federal aid for Roman Catholic schools, no federal aid for *any* schools. And he makes it stick. Of this, Walter Lippmann has said: "The defeat of the President's program under such conditions would have grave consequences, for it would introduce into the center of American public life the profoundly troubling issue of clericalism."

You ask yourselves if the Catholic

hierarchy would accept secular standards, and you reply: "We don't know." I suggest you haven't been reading the history of church-state relations in European and South American countries carefully. I urge you to adopt the position of *The New York Times*:

"We have always considered the right of parents to choose and maintain non-public schools for their children as a fundamental right. But we believe that this basic freedom does not therefore imply the right to public financial aid."

> W. H. von Dreele New York, N. Y.

★ It is often said that parents who have children in parochial schools bear an extra tax burden. Perhaps so. This burden, however, is self imposed. Catholics feel that public schools are not sufficient, so their children are sent to church schools. The fact is apparently ignored that religious instruction may be obtained after public school hours. In regard to bearing an extra tax burden, it would seem that unmarried men and women, and couples who have no children also bear this burden. We do not want our tax money to be used to support any private school whether it be St. Helena's, Kemper, or Groton. If people want their children to attend private schools, it is they who should pay - not we. John H. George

Carl Wiechmann

Hobbs, New Mexico

★ Now that the mythic constitutional fog surrounding the church-related school controversy is beginning to break up (although it still lingers around the Supreme Court building), the real reason for some of the more virulent opposition to aid is coming into focus. For one reason or another, it is assumed that private and, above all, church-related schools have no right to exist, let alone benefit from the nation's concern for the education of its children. The three letters appearing in your March 16 issue demonstrate this rather well.

While I sympathize with Mr. Schneider's concern that private schools are skimming the cream off the crop, leaving only the mediocre and the dregs to the public schools, I seriously question its basis in fact and I even more seriously question its relevance. The question at hand, after all, is not the relative one of maintenance of standards in the public schools; it is the question of justice to a substantial number of non-public-school children. Mr. Schneider wants public-school students to be superior, and this is laudable; but a superiority which is achieved by standing on the other fellow's head involves a peculiar ethical posture.

Dr. Mackay's doctrinaire rantings hardly rate a reply. He is quaint and amusing in his money defense of 19th Century militant secularism; but he suffers from that generation's morbid defect, the tendency to make secularism into a monolithic orthodoxy – an orthodoxy far more dangerous than its religious counterpart, since it demands the allegiance of everyone, not just that of a limited number of sectarian adherents.

Mr. Guyton throws his hands up in pious horror at the divisive tendencies



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of parochial education. If a monolithic uniformity is indeed desirable, as Mr. Guyton implies, then of course private education is wrong and should be abolished; but it is a concept alien to the democratic process.

When such responsible journals as The New Republic manage to stand up without flinching before the legions of bogeymen generated by such specialinterest groups as the NEA (the dissolution of the public school system), such monomanic aggregations as the POAU (a papist plot), the fuzzy fringe on the far Left, and the lunatic Right, it seems just barely possible that the American public will cease being frightened out of its uninformed wits and will see fit to render to each of its children the justice due to him.

> Michael Sundermeier Omaha, Nebraska

 \star If parochial schools are not religionoriented, why have them? Why spend money on them? If they are not religion-oriented then they are the same as secular public schools. Under these conditions, if parents can get their children educated at public expense, why should they support, at great sacrifice, a parochial school system? In that case, a simple solution would be to have all the parochial schools handed over to the public school system and converted into secular schools. You say, let's take a chance and see if the parochial

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schools, when and if they are handed the money, would eliminate the religion-oriented instruction in non-religious subjects. That, I claim, is putting the cart before the horse. Thus far, we know quite definitely that parochial schools will not permit the elimination of religion-oriented instruction from any part of their curriculum. If they did so, they would be clearly defeating the very purpose of their existence.

Alan DeWitt Brooklyn, N. Y.

★ Once public tax money becomes available to parochial schools, Protestants will jump on the bandwagon; if they are being taxed for Catholic parochial schools, they might as well have their own. (At the last Presbyterian General Assembly, it was proposed, but defeated, that the Presbyterian Church plan a parochial school system, ready to be implemented if and when federal aid is granted to parochial schools.) Since Protestants will not, for the most part, be able to get together on a single Protestant school system, there will come into being a multiplicity of sectarian schools, most of them small and weak; but the reduction of public school enrollment, and consequent reduction in the number of people interested in voting for school tax increases or bonds, will probably mean a very serious weakening of the public schools - a vicious circle.

Six years ago a Committee on Religion and Public Education, including prominent educators and churchmen widely representative of varying backgrounds and experience, was appointed by and reported to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. Their report, entitled "The Church and the Public Schools," merits your attention. It includes the following statements:

"There is very real danger that as parochial schools become strong the public-school system may be reduced to a second-rate institution. It is difficult to finance and to engender psychological drive to support competing systems of education. We are convinced that in the event parochial schools become dominant, the free public schools will not only be made less effective but the health of the body politic will be weakened

and freedom in the community diminished. It is our conviction that parochial education accentuates differences, causing social cleavage. This cannot serve the best interest of free inquiry as a part of broad educational values. A united community calls for a setting within which children of all religious and cultural backgrounds freely mingle and develop attitudes of common understanding and trust."

As a Presbyterian minister, I can see great advantages in Christian schools, whether Catholic or Protestant, for I believe that religion runs through every aspect of life, and that even mathematics is seen truly only when seen as a manifestation of divine order. But in our American pluralistic society the price of Christian schools is simply too high. Banes Anderson Fresno, Calif.

★ Your advocacy of public aid for parochial schools is a blow to democracy. The Catholic Church, which would be the main beneficiary of such aid, is a religious dictatorship, a fact which you entirely overlook. Since one of the principal foundation stones of that Church is its school system, to give it state financial assistance would simply serve to strengthen that dictatorship. Whether in politics or religion, the world has too much of this kind of rule as it is.

Edwin E. Aiken Goshen, Massachusetts

★ Milking public schools of support and siphoning out better students could be more harmful to public schools than NR seems to envision. It would be tragic to transform public schools into ghettos of troublemakers and slow learners for the sake of building up a private school elite. When apportioning public funds, the familiar formula – the greatest good for the greatest number – should be remembered. Most of our students are in public schools. More, not less, state aid should be given to public schools to help improve their educational offerings.

Public education has been the single most important institutional factor in making the United States as great as it is, and is our hope for the future. I am opposed to anything detrimental to the continued growth and improvement of that system. As evidenced in your issue

of March 23, NR has done some rethinking of the issue and will, I hope, do more.

As a final note, I suggest the questions NR raises on the possibility of secular-Catholic standards-of-instruction conflict in the event of state aid being increased be posed to several members of the Catholic hierarchy. The answers should be enlightening and interesting. Clifford C. Hill

Kankakee, Illinois

★ Three years ago when I was in Holland, having been raised in Brooklyn, I visited Brueklin, the village that gave its name to the New York City borough. I was graciously shown around by the Burgomaster and, when I asked about a rather dingy school building in the middle of the village, was told that no new school could be built because the Catholic minority in the village wanted a parochial school; the non-Catholics wanted a new public school; and since the village was too poor to have two schools, it could have none! Holland, you probably know, has the system you advocate of subsidizing Catholic as well as public schools.

Jean B. Trapnell

Los Angeles, California



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