

103-448311

DD/S 63-8472

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support *S/LKW* 24 DEC 1963
Executive Director - Comptroller

SUBJECT : Release of Information About the DD/I Area

REFERENCE : Memo to DDCI from DD/I, dated 27 November 1963, same subject

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 8 for your approval. It proposes disapproval of recommendation in reference and suggests an alternative.

2. In reference, the DD/I recommends a broader dissemination of information about the DD/I area and possibly certain components of the DD/S&T to the outside world. He identifies three types of audiences which would be appreciative of a larger volume of information: the production elements [redacted]

[redacted] contacts within the academic world and learned societies of the kind encountered in the recently executed "100 Universities" program; and the press through the involvement of the new Assistant to the Director, Mr. Carstien.

3. Through the years, the Agency has held fast to the policy of compartmentation and strict adherence to the need-to-know discipline. Only last year this policy was firmly reinforced by the issuance of [redacted] subject: "Personal Security: Compartmentation". This policy has served the Agency well and can continue to do so in the future. The underlying rationale has always been to avoid publicity pertaining to intelligence, either factual or fictional, or related to programs and functions of this Agency or any intelligence agency. The Agency's body of relevant

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

Security

regulatory issuances was carefully constructed with this concept in mind. The area of foreign releases is covered by [] which affords considerable latitude to the Deputy Directors in calculating the "net advantage" of each release. Regulations covering disclosures by employees in their private capacities [] releases to public information media [] care and use of official data, [] and others deal with the broad problems involved from many prospectives. The composite of these regulations provides a workable and flexible system which clearly permits releases of the proper kind.

4. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in reference, is promoting an increased flow of information under the existing regulations. While undoubtedly there are receptive, if not downright eager, audiences for more information, the need and advantage of such an increment of flow is difficult to grasp from the arguments presented. Issuing a blank check of this kind seems unnecessary and dangerous. Each specific information release from CIA should be meaningful and have a specific goal. Each release should result in a net advantage to CIA which is concrete and, if not actually measurable, then certainly beyond debate.

5. The effectiveness of the present system is that it provides checks and balances and makes releases an organizational matter rather than an individual concern. This is important because each item released pertaining to the operations of CIA adds to the fund of such knowledge in the public domain. The article "Our Fantastic Eye in the Sky" by Howard Simons (Washington Post, 8 December 1963) illustrates how an amalgam of many overt and perhaps individually innocuous items can be blended into a very revealing product.

6. There is nothing operating in the Agency today to prevent or even discourage operating components from developing worthwhile special programs with information release implications and working out a satisfactory and secure approach to the potential releases. Such programs have been handled on a case-by-case basis

in the past with the cooperation of the Office of Security. This was done in the "100 Universities" program with apparently good results.

7. In regard to relations with the public information media, this office is not opposed to progress nor is it resolutely against change. What is felt is that any new approach that is considered regarding publicity and public relations should be carefully plotted and shaped through the interaction of the Assistant to the Director and the Office of Security.

8. It is recommended that: (1) no change in Agency philosophy or practices regarding information releases be sanctioned at this time; (2) a greater information outflow from CIA be discouraged; (3) a very strict net advantage criteria for information release be reaffirmed at the highest level in the Agency.

R. L. Bannerman
Director of Security

*Concur LKKI
24 Dec 63*

The recommendation in paragraph 8. is approved.

_____ Date

Note by DDCI:

*"overlaken by policies emanated in
Memo for Exec. Comte - "Agency Relations with News Media
dated 16 Jan 1964.*

*S/MSC
11/24/64*

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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
27 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Release of Information about the DD/I Area

1. Paragraph 5 below contains a recommendation for your approval.

2. A number of recent incidents have brought me to believe that it would be wise to reexamine the security atmosphere in which we have been regarding outside discussion of and publicity with respect to the DD/I side of CIA. There has of course been a certain amount of information in the public press about DD/I functions, the estimating responsibilities for instance, but it has been spotty and stems from no common understanding as to what we should say and what we should not.

3.



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In conjunction with the recent "100 Universities" recruitment effort I spoke to a dinner group at Harvard and was impressed with the lack of information these senior academic officials had about the overt side of our business and how grateful they were to hear about our general functions and personnel needs. A similar reaction was received by almost all the other participants in the "100 Universities" program, I understand.

4. Incidents such as the above lead me to believe that there is a useful result to be obtained from wider discussion with selected outsiders about my side of the Agency. It is

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downgrading and
declassification

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good public relations and does not, when kept in general terms, violate any necessary security standard. Such discussion may, in fact, be helpful in that it removes from people's minds the obviously wide-spread belief that CIA is principally in the clandestine operations business and does little else.

5. I have discussed the above thoughts generally with the DCI and believe that he is in agreement. I would like, then, with your approval to be able to authorize broader dissemination of information about the DD/I area (and also with the agreement of the DD/S&T certain components of his such as OSI and OCS) in situations where this would seem to be helpful to the Agency, such as in contacts with the academic world and learned societies.

[Redacted]

As for the press, I believe some helpful lessening of present restrictions can be developed with the new Assistant to the Director, Mr. Chretien.

[Redacted]

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Note by DDCL:

~~APPROVED:~~

*"Overtaken by Memos for Exec. Comte
Agency Relations with News Media - 16 Jan 1964
S/MSC."*

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

ODDI/AvS/vcl
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Kirk:

~~Please look these
over at your
convenience and we'll
have a clam bake
later —~~

~~Pat~~

Return as
indicated

MEMORANDUM FOR: *DDCI*

You asked for Dick Helms' comments on Ray's proposal to publicize DDI.

1/2

(DATE)

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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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