

SECRET

Executive Registry
63-8367

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

6 NOV 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support) *LSW* 6 NOV 1963

SUBJECT : Counterintelligence Programs;
Programs for Safeguarding Intelligence and
Intelligence Techniques and Methods;
Personnel Security Screening and Clearance
Programs

REFERENCE : Memoranda to Secretary of Defense and
Chairman, USIB, from McGeorge Bundy,
dtd 20 Sept 63 and 14 Oct 63, subject as above

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. Pursuant to your request, set forth below is a status report on security studies listed as pending in the paper presented to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as a result of Mr. McGeorge Bundy's memorandum dated 20 September 1963.

I. Security Procedures for the Protection of Intelligence Information

Following the revelation of the [] case, the DCI has held various discussions with senior officials within the community concerning personnel security procedures. A review has been conducted of the personnel security procedures employed within CIA.

25X1

As a result of these reviews and discussions, certain conclusions were reached regarding the basic requirements of a good security program. One such conclusion stressed the need for uniform clearance and screening standards and practices for both military and civilian personnel assigned to intelligence duties. A second conclusion emphasized that the security control of such individuals should rest with senior security

Security

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

officials of the component where they are assigned. A third conclusion identified the dimensions of an adequate screening program to be: full field background investigation; voluntary use of the polygraph; and close coordination and data exchange between medical, personnel, and security components.

The DCI, in a letter to the Secretary of Defense dated 11 October 1963, enumerated these conclusions and identified the National Photographic Interpretation Center as illustrative of a site where these factors should come into play. He informed Secretary McNamara of his determination that all military and civilian employees of the Department of Defense assigned to the National Photographic Interpretation Center would be security investigated and processed in the same manner as CIA personnel.

The DCI recommended that Secretary McNamara consider the above security practices for application to intelligence activities and components within Defense. Secretary McNamara, in a reply dated 25 October 1963, advised the Director of Central Intelligence that he has directed a thorough review of the personnel security procedures and practices of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to individuals directly involved in intelligence matters. The review is being undertaken by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower). Mr. Robert L. Bannerman, Director of Security, CIA, has been designated by the Director of Central Intelligence to assist the Department of Defense in its study.

II. Review of the Procedures and Standards Within the Intelligence Community for the Control of Sanitization and Downgrading of Sensitive Intelligence

The Security Committee of the USIB has completed its comprehensive review of the procedures for sanitization and downgrading of code word materials. A proposed Committee report to USIB is now being coordinated with the SIGINT Committee, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), and the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) of the United States Intelligence Board. Joint ad hoc working groups of the committees have been formed to consider certain highly technical areas in greater detail. This review, of necessity, involves extensive and time-consuming study since the principles are complex and the procedures finally approved will affect procedures which have been operative within the intelligence community for years.

SECRET

Page Denied