

ER 61-3832/a

14 MAY 1961

[Redacted]

[Redacted] STAT

Dear Tom:

Thank you very much for sending me the article [Redacted] I have read it with interest and subscribe to your own analysis of it.

It was very pleasant to see you in [Redacted] recently, and I hope we can get together again soon.

STAT

Best regards.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

p.s. Also thanks for the tennis shoes. Maybe I will play better. 1st of A. H. D.

O/DCI/W. Elder:kpm(5/12/61)

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - ER (w/basic)

1 - C/WH w/ey article (translation) + article

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

~~SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~ B

[Redacted]

Executive Registry
61-3832 STAT

C

[Redacted]

STAT

April 24, 1961

Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
2430 E Street,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Allen,

STAT

We were all very happy to have had the pleasure of
your company at the [Redacted]

STAT

As promised, I am sending you the front page of the
[Redacted] of 6th April with an article by [Redacted]
[Redacted] about which I spoke to you.

STAT

It seems to me to be a very constructive effort to
persuade people that they should look at American actions in
a constructive manner and not try to find fault all the time.

STAT

Hoping that we may have the pleasure of seeing you
again before too long, I am

Yours sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

STAT

tjb/akc

Encl

add to EL 61-3832

US IS BLAMED FOR EVERYTHING

STAT

The comedy is being played out in best communist style: the Soviet Union sets up an airlift to push the invasion of Laos full force; in the meantime Khrushchev vanishes deep in Siberia in order personally to study the burning farm problems of a country in which communism long ago solved all problems ... Could anything constitute better confirmation of the facts which a few of us in the West have been pointing out for years? We were told that Khrushchev had the burning desire to establish good relations with the new President of the United States. He was allegedly really vitally interested in that. But not too much; he was not sufficiently interested in this to miss an opportunity for grabbing another piece of valuable real estate from the free world.

Once again we have seen the usual offensive against world public opinion. First, we were reminded of all the "mistakes" the Americans made. Supposedly, the Americans had been supporting a pro-American government in Laos. What utter folly -- to support one's own friends! Now, if the Americans had not supported the pro-American party in Laos, then the Russians of course would not have set up their airlift, which they are using to support the communist attack on Laos. It's as simple as all that -- or so one would have us believe.

But the way the people, who are arguing in this fashion, seek to prove the correctness of their assertions -- that is another problem. Again and again, the Soviet Union has demonstrated that it is not the least bit interested in whether a government has the support of the United States of America or not -- so long as the USSR wants to topple that particular government. It takes all the wishful thinking, that blinds the leftist circles and a good portion of the rightist circles in Europe and in America, to believe that Soviet aggression is merely a reply to the "provocations" of the "unwise" or "aggressive" Americans. The West should know by now that aggression is the very essence of Soviet policy.

Behind the West's widespread misconceptions about Laos, we find the basic error of looking upon the East-West conflict as nothing but a power struggle, with its customary balance of power, spheres of influence, etc. This false concept starts from the premise that we have

equivalent [identical] powers facing each other here. Power is balance; pressure generates counterpressure. As a matter of fact, the issue here is not a struggle for countries and regions, but the domination of public opinion. Control over real estate is important only in the sense that the physical occupation of countries enables communism to seize control of public opinion.

Aggression is therefore indissolubly linked with communism -- regardless of whether or not the United States supports the victims of aggression. In cases where the United States favors a government the Soviets want to eliminate, Moscow or Peiping uses this fact in order to justify and embellish aggression. In other cases they simply invent some other pretext. The case of Prague is quite characteristic here. When Moscow decided to eliminate the Benes--Masaryk government and to have the country henceforth run by its stooge, the Czech Communist Party, Zorin was entrusted with the execution of this maneuver and Czechoslovakia was swallowed up. Was there any talk anywhere at that time to the effect that this was done because America was supporting Benes?

It is a crying shame that a good half of the people in the West are determined to stick to the illusion that one can come to an understanding with Moscow. That is why these people demand that nothing be done that might in any way rub the Soviet Union the wrong way; hence, the frantic search for signs indicating Moscow's willingness to come to an agreement with the West; hence, the untiring search for explanations and excuses for brutal diplomatic methods, such as they were used for instance in the attacks on Hammarskjold, or for aggressions, such as the one in Laos.

This inclination is to be found constantly among a large and influential portion of public opinion in the West. It would be foolish to ignore the danger inherent in this attitude. For it prepares the West for seeing the new developments, which are bound to come, in a distortion mirror. Only if we know that the Soviet Union in reality is not and never was interested in arriving at an understanding with the West in order to "bring about a relaxation," only then can we see the individual crises -- which kept erupting and will continue to erupt in Laos, the Congo, Korea, and elsewhere -- as episodes in a continuing war which is being kept up by the continuing aggression of the Soviet Union. Only then will we be able to meet that situation properly. But if we stick to the illusion that the Soviet Union really feels the need for an understanding with the West and for relaxation of tensions, then we will necessarily be tempted to see these crises -- in Laos, the Congo, and Korea and all the others -- as unfortunate incidents which might just possibly be our own fault. That will shake our own position and weaken our own unity, for there will of course be people who will keep harping on the "mistakes of the Americans."

No one will want to say that the Americans never made any mistakes; but there is no need to keep talking about such "mistakes" as it is the case today. As recently as yesterday, the United States of America was an isolationist nation. It was pulled out of the suit of armor of distrust toward the rest of the world -- an armor built for it by George Washington -- only by the combined efforts of the rest of the world, and the main job here was done by the Europeans and the Chinese. It took two world wars of unheard-of proportions to get the United States finally to a point where it would don the mantle of free-world leader. American thinking, American weapons, and American money are now everpresent throughout the world. Can such vast tasks be accomplished without the Americans here and there, now and then, overstepping the limits of caution by a few inches or sometimes even falling a few inches short of expectations as to their boldness? American mistakes are the counterpart of American action and simply must be accepted as part of the bargain. At a moment in history when we should be rallying all our forces to counter the Soviet offensive, we should have something better to do than to split our ranks and weaken our forces through untimely and most probably also unjustified selfcriticism.

- END -