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77-4702/1

DDI

3 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Paul V. Walsh
Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : DCI's Unclassified Monographs

1. This memorandum provides the DDI's views for your use in discussing with Admiral Turner his proposals for a program of unclassified monographs.

2. Before such a program is officially launched, Agency management should give careful consideration to a number of issues.

a. Should the program be driven by a force of its own or flow from the classified work we are doing?

b. How will the program impact upon CIA's analytical and support resources?

c. Will the program put at risk our efforts to protect sources and methods?

d. Will the program make a contribution over and above that made by literature already available on many of the proposed topics?

e. Will the unclassified monographs make a positive contribution to the needs of policy-makers?

f. Will press and public interpretations of CIA motivation in "going public" make the program counterproductive in terms of improving CIA's image?

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g. Can we count on Executive and Legislative Branch support for such a large program?

3. In the context of the above questions, I have several concerns:

a. An immediate, even if bureaucratic, concern for the resource implications of the proposal. The type of monograph Admiral Turner has in mind simply is not something that falls out of our existing research and policy support programs. Most of them would require a very different approach and demand new research and analysis. I cannot, at this time, give any estimate of the manpower implications, but I feel certain they are substantial. Our resources are presently stretched so thin that adding this burden would have a resource impact which becomes critical. I am also concerned about the impact of this program on our cartographic resources. As you know, this very small staff has been working extreme amounts of overtime simply to keep up with current demands. The kinds of slick publications the Admiral has in mind would, I think, create a situation with which the Cartographic Division could not cope.

b. Another concern is the extent to which the monographs would really make a contribution to public understanding. On some issues such as strategic forces, for example, there is a great deal of informed comment in open literature. I think a case might be made that we cannot advance the state of public understanding very much on an unclassified basis. In other words, the real impact and significance of what the Agency has to say is determined greatly by our sensitive sources which must be protected. If, in fact, our monographs do not make a measurable contribution to public understanding, then I believe the program would be regarded as both redundant and marginal.

c. Another concern with serious implication is outside perception of what the Agency is up to. I realize that this can be resolved partly by the manner

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in which these reports are released--through the Congress, for example--but the odds are much better than even that the reports will be viewed by many as policy advocacy. Or, the reports may become debating aids for both sides of an argument, including those opposed to the Administration's foreign policy initiatives. I also anticipate that we would have to tread a very careful line if we are to avoid feelings on the part of State and Defense that we are inserting ourselves into their policymaking functions. In some cases, I believe we also would get adverse reactions from foreign countries.

d. The proposal may also seem to many observers to be inconsistent with the mission and charter of CIA and might be viewed in the OMB and Congress, for example, as a marked departure from our primary role of collecting and producing classified intelligence.

4. All of this said, I am personally sympathetic to and have encouraged the unclassified release of CIA intelligence when I believe that it represented quality research and analysis on subjects for which the Agency has a responsibility to produce intelligence. I have also tried to ensure that we did produce unclassified reports which might not be perceived as public relations gimmicks or as CIA intrusions into foreign policy debates.

5. Since we entered the DOCEX program, for example, we have declassified well over 300 of our finished intelligence reports, and we have also cooperated with the Congress in declassifying a large number of studies on the communist countries, particularly through the Joint Economic Committee. Although our program may appear to be modest, it has had the important advantage of being a natural fall-out of executing our statutory responsibilities in the national security field. This means that it has been a cost effective program carried out with minimum disruption to established activities.

6. I believe that we can, with only slight additional effort, make notable increases in our unclassified release of materials we produce for use within the Government. The extent to which we

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do this depends upon the audience we are trying to reach and the purpose of the program, weighed against our available resources and our intelligence production priorities. I would recommend that you urge Admiral Turner to decide these questions before we move hastily into a program which may be simply too costly in terms of resources and risks.

[Redacted Signature]

PAUL V. WALSH

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20 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Unclassified Monographs

1. I would like to begin producing a series of short, unclassified monographs along the same lines as the one we have just done on Civil Defense. Their major objective would be to lay out the criteria for judging/ assessing some complex, current problem rather than trying to provide all the answers. For example, in the strategic area, articles in the press and in journals usually concentrate on one weapon characteristic as being the most significant: throw weight, or accuracy, or warhead size, etc. Our monograph would lay out all the prime determinants of strategic capability, emphasizing that one cannot be taken in isolation but all must be considered together as part of the problem. Then we would go on to succinctly assess the current situation based on the criteria we have established. We should also include enough fundamental/rule of thumb/generic information to make the monograph a good primary source. My hope is that these monographs will help to simplify and explain a complex issue, and be a useful tool for the Congress and general public alike.

2. Start with the following topics, but let's solicit suggestions for other areas of interest.

Economics	Agriculture/crops
Civil Rights	Technological Growth/Application
Strategic Arms	Fishing/Ocean Commerce
Conventional Arms	Raw Materials
Population	

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