

SECRET

The Director

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

Executive Registry



Washington, D. C. 20505

14 September 1977

Dear Harold:

You wrote to me on 17 August requesting CIA participation in a net assessment of Soviet and US command and control communications. I have reviewed the resources which could be applied to your study, together with the competing demands on these resources, and I regret to say that they are already overextended and unable to absorb further tasks at this time.

We have already committed our small C<sup>3</sup> analytical group--staffed by only five analysts--to a number of major projects including several upcoming national intelligence estimates in which command and control is an important consideration. This group is also deeply involved in studies related to indications and warning, military readiness, and exercise analysis.

I recognize the importance of your C<sup>3</sup> net assessment and, if this were an area in which analytical resources could be shifted or expanded easily, we would be eager to take part. The C<sup>3</sup> discipline, however, is so specialized and complex that new analysts require a long "working up" period. It is also an area in which we must be particularly careful to preserve a strong research base and keep it from being totally caught up in supporting other work.

We plan a substantial augmentation of our C<sup>3</sup> analytical resources in coming months, and I hope that a year from now we will be in a much better position to meet the burgeoning requirements in this area.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1

The Honorable Harold Brown  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

SUBJECT: Letter to Harold Brown re CIA participation  
in net assessment of Soviet and US command  
and control communications.

CONCUR:

25X1

Deputy Director for Intelligence

6 SEP 1977

Date

Distribution:

Orig. -- Addressee

1 -- DCI

1 -- ADDCI

1 -- ER

2 -- DDI

2 -- D/OSR

1 -- SEC

1 -- SEC/CCG

1 -- LC

25X1

OSR:  (31 August 1977)

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR *SIGNATURE*

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A0018001200

Date: 8 Sept. 1977

TO: The Director

FROM:  *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Proposed Rejection of SecDef Request

REMARKS:

On 17 Aug. SecDef ~~W~~ Brown wrote to cite House Appropriation Committee commendations on a DoD C<sup>3</sup> study to which CIA made "essential contributions. He asked for similar support for an update on this report, and for annual reporting in the future.

OSR pleads that it does not have sufficient people to do even the national Intelligence job, that it can't spare the necessary manpower to do this extra work. It took a 9-man-month effort last time, and on an annual basis would take a man-year per year effort. In short, according to OSR, requirements overreach present assets.

If you agree with this position, you will want to judge the tone of the proposed turndown letter to SecDef. Do you want to, at least call him Hal as you do in other letters?

10 SEP 1977 *Never heard anyone call him Hal - I use "Harold" - perhaps others use Hal but not to my knowledge.*

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A0018001200

ACTION

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Executive Registry

77-5513

DOI # 3000-77

17 August 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Stan,

In its report on the 1978 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, the House Committee on Appropriations (HAC) commended the Department of Defense for the quality of the Command, Control and Communications Net Assessment. The Central Intelligence Agency made essential contributions to the final report. The HAC report also directed that an updated net assessment be provided to the committee on January 15, 1978, and that it be updated every January thereafter. I would appreciate your arranging for CIA to revise that portion of the report within its cognizance to reflect any new information.

To meet the HAC schedule, a final draft should be available for coordination by late November 1977. Preliminary drafts will be circulated among a working group as they are produced. Looking ahead to the January 1979 submission, we should begin the longer term work that will result in a more comprehensive assessment at that time.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence will be responsible for producing the reports. Please name a point of contact to participate in the working group.

Sincerely,

*Harold Brown*

100 10 2 12 1977

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

31 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Reply to Request from the Secretary of Defense, and Resource Limitations in Command and Control and Related Fields

1. The Secretary of Defense, in a letter to the DCI, requested CIA assistance in a DoD net assessment of Soviet and US command and control communications. My recommendation (a response from the DCI is attached) is that the DCI decline to participate in the study, which has a target completion date of November 1977. My reason for this negative recommendation is essentially one of resources and priorities: given a low and fixed (at least over the short term) amount of resources, I believe priorities dictate that they be applied exclusively to national intelligence production. The remainder of this memorandum provides--for your consideration both of the DCI's response to Secretary Brown and of the more general issue of command and control analysis in national intelligence--my assessment of the resources-priorities picture in this field.

2. Growing emphasis in national intelligence on questions of command and control led to a serious imbalance between our available analysis resources in this area and current tasking. Difficult decisions will have to be made regarding which tasks to accept and which to decline.

3. The analytic responsibility in CIA devolves primarily on OSR. Within OSR, these subject areas are treated by a unit at the branch level of the Strategic

25X1


WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6



Evaluation Center consisting of only five analysts. This group is responsible for collection support, data base maintenance, tasking, research, and production, including support to national intelligence publications, in the areas of Soviet and Warsaw Pact command and control, communications, indications and warning, integrated aspects of military readiness, and strategic and theater military exercise analysis. The subject areas treated by this group can be broken down as follows:



25X1

25X1


Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/31 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800120007-6

SECRET

5. As can be seen, requirements greatly overreach our present analysis assets. We are already four analysts short of what would be required to provide adequate support to NIEs and the OSR research program alone. It will, therefore, be necessary to decline to support a number of important and useful activities currently and in the coming years.

  
S. N. GRAYBEAL  
Director  
Strategic Research


25X1

Attachment:

Letter to Harold Brown  
from Admiral Turner

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 -- Addressee (w/att.)  
2 -- D/OSR  
1 -- SEC  
1 -- SEC/CCG

OSR:  (31 August 1977)

25X1

SECRET