

CANEEL BAY  PLANTATION

15 JAN 1960

St. John, Virgin Islands, U. S. A.

July 22, 1959

Dear Allen:

Many thanks - albeit belated - for your kind note of May 25th, enclosing the cheerful earful from Brazilian CP sources. Far from being merry about my failure to show in Rio, I should think the CP's would be very sad? It's going to be very hard for them to paint John Cabot as the author of all Yankee sins and the exponent of all Capitalist vices. I might have shoved them around a bit, but think of the fun they would have had, with the help of old oystereyed, coffin-headed Wayne Morse laying into me. Even Communists must occasionally enjoy a colorful enemy!

In any event, in retrospect, the decision still seems to me to have been a prudent one from the point of view of Uncle Sam's best interests. My only regret is that all the Portuguese I learned is never going to be of any use at all.

Allen, I've thought of you so many times since Foster's death, and of what a cruel loss he is to you as well as to the nation. There can be no doubt that his passing will result in a change - and not for the better, I fear - in the field of international diplomacy.

There were many who felt sincerely that his policy was too rigid, too unyielding in face of the USSR's growing economic, political and military power. But everyone agrees that he was the greatest guarantor of our fixed purpose to resist further Soviet conquest.

In any event, there seems to be a growing conviction that the time has come really to negotiate with the Soviets. No doubt that is the real significance of Chip Bohlen's recall to the Department. His views-- at least as I remember it --is that we must negotiate the end of the stalemate. I remember well, in Tommy Thompson's embassy in Austria in 1953, he was bitter because the White House and State did not at that time see the absolute necessity of securing a peaceful rollback of Soviet armies in Eastern Germany, even if that were to mean that we would agree to withdraw our forward bases on the Soviet perimeter. Bohlen felt that this rollback was, in the end, the only hope of 'liberating' the Satellites, and that even the neutralization of Germany, and the progressive withdrawal of U.S.


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forces from Europe would not be too high a price to pay. He had little confidence in the military efficacy of NATO in the event of war, and he believed that its very existence tended to aggravate Russian aggressiveness and justify it, too, in the eyes of Eastern nations.

I remember well the long conversation I had with him that autumn night... (It was on the day Beria's disappearance became known in the West.) Bohlen believed that the greatest diplomatic victory the West could have was to secure the withdrawal of Russia's armies behind her own borders, and that almost any price which would not leave the U.S. militarily naked was justified in securing that. As a Russian student he kept insisting *that* the "inner contradictions of communism are worse than the inner contradictions of capitalism," and that with a real rollback of Soviet armies there would be slow but certain interior changes in the USSR and in the Satellites which would all be in the direction of peace and a more prosperous and "open" world situation.

If this is the policy which the White House and State are now considering, they must realize it will impose great difficulties for the President and Herter. They will have to determine whether to pursue such a policy secretly, by classic diplomatic methods - in direct contact with Khrushchev - or whether to try to prepare our own public opinion for it, and the public opinions of our allies. It will not be easy to convince any large segment of the Senate that such a policy may well be the only alternative to maintaining the present state of perpetual crisis cum stalemate. Such a policy will certainly be called by many here and abroad capitulation and appeasement. And it would be viewed as a sign of American weakness. Furthermore, it could only hope to be effective if we made it clear at the same time that if the rollback didn't stay rolled back, we would take the initiative in imposing military sanctions, i.e., go to war.

I foresee no circumstances in which, in our form of democracy, we could ever hope to get any public agreement or make the Soviets believe we would ever in any circumstances strike the first atomic blow.

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As a pure diplomatic concept, Bohlen's "rollback" goal is sound as a bell. And certainly most of the European nations, with the exception of Germany, could be persuaded to go along with it. (I expect that Adenauer's change of mind about being Chancellor was his fear that Foster's death would clear the ground for just such an idea?) Plainly the first victim, in case the rollback didn't stick, would be "neutral Germany."

In many ways, the practical political difficulties of getting a new policy - of real negotiation - off the ground are infinitely greater than those of the sit-tight containment policy we now have. At any rate, such seems to me to be the meaning of Bohlen's recall. If the President and Chris Herter are prepared to consider his recommendations on how to secure the rollback (and God knows some new ideas would be welcome!) they have the right man. But I foresee nothing but frustration and bitterness for Bohlen and the Secretary if he is just being called in as a highly trained diplomatic kibitzer on U.S.-Kremlin affairs. If he's called back, and his ideas are then kissed off, by 1960 he will be in a position to take to the hustings and he will, you may be sure, give unshirted hell to the entire policy of the last eight years.

Are you well? Are you going to get a good vacation? I'm sorry you can't get a few days here. Caneel Bay is a delicious place for swimming and snorkeling. There are comfort, service, good food - and no telephones.

Will you give my most affectionate regards to the three wonderful Dulles women - your sister, your wife, and Janet.

Affectionately
Allen


The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

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Clare Boothe Luce

VIA



PERSONAL

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C.

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