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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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22 July 1974

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22 July 74

Prof. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
Brown University
P. O. Box 1844
Providence, Rhode Island 02912

Dear Professor Kirkpatrick,

Bill Colby asked me to thank you on his behalf for your thoughtfulness in sending us the monograph entitled "Defense Policies for the Seventies" which just arrived. The evening of 22 March must have been an interesting one. You certainly had an impressive group of participants addressing issues of importance to us all. The written record indicates that it was a very good and often stimulatingly provocative discussion which, incidentally, I think you chaired admirably.

You put your finger neatly on what really are the two key questions: What do we need and how much is enough? These are matters over which, as the discussion showed, well-informed and reasonable men will differ; but it behooves all of us in the national security field to keep remembering that these are the basic questions behind much if not most of our continuing work.

I enjoyed ^{our} ~~are~~ recent conversation in Washington and look forward to another chance to talk with you when you visit us again. There are few people who can take pride in even one successful career; you are one of the rare people who have made great contributions and achieved well-merited distinction in two.

Once again, thank you for sending us the monograph. We would appreciate receiving copies of similar documents in the future if you hold other symposia, particularly ones as enlightening as this.

With best regards,

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

K-5

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

cc: EA/DCI w/return of monograph

ST

DCI

Review Copy

Compliments of

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
Brown University
P. O. Box 1844
Providence, R. I. 02912

MONOGRAPH ON NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Defense Policies for the Seventies

A SYMPOSIUM HELD AT BROWN UNIVERSITY, MARCH 22, 1974

Dr. Donald Hornig, Presiding
The Hon. Clark Clifford, Keynote Speaker
The Hon. John Chafee, Panelist
Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner, Panelist
Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Panelist
Prof. Laurence Radway, Panelist
Prof. Lyman Kirkpatrick, Panelist

BROWN UNIVERSITY

MONOGRAPH ON
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DEFENSE POLICIES FOR THE SEVENTIES

A
SYMPOSIUM

BROWN UNIVERSITY

PREVIOUS MONOGRAPHS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM

by

HARRY D. LATIMER

JUNE 1974

PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND

THE SYMPOSIUM ON NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES FOR THE SEVENTIES

AND THIS MONOGRAPH WERE MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH A GRANT

FROM THE CARTHAGE FOUNDATION, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

FOREWARD

Far too long has defense policy been a subject discussed and debated principally in the Congress. Public discussion, and even interest, has been limited. In an effort to stimulate analysis and debate this symposium focussed on those matters which should interest the American citizen whose tax dollars pay for defense. The need for a defense establishment was accepted: therefore the issues which were raised were on how much to spend, and for what.

The symposium was held from 8 to 10 P.M. on March 22, 1974 in Alumnae Hall at Brown University. The public was invited and approximately 500 attended. It was televised live by Channel 6, New Bedford-Providence, and taped for rebroadcast by WGBH, Boston over some 112 radio stations. This is the verbatim transcript.



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
Brown University

DR. HORNIG:

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is not really the beginning of the discussions for this evening. Each of the panelists and the technical crew need to get themselves ready for the live TV broadcast and radio tape recording of tonight's discussion. The symposium will be used throughout the public broadcast network at later dates. The format for the program will be as follows: I will introduce the panelists and the moderator, Professor Kirkpatrick, when the broadcast director gives me the signal. Professor Kirkpatrick will introduce the issues and the keynote speaker. After Mr. Clifford gives his remarks each panelist will be called upon for a short critique of the positions advanced by Mr. Clifford. The last half of the program will be open to questions and answers among the panelists, the keynote speaker and from you in the audience. Our usual procedure for questions from the floor is to urge you to ask well-designed questions pertinent to the positions advanced by the panel. You may assist us and the radio and television audience by avoiding long comments or unrelated asides. Questions will be limited to one from each person in the audience until everyone has had their chance to query our panel. We will appreciate your making your point interesting and effective.

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

Welcome to Brown University. It is a pleasure to present this symposium on Defense Policies for the Seventies. We hope this program will help our radio and television audience as well as those of us

in Alumnae Hall to understand the major issues which face the nation and our defense policy. Two or three years ago, a discussion such as this would have been very difficult to conduct in any university in this country. Nonetheless, now the importance of this discussion is appreciated. On the one hand, we are all aware that the escalation of nuclear arms born of the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States has led to what many of us consider an unreasonable level of armaments on both sides. This is being dealt with in the discussions of the SALT II talks. On the other hand, as a consequence of the very unpopular war in Vietnam, there has been some tendency to avoid altogether the fundamental issues of defense. For example, nuclear arms are totally irrelevant in the kind of situation we have recently faced in the Near East. We have to ask what does a rational defense policy consist of? At the same time all of the issues involved in defense policy are constantly changing because of the progress of defense technology on the one hand and a constantly changing political situation on the other. These are the things on which our panelists will have to cope with this evening.

Our panelists for this evening are:

The Honorable John Chafee, former Governor of Rhode Island and Secretary of the Navy, who now practices law in this city.

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, president of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Former Deputy Director for Science and Technology of the Central Intelligence Agency and former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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DR. HORNIG: cont'd.

Professor Laurence Radway, who specializes in defense policy studies and teaches in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College.

The keynote address will be presented by the Honorable Clark Clifford who has held many distinguished assignments in government. Most recently he served as Secretary of Defense. He now practices law in Washington.

The moderator for this evening's discussion is Professor Lyman Kirkpatrick, University Professor of Political Science at Brown University. His early career included senior government assignments and the executive directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ladies and gentlemen -- Brown University is pleased to welcome you to the Symposium, Defense Policies for the Seventies. Professor Kirkpatrick.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Thank you, President Hornig. The discussion of Defense Policy for the Seventies really revolves around two basic questions - what do we need, and how much is enough? The real controversies arise on these particular issues. To determine what the present needs are we obviously must have considerable knowledge about our potential adversaries, whoever they may be, and whenever the potential hostility might occur. Mr. Clifford and all of our panelists will probably agree that an adequate defense is necessary. The real question before the house is again, the need and what is adequate?

It's a great pleasure on my part to introduce to you a man whom I have esteemed and honored through many years of government service,

PROF. KIRKPATRICK: cont'd.

particularly during his service as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and of course later as the Secretary of Defense at a most crucial time in the history of the nation. Mr. Clifford will open with an address following which each of the panelists will have an opportunity to comment. We will then have discussion among the panel, and sooner or later you'll get a chance to ask questions. Mr. Clifford

CLARK CLIFFORD:

President Hornig, Professor Kirkpatrick, distinguished guests, members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen:

I consider it a privilege to be at Brown University and to pay to Brown the debt that's owed by all citizens for the contribution that it has made to the intellectual life of our country.

I particularly appreciate being here because it gives me an opportunity to see two old friends with whom I served in government - your President Hornig and Professor Kirkpatrick. I honor them tonight for the contribution that they have made in many years of service to our government.

Our nation's policy regarding its national security is of such vital significance to all of us that it should be the subject of widespread discussion and debate. If war is too important to leave to the generals, then defense policy is too important to leave to officials in Washington. It is you, the public, who must make your views known. It is your lives that are affected, your futures that may be imperiled, and you are the ones who have to foot the bills.

It is my hope that you will find this evening's discussion sufficiently provocative and challenging that you will choose to enter

the controversy on this subject that is now just beginning to emerge in Washington.

The major thrust of my remarks tonight is that A) the world has changed; and B) the United States' defense policy and defense budget have not changed. I cannot state the problem more simply.

As our tragic intervention in Indo-China draws too slowly to a halt, we look at the world around us and we see a near total transformation. It is in this transformation that we will find the guides for reshaping our defense policies and budgets.

During the Cold War era, faced with an aggressive Soviet Union and what we took to be Soviet-Chinese solidarity, and a communist effort to be involved itself in every significant conflict over the future of any nation -- those responsible for our nation's policies, including the state of our military forces, felt that the United States had to plan its military forces with the real expectation that they might, at any moment, be called upon to resist militarily, and directly, large-scale aggression in Asia or Europe, and perhaps in both simultaneously.

On the nuclear side, as our atomic monopoly evaporated, the need for a constantly increasing stock of even more sophisticated nuclear weapons seemed to grow greater, not less. The first priority was to build a deterrent, proof against the most effective conceivable surprise Soviet attack. In addition, in an effort to extend our nuclear strength to protect our allies, we deployed literally thousands of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

This image of the world on which our military forces were

premised is scarcely recognizable from the perspective of early 1974.

First, our relations with the Soviet Union have changed. To be sure, profound differences between the social and political systems and the international interests of the United States and the Soviet Union remain. Nonetheless, the relationship of the two superpowers simply can no longer be described as one of general and unrelenting confrontation. We have seen two United States-Soviet summits marked by effusive cordiality, and a third is promised for this spring. There has been a strategic arms limitation agreement which, whatever its limitations, marks an acceptance by both sides that there is no real defense against nuclear war except mutual vulnerability, and opens the way for the current talks on further agreements. We hear intense discussion of immensely expanded economic links between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The European security conference and the negotiations on force reductions in Europe are signs of a change in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the nations of Western Europe and may portend more basic settlements in the long run.

By contrast, relations between China and the Soviet Union have so deteriorated as to make the phrase "Sino-Soviet Bloc" but a memory. Even as the Soviet Union and China remain openly hostile to each other, the United States and China have opened a process of re-establishing communications and contact. Domestic government upheavals in China -- or one might add in the United States -- are unlikely to change the foundation of that process, which is a recognition that however different we are from China and she from us, the

real points of conflict between our important interests are few indeed.

And, of course, in planning defense policy, there is the fact that we are involved no longer in direct combat in the war in Indo-China.

Finally, in a world in which economic issues on the international scene are growing in relative importance, we must recognize that the United States has lost its economic domination of the international scene, even while retaining its vast military strength.

From these profound changes in the international setting, one would expect profound changes in American military policy and American military forces. For it is, of course, to serve our international policy that we create military forces, however often it may seem that the relationship is reversed.

Yet, despite these changes and the much-advertised winding down of American involvement in Viet Nam, we are being asked to spend more, not less, on military force. The Administration has asked Congress this year for more dollars than have ever been spent in defense in our history. Even in today's inflated dollars, the amount is still staggering -- approximately \$95 billion in new appropriations for the Defense Department, after adjusting the stated figures to reflect more accurately funds properly attributable to the coming year.

That represents an increase of \$13 billion over the 1974 budget. And that increase is by no means due only to inflation. The growth in the defense budget exceeds pay and price increases by more than \$7 billion -- which means an increase in real terms of more than eight percent. What a contrast to past post-war budgets -- note not

a cut in spending, but a big increase! And I ask myself what kind of forces would the Administration be asking the American people and the economy to support if international relations had remained essentially the same? And what would we be told we required if relations with China and the Soviet Union had worsened?

These profound changes in the world setting are not reflected in our defense policies. Instead, we maintain and we are being asked to pay more in the future to continue to maintain, essentially the forces that were created to meet what we felt to be the needs of the height of the Cold War. When we look at the forces today and compare them with the forces of the early 60's, it is evident that it is simply incorrect to proclaim, as Administration spokesmen sometimes do, that in demobilizing the forces created to fight in Viet Nam, we have also made significant cutbacks in the pre-Viet Nam "baseline" forces.

Of course, there are differences between our 1975 forces and those of 1964, but it is striking how similar they are. To be specific:

-- We have 70 percent more strategic missiles than in 1964, more than compensating for the decline in bombers.

-- We maintain the same number of tactical air wings -- 38 -- as in 1964.

-- The Navy has the same number of attack carriers and $3\frac{1}{2}$ times as many nuclear submarines. The Pentagon itself explains the decline in the number of surface war ships as due to retirement of "marginally" effective ships.

MR. CLIFFORD: cont'd.

-- The number of ground divisions has declined from 19 1/3 to 16 1/3, while there have been major increases in firepower and equipment. This modest reduction reflects, one would assume, such facts as the Berlin buildup included in the 1964 force, the vastly increased cost of manpower relative to equipment, and the abandonment of plans to fight major land wars simultaneously in both Asia and Europe.

And, these are crude comparisons of numbers only. Qualitatively, the 1975 forces are vastly more powerful than those maintained in 1964. To give just two examples, the 1964 missiles mounted about 1,000 warheads, while the force planned for the end of 1975 will have in excess of 7,000 warheads. The number of helicopters attached to Army units has increased from about 4,000 in 1965 to well over 8,000 today.

And perhaps more important, the missions assigned these forces seem to be essentially the same as those of 1964 -- deep interdiction by the Air Force of enemy supply routes as part of a prolonged war in Europe or on the Asian continent; a sustained anti-submarine effort by the Navy in the North Atlantic and carrier air support for sustained shore combat; for the Army, a long land war in Europe, and, to judge from the deployment and numbers of ground forces, also a sustained land battle on the Asian continent.

The future cost of maintaining such a force for the indefinite future regardless of international events can only climb steadily upward. The time has come to look critically at our military forces and to bring them into line with our real needs for the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Certainly nothing in very recent events, dramatic as they may be, can justify the large increase in funds for defense which are proposed, or continued adherence to our Cold War defense policy.

Our nation's current economic difficulties may, it has been responsibly suggested, have led to the inclusion of as much as \$5 billion extra in the defense budget to "help the economy." Such a load factor for pump priming makes a mockery of the argument that this huge budget is dictated by real national security needs. When we face such immense inflationary pressures, this kind of wasteful spending will not help the economy but it will do the reverse. Nor is increased spending on unproductive and unnecessary weapons of war a sound way to avoid unemployment when there are so many truly vital projects crying out for funds.

This has been the year of energy. In a period when increasing energy prices and shortages of fuel may have a serious adverse economic impact, we should cut back the costs of government wherever we can, including in the defense area. At the very least, the energy shortage suggests that our true national security in the long term would be better served by taking some of the excessive funds allocated to defense and putting them into an effort to improve our sources and uses of energy.

Nor does the renewed fighting in the Middle East furnish any excuse for ignoring the need to reexamine our defense policy in the light of changed world conditions. Far from the October War showing the world to be a highly unstable place in which relatively small differences in military power may make a crucial difference, I believe that the war shows the reverse. The sharp fighting between

MR. CLIFFORD: cont'd.

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the Israelis and the Arabs did not draw the United States and the

Soviet Union into conflict, despite the important interests of each side involved.

Of course, a basic adequate U.S. military force is an essential part of effective diplomacy, and maintaining such a force is not in dispute. But, for me, the lesson of the recent Mid-East crisis is that military gestures that are but dangerous window dressing, far from being crucial aids, may be a serious interference with the process of diplomacy and negotiation which offers the best hope of a solution to this long-standing problem.

Nor does the American concern for the security of Israel justify either an increase in defense spending, or the permanent maintenance of our present force. We can meet our obligations and commitments to Israel, like those to our other allies, at a significantly more economical force level.

In short, a critical item on our national agenda remains to bring our defense establishment and budget into line with world realities -- to give us a defense policy for the world as it is, not as it used to be.

Substantial savings can be made simply from greater efficiency, particularly in use of manpower, in curtailing our propensity for excessively complex weapons, and in restraining ourselves from procuring nuclear weapons which may actually lessen our security by making the nuclear balance less stable. But we must go beyond these steps to a more fundamental reexamination of the missions and structure of our military forces.

We must ask "What military missions make sense in this decade of the twentieth century?"

First, of course, to defend the United States itself. Indeed, we see how large our military has become by realizing how small it could be if defending the territory of the U.S. itself were the only mission. For that an invulnerable nuclear deterrent and minimum conventional forces, costing perhaps a third of our current budget, would be enough.

But despite the changes in the world, it remains true that America in her own self-interest also needs military forces adequate to support her international commitments jointly agreed upon by the Congress and the President.

In strategic forces, we need a secure and stable nuclear deterrent. But we must not expect more of our nuclear forces than deterrence. For all their frightfulness, the political and military use of nuclear weapons beyond the deterrence of their use by others is limited indeed.

The recent proclamation of a strategy of increased "flexibility" for our nuclear forces must not be allowed to lead us astray from absolute deterrence of nuclear war as our objective. It may be desirable that we should have some response to a nuclear attack other than a world-destroying spasm, horrible as even the smallest such a strike would be. However, we can have all the choice of response to a nuclear attack any one would want without any significant change in our present force.

It seems to me useful also to say what we do not need our military forces to be able to do. We do not need to exceed our potential

opponents in every possible category merely to avoid the supposed stigma of not being "number one" in everything. We do not need to be ready to intervene everywhere in the world on short notice. We do not need to maintain forces prepared to fight in contingencies -- such as the so-called war at sea or a long conventional war in Europe -- which are not only remote, but which would occur only after we had received advance warning of a radical change in the political setting.

For strategic forces, that is, our nuclear forces, we need sufficiency; we do not need to be frightened of disparities in crude force levels or destructive power which measure only how many times over each side can utterly destroy the other, or as Winston Churchill once said, "Why do we need additional nuclear weapons just to make the rubble balance?" We do not need to accumulate "bargaining chips" which in fact make negotiations on arms control more difficult by fostering responsive programs by the Soviets and creating vested constituencies on each side for the preservation of weapons. We may need to offer the President a greater range of horrible choices should nuclear war occur; we do not need the missile accuracies or other technology which might give our opponents cause to fear that we were seeking the choice of a first strike.

If we proceed from these goals, both positive and negative, and not from the habits of the past or the pressures of bureaucratic and service interests, it is clear that substantial cuts can be made in our defense budget and in our forces, while fully meeting our real national security needs.

I do not favor that the kind of cuts we need be made precipitately all in one year. Smaller reductions spread over a period of years

MR. CLIFFORD: cont'd.

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would have less impact on our domestic economy, upon employment in
defense industries, and upon the attitude of other countries.

However, I do believe that far from a \$7 billion real increase
in defense spending, we should begin in fiscal 1975 -- that's the
year that starts this coming June, a process of cutting back on real
defense expenditures. I have proposed before annual cuts of about
\$4 billion, to stabilize at a budget of around \$70 billion in four
years -- all stated in terms of constant 1974 purchasing power. In
this period, therefore, under the plan I recommended, we would, in
round numbers, have instead of a current budget of some \$95 billion --
likely to grow in the future -- have a budget stabilized by 1979 at
a figure of about \$70 billion.

This is not the occasion, nor have I the time this evening, to
present in detail the specific cuts to reach this objective. I can
indicate some general areas in which changes should be made.

The substantial ground and air forces earmarked for Asian con-
tingencies can be cut back sharply or eliminated, to reflect the
tragically hard-learned lesson that we should not and need not fight
land wars in Asia.

We should start bringing some troops back from Europe now.
Bringing our NATO forces up to date gradually and in close consul-
tation with our allies will not, as is so often claimed, unbalance
the deterrent in Europe, destroy the alliance, or foredoom arms
control possibilities in Europe.

In our strategic nuclear and our conventional weapons, in our
tanks, in our airplanes, in our missiles, and ships, we must put a
stop to the technologically-driven process of buying systems which

are inordinately complex and expensive, and which represent little if any real advance in terms of real combat capability over existing systems, or over more combat-wise alternatives. And we must determine the design of such forces, and their numbers, with a view to the most likely and not the most remote contingencies.

We must make more efficient use of military manpower, both uniformed and civilian. Some 55 percent of the defense dollar now goes for pay and allowances for personnel. This huge part of the defense budget -- like the massive support costs area generally -- has only recently been subjected to intense public analysis. Those analyses demonstrate that very significant cuts can readily be made.

I emphasize that such cuts will leave us with a military establishment fully adequate for our own defense, for meeting our commitments to our allies, and for providing the necessary underpinning for our diplomacy. Indeed, by reducing the costs to a level we can sustain, they will strengthen our economy and the overall confidence and unity of our society, and with that they will increase our true national security.

For the debate is not between proponents of military strength and advocates of deliberate weakness, but over what military posture will give us the strength we need at a price we can afford.

Let me urge you to take part in this debate. It is our younger citizens who have the greatest stake in the determination of these questions. The decisions made now will have an impact on your entire life.

Get in the struggle. A quote that I find inspiring let me pass on to you. It was uttered by President Theodore Roosevelt and

MR. CLIFFORD: cont'd.

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I think it might very well apply today particularly to our younger

people:

It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions and spends himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the triumphs of high achievement; and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly; so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither defeat nor victory.

Thank you very much.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK :

And now we come to our panel. Each of the panel members first will be given an opportunity to comment on Mr. Clifford's remarks or to express their own views regarding defense policy.

In the area of defense studies, there are those whom we regard as defense intellectuals, military intellectuals. This is not altogether a welcome designation because to the military they are intellectuals and to the intellectuals they are military. However, I think that we can say tonight that we have truly a man who deserves that recognition. He is Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner, graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, a Rhodes Scholar, and the youngest man ever to become President of the Naval War College. In some parts of Newport, you might hear a discussion of what is called the "Turner Revolution" because he has truly changed the Naval War College in many very important respects. Naval officers at the War College now read about 1,000 pages of texts a week; have three-hour seminars and take examinations. I'm sure there are many in the Navy and the other services who attend the War College that might not find this totally welcome. In any event, it has been a change of rather striking dimensions. It's a great pleasure to welcome to this stage, Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner.

ADM. TURNER:

Thank you, Professor Kirkpatrick. Good evening everybody. Mr. Clifford's remarks are certainly well balanced, thought-provoking and a fine basis for our discussion tonight. As I understand it, he is making two basic points. First, that we in the military have to

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ADM. TURNER : cont'd.

review our missions or purposes in light of the changing environment and that in his view, we can meet those purposes with fewer resources. I agree with you, sir on both points. On the first, let me assure you however that much thought and effort has gone and is going into the adaptations of our military missions to the changing world environment. We in the military are very much aware that the incipient detente with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic must and should have an impact on military policy. We are, for instance, actively participating in the government's preparations for the strategic arms limitations talks and for the discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. On the Navy side, we have already negotiated and signed an agreement with the Soviet Navy to prevent incidents at sea.

On the second point, that we might be able to do our missions with fewer resources, I agree to the extent that that is precisely what we are doing today. The resources available to the Defense Department are less today than they were prior to Vietnam. Now, Mr. Clifford cited some budget figures to the contrary but he carefully noted that those were not actual budget figures but adaptations of them. And I fully agree that all budget figures require interpretation. I have a chart here that I'd like to use to share with you the actual budget figures over the past decade because I think we need a common point for our discussion and these figures clearly show the rising costs of defense that Mr. Clifford has portrayed (Fig. 1). But there are two interpretations on these figures. Note

ADM. TURNER: cont'd.

that the rise from 1974 to 1975 is a dotted line. That rise will only occur if the Congress passes the amount of funds the President has requested for the Defense Budget of 1975. That issue is still in doubt. That rise may or may not take place. Secondly, this entire chart is misleading. Yes, it's misleading as were all the figures you've had cited to you so far tonight. It's misleading because these figures all assume that the dollar is worth as much today as it was in 1964. There's no one in this room who believes he can purchase as much today with a dollar as he could 10 years ago. And that's just as true for a defense dollar as it is for your personal dollar. This next chart (Fig. 2) takes these same figures, removes inflation, and shows constant dollars. You can see there was a large jump of real spending for Vietnam, but that is long behind us. It tapered off some time ago, and today we are out here just about where we were prior to Vietnam, and even that assumes that the President's budget is passed.

Now, beyond that there are two other things that make this money not as valuable as back in 1964. We have two charges against the Department of Defense today that we did not have in '64 -- the first is the cost of prior wars and military readiness. The cost of military retirement in this ten-year period has gone up by \$5 billion dollars. The second is that today we must pay for what used to be a free good or a subsidy, principally the draft. Today we must compete in the marketplace for our manpower, and our manpower costs have gone up in this period by \$20 billion dollars.

Over and beyond these statistics the real proof that our purchasing power has not gone up is the marked decline in military forces and capability. Again, Mr. Clifford cited some instances where our forces have increased in the last ten years. Those, in my view, are questionable cases. They were the strategic missile forces and the nuclear powered submarine forces; but, ten years ago those were brand new weapon systems. We had none of them. We were building up from scratch. They had to go up. The real facts are that while they were going up, the total submarine force for instance, dropped by 33 percent. The total aircraft carrier force dropped by 40 percent. The total ships of the Navy dropped by 45 percent. But let's leave weapon systems aside because they are controversial and difficult to comprehend.

Military manpower must be some index of military strength and here is what happens in that field (Fig. 3). We are today 22 percent below where we were in manpower in 1964. Even so, Mr. Clifford suggests that a \$70 billion dollar budget would be acceptable today, and that's a perfectly reasonable suggestion. There's no reason that we necessarily must have the same military strength in 1975 that we had in '64. But let's look for a moment at what the impact would be of going today to a \$70 billion dollar budget. Mr. Clifford said that was \$70 billion dollars fiscal '74 purchasing power.

Let's look at the 1974 defense budget to see what it would mean. It was an \$87 billion dollar budget divided almost equally between people and other things (Fig. 4). Now if we're going to

Fig. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS
(BILLIONS OF CURRENT \$-TOA)




Fig. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS
(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY 1975 \$-TOA)




Fig. 3
MILITARY MANPOWER




Fig. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR 1974
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

PEOPLE	45
OTHER	42
TOTAL	87

take that to \$70 billion we have to find \$17 billion to remove from the budget. If we take 17 out of people we must remove about 1,200,000 people from the military. That's the equivalent of the entire U.S. Navy and the entire U.S. Air Force. If we take it out of the other things we would have to cut our weapon systems about in half. We would all like to spend less for defense, to spend less for our federal budget and I would welcome the day that we could have a \$70 billion dollar defense budget just as much as Mr. Clifford. The question is what would we cut to get there? What military capabilities that we have today are you willing to forego?

Today the military world is still bi-polar. There's us and the Soviet Union. We are in a real sense of balance. This is not just an artificial thing like counting missiles, airplanes and ships. This is real and is reflected in perceptions: our perception of the Soviets; the Soviet's perception of us; the perception of other nations of both of us. Any precipitate or careless change in the visible power on our side of this balance could destroy the great progress we have made recently towards a detente. It would be one thing if we shifted that balance downward by mutual agreement. It would be quite another if we should unilaterally tip that balance off-center. If we did that I personally believe that we would jeopardize the steps that have been made and lie ahead of us to be made to ease the tensions in this world. Thank you.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Thank you Admiral Turner. Our second panelist is a scientist. He has had a distinguished career in both the academic world and in government. Since leaving the government a few years back, he has devoted himself to writing about the field which he knows best, that is, the field of missile warfare generally in the arms control area, having been in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It is a real pleasure to welcome an old friend and colleague, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.

DR. SCOVILLE:

Thank you Professor Kirkpatrick. I'd just like to start off from what Admiral Turner was talking about when he referred to the fact that he was using actual budget numbers. I believe that Secretary Clifford also was using actual figures. He just was interpreting the actual figures slightly differently from the way that the Administration would like to present them. However, I will go one step further and I will even use actual figures which the Administration has put out without even trying to interpret them. I would like to refer to a specific field which happens to be a field which I am particularly interested in because I think it is the most dangerous area of military security; that is the strategic weapons area.

Now two years ago we had had an agreement with the Russians which guaranteed the state of mutual deterrence to avoid nuclear war. President Nixon stated this was the greatest agreement in the nuclear area that we had ever had to date, and I am perfectly prepared to agree with him on that conclusion. On the other hand, in those two

DR. SCOVILLE: cont'd.

years, what have we done as a result of that agreement? What we have done is we have continued to increase our nuclear strategic arsenals at an alarmingly fast rate. We have added to our stockpile of nuclear warheads at the rate of more than three every single day.

But to get to the budget figures, actually we are also sending more dollars each year now than we ever did before these so-called SALT agreements were reached in 1972. This year by the Administration's own figures, we are increasing our budget for new strategic weapons by more than 700 million dollars and this increase is far greater than can be accounted for by inflation. This is still a major increase even on a constant dollar basis.

But perhaps there is one other thing this year which is even worse. That is, we have just agreed in SALT that our basic strategic posture should be a posture of mutual deterrence in which nuclear war is avoided by the fact that the risks of starting nuclear war were so horrible that nobody would seriously contemplate it. This is not a very happy situation but it is about the only one you can have when nuclear weapons create such untold damage. And this mutual deterrence was essentially legislated by the ABM treaty agreed to in Moscow in 1972. Since we have now guaranteed deterrence we have no further excuse for buying more weapons in order to improve that deterrent. But what do we do? We come up with a new strategic posture. And the new strategic posture is that we must now acquire weapons which can threaten the deterrent of the other side.

Now I would say that this is an extremely dangerous move we are making. In terms of dollars this year this program does not

DR. SCOVILLE: cont'd.

involve a great deal of money, as defense budgets go something around \$200 to \$250 million for research and development. But these weapons if we actually put them into our arsenals in coming years can cost 5 or 10 billions of dollars depending on how far we go. But even worse than the cost -- I'd be willing to spend necessary money -- this expenditure decreases our security when it gives our land-based ICBM missiles a capability of attacking and destroying the Russian deterrent. What we are doing is making our ICBS very tempting targets to the Soviet Union. We are providing great incentives to the Soviet Union to attack these missiles because if they attack them first then they will have a tremendous advantage; on the other hand if we are allowed to shoot first, then we would have the advantage. This is a very dangerous situation -- these weapons are increasing the risk that we will all be incinerated in a nuclear war. So it's not just dollars, it's the real danger that worries me.

Moving on to the dollars; I can't resist the temptation because the dollars are so shocking also. Since SALT I, not only have we been building more weapons, we've been building all kinds of new weapons. And the classic example of where we are proposing to spend very large sums of money is the so-called Trident submarine. Now I know the Trident submarine is perhaps a bit of a difficult problem in this locality, but I think that one might as well face up to the issue. The Trident submarine program is a fiscal, technical, and military disaster. It not only costs billions of dollars, the present estimate is \$13 $\frac{1}{2}$ billion dollars for the first ten

submarines, but it is technically a very bad solution if at some time we need a new submarine to replace our presently invulnerable submarine missile forces. What we are doing is we are putting more of our missiles in a smaller number of submarines and thereby increasing in the long run the vulnerability of this key element in our deterrent forces.

Furthermore, because this submarine is so big and so expensive, we can only afford one base. For political reasons which I will not discuss here, we decided to put that one base in the state of Washington. As a consequence, after spending \$13 billion dollars and maybe eventually \$15 billion dollars, we will end up with a submarine fleet which can only operate in the Pacific. And this is the worst ocean in the world if we're going to have to operate a submarine force. So what are we doing? We are only increasing our vulnerability after spending billions of dollars.

At last I have to say something nice about the present defense budget because I always think you're vulnerable if you don't say anything good. I'm very pleased to find that in this year's defense budget there is a \$20 million dollar item for an alternative to the Trident submarine. This is a smaller submarine that has fewer missiles in each ship. Therefore it decreases the vulnerability of the fleet as a whole and will permit these submarines to operate in the Atlantic as well as the Pacific. It could perhaps even be based in the Newport area. So at last we see at least a ray of sanity in this program. But unfortunately, coupled with a paltry \$20 million dollars for this smaller submarine, which is an infinitely better

DR. SCOVILLE: cont'd.

solution than the Trident, we have more than two billion dollars for the Trident submarine in the budget. If Admiral Turner says we can't afford to cut back funds because we need them for our security, I submit we can save several billions of dollars this year and many billions in the future by stopping such weapons programs as the Trident submarine.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

A moderator of a program like this always starts to wonder as the program progresses as to whether he is going to have controversy. There is little interest unless there's a bit of controversy. I think we have the basic flame flickering at this point.

Our third panelist is a noted scholar in the field of defense studies. He has served in Washington but he has been resident more frequently of Hanover, New Hampshire. I think all of us should be grateful tonight for one especial reason, Larry Radway interrupted a determination to walk across the entire state of New Hampshire and speak at every town and hamlet on behalf of his candidacy for the United States Senate so it is a pleasure to welcome you here, Dr. Laurence Radway.

DR. RADWAY:

Thank you. Thank you very much. I've been waiting to see maybe if the commentators were going to a 2-2 tie up here waiting for our last man to get on board. In case there is any doubt, let me say at the outset that my own remarks assume the general validity of Mr. Clifford's argument without necessarily embracing the particular dollar figures he has used and go on to a related, but to me very

DR. RADWAY: cont'd.

important, point which also relates to the introduction that was given here - that is, the state of mind of the American people as I see it on some of these points at present. I'm a teacher also and you just have to forgive me if I refer at this point to a place in Plato's Republic where wise men are discussing the nature of justice and eventually one of them says, "Well, let's see what the people in the streets say about the subject." And I'm very much interested in what the opinion on the street is. And my perspective here is not that of a guy who's had a major executive office, but really of a political figure who has been walking around talking to maybe 2,000 people in the last couple of months. And that, I think, suggests the importance of saying something about the framework of opinion within which these issues we are talking about tonight are going to be discussed and debated by public opinion at large. I want to draw one inference from that framework of opinion.

Mr. Clifford said that the world has changed. My notes say: "The war is over." I had in two months not a single question, not a single comment on the foreign relations of the United States, the national security of the United States, or the military budget from any person I met, not even about the Middle East, although that crisis was very much on our minds at the time. What people are concerned with are the domestic issues. They're concerned with prices, with the supermarket, with what's going on at the gas pump. We're here immersed in the politics of the check-out counter rather than in world politics. So, there is silence, I think, among the

DR. RADWAY: cont'd.

general public on the issues which to us seem so terribly important here tonight.

I believe this silence masks a fundamental underlying pessimism in the public, a general agreement that perhaps American power is fated to decline at least in the near future vis-a-vis Soviet power, that Soviet power is on the whole slated to increase, a pessimism about allies and about neutrals in the sense that they're deemed increasingly to be unworthy of American assistance, American aid. This pessimism, in contrast to the pessimism of twenty years ago, is not the occasion for alarm, for a sense of crisis, or a desire to spring into a posture of confrontation with rivals. The threshold of intervention is markedly higher than it has been in the past. I think opinion on issues such as the bombing of Cambodia and Laos runs about 2 to 1 against it principally because of the concern or fear that somehow we will be drawn back into the morass. I think most people would be prepared to cut our commitments to NATO and probably still fewer support the maintenance of our forces in Asia. At the same time, however, I think there is substantial support for the present level of defense expenditures and that that support is reasonably stable. It changes from time to time, but let me put it this way, that the growing reluctance as I sense it to use a big stick is not accompanied by a comparably growing reluctance to whittle the stick down.

There is still pride in national power; there's satisfaction in being number one. "We're number one, we're number one." You hear it in the basketball courts. You see it in public opinion.

DR. RADWAY: cont'd.

There's concern about becoming number two. There is a machismo element in world politics just as there is in ward politics. I find this particularly strong and this brings me really to the point I want to make - among working people in our country. I find it a little less strong among the college educated and among professional people and I find a remarkable and significant parallel here with a structure of public opinion in the late 1930's before we got into the second World War. When middle America was isolationist, middle America was nationalist, at least as measured, say, by the leadership of the American Legion and such organizations, it was supportive of a somewhat higher level of military expenditure.

Well, what inference do I draw from this? I think that it leaves me, or anybody with the premises I share, a highly important job for the opinion leaders of the United States. If they believe as I do that the nature of the world, the nature of what the military calls a "threat" has indeed altered and that this country should rely more on diplomatic and economic instruments of policy than on military (and particularly, unilateral military) instruments, they're going to have to campaign vigorously. They're going to have to maintain a vigorous and sustained educational effort, in alliance frequently with fiscal conservatives, in an effort to keep our level of defense expenditure and our defense budget under control. Thank you.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Perhaps I should anticipate a question here. Was Prof. Radway out yesterday? Yes, he was out yesterday walking all day, stopping

only periodically to have his staff dry him out.

Our fourth panelist is a man who needs no introduction to this audience. He is batting in the clean-up position as one would call it in baseball. He has had experience both at the state level and as Secretary of the Navy of the United States. It's a great pleasure to welcome John Chafee to our stage.

MR. CHAFEE:

Thank you very much, Professor Kirkpatrick. First, I'd just like to say a word of encouragement to Professor Radway. I wish him good luck and in my present mood I'm very supportive of outs who want to get in - that is, on the state level. Secondly, I'd just like to mention a story Jim Farley used to tell when he was Democratic National Chairman, about spending on political campaigns. He said that he was absolutely convinced that half the money he spent in political campaigns was wasted. The only trouble was he never knew which half. And to a degree that applies to, I presume, military spending although I'd hate to think that it was one half.

Before we get into this too deep, I'd like to just mention something about what we're talking about. Frequently there is talk about "the Pentagon wants to spend." I really think it has to be broadened to: "the nation wants to spend" because our representatives in Congress vote on the military budget. I certainly had the experience while I was there in the Navy Department of finding that frequently Congress would increase our spending.

For example, Mr. Clifford mentioned nuclear submarines. We went up with a class of submarines which Congress encouraged us on, the 688 class. And the first year I was there we asked for two and

MR. CHAFEE: cont'd.

Congress gave us three; so the next year we asked for three and Congress gave us four; so the next year we asked for four and Congress gave us five; and they've accepted nothing but five ever since. It's not only Congress that has an input into the defense budget but other departments of government do. For instance, it's the State Department that insists that the U.S. have always two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. The Navy didn't want that. We felt that was locking us in.

Mr. Clifford's remarks, it seems to me, made two assumptions or two points. One, that the world has changed for the better for the U.S. and secondly, that U.S. defense policy, and particularly, the U.S. defense budget, hasn't changed. Now it is true that there's this growing detente with Russia, yet what has happened say in just looking at the ten-year period that Admiral Turner referred to? At the start of that ten-year period I think there is no question but what the United States had nuclear superiority. They had for example, a Navy that was unquestioned in its supremacy over the Soviets. Now, ten years later, I don't think anyone would say the U.S. has nuclear superiority, taking all factors into account. And certainly anybody who suggests that the U.S. Navy was superior in all facets to the Soviet Navy would be making a rash statement. And so, things have changed but in those ten years Russia, the Soviets, have grown incredibly stronger in the particular areas of concern to this panel and to this nation - mainly in nuclear matters and in naval matters. Certainly their land strength has not decreased. Now sure; the Indo-China War is over, but that was a disaster from the

MR. CHAFEE: cont'd.

military preparedness point of view of our armed forces.

Just to give you a little illustration - in the last ten years there hasn't been a new destroyer join the U.S. Navy, not a single new destroyer - because our resources were going into that war. There hasn't been a new carrier join the U.S. Navy in six years. What I'm saying in connection with the U.S. Navy applies to the other armed forces as well. So there's a tremendous amount of catching up, if you would, to improve our weapons systems to make them equal or close to what the Soviets have achieved in these years of relative peace for them. Now I think there is a tremendous factor that has improved and that is namely as far as we're concerned the Soviet-Chinese bloc doesn't exist the way it did ten years ago, but at the same time I think another factor that's come into the equation has been the growing importance of other nations to the United States. We've always been dependent on other nations and had concern, but I think the fact that our imports of strategic materials, particularly oil, are so much greater than they were ten years ago, that it gives us concern far more for the rest of the world, particularly say the Persian Gulf area, than was true ten years ago. And I don't think anybody would suggest that now having a fortified America, that is, just defending the United States, would be adequate for us.

But the question we have as we look at what's taken place, is why do the Soviets behave the way they do? It's been mentioned that the United States has gone ahead with weapons systems, development

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MR. CHAFEE: cont'd.

of nuclear warheads, but in just the past year, the Soviets alone have tested four different intercontinental ballistic missiles. That's a tremendous achievement but it's a frightening one as far as we're concerned.

Now the second point that Mr. Clifford made, has the United States defense budget changed? And in numbers it certainly has. And Admiral Turner mentioned these but I don't think it sinks through unless we see it happen quite close up. The manpower as we mentioned in the military forces in the past ten years, and we're taking ten years because it was prior to the Vietnam buildup, has decreased for the military services by 20 percent. But the curious thing is that while that manpower has gone down 20 percent, it costs us twice as much to pay for them and these were shown in the chart. And the cost of the all-volunteer force is tremendously expensive and frankly we haven't seen the end, because of the inducements we're having to offer cash-wise, bonuses and so forth. Frankly, in some of the services, we have not been able to achieve the force levels that are sought for.

Another factor, I think, we've talked about real dollars and 1975 dollars but one way of looking, I think, is significant, is looking at the federal budget -- how much of this piece of pie is the Defense Department taking? Ten years ago, the Defense Department was taking 42% of this piece of pie and now they're taking 27% - still a substantial slice but still it's some 35% less of the total federal budget than was taking place ten years ago. So in comparison to what's taking place within the entire federal spending,

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MR. CHAFEE: cont'd.

the defense has certainly gone down. As part of the Gross National Product which is another indicator that is significant I believe, defense is taking 29% less.

Now, of course, you always get the question, "How much is enough?" Well, I don't know if anybody has the ability to say how much is enough. As nuclear parity has been achieved over the past ten years, it, I believe, has placed a greater reliance on the non-nuclear forces, what is called in the trade the "conventional forces," that is, the regular ships, the regular aircraft, the men in the armed services, military and army air force and so forth; because no one wants to be the first to start a nuclear war. And so if there are threats and pushes and shoves, it seems to me we've got to have another way of meeting it other than somebody pushing a button with a nuclear weapon. The way to do that of course is with the conventional forces to the extent to which we can afford them.

The whole thrust of the U.S. policy is, as I see it, to deter the Soviets, to discourage them from making a move that is rash; for them to understand we've got this ability as well as for us to understand it. For the last twenty-five years, we have, in this country, been able to achieve through our military forces, an uneasy peace throughout the world. Certainly, we all hope that through the agreements that are being reached, through the mutual force reductions that are being talked about in Europe, through the SALT talks, we can achieve a mutual reduction. As has been pointed out we've taken reductions in this country whereas such has not been true for the Soviets. And there is a lag in development of weapons

MR. CHAFEE: cont'd.

systems. But just a little example - I think all the U.S. forces were quite shaken by the effectiveness of the Soviet surface-to-air missiles which were not only deployed around Hanoi, which is a very concentrated area, but were used in the Yom Kippur War by the Egyptians. I think the effectiveness of those surface to air missiles really took the U.S. by surprise.

And so it isn't enough to think that we're big and strong and we've got this deep-rooted technology that is superior to what anybody else has and that somehow we can grit it through and if the crunch comes, we'll come up with something better. In this modern world, there isn't time enough to come up with something better quickly, and the Soviets have shown that they're very skillful and intelligent and they've got great capacity and are willing to put the money into these weapons systems. It seems to me that we've achieved these reductions. We're taking a smaller part of the national budget, we've come down and I think the course we're on is the right one.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Before we open the discussion up to the audience, we would like to have Mr. Clifford respond to the remarks made by the panelists.
Mr. Clifford.

MR. CLIFFORD:

Last October, Admiral Turner and I appeared on a program in Washington called Pacem In Terras. Admiral Turner had his turn just

MR. CLIFFORD: cont'd.

before another panelist, and did such a superb job that he took away most of the arguments that that panelist had in mind so the panelist told a little story. He said a man was sitting at the dinner table as a guest and turned to his right to his dinner partner and said, "I understand your name is Post." And she said, "Yes." He said, "Is it Miss Emily Post?" and she said, "Yes," and she said, "Why do you ask?" "Because," he said, "You've just eaten my salad."

I have a major point to make, and I'll make it as simply as I can because we can become so complex that we could empty the hall in a hurry. Recently we had very strained relations with the Soviet Union. Also, we had no knowledge of where Red China was heading and we were engaged in a war in Vietnam. Now all three of those equations have changed. We're not in the War anymore with our military forces. We have established a detente with Red China which seems to be working very effectively. Our whole relationship with the Soviet Union has been altered. Yet the simple fact is that, from the time we've had all those three problems until now, instead of our budget going down our budget has gone up very substantially. I cannot understand it. It doesn't make any sense to me.

Now the figures are subject to some different interpretations. I will give you my figures and Admiral Turner is certainly equipped to give his. The way I have analyzed the present figures, for fiscal 1974 I believe that our budget was 82 billion dollars. I believe that our budget for 1975 is 95 billion. Now one reason why there is some difference is that certain items that should properly be in the '75 budget have been transferred by the Defense Department to

the '74 budget. They're what is known as supplementals and as you get near the end of the year then the Department says, "well we didn't ask for enough so here are some supplemental requests for appropriation." They are including some of those items in '74 when they properly belong in '75. So under my interpretation I think the proper figure for '74 was 82 billion. I believe '75 is 95 billion approximately. Now out of that, I will concede $5\frac{1}{2}$ billion for inflation. That to my way of thinking still leaves approximately $7\frac{1}{2}$ billion more dollars than we're asking for in '75 than we did in 1974, although we're out of the war and our relationship with Red China and Russia has improved substantially.

Now it would be splendid if, whatever the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense and the Congressional committees wanted for defense we could give them. How comforting it would be just to say whatever you want we'll give you because then we all will be comfortable. We can't do that. Right now every one of us knows the economic problem our country has. We're having the worst inflation that we can remember in our lifetime. The dollar is going down in value steadily. It's almost a joke now, that old expression I used as a boy, "sound as a dollar." And we have a real energy problem. So I say we don't have the funds at this time to afford this lavish expenditure on defense. I believe we've got to cut it every single place that we can cut it. If there's money in the defense budget which Secretary Schlesinger says there is, to prime the pump of the economy, I'd get it out of there just as quickly as I could. You put money in a tank, you put money in a piece of artillery, you put

MR. CLIFFORD: cont'd.

money in a missile, you get no benefit from it at all. It's a loss. You put money in a house, you put money in a lunch, you put money in an education, then you get a real return from it. For that reason I believe we must pare this budget down to the bone.

Another quick comment, Dr. Scoville said that as we go on, we're creating three new nuclear weapons a day in this country. Well, that's a lot. You figure out how many days in a year there are, Saturdays and Sundays included, and we're creating three a day. Now why do we do this? Again, I cannot understand that.

I've read a lot about what our atomic scientists say it would take in missiles to subdue the Soviet Union. Some scientists say that it would take ten of our hydrogen bombs, which as you may know may be a thousand times stronger than the bomb that was dropped at Hiroshima. Ten of those, some scientists say would do the job. Others say, "no, they're wrong." Some groups have estimated that as high as 400 would do the job. The highest I have read, is a thousand. Some scientists say a thousand hydrogen bombs falling on the Soviet Union, and you have just a cinder left.

All right, suppose we take the figure of a thousand. We have over 7,000 today already, and we're getting more all the time. The sole purpose of Trident and the B-1 bomber is to deliver more nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. I don't know what Admiral Turner thinks about Admiral La Roque, but I heard Admiral La Roque say, that if all of our present plans for the development of nuclear weapons are to go through to their ultimate realization - that includes Trident, B-1, exchanging Poseiden, all of those - he says we'll

MR. CLIFFORD : cont'd.

have 18,000 nuclear weapons. Now I say why? I think we have enough today. We are ahead of the Soviet Union. Governor Chafee says we were much farther ahead ten years ago. That's right and what a marvelous comfort it was to be that far ahead, but it's unrealistic to think that we can stay that far ahead. Suppose the Soviet Union pulls up even with us. All right, we can destroy them and they can destroy us. But we're still infinitely ahead of them and as far as I can tell from the figures, it looks to me like we're getting a little farther ahead all the time. I'd like to stop that.

I'd like the Congress to examine every single item in the 1975 budget and say we can't afford this, we can't afford that, and I'd like to bring it down.

Now, my last point. I don't suggest bringing our budget suddenly down to \$70 billion. So that Admiral Turner might understand my point, I'd like to get it from where it is today back down to 70 billion in five years. I'd like to take off about four billion a year, and get it down to about 70 billion and keep it there. That I think would be realistic in the light of the situation in the world today. Thank you.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK :

Thank you, Mr. Clifford. We have just five minutes until the audience gets its chance to ask any questions. This panel was offered the opportunity to make five-minute opening statements. They averaged ten minutes apiece. Who would like a minute? Would any of the panel like a minute at this point to comment? If not, the

first question from the audience comes from the Honorable Thomas Corcoran, a Presidential adviser and a distinguished graduate of Brown University. I might just say that last year, that is a year ago last June, Mr. Corcoran was the Grand Marshal of the parade on his fiftieth reunion. Sir.

MR. CORCORAN

I don't understand, and yet I respect all the panelists. They are great admirations of mine but I don't understand all these figures. I never did understand the new math. But, you know, I have a little worry about the fundamental assumption that the world has changed. At the risk of making a speech, my first experience in international affairs was with a great under-secretary of state named Cotton to whom I was a law clerk in Washington. He went down to try to keep the British from letting the Japanese invade Manchuria. It was the time of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Many assumed that with these covenants that were made there would be no war. Now Cotton said to me after that, and I say this in no derogation of my profession, and with no aspersions to my very much admired friend and colleague, Clark Clifford, he said, "You know Corcoran, no lawyer should ever be Secretary of State, or make any decisions about international politics, because an American lawyer thinks that once you have a contract and the deal made, it will be enforced or the guy who doesn't agree with it will go to jail. There never was an international treaty from here to kingdom come that ever was enforced or that ever will be enforceable or that you can rely upon."

MR. CORCORAN: cont'd.

Now when I hear that we now have a changed world in which we are getting to detente with Russia and China, I think that may have been the situation six months ago. There are strange things that have happened since that time that make you wonder whether we believe in detente and believing we hope, because we want to maintain the fact, whether the Russians believe in detente or whether the Chinese believe in detente. Now just see where our friend Mr. Kissinger's world is right now. The nice situation that we had with the Chou faction in China is beginning to be under suspicion. If there were any tell-tale signs to make you wonder, it's that David Bruce was brought back from Peking, that nobody's been put in his place despite the story they tell you in Washington, that he was brought back to fix the North Atlantic Alliance. And as far as the Russians are concerned, it seems that detente depends completely on economic loans from the export-import bank. I am sure the Congress is not going to give them concessions. The present cessation of hostile attitudes toward us which has characterized the Soviets for so many years is based, as is the Chinese thing based, on the fact that for a moment they can drop their ideological designs against us and the rest of the free world for the sake of getting a crack free at our American technology. Now, may I say, doubting the fundamental assumption of this whole discussion, may I ask Admiral Turner, "Are the Soviets acting in the ways that they are, building up their military business (and the ruble doesn't cost as much as the dollar because they draft their men and they order their economy):

MR. CORCORAN: cont'd.

Are Soviets and the Chinese acting militarily, the way they're re-building up their budgets and their strengths, in such a way that makes you believe that we may assume that the world has changed with detente?

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Thank you, Mr. Corcoran. Admiral Turner.

ADM. TURNER:

Mr. Corcoran, we certainly see no sign of any slackening of the Soviet military buildup in any of the fields in which they are moving very forcefully with new equipment and larger size forces. I think what you've said is most poignant here. I would suggest that I would not like to take Mr. Clifford's term of the "effusive cordiality" of detente because cordiality is rather inexpensive. I would like to see deeds for detente. And my experience tells me that last October when the Soviets thought they had us at a disadvantage in the Middle East, their deeds were to try to take advantage of that. Our experience a few weeks ago was when the Soviets thought that we were vulnerable on the oil embargo, with their deeds they encouraged the oil producing countries to continue that embargo. I would like to see some deeds in the other direction and I think lastly, that we should never forget that when you are dealing with a country where there is a total suppression of freedom of expression you can never count on any warning of abrupt change on a policy like detente.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

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Thank you Admiral Turner. Our next comment is by Dr. Scoville.

DR. SCOVILLE:

I think that it is basically false to base your military policies on the thought that you can count on detente for the indefinite future. I think we should base our arms policies on our fundamental security needs, and that applies to our arms controls policies as well as our arms procurement policies. Now we fortunately do have ways of checking up on what the Soviets are doing in the major weapons area. This is a major change from what it was in the early 1960's and 1950's. We do know what the Soviets are doing. In fact, you see the Secretaries of Defense continuously reporting on Soviet developments. It is perfectly true that the Russians have been testing four new types of ICBMs. This is not in violation of any treaty. What they are doing is testing ICBMs with MIRVs, the multiple warheads that can be aimed at separate targets. These are the same kinds of weapons we started testing in 1968. Now in 1969, Secretary Laird said they'd already tested MIRVs, but now he's admitting they only started less than a year ago. So what they're doing is trying to catch up to us. We are also not acting with restraint.

I'm not happy about the Soviet actions but I'm not happy about our own because while the Russians have been developing new ICBMs, we have been deploying new ICBMs which add more than three warheads to our stockpiles every single day. The Poseiden missile we are deploying is heavier than the Polaris it replaces. We're putting these in as fast as we can put them in. Our old Minuteman missiles are being replaced with new ones, and these are heavier too; yet

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we decry the Russians building bigger missiles. Sure, I don't like the Russians building them but we're doing it too and we have no security need for all of the ones we're building. At some point someone's got to blow the whistle. If we keep on going ahead we're going to be another 5,000 warheads ahead of them in 1980. At the rate we're going now, we can never expect the Russians to stop. We can afford to wait because there is absolutely no threat to our deterrent; Secretary Schlesinger has repeated this just in the last couple of weeks.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Thank you. Dr. Hornig.

DR. HORNIG:

Thank you very much. I would just like to ask the panel a few questions. I spent about ten years of my life trying to inquire what "rationality" meant, with regard to this question of national defense policy and political theory. And part of my great admiration for Secretary Clifford comes from the fact that in a decade when much of the discussion centered around how much it took to settle the Vietnam affair, he was perceptive enough to perceive that defense policy did not revolve around how much, but about how national policy related to the political situation with which we were confronted. And one of the great triumphs of his regime as Secretary of Defense, it seemed to me, was that he was able to see clearly a route to disengagement, from a most unhappy situation and this has always seemed to me a triumph of defense policy.

DR. HORNIG: cont'd.

Now, the question - we've listened tonight to a discussion which has to a considerable extent related to how much, but although there have been some allusions there has not been enough discussion it seems to me of how it is related to the world of the future. And for example, I think there are two kinds of defense policy which have gotten very widely separated in the decade behind us. I think there is no question that the matter of strategic weapons is a matter of life and death for all of us. It's the particular question over which probably both the Soviet Union and the United States could destroy each other. We've become preoccupied with things. We have gone through a decade and a half with each side making conservative assumptions about what was happening on the other side - constantly overbuilding to meet threats and the threat was constantly met by overbuilding on the other side. This is the whole progress of mutual escalation which has led us into the third situation that has already been mentioned in which everyone can reduce everyone to cinders.

But the consequence of this is that our nuclear strategic policy and that of the Soviet Union as well, seems to have very little relation to the ongoing political situation. All one has to ask is how much did these massive nuclear forces affect our position one way or another in Vietnam, for example? Or, how did these massive nuclear forces affect our position or that of our allies or that of our opponents one way or another in the Middle East? The answer, of course, is that this has become an esoteric sort of game in which there are only two players - the Soviet Union and the United States -

DR. HORNIG: cont'd.

playing for supreme dominance and this is one game and then there is the whole rest of the politics with which we're concerned. And I would say that in relation to that policy it has been demonstrated that nuclear warfare is so out of proportion to the stakes that it is no use either to the Soviet Union or to the United States. And therefore a significant part of any discussion of defense policy must concern itself with what, besides strategic nuclear warfare, is relevant to the decade ahead of us? Thank you.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Thank you, President Hornig. Do we have other questions from the floor?

WILLIAM (TRIP) SYMINGTON:

Dr. Hornig, speaking about the nation as a whole and its ability to handle the war in Vietnam, mentioned something that is of great interest to we who, as Mr. Clifford mentioned, are concerned with continuing U.S. expenditures in Southeast Asia. So, I'd like to ask a question of Admiral Turner and of Mr. Clifford. Could each of you tell me in your own numbers what percentage of the military budget for fiscal '74 was spent in any way in Southeast Asia? And, what you think should be spent in any way in fiscal '75 and Dr. Hornig's question, what is the relevance of these expenditures to American defense policy not just in '75 but in the rest of the 70's?

Perhaps it will take both Admiral Turner and me to answer that. My recollection is that in this 1975 budget there is something like a billion nine for military expenditures in Indo-China -- that would include South Vietnam and I suppose Laos and Cambodia. Then recently I've heard that the administration has asked for another \$690,000,000 so that would mean in '75, ('74 figures I do not have, sir) but I believe in 1975 the request is somewhere in the neighborhood of 2½ billion dollars for Indo-China.

Now, I can't understand it. I think that an expenditure of that magnitude in South Vietnam where a substantial portion of it goes merely to keep President Thieu in office is a calamity. I don't believe we're going to get a settlement of the Civil War in Vietnam until President Thieu leaves office. As long as we continue to support him I think we're not going to have peace. In January of 1973 we had a cease-fire and a good deal of congratulating went on about the peace treaty signed in Paris. Keep in mind that in this last year, in which we were supposed to have peace, 60,000 Vietnamese have been killed. That's South Vietnamese. So there is no peace there. And we won't get peace by continuing to pour military funds into South Vietnam. I wish we would stop it.

ADM. TURNER:

The military funds that we are pouring into South Vietnam, as Mr. Clifford says, are in conformance with, and in support of, the negotiating settlement in Vietnam whereby we are to replace equipment that is worn out on the South Vietnamese side just as it is

ADM. TURNER: cont'd.

being replaced even more so on the North Vietnamese side. I think that with the sacrifice those people have made over the years with our support, we owe it to them to continue this small contribution to their continued survivability, particularly when they are opposed by a large influx of equipment and money from the Communist side.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Questions from the floor?

ANDREW SOLOMON:

I have a relatively simple question. Given the fact that Western Europe has a population base greater than ours and an industrial base that is at least the equivalent of ours, why it is necessary for the United States to spend so much money in defense of Western Europe? Specifically, why shouldn't Western Europe be responsible for its own defense and America responsible for its own continental defense? Thank you.

ADM. TURNER:

We're not spending a great deal of money on the defense of Western Europe. We have troops stationed there. It would cost almost as much to station them at home. There is a balance of payments problem. The West German government in particular, off-sets that balance of payments problem in a large measure and therefore this is not a major expense to the United States.

MR. CHAFEE:

I'd just like to comment on that too. We're not doing it, I

don't think any Secretary of Defense has ever suggested that we're doing that in order to do a great favor to the Western European nations. I think every Secretary of Defense has put as much pressure on them as he could. I see where recently they negotiated an agreement with the West Germans where they're going to pay a 2.2 billion dollars a year for the maintenance of our forces to help defer the cost of our forces. Because we're really doing it because we think it's right for our nation. Everything we do is for our own good. And it's our feeling that it behooves us to spend what extra money is involved in order to give them the cohesiveness and the mortar as it were to get them to stick together in their common defense. It's an investment for our own self interest that every Secretary of Defense has felt to be a wise one.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

I think the point should be made too about defense of Western Europe that if you take the American forces out of there, there is a very strong likelihood that NATO might disintegrate, because of the very psychological factor that the United States is not there. So I think that this deserves consideration. Professor Radway.

PROF. RADWAY:

Yes, I think the original reasons were perhaps largely military for stationing our forces there but the logic that I have heard in defense of it more recently has been primarily political - it has to do with the domestic politics of the two Germanys and so on. And I

PROF. RADWAY: cont'd.

personally would not be disposed to any kind of abrupt or radical change in the level of those forces but I think that situation is evolving and that particularly I think there is a relationship between our forces there and our position in the Middle East as well. And when the Middle East is crisis-quiet, the pressure will build up inside the United States and should build up inside the United States for a gradual thinning out of our forces there. And I personally would like to see that done on a unilateral basis with respect to our supply or logistic support forces in a kind of Europeanization of the supply side of NATO that is a sort of counterpart to the concept of Vietnamization of Southeast Asia. And a further thinning out of our combat forces in tandem with comparable Soviet initiatives but linked to that, not unilateral.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Thank you very much. We have less than 10 minutes left. We've got two questions waiting so both questions and answers brief, please.

QUESTIONER:

I was drawn here tonight because this was advertised as a symposium of reasonable and intelligent men - the subject of defense and that disturbed me somewhat deeply, in that 10 years ago, when I was an undergraduate in Cambridge, there were similar symposiums held. The people might have been different. The names might have been McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, but surprisingly the subject matter

and some of the exact words used were very similar - "land war in Asia," "cost effective," "economic distribution of forces." Two years later as an undergraduate and a reasonable white, Anglo-Saxon male faced with induction into the draft, I chose the more honorable way and became an officer in Mr. Turner's Navy.

Two years later I found myself in Vietnam and there I began to understand certain things of which I would like to perhaps remind people of this evening. At that time I began to gain the perception that all the abstract notions of economics and strategy

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Would you come to your point, please?

QUESTIONER: cont'd.

intersected reality with a piece of metal in a man's gut. And I might offer one example. Some American adviser communicated a tenuous piece of intelligence to someone and as a result, the boat on which I was riding at the time was ordered to stand off a small tree line while an air raid came in. Following the air raid, a Vietnamese man of indeterminant age - it's very difficult to tell - paddled out to us and occasionally stopped paddling and held a small object over his head. That object turned out to be his infant son who was completely burned. His eyes were burned, and the man in Vietnamese kept saying something and pointing to his son's burned genitals and the other officer on my boat could only say, "San Loi" which meant, "excuse me," because we weren't trained to talk to these people, we were only trained to shoot them. But I don't think I could have gained this perception without a unique

QUESTIONER: cont'd.

phenomenon occurring, which occurred here in the United States, which was that with the kind of clear perception that occurs in the middle of the night, maybe when a mind is at peace with itself, people understood that in real human terms, these abstract subjects that we sit here reasonably listening to tonight, mean only death and destruction to individual human beings, members of our own society, members of other societies in the world. And so I find myself disturbed that once again, rooms are filled with people listening to such "radical" or "revolutionary" excuse me, reasonable discussion.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

Thank you very much. Will you sit down and let us continue with this, please. We've heard your statement and I think it's fine. Thank you. Would you sit down. Mr. Cohen, would you please go ahead with your question. On behalf of the speaker, he appreciates your applause.

STEVE COHEN:

Mr. Clifford said earlier that we don't need vested constituencies of various weapons programs and many authors and scholars have suggested that one of the reasons we were in Vietnam was a result of mis-information or vested interest. My question is directed to Governor Chafee and Admiral Turner and it's basically that since 1969 many of the top positions in the defense department which were previously held by civilians or civilian posts have been filled now by military officers. Is this a contradiction of civilian control?

MR. CHAPIN:

Well, I don't believe the statistics will bear out that statement that many of the top positions are filled by military when they were filled by civilians before. Certainly, in the experience I had there, I didn't find that to be true. You still have your civilian people, at the top and in all the appointed positions. From what I saw I couldn't agree with your statement, whether Mr. Clifford found that too I don't know.

MR. CLIFFORD:

I can see no threat or challenge to civilian control of the military at this time because we believe fully in civilian control.

PROF. KIRKPATRICK:

I think the question that Mr. Cohen has proposed is the fact that 40 to 50 percent of the deputy assistant secretaries of defense are now military. Those studying the trends in the defense department are speculating as to how much longer this trend will go with increased militarization of the senior defense posts.

Ladies and gentlemen, I regret that we have reached the end of our time. I want to just briefly recapitulate as to some of the comments that have been made. I think first it's necessary to say a word or two about the young gentleman who had the microphone. He speaks as though those of us on the platform do not know the realities of war. Nearly every one of us here have been at war, have seen men, women and children killed. I experienced something over 100 air raids in London and those killed were just as innocent civilians as exist elsewhere in the world. We are all very very concerned about war and one of the main purposes of talking about

PROF. KIRKPATRICK: cont'd.

American defense is to talk about how to avoid war. Nobody wants war. Nobody wants a nuclear war especially: Nobody wants a war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Our friend, Mr. Thomas Corcoran expressed the concern that many people feel about detente and how much reliability one can put on detente. Mr. Clifford in his opening address and his related comments made it clear that he was concerned too about the adequacy and the necessity for having adequate defense forces. He was talking about the immense cost of the weapons that one mentions such as Trident and one could add F-14, F-15, B-1 bomber, and a long list not necessarily all Navy or all Army or all Air Force, which raise the immensity of these defense expenditures that we are making today. I think again in relationship to the young man's comments, none of us found the war in Vietnam either appealing, attractive or necessarily to the honor and the credit of those participating. And it is with great regret we see that the bloodshed still continues unabated in a most unfortunate area of the world.

However we think we have brought at least some questions to mind about defense problems. I would note that we talked about budgets and you heard two or more interpretations of budget figures based upon inflation, based upon the escalation of costs, based upon the increase in manpower. It is a most difficult, complex subject and we could probably talk about it all night with constant new views coming forward. We did not get into a complex or perhaps meaningless comparison of 1,054 United States ICBM, (inter-continental ballistic missiles) against 1614 Russian missiles. The whole purpose

PROF. KIRKPATRICK : cont'd.

of the discussion tonight was really to get at the problems that consist of defense policymaking in trying to decide what this nation should have in the way of an adequate policy for defense.

Perhaps like any discussion of this nature, we have had an expression of feeling about the intensity, by some, of the fact that there is bloodshed going on, that there was an appalling war in Vietnam in which many people suffered. We would encourage those who have listened to us to pursue this further. This is a government by the people. Your congressmen act on defense policy. They pass the budget. They are elected by the people of the United States.

On behalf of President Hornig, and the Brown University community, I would like to thank the Honorable Clark Clifford for appearing tonight, Admiral Turner, John Chafee, Herbert Scoville, Laurence Radway who gave up of their valuable time to be here and discuss the matters which I think are of almost prime importance to the United States. So if there is any consequence of our discussion tonight, carry it home and talk about it with your friends and act above all. Thank you.