

~~SECRET~~

The DDCI believes that problems of dissent and disaffection are regarded as extremely important by the Soviets, affecting as they do not only the party leadership's political control, but Soviet relations with the West and with fraternal Communist parties as well. He believes, however, that in comparison to other inhibitions which would have to be overcome before taking so cataclysmic a step as initiating a major war, concerns about internal dissent would not have major significance. Indeed, he questions to what extent dissent in any form would survive if the USSR were placed on a war footing. He agrees that the Soviets would be more affected by misgivings about the reliability of their Warsaw Pact allies than by concerns about their own population.

~~SECRET~~

O/DDCI

ROUTING SLIP

TO	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1 DDCI		X		

SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks: "Final" draft of 11-4. Points you might want to take a special look at:

pp. 10-11: The footnote is overstated, but the point is - I think - also, in the other direction. Perhaps it's that word "brittle", with its implication that the Soviet system could shatter instantaneously into so many fragments.

I gave some thought to this. Perhaps it's that word "brittle" with its implication that the Soviet system could shatter instantaneously into so many fragments. What do you think?

p. 35: The Air Force footnote here is so strong I wonder if it does not tend to discredit either its author or the Estimate. Could Gen. Tighe possibly be induced to drop it?

pp. 38-9 (para 40 and footnote): Estimate and footnote are still terribly far apart here.

pp. 40-42 (paras 43-46a): The controversial passages on Naval development and distant intervention. Look like good compromises, but you will want _____ Date to take a hard look.

p. 47: Last sentence: understates Soviet ~~subversive~~ capabilities by exclusive reference to military means.

FR. with me. 8/1/77

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