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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. 1

DATE 11 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR:

- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)
- COMPTROLLER
- INSPECTOR GENERAL
- GENERAL COUNSEL
- ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES

AD/CI

AD/RR


AD/SI

C/FI Staff

C/CI Staff

C/CA Staff

C/SR



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2 May 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Director [redacted]

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1. This afternoon, the Director spent an hour with [redacted] who reviewed his impressions of the Soviet Union gained during his visit earlier this year.

2. The Director began by asking [redacted] how he reconciled his apparent feeling that Khrushchev seeks some measure of relaxation and peaceful co-existence with the obvious evidence of a vigorous Soviet arms program, the Soviet switch to a tough line regarding disarmament and nuclear controls, and continued Soviet insistence on the utmost secrecy. In reply [redacted] said that:

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- a. Khrushchev's reasons for pressing his military program are not unlike our own. He is determined not to take second place in the arms race.
- b. Soviet tactics in disarmament and related negotiations have followed a familiar pattern. Once a basis for agreement appears to have been reached, the Soviets often like to proceed from there to tack on four or five additional conditions, thereby destroying chances for any firm understanding.
- c. Khrushchev considers secrecy a major strategic weapon. He feels that by learning as much as he can about his adversary, and keeping his adversary in the dark about Soviet conditions, he achieves substantial advantage. While Soviet secrecy may be designed to conceal certain weaknesses, it is only safe to assume that it is primarily intended to protect major elements of Soviet strength.

3. Mr. McCone recalled a letter that Khrushchev wrote to the President and Prime Minister MacMillan in 1960 expressing the view that a completely effective control

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system could be devised. Soon thereafter, this attitude was apparently reversed.

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4. [ ] commented that in his view something happened in the spring of 1960, before the U-2 incident, which brought a sharp change in Soviet policy. He speculated that this occurred in March, and that it might have resulted from certain unidentifiable internal pressures--perhaps from the military leadership. [ ] did not believe that the Chinese Communists were a primary factor in any such shift in Soviet policy.

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5. [ ] went on to comment that there were also pressures within Soviet society for a more moderate foreign policy and for a reduction in internal tension.

6. Mr. McCone asked whether increasing affluence, in the form of more plentiful consumer goods and better living conditions might have a moderating effect on Soviet policy.

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7. [ ] replied that this was indeed a factor, but perhaps more important was the growing intellectual ferment of the younger Russian generation. He noted the long history of soul-searching and dissent among Russian intellectuals, going back to the 19th century. He said the younger generation, thoroughly bored and disillusioned with Communism, were now groping for new ideas and ideals. He said they were not sure what they were looking for, but they definitely looked toward the West rather than the East for intellectual nourishment.

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8. Mr. McCone inquired about religious movement in Russia. [ ] replied that the Russians continue to be basically religious people and noted that despite forty-five years of anti-religious propaganda not only the Orthodox Church, but the Baptists, the Roman Catholics, and in some areas, the Jews were still active.

9. Turning to the Soviet economy, [ ] spoke of the plight of agriculture and said this problem obviously could not be solved except through incentives--particularly in the form of private land--for the peasants. He recalled that during his visit Ignatov [Deputy Chariman

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of the Council of Ministers] conceded that Khrushchev's goals would require 40 million tons of fertilizer, whereas less than 20 million were available.

10. Commenting on Soviet steel production, [redacted] said that if we make allowance for the absence of automobiles in the Soviet Union--with all the steel consumed in their manufacture and the construction of highways, etc., for their use--the Soviets are probably as well off in steel as we are--especially in regard to strategic requirements.

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11. [redacted] felt that there was a keen desire for material goods and better living conditions among the great majority of Soviet citizens. However, he did not believe that many of them would favor a return to the free enterprise system. What they want, he said, is to own homes, personal property and, in agricultural areas, farming land. They also want greater personal and intellectual freedom.

12. [redacted] emphasized the evolutionary nature of Soviet society and said he was much impressed with the extent of gradual but continuing change in the system and among the population.

13. On the question of whether an intensified Sino-Soviet split would serve US interests, [redacted] made the following points:

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- a. The split has already gone beyond repair, although the intensity of Sino-Soviet hostility will fluctuate within limits.
- b. Looking far ahead, Sino-Soviet differences will almost certainly be to the advantage of the US.
- c. More immediate manifestations of the conflict, however, may create certain difficulties for the West. In particular, Sino-Soviet rivalry is likely to spur the two contenders into competition in stimulating and exploiting revolutionary movements in various unstable areas.

14. On the subject of the Soviet attitude toward China, Mr. McCone recalled the remark Yemelyanov, Chief of the Soviet Nuclear Energy Program, to the effect that the

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reason the Soviets were developing resources in Siberia was to keep the Chinese from overflowing into the open spaces of the Soviet East.

50X1 15. [redacted] commented that this was indeed a most significant and thoroughly valid reflection of Soviet attitudes toward the Chinese, adding that for generations the Russians have considered the Chinese-- whom they tend to identify with the Mongol invaders of centuries past--as natural enemies.

50X1 16. In evaluating overall Soviet strategy, [redacted] had the impression that the Soviets had slowed down noticeably in recent months and appeared to be drifting. He speculated that Khrushchev might now feel a strong need for some tangible evidence of accomplishment. This need might be filled by some sort of agreement with the West that Khrushchev could point to as proof of the success of his foreign policy. [redacted] also thought Khrushchev's recent decision to cultivate farm land more intensively might stem from a desire to show short-term gains in agriculture, even though serious long-term problems will inevitably result.

50X1 17. Mr. McCone inquired whether [redacted] would have any suggestions regarding US policy in dealing with the Soviets. [redacted] replied that he had no suggestions regarding the basic direction of our policy, pointing out that it had been consistent throughout the past two administrations. However, he said he thought the current administration had been more effective in explaining the American viewpoint in language which the Russians and others could understand. He said that the US Trade Fair in Moscow and the Kennedy-Adzhubei debate were very effective in getting the American message to the Russian people.

[redacted]  
Chief, SR Division

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