

25 July 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Turkish Reaction to Failure to Lift US Arms Embargo

1. Until the dust settles, it will be difficult to predict Turkey's eventual reaction to the failure of attempts to end the arms embargo. For the Turks, much is at stake, and if past experience is any guide, they will weigh their interests carefully and avoid rash overreaction.

2. From the Turks' perspective, there is a significant change in the situation in the wake of yesterday's vote in Congress. For the past several months they have believed that the embargo could be reversed without any prior Turkish concessions on Cyprus, that all they had to do was keep their heads down and avoid excessive retaliation against the US for the arms cutoff.

3. Now, for the first time, the Turks cannot escape the painful conclusion that they will have to pay a high price for their actions a year ago and their inaction since. They will be more sorely tempted to react vehemently, but will be unable to prescind from the realization that that kind of reaction will not get them the arms aid they need.

4. In deciding on their future course, the Turkish leaders will be mindful of various constraints on their behavior:

-- They have learned over the past few months that, as they

had feared, they have no feasible alternative to US arms supply, at least for the near term.

-- There is no widespread sentiment in Turkey in favor of seriously damaging ties with the US, and the government that could be accused of being at least partially responsible for doing that would be vulnerable.

-- Turkey's economic situation, already deteriorating, would be hurt badly if Ankara had to use its dwindling foreign exchange reserves to purchase arms.

5. On the other hand, the Turkish leaders have the important matter of face to consider; they are likely to feel obliged to do something tangible -- probably some action against US installations in Turkey -- to show their displeasure. US intelligence facilities may be the first target.

6. In sum, as bad as the situation is, it may not yet be at rock bottom. Though many schemes for retaliatory action have been developed, we suspect that Demirel, Caglayangil, and the military will want to reexamine anew procedures and consequences of retaliatory steps. This process will probably begin at the cabinet meeting this morning and continue next week in the framework of joint Turkish-American negotiating team that met initially on 18 July and then adjourned sine die.

Early Press Reaction

7. The result of the House vote received banner headlines in today's Turkish press but the story broke too late for editorial reaction or official comment. The headline treatment was straightforward although one paper noted that "Greek pressure groups had won." Heavy emphasis was given to the intense efforts by the administration to obtain passage of the bill.

DCI/DDCI

Routing Slip

Executive Registry

75-3436/1

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDA			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC			18			
9	D/DCI/NIO	✓		19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Aside from the substance problem re Turk reaction, PLEASE write to communicate in simple language, not to impress with our erudition ("prescind")

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