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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry
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25 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
(National Security Affairs)

SUBJECT : Discussion with Congress on the Stakes in Turkey

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That is the possibility that the Soviets might ask for and receive permission to overfly Turkey en route to the Middle East.

2. Heretofore, lacking Turkish overflight permission, the introduction of Soviet military forces into the Middle East and even resupply efforts have offered numerous logistic difficulties. If a combination of alienation from the US, Soviet pressures on Turkey, and a Turkish desire to cultivate the Arabs should change Turkish policy in this respect, there could be serious consequences in the event of another Middle East conflict.

3. If, for example, Turkey were to permit the USSR to ferry combat aircraft directly from bases in the Caucasus area to Syria, the Soviets could bring their 300-plane 34th Tactical Air Army to bear in Syria in a matter of hours. Under present circumstances, without overflight privileges, they would have to disassemble aircraft and transport them some 1500 miles through Yugoslavia and across the eastern Mediterranean -- a movement requiring several weeks.

4. There are, of course, strong disincentives to such a forward course on the part of both the Soviets and the Turks, but if US-Turkish

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relations disintegrated far enough, the contingency could become a real one. I am pointing this out in my discussion this afternoon with selected House members.

/s/ Bill

W. E. Colby

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