Approved For Release 2005/03/30 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000100270002-7

# UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-A-183 11 November 1975

#### AGENDA

One Hundred Eighty-Third Meeting Tuesday, 11 November 1975, 1000 Hours Room 6E-0708, CIA Headquarters

#### Preliminary Comments

- a. DCID 1/7
- b. DCID 1/-
- 1. Approval of Minutes
- 2. Reports of Chairmen of Subcommittees and Working Groups
- 3. USIB Policy on Release of Intelligence to Contractors (Attached for members only)
- 4. 4Cs Cost Tradeoff Guidelines (Attached for members only) Briefing by
- 5. Interim Declassification Guidelines (Attached for members only)
- 6. New Business
- 7. Next Meeting

Wednesday, 17 December, followed by Christmas luncheon at The Dory Restaurant, McLean, Va.

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#### INTERIM DECLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES

#### Changes

Page 1: Add footnote after 1st sentence in Introduction

Page 2, para 2, 2nd sentence: Take out rd.

Page 3, para 1c: Add to last sentence.

Page 3, para ld: Change first sentence.

Page 6, para 3b: Add to last sentence.

Page 6, para 4a: Revised.

# INTERIM INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR EXTENDED CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

#### INTRODUCTION

All US Government classified information more than 30 years old will be systematically reviewed to determine if it is to be declassified or to have its period of classification extended. (Reference Section 5(E), Executive Order 11652.) Only the head of an agency or department can extend classification protection beyond 30 years. Section 9 of Executive Order 11652 parallels the charge given to the DCI in 50 USC, 403(d)(3) and (g) and provides for special requirements relative to the protection of intelligence sources and methods. In order to reasonably and effectively comply with both Executive Order 11652 and the statute, these guidelines identify intelligence information relative to sources and methods which require protection beyond 30 years.

#### GENERAL

1. These guidelines are established to enable intelligence community personnel assisting the Archivist of the United States in meeting his systematic review requirements to declassify documents containing information concerning intelligence sources and methods and to properly identify those documents containing such information which require protection beyond the 30-year period. When personally approved by the Head of the Intelligence Community Department or Agency concerned, these guidelines are to be used by National Archives and Records Service personnel and by Intelligence Community Department and Agency personnel to identify that intelligence information originated by or under the current cognizance of such Department or Agency which may be declassified or which requires continued pro-The periods of additional time for continued classification of intelligence information shall be as shown for the specific items identified herein. These guidelines shall be cited as authority for either declassification actions or continued classification of the

<sup>\*</sup> The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires that the Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration, "maintain a continuous review of R&D" to determine which information may be declassified and removed from the R&D category without undue risk to national security (See Section 8, Executive Order 11652).

information so specified. The provisions of the National Security Council Implementing Directive for Executive Order 11652 shall be applicable in the case of documents containing information requiring continued protection under these guidelines.

- 2. Guidelines for the declassification or extended classification of information concerning intelligence sources and methods shall be reviewed annually and personally approved by each Head of the Department or Agency concerned. Initially these guidelines will apply to all such information originated on or before 31 December 1946. In order to facilitate the systematic review requirement imposed on the Archivist of the United States under Executive Order 11652, these or later-developed guidelines may be provided to the National Archives and Records Service as needed.
- 3. A major purpose of any classification or declassification review is to make available to the general public the maximum amount of data consistent with the obligation to safeguard national security interests. These interests include the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Such intelligence is identified as that classified intelligence, the unauthorized disclosure of which could lead to counteraction (1) jeopardizing the continued productivity of intelligence sources or methods that provide intelligence vital to the national security, or (2) offsetting the value of intelligence vital to the national security. "Sources" can be identified as the origins of information and "methods" as the ways by which intelligence data and/or intelligence sources are developed. In many cases, sources and methods are inseparable.

### GUIDANCE

#### 1. GENERAL

a. If, upon review under these guidelines, it is determined that a document must remain classified but much of the information therein could be declassified provided certain limited portions were excised, such as those which identify sensitive intelligence sources and methods, this fact should be noted. This will enable the Archivist to provide sanitized versions of otherwise classified documents to the public provided they are otherwise releasable under the law. However, care should be taken to ensure that the sanitization of a document does not change its meaning.

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- b. Intelligence documents and other record media, regardless of the subject, which contain information on identifiable intelligence sources and methods, the origin of which can be clearly traced to other US Government agencies, may not be declassified unilaterally by the holding agency. Such information or material may only be declassified after consultation with the agencies of origin or with successor agencies having direct interests in the subject matter.
- c. Conventional or confidential sources of intelligence which have been disclosed by official spokesmen of Agencies or Departments of the Intelligence Community or by other senior US Government officers acting in their official capacity, or which have otherwise been so authoritatively and widely disseminated that they have become common knowledge, need no continued protection. The formal determination that the sources need no continual protection will be made by the originating agency or successor Agency having primary interest in the subject matter.
- d. Documents containing classified intelligence which were provided to the United States by foreign governments or international bodies or classified by agreement with a foreign government or international body with the understanding that the information would be protected may not be declassified unilaterally by the United States without the concurrence of the foreign government or international body concerned. When specifically requested, such documents should be referred to the receiving US agency or its successor, and if that agency believes they can be declassified, it may seek a determination from the originating government as to the need for continued protection.

## 2. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE - SOURCES

a. Individuals. Human intelligence sources may be divided into two main categories: conventional and confidential.

#### (1) A conventional source is:

- (a) An individual or official with whom normal unconcealed, overt contact or liaison is maintained; or
- (b) One who provides all types of intelligence information with the permission of his government; or
- (c) One whose identity, relationship and connection with intelligences 2005/03) Stile CfA RDP80M01133A000100270002-7

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# UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SECURITY COMMITTEE

#### COMPAR TMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

11 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

SUBJECT

: USIB Policy on Release of Intelligence to

Contractors

REFERENCE

: SECOM-D-108

- l. Referenced memorandum requested the Compartmentation Subcommittee to conduct a review of USIB Policy on Release of Intelligence to Contractors to ensure conformance with DCID 1/7 and to make recommendations for amendments or cancellation as appropriate. This action has now been completed and a revised copy is attached to this memorandum.
- 2. The consensus of the members of the Compartmentation Subcommittee, Navy dissenting, was that this policy statement is a useful adjunct to DCID 1/7 in that it specifies how intelligence information is to be handled by contractors. DCID 1/7 provides uniform controls and procedures to be applied by all USIB departments and agencies in the dissemination of foreign intelligence.
- 3. The Navy recommends the cancellation of a separate statement for the following reasons:
  - (a) The principal policies set forth in this policy statement are stated in DCID 1/7.
  - (b) The restrictions established in the policy statement which are not included in the DCID are generally covered in carve-out contracts in the industrial security program.
  - (c) The particular restrictions set forth in the policy statement regarding reproduction and release records are over and above those necessary for the protection of foreign intelligence.

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COMPLEMIAL

4. It is recommended that the Security Committee forward this revised policy statement to USIB for their consideration. This has been informally coordinated with the Chairman, Information Handling Committee/USIB, who stated that he had no interest in this statement being returned to his Committee.

Chairman	

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Attachment

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SECOM-D-123 11 November 1975

Chairman

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Attachment

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11 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Committee Members

SUBJECT: Present Costs for Controlling Compartmented Access Approvals

- 1. On 25 September the Community-wide, Computerassisted Compartmentation Control System (4C) concept was presented to the United States Intelligence Board.
- 2. The Board endorsed the concept of the 4C System and noted that the Security Committee, with the support of the Intelligence Community Staff, would look into funding costs and trade-offs and prepare recommendations for USIB.
- 3. With this guidance in mind each USIB Agency is being asked to determine how much money is spent yearly, currently to maintain and operate its present computer and manual system to keep control of all individuals who have compartmented access approvals.
- 4. All participants are requested to complete their organization chart (see attached) as it applies to the handling of your agency's compartmented bookkeeping. For some agencies this may be a relatively simple chart, for others it might be more complicated. Completing the organizational chart will give each participant a clear picture of exactly which offices are involved.
- 5. Once the organizational chart has been completed it will be easier to identify for each office or branch involved number of personnel, machines and equipment, material, miscellaneous, and formal training required.
- 6. When these numbers and activities have been identified, the costs for each can be computed and entered into the appropriate spaces on the organizational chart. Always keep in mind that only offices, branches, and activities that relate to or have a direct bearing on control and bookkeeping of individuals with compartmented accesses, are of concern in this exercise.

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7.	For	the	purposes	of	continu:	ity	and	a	common
evaluatio	on fa	actor	please	use	figures	for	FY	75	

8. Attached for your i	use is an already completed chart	1
to be used as a guide to pro	oducing your own. Any questions	
celating to this project she	ould be addressed to	STAT
Chairman, 4C Work:	ing Group, Security Committee,	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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9. Please respond with	h your figures within thirty (30)	STAT
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	Chairman	
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Attachments

(A) An example Organizational Chart(B) A blank Organizational Chart

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### EXPLANATION FOR COMPLETING CHART

Personnel Costs; should represent all salaries (including that of the head of the appropriate office, branch, group, etc.) and direct fringe benefits.

Machine and Equipment Costs - include total annual machine rentals except where machines or equipment are purchased; in this case an annual cost is computed by amortizing or using approved write-off procedures. If machines are both purchased and rented, the sum of both costs must be developed.

Material - costs include annual expenditures for office supplies such as forms, paper, punched cards to accommodate the present compartmented bookkeeping tasks.

The Miscellaneous - classification allows for unusual and significant costs not otherwise classified. It is possible that this section may not be needed in your survey.

Formal Training - addresses the new hires who are sent to training classes to prepare them to do their job. This section does not include on-the-job training. It is possible this section  $\overline{\text{may}}$  not be needed for your survey.

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