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
20 July 1972

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tweedy, D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Products

APPROVED BY
MR. TWEEDY ON
20 JULY



1. These comments and my request for your approval of the policy set forth in this memorandum result from consideration of NSCIC Working Group activities to date and my reading of the report, "CIA Evaluation Systems - Preliminary Observations," which the Inspector General made available to me on 19 July. The attached 12 June memorandum for the Inspector General from Mr. Colby, which you may already have seen, also pertains.

2. I recommend that the Product Review role with respect to the evaluation of intelligence products be as follows:

a. To participate as appropriate in such reviews of the responsiveness of intelligence products to consumer needs as may be sponsored by the NSCIC Working Group. It is anticipated that these reviews will focus primarily on the assessment of intelligence responsiveness in crisis situations (as in the case of the India-Pakistan crisis of 1971) and on the review of the adequacy of intelligence inputs to specific problems of high policy interest (as in the case of inputs to NSSM-69).

b. To arrange, where appropriate, for consumer evaluation of specific intelligence products which are of high consumer interest. The proposal to have NSCIC Working Group members assume responsibility for completion of evaluation forms on NIEs and SNIEs for a period of time is an example.

c. To identify specific problem areas which appear to call for corrective action. These will pertain more to identification of gaps in the production program (or, perhaps, "overkill") than to the specific evaluation of production output. My pending proposal for the application of special effort to the Soviet R&D effort is an illustration.

d. To conduct research in areas identified as posing problems related to production. The proposed project with OMS/PSS to improve the quality of future production by

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developing better recruitment criteria for the selection of analysts is one example. Another is the proposal that PRG look into the impact which delays in the processing of certain types of data are having on the production effort.

3. Your approval of the foregoing would mean that the development of product evaluation systems for use within the production elements of the intelligence community is recognized as an in-house responsibility. The program which Mr. Colby and the Inspector General are pursuing within CIA, as per Mr. Colby's memorandum of 12 June, would be recognized as an Agency responsibility, supporting the aims of the DCI in response to the Presidential memorandum of 5 November 1971 and to the new NSCID No. 1. PRG would have no role in this activity except that, once the CIA is operating, I suggest it would be appropriate for PRG to draft a letter for the DCI to send to [] [] citing the CIA actions and requesting that they advise him as to the internal measures they are taking for quality control and evaluation of their products.

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Chief, PRG/IC

Attachment:
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1 - []
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12 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General


SUBJECT : Evaluation and Productivity

1. Thanks to the report on "CIA Evaluation Systems -- Preliminary Observations" submitted by the IG, a useful discussion of productivity and evaluations took place at the Director's Annual Conference. While there was some discussion, if not dissent, as to your appraisal of what systems actually exist, there was general agreement that the subject requires more and continuing attention. The Director is particularly concerned as to the interrelationship between motivation of our personnel and productivity of their efforts, and the degree to which evaluations can contribute to maintaining these at a high level. He charged the Deputies with examining the actual status of their evaluation systems in their directorates (and with a post-mortem review of NIE's five years after), and he called for a discussion of this subject in detail at a forthcoming Deputies Meeting. The evaluation assessment should include all sorts of post-mortems and assessments of effectiveness, in addition to any specific evaluation systems which may exist.

2. The Inspector General is directed to perform the staff supervision of the assembly of this study and the development of the appropriate agenda and backup material for a future discussion of evaluation systems at a Deputies Meeting. This should be carried out in close coordination with the directorates through whatever officer is nominated by each Deputy as a point of contact for his directorate. The meeting agenda should include the following subjects:

- a. Inventory of current evaluation systems;
- b. Utilization of evaluation systems in program, personnel and other decision-making;


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- c. Interrelationships and comparability of evaluation systems;
- d. Critique of current evaluation systems and gaps, with reference to the needs of unit, office/division, directorate and Agency levels of management respectively;
- e. Recommendations.

3. While we should move with all deliberate speed on this action, I think it important that the discussion and resultant recommendations be fully informed and responsive to CIA's unique requirements for flexibility, security, and adjustment to customer and policy needs. Thus, no date is established for this Deputies' discussion, but you and the Deputies' representatives should recommend a date which will give the time needed to do a thorough and sensitive study responsive to the Director's desires and appropriate for presentation to him.



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W. E. Colby

Executive Director-Comptroller

cc: DD/I
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MOR, 18 Aug 72

6. Andy also said he was working with DIA where a project is underway to produce an experimental product using Bayesian techniques. My discussion of the effort underway in PRG emphasized my feeling that production managers would have to have considerable control over the effort if they were to be receptive to the results, but Andy is of the belief that attention also needs to be given to a community mechanism outside DDI, DDS&T, and DIA. He has an idea that the use of outside consultants and contractors working with key elements of the DCI/IC staff might prove feasible. He also said that Pat Parker of ASD/I has advised him DIA already is using outside consultants to train selected analysts in advanced analytical methodologies.

7. Since Andy had mentioned the need for quality control in his 27 July memorandum, I told him I was aware of an effort already underway to survey evaluation methods and by close of the year was charged with preparing a study recommending how an improved evaluation system could be brought into effect. Pickett asked if he could be put in touch with this group and I declined on the grounds that the activity was being closely held and should be so regarded at least until its report had been completed. I did not identify the office which was preparing the study.

8. We also discussed briefly the discussions PRG has had with OMS/PSS focused on ways and means of identifying the attributes of good and bad analysts. I reported, however, that current indications were this would be a rather expensive project and decision had not been reached as to whether to proceed with it.

9. Andy indicated most of his present activities relate to formulation of a net assessment program. Commander Robin Pirie, who has had experience in OSD/SA prior to recent sea duty, has joined Andy's staff and will work on net assessment matters.

10. With respect to on-going projects, Andy is still reviewing notes on the proposed revision of the India-Pakistan study; the NSSM-69 study is in second redraft; Bob Baraz of State is heading the team on the Arab-Israeli cease-fire study; [redacted] of CIA is heading the Jordan/Fedayeen civil war study; and [redacted] of DIA will do the LAMSON-719 study. [redacted] wants JCS participation in this.

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11. Andy's office is being moved next week to Room 302, E.O.B. The telephone number will remain the same.

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[redacted]
Chief, PRG/IC

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A Excerpts from MOR of [] 12 July 1972, Subj: Conference with Andrew Marshall, NSC Staff

"4. With respect to the expression of community judgments on intentions and objectives, I suggested he might consider proposing that during crisis situations, ONE establish an ad hoc group, including community representation, which would function full-time and prepare SNIEs as necessary to maintain the currency of community judgments as the situation evolved. This would not put ONE in the current intelligence business but would provide a means by which policy makers could be kept aware of intelligence community judgments on major facets of the crisis situation."

"5. Andy said he did not consider the ONE style of writing was adequate for such purposes. In his view, ONE writing is deliberately fuzzy and does not convey the clear and distinct expression of views needed by decision makers."

"11. We discussed the matter of feedback from users to intelligence producers, and Andy's view was that his attempts to increase feedback had not shown much receptivity at the intelligence end. He said the primary reaction has been a 'bristling' or a comment to 'get it in writing from Mr. Kissinger' without much else happening."

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