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THIRD DAY

Senator Symington. We will call the meeting to order and, Mr. Director, it is my understanding that you have an engagement. When do you have to leave?

Mr. Dulles. When you are through with me. I have arranged for General Cabell to take the meeting, so I will suit your convenience.

Senator Symington. That is fine.

Mr. Dulles. This is our regular weekly meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and there are two or three papers --

Mr. Hamilton. I think we might be able to arrange it so Mr. Dulles would be free in an hour, if that is agreeable.

Mr. Dulles. I will suit your convenience.

Senator Symington. Mr. Hamilton, will you commence?

Mr. Hamilton. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ALLEN WELSH DULLES;

ACCOMPANIED BY:

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD E. WATSON

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AND

(RESUMED)

Mr. Hamilton. Do you have anything you would like to say before we start this morning?

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Mr. Dulles. No, I don't think there is, Mr. Hamilton. I thought when the whole record is in, we will review the whole record, and then try to do two things: One, to discuss with you the question of what we feel can be released, and with the chairman, if he desires; and then, second, if there are any ambiguities or corrections, to give them to you promptly.

Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Dulles. There is one point which was raised here the other day, and we have here a prepared chart indicating distances of 500 miles, 1,000 miles, and 1,500 miles from the outmost Soviet real estate. [ ]

We probably could work out a copy of this to put into your record, if you so desire.

Senator Symington. Fine. That would be very interesting.

May we keep this for a while?

Mr. Dulles. Certainly.

Senator Symington. Is it classified?

Mr. Dulles. No.

Senator Symington. It is not. Thank you.

By the way, I spent last night rereading testimony most of the time, and I would like to present to you my opinion, and that is, there is a very great deal of this testimony which could be released without

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violating any classification, and I would like to respectfully urge that you consider that, because I think the people are hungry for news, and a fair amount of news might be far better than a flat statement that it could not be done.

Because it is obvious, in reading it, especially parts of our planned questioning, that some of it can be released. I, for one, regret the constant soothing syrup of some of these remarks which are being made by people in the Department of Defense at this time in reply to things like this thing that Khrushchev said.

I know enough about the British people, I was over there when they were at war, and when a fellow makes those kind of statements that he made, I am not thinking so much of his boasting of what they could do with missiles -- we know that, you have already testified to that in these hearings to a large extent -- nor am I thinking of his statement, "Never shake your fist at a Russian," but I am thinking about his comments, as reported, with respect to President Eisenhower's plan on an aerial inspection. He said he did not want anybody in his bedroom, or something to that effect, as reported in the news this morning.

And this constant sort of saying, "Well, this really doesn't mean anything if they have got the missile," and so forth, is building up to a point where I am afraid there are going to be repercussions from it in the mind of the press and public if it goes too far.

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I would like, if you could, to have you seriously consider releasing as much of this as possible.

Mr. Dulles. I will try to give immediate consideration to that in the next two or three days, and then report to you.

Senator Symington. It is in no sense an argument, or to be contentious, because you will be the final decider. For example, this would be, if it is not classified, an extremely interesting document, and I am glad it is not classified, [ ]

Mr. Dulles. I see no reason whatever why that cannot go in.

Senator Symington. Neither would I.

Mr. Dulles. I am not keying that to any <sup>plane or</sup> [ ] missile.

Senator Symington. That is right.

Mr. Dulles. I am merely keying that to the number of miles from a geographical point. There is nothing classified about that.

Senator Symington. If you do not key it to a missile [ ], then there is no reason for classifying it.

Mr. Dulles. We can give that to you. We can have prints made of it.

Senator Symington. I am sure grateful for that.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

COMMITTEE INSERT - MAP

Senator Symington. In reading last night some of the things you said, for example, they were terribly interesting about their scientific

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training of people, there would be no classification of that. [ ]

I was also reading last night some information which came from Harvard defense studies, that new set-up there, in which they talked about it, in a pamphlet they put out giving quotations on it; and for many, many years I have been interested in this.

Charlie Thomas, the present President of Monsanto Chemical --  
Mr. Dulles. I know him well.

Senator Symington. You know him. He was the one who got me interested in this in 1950, and he was chairman of a board on this when I was Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and he agreed to function as chairman of a board to look into this problem of shortage of scientists.

That was something over six years ago, and it was not like it is now, and I think it would be a good thing to tell the American people as much about this problem as possible.

Mr. Dulles. I agree thoroughly.

I made a talk at Columbia last June, and I kind of started this thing going, because I felt it was very important that we understand where we were going, and the terrific efforts which the Soviet were making, and where they would be vis-a-vis us in a certain period of years.

Senator Symington. Yes.

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Mr. Dulles. This is the only field, possible, where I have left the principle that I started with, that I did not make comparisons, but I thought here I was dealing with an entirely unclassified field, as far as the United States was concerned, since the number of our students and scientists is a matter of well known information.

Senator Symington. One more point on it, and then I will drop it.

You made this talk on April 20, last, yest a few days ago, which Mr. Hamilton read, and which sounded most interesting and impressive, and it showed your concern with it. And certainly it would be well to repeat anything that was in a classified hearing which had already been unclassified, as against just putting a curtain down on all of your testimony; and without in any way fooling the people, the more information we gave them, the better I would like it, which did not help the enemy on any basis.

Without fooling them in any way, it would show there were a lot of things they knew about which perhaps they had not had brought to their attention before.

Mr. Counsel, will you proceed?

Mr. Hamilton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles, I would like to direct your attention to, in general, the period since the war, and in particular to the period of time in which

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we had a monopoly of the A-bomb, and ask you, if you can, to state what, in general, seem to be the principal concerns of the Russians during that period from the standpoint of the development of their own military power, defensively or offensively, if that is not too general a question.

Mr. Dulles. No, Mr. Hamilton. I think that while it is a general question, one can give certain general answers.

It is obvious that the Soviet were making a major effort to achieve a breakthrough in the nuclear field, which effort, while it started even before we made the breakthrough, was redoubled thereafter.

I am told in the scientific field that once a scientist knows a particular scientific objective is achievable, his opportunity to achieve that objective is multiplied many times.

We, therefore, gave the Soviet the assurance that the nuclear breakthrough and the nuclear bomb could be achieved, and both through scientific means and through the redoubling of their espionage on a world-wide front where they could gain anything, they achieved the breakthrough some years after we did.

I think that the Soviet were quite confident that they had time -- there was no indication in this early period, the period 1945 to 1948 and 1949, when they achieved the breakthrough, that we were likely to start aggressive action; that is not the temper of the American people.

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Mr. Hamilton. They did not fear our monopoly or preponderance of power in the military field?

Mr. Dulles. They did not fear it in the sense they did not believe that we would make early use of it.

Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. I think they were fearful of it over the long range, and I think that that had a deterrent effect on them as regards taking aggressive action in that period.

They were also, of course, at that time making their plans with regard to their long-range bomber fleet.

Mr. Hamilton. They were working on that, on long-range delivery systems, at that time?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Would you indicate, General, when you think -- when did they start, for example, work on the BISON? Have you any intelligence on that?

General Watson. When they started working on the BISON, sir?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

General Watson. That would be approximately five or six years ago; approximately five or six years ago.

Mr. Dulles. Were they in the drawing stage earlier than that?

General Watson. Sir, their interest in bomber weapons systems, as such, dates back to the mid-thirties.

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Mr. Hamilton. I think it might be interesting, General, if you would just very briefly recapitulate, as you did for us on Sunday, the Russian decisions in that field.

General Watson. A rather detailed study of Soviet history, as I expressed yesterday --

Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

General Watson. (Continuing) [ ] quite firmly indicates that the Soviets had a considerable interest in the possibilities of a bomber force, as such, in a future war.

Tupolev was an early proponent of bomber weapons systems.

Mr. Hamilton. At what time are we speaking of now, General?

General Watson. Mid-thirties.

Tupolev and others were proponents of the bomber system for many years, and they were trying to sell this concept to Mr. Stalin, without a great deal of success, because the Soviet system was somewhat dominated by Army generals during that period.

Going now to the period of the early forties --

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Mr. Dulles. May I not add there, too, and I think that at that time they were possible more interested in defense than offense, I would reach that judgment. d

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insofar as their national strategy was concerned.

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(Note to the Director:

Here follow 10 pages of unclassified discussion on Soviet bomber development in the 1940's, left on the Record. In master copy, these are from bottom of page 250 to page 260, line 9.)

Senator Symington. So what they did was, until they came up with their B-47 type characteristics, they just rode right along with the TU-4's; is that right?

General Watson. They jumped from the TU-4 right to the BADGER type.

Senator Symington. Right.

General Watson. I understand, sir, they did have several false starts in there; there was evidence of a turboprop or a four-engined bomber.

Senator Symington. Right.

[ ]

Mr. Dulles. Apparently were or were not successful?

General Watson. Apparently was not successful, because they never appeared in their inventory or operational units.

There was evidence of work in the jet bomber field prior to and in a different configuration than the BADGER, which is the equivalent of the B-47.

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Senator Symington. Now you have got them to the BADGER.

Will you go ahead?

General Watson. I have them through the BEAR, which is a later development that we have seen, in the bomber field. And the evidence which we have submitted so far, I believe, has given you a clear picture, to the best of our knowledge and ability, on the BADGER, the BISON, and the BEAR, and our future estimates --

Senator Symington. When did they start designing the BISON?

OFF THE RECORD

General Watson. [ ]

Senator Symington. And we started designing the B-52 when?

General Watson. The closest and rough estimate, now that I can possibly give you on that, sir, would be approximately 1948, sometime in 1948.

Senator Symington. It would be, well, it might be a little earlier than that. I saw a complete mock-up of the B-52 in the late summer of 1949, complete mock-up.

General Watson. Late summer of '49. So it would be possible to have started in '48.

Senator Symington. So it would be '48 or '47. Would you find out, for the record, when the design actually started on the B-52?

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Mr. Hamilton. I think, Senator, I can help you ou that, because we have that chronology; the Defense Department has given us the story.

Senator Symington. What is it?

Mr. Potts. We have it up to the B-52 chronology.

Senator Symington. I think it is very important, because even if it was '48 --

Senator Jackson. It cut their lead time in half.

Senator Symington. Because they have now a lot more BISONs than we have, and they started a lot later than we did. That was the only point, General, I wanted to make.

General Watson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hamilton. What about the situation with respect to the BEAR? Do you have any information, General, that you could give the committee as to how long, in your view, it took them to get that into production?

OFF THE RECORD

General Watson. [ ]

Senator Symington. This is of personal interest to me, which I would like to place in the record: Between the time that General LeMay was the head of SAC, or rather, before he was the head of SAC, he was Commander in Europe at Wiesbaden, and before that he was the head of research and development, which a lot of people forget, and I know that he was in Wiesbaden at the time of the airlift, which would be in June of '48. So it must have been before June of '48 when he and I discussed

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the problem which was a limitation, that we either had to make the B-52 type or the turboprop BEAR type; that we did not have funds and were not allowed to have funds to make both, you see.

General Watson. Yes sir.

Senator Symington. And we finally decided, and he was the prime mover, I think it would be fair to say, in the air staff, to jump the double jump into the all-jet, which, as it turned out, was a very wise move.

General Watson. Very wise.

Senator Symington. And, yet, the Russians compromised their approach to the problem by building both, which interested me, because they had such a limited economy as against ours.

What was the figure on that?

Mr. Engle. We are getting it.

Senator Symington. I am sorry. Will you go ahead, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. Hamilton. What would you say was the lead time on the BADGER, General? Do you have any views on that?

General Watson. It took approximately four years from their initial design layout, evidently, to get into production, to start their production line, for the BADGER, to answer your question, Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. Hamilton. What was roughly the date they began; what roughly was the date they began, and the date they ended?

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OFF THE RECORD

General Watson. [ ]

Mr. Hamilton. On the BADGER?

General Watson. Yes; I believe previous testimony, Mr. Hamilton, covers the start of production.

Mr. Hamilton. Do you recall when that was?

General Watson. I have so many figures in my head.

Mr. Hamilton. That is all right.

General Watson. It is in the original testimony, I believe, of Mr. Dulles. [ ] is the earliest, we believe, that they were in production.

Senator Jackson. So they started in [ ] .

General Watson. They set up in a small way on the BADGER.

Senator Symington. Just to sum up, as I understand it, they started the BISON in [ ] and they will have [ ] of them by the end of this year; and we started the B-52 in 1948, or thereabouts, and we will have how many by the end of 1956?

General Watson. Sir, I don't have that figure in mind.

Senator Symington. Well, let's put that figure in the record here at this point, because I think it is very important.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

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Mr. Dulles. I think maybe some of these figures should come from Defense rather than an intelligence briefing on the figures, Mr.

Chairman.

Senator Symington. They were given to us originally, Mr. Director.

Mr. Dulles. They certainly ought to be in.

Senator Symington. So I am just asking for a repeat, to get my mind clear on it.

What year was the B-47 started?

General Watson. I don't have that, either.

Senator Jackson. The reason I am asking the question whether they were attempting to copy something --

General Watson. No.

Senator Jackson. (Continuing) -- obviously, the propulsion system is entirely different; but what about the configuration and design?

General Watson. Well, oddly enough, the wing span of the BADGER and the B-47 are <sup>comparable.</sup>  $\sqrt{\quad}$  7. Now, this I would charge up to being purely coincidental; it is a designer's choice in this regard.

The other dimensions don't square with the B-47.

Senator Jackson. They have a different propulsion system?

General Watson. A different propulsion system.

Senator Jackson. But the size is about the same, the wing spread is about the same.

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General Watson. But if this is for a weapons system of that variety, and if they settle down and feel that was their requirement, two nations are bound to come up with something about that configuration, because that was the state of the art.

Mr. Hamilton. Did they copy any of the three planes you mentioned, did they copy from us very extensively?

General Watson. There is no concrete evidence that this was a copying exercise on their part.

Mr. Hamilton. You think each of them was an original development?

General Watson. Original development and design.

Senator Jackson. No evidence of espionage so far?

Mr. Dulles. We assume there is continuous espionage.

Mr. Hamilton. Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. Well, the espionage of the open eye, I guess, just walking by these plants where the planes were being produced.

Mr. Hamilton. General Watson, that concludes the questions I have, the deviation from the main line of questioning of Mr. Dulles, and I would like to return to that.

Senator Jackson. Might I go back on this -- were you through on the development of the long-range bombers?

Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

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Senator Jackson. I had just one or two questions.

Senator Symington. Yes.

Senator Jackson. As I understand it, immediately prior to World War II, then they had roughly about 40 of the B-17 type.

General Watson. Prototype of the B-17, roughly equivalent. They are not equivalent in many regards.

Senator Jackson. Yes. They were not the same in every respect, but they were four-motored and considered long-range bombers of that day.

General Watson. That is right. At that time period, they were considered as long-range, but eventually they were called medium-range.

Senator Jackson. General, did the curtailment or eventual elimination of this program have anything to do with their foreign policy, or was it a matter of military decision? I am just wondering about that.

Mr. Dulles. Which dropping are you referring to, Senator?

Senator Jackson. Their original four-motored bomber prior to World War II, immediately prior to World War II. That intrigues me why they --

Mr. Dulles. Well, I have the general idea that along that time they had to emphasize the defense rather than the offense. If you trace Soviet policy vis-a-vis Germany, the Soviets were clearly on the defensive, and they realized it, and they were trying to hastily prepare, knowing what Hitler was doing, but at the same time trying to do everything to avoid

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getting into war, because they were not then building up the offensive capabilities, because they had to concentrate very largely on defensive capabilities, in view of the character of German Nazi strength.

Senator Jackson. Well, that is all I have.

Senator Symington. All right, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. Hamilton. Directing your attention now, Mr. Dulles, to this period after they achieved an atomic bomb, I believe you had said that they then concentrated upon long-range delivery systems.

Mr. Dulles. That is correct. They concentrated -- they put that as one of their top priorities. They did not exclude their continued emphasis on defensive capabilities, radar screens, defensive armament around the City of Moscow, fighters, and the like, so that I wouldn't want to give the impression that they concentrated on the long-range delivery systems to the exclusion of the defense of the homeland, because it is our view that the primary thing that the Soviet leaders want to do is to preserve their position.

They are not vitally interested in a war that somebody else might win. I mean somebody else than the Soviet Union. They want to protect their own position. And we have felt that to protect their own position was one of the guiding motifs of the Soviet leaders during those years, and probably even now.

[ ] Isn't that right, General?

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[REDACTED] That is right.

Mr. Hamilton. Was there, has there been, a change in the attitude that you described, that you attributed to them, Mr. Dulles, when, as I recall it, you said in substance that at least immediately after the war they didn't seem to be concerned that we were going to start a war?

Mr. Dulles. I don't see very much change. If you trace their activities, under Stalin they were extremely aggressive in Greece, as you may recall; then they were aggressive in Berlin, with the blockade; and then, of course, in Korea, at the time when they had a prototype bomb, by the time when they must have realized that the atomic power of the United States was a reality, whereas they had probably a very few nuclear weapons, say, at the time that the Korean War started.

Mr. Hamilton. I am not quite sure, though. What would you say their view is, let us say, as of today, in contrast with their view --

Mr. Dulles. I think they still consider that they are inferior in the nuclear field.

Mr. Hamilton. I meant their view as to what we were likely to do with our power.

Mr. Dulles. I do not think they took into their estimates the idea that we were likely to start a preventive or aggressive war.

I, however, believe that they have always been worried about our overseas bases --

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Dept. of Defense say they never release any statements  
comparing ~~TOP SECRET~~ 2001/08/25 : CIA-RDP80M01389R000400110011-1  
O.K. to release, since keyed to Soviet thinking. *We believe this*

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Mr. Hamilton. You think they have been?

Mr. Dulles. (Continuing) -- as giving us a potential in that direction, even though they did not credit us with the likelihood of using it; and also giving us a great potential in case the Soviets themselves initiated war.

Mr. Hamilton. Would I be right in inferring from that, or wrong, that they would like to get rid -- they would like to get us, deprive us of those bases?

I am not talking now about military action.

Mr. Dulles. We would estimate that that was one of their major foreign policy objectives.

Mr. Hamilton. To deprive us of access to those bases?

Mr. Dulles. To deprive us of those overseas bases.

Mr. Hamilton. Turning again and asking a general question, Mr. Dulles, I don't know whether or not you would care to answer, but with respect to the period since the war, would you say that our estimates as to their scientific, industrial capacity, their capacity in technical fields, have been generally correct, generally incorrect?

Mr. Dulles. I think that --

Mr. Hamilton. High or low?

Mr. Dulles. I think a few years ago we were inclined to underestimate <sup>in these fields.</sup> I think that for the last year or so we have become far more

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realistic. And I say, and I think I mentioned before, that in the intelligence community, we now generally go on the basis that if we can produce something, they also can produce it.

Mr. Hamilton. If we can; that is, if the United States can?

Mr. Dulles. That is correct.

Mr. Hamilton. In other words, you think they are as good as we are, so to speak, in this field?

Mr. Dulles. I didn't quite say that.

Mr. Hamilton. I know you didn't. That is why I --

Senator Jackson. They could produce something similar?

Mr. Dulles. We have many technical advantages. We have a base, a gross national product, that today is roughly three times that of the Soviet Union. That gives you a great advantage.

Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. We have the situation I mentioned before, that throughout the breadth of this country, the young men are mechanically minded. I don't mean they are scientists, but we are producing today between 50 and 70 times as many automobiles, not including trucks, as they are. Well, that means that you have in this country 10 or 20 times as many people who have some mechanical knowledge, because even to drive an automobile gives you some mechanical knowledge. And we have this great backlog, throughout the country, of men and women who are acquainted with these mechanical instruments, which is not the case in the Soviet Union.

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Mr. Hamilton. But you would think that as far as scientific developments are concerned, would it be fair to say, that they are, that you give them, so to speak, credit for having the capacity to do anything that we can do in the field of scientific development?

Mr. Dulles. That is correct.

Mr. Hamilton. Then turning to the field of general industrial potential, so to speak, I suppose that from the military standpoint, would it be true to say that your military might, to the extent that it depends upon the factors that you mentioned, is a function both of what is available in a general way, and what amount of that which is available is being directly utilized for military purposes?

Mr. Dulles. That is correct. They use a larger percentage of their gross industrial product for military purposes than we do. The figures I gave you on automobiles is a dramatic illustration of that.

Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

Would the same thing be true of their personnel, technical personnel, or not?

Mr. Dulles. I think I have indicated that they graduate from their universities a much higher percentage on the technical and scientific side than we do. The actual numbers -- I have given the exact numbers; and in actual numbers the difference is not so great, but their curve is going up much more rapidly than our curve is --

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Mr. Hamilton. What I really has in mind --

Mr. Dulles. (Continuing) -- in that field.

Mr. Hamilton. (Continuing) -- was whether they use their people technically, percentage-wise, in the military field more than we do.

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hamilton. Percentage-wise?

Mr. Dulles. I would say it is much higher, because they are not emphasizing the automotive field, they are not worrying much about television. They are to some extent washing machines, and things of that kind, and refrigerators and all that field. That is secondary.

They are taking it out of the hide of their own people to a very large extent.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Dulles, that is why, when we say we have a larger gross national product, it does not give the true picture of what is going on, because a greater part of our gross national product is going for our higher standard of living. That is essentially the difference, is it not?

Mr. Dulles. That is correct. And I said they are taking it out of the hides of their people; and if you take the amount of steel that they devote to military purposes on a percentage basis, that percentage would be far higher than the percentage we devote; and if you go through aluminum and other basic metals, you reach very much the same thing.

Senator Jackson. They are earmarking a greater part of their national economy for military purposes than we are; that is what it boils down to.

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Mr. Dulles. That is correct.

Mr. Hamilton. What would you say --

Senator Symington. May I interrupt for just a second to clarify the record and just to nail the question down:

When I was with the National Security Resources Board in 1950, the head of a steel company came to me and complained bitterly about cutting down the production of steel for civilian purposes -- that was around -- we had a total production of around 90 million tons -- and the reason that was given to him was that there were too many automobiles already on the road.

And we got to talking about the question of the Russian economy, and he said, "How could you imagine that a country that only had 18 million tons of steel at that time" -- that was the figure he gave me -- "could compete with a country that has 90 million tons of steel?"

We got to talking, and I said, "How much steel do we put into our situation of defense?"

And he said, "I understand about 10 percent."

"And how much do the Russians put in?"

And he said, "Well, that is right, they are supposed to put in about 50 per cent."

"That would be 9 million against 9 million."

He said, "Yes, that is right."

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And then I went back, and I found out we were putting 3 percent in of our settl, and actually it was the fact that Russia was around 9 million , and we were putting in 2 to 3 million, and that bears out the point. That is an actual experience.

Mr. Dulles. Of course, those percentages have been somewhat corrected.

Senator Symington. Yes, I understand we are up to around 120 million tons now; but they are, counting their satellites, around 50 million, counting their satellites.

Mr. Dulles. That is right. We give them credit for fifty.

Senator Symington. So all variations in the figures have been very much in their favor; and that experience, I have never forgotten that one.

Go ahead, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. Hamilton. What would you say, Mr. Dulles, is their present intention with respect to their current long-range air force? What is their -- I should say, what do you regard as being their objective?

Senator Symington. Excuse me. I just want to make my point, and I knew it had happened when LeMay was here, you see.

The initial contract to develop the B-52 was 1946; 1946, not 1947 or 1948.

General Watson. What, sir?

Senator Symington. 1946, for the B. 52.

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General Watson. B-47?

Senator Symington. No, B-52.

I was reasonably sure -- I told Colonel Potts it was 1946, to the best of my memory, because General LeMay was running research and development.

This comes from a chronology submitted by the Department of Defense. And there the point, General -- we are both after the same thing -- the point is, they start, they get a contract for the B-52 in 1946, which may well mean they were designing it in 1945, because they have got to come up with something to justify a contract. And, therefore, the airplane that we have in 1945 or 1946, if we may bend this rubber to its maximum now, they are going to have a lot more of it at the end of 1956 than we do, of an airplane that they, to the best of our knowledge, designed in [ ].

Excuse me. I just wanted to get that in the record.

Mr. Hamilton. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

I was wondering, Mr. Dulles, what you regarded as being their goal for their present long-range bomber air force. How strong an air force would they like to have?

Mr. Dulles. I will have to answer that, I guess, in a very general way.

I think the answer would be enoughness to maintain the policy of the Soviet Union. Now, I grant you that is a very vague term, but I don't know how you can go further than that.

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Mr. Hamilton. I was just wondering. As I recall the conversation on Sunday, I cannot recall it exactly --

Mr. Dulles. Yes/

Mr. Hamilton. (Continuing) -- whether you regard it as their objective to try to get an air force superior to ours, long-range bomber forces to be superior to ours.

Mr. Dulles. I think that they might try for that. One has to take into account the <sup>geographic</sup> ~~strategic~~ position of the two countries. As long as we have overseas bases, we may be able to reach targets, say, with medium bombers <sup>while</sup> ~~which~~ they, to reach comparable targets, would have to have ~~long-range bombers.~~ <sup>So it might be they would say, "Well, we need</sup> ~~long range needs~~ <sup>more long-range bombers than the United States does."</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~accomplish the same mission that we could accomplish, let us say, with long range and medium bombers, assuming that we can maintain our overseas bases and our greater nearness to their heartland than they are today to our heartland.~~ <sup>Today,</sup> ~~We have that position of greater nearness~~ <sup>to their heartland,</sup> ~~today,~~ and if we continue to maintain it, it is reasonable to assume that we might concentrate on different types of bomber fleet than they.

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D.K.  
M

Mr. Hamilton. I really was not talking so much about what we were doing as what you thought their objective might be.

Mr. Dulles. Well their objective would be that if war comes, to be able to deal what they would consider to be a crippling blow to the

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United States in order to diminish our great industrial potential. I think that the Soviet Union has a knowledge of something which the Kaiser ignored and which Hitler ignored, namely, that in a protracted war, the country with the greatest industrial potential in existence is the country which is likely to win the war.

And, therefore, their objective would be to have a force which could deal a devastating blow to American industrial establishments.

25X1A9a I would like to ask [REDACTED] if he would like to add anything, because he has been particularly studying this question.

Mr. Hamilton. I am sure you will understand why I am asking this question: I would like to know whether it is your own general views, or whether it is based on intelligence.

25X1A9a Mr. Dulles. Well, it is based on our general understanding. As I say, if [REDACTED] could just say a word, he is Vice Chairman of our Board of National Estimates, who has been working on the general problem.

Mr. Hamilton. I wonder if [REDACTED] would tell us, for the record, a little bit of his background.

25X1A9a [REDACTED] My background?

Senator Symington. General, have you been sworn?


25X1A9a [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

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25X9A5


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Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much.

General --

25X1A9a

 In my present assignment, I have been acting as Vice Chairman of the Board of National Estimates.

I would say that the Soviets would probably include among their war objectives, an effort to cut down our capabilities to mobilize and to mount offensive operations, and an effort to nullify our nuclear capabilities, both in the United States and overseas.

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25X1A9a

Mr. Hamilton. Then I would like to ask -- pardon me, sir.

[REDACTED] And another objective is somewhat different than those two, but it overlaps, and would involve attacks against big industrial centers and centers of population.

25X1A9a

Mr. Hamilton. Well, now, if I may, I would like to --

[REDACTED] Those are three probable objectives.

Mr. Hamilton. I would like to put to you the same question I put to Mr. Dulles: Whether your estimate as to their intentions in the regards that you mentioned, is based upon specific intelligence, or whether it is simply a matter of inference from the fact that, so to speak, they are developing a long-range bomber force and putting emphasis on it, and you would suppose that would be their intentions, if you see the difference I am trying to get at.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] Yes.

I do not believe that those objectives are based on any known mind-reading of the Kremlin or special knowledge of their plans or intentions. From an analysis of the whole situation which they face and which we face, if they wished to win a general war, they definitely are going to have to take us out or cut us down.

And it is my judgment that those three objectives would be the objectives they would probably seek *to attain.*

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Mr. Hamilton. It is what they ought to seek, in other words, so to speak.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] If they are going into a general war situation, they would have to attack the U.S., and they would probably go after those objectives.

Mr. Hamilton. The reason I asked the question, I got the impression -- and I don't know whether it was the intention that Mr. Dulles wanted to leave --- that it was his estimate their primary target would be our plants, our industrial plants, and facilities of that kind.

25X1A9a

Mr. Dulles. I would certainly add to that, as [REDACTED] has, our overseas bases and, obviously, the airfields and air installations from which a retaliatory force might take off.

Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

Senator Jackson. SAC would be first.

Mr. Hamilton. That is what I am getting at. Would you pick our bases?

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] First; their fear of our retaliation puts this first.

Senator Symington. Let me ask this direct question. I did not understand this; We have been talking about '52 and '57 so much, but would it not be their thought their primary original target would be our capacity to retaliate from this country as well as from foreign bases?

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Mr. Dulles. Their first objective.

Senator Symington. In other words, they would want to destroy Barksdale and Offut, and destroy all the places which had planes; isn't that true?

Mr. Dulles. That is correct.

Senator Symington. From all I can gather, it is a fact if Goering had stuck to the southern airfields of England in 1940 -- and I was over there shortly thereafter -- he would have won the Battle of Britain. At the time he quit and went to the cities, there were five planes left in England, five fighter planes left in England left in reserve.

So inasmuch as we gave them all the information we had with respect to the concept of strategic bombing, General Vandenberg going to Moscow and doing it himself, towards the end of the war, presumably they know all about those things themselves, do they not?

Mr. Dulles. We believe they have a very good knowledge of that.

Mr. Hamilton. I would like, if I might, Mr. Dulles, to pursue with you, perhaps with General Watson, as the case may be, the question which was touched upon yesterday, but I don't believe the record was quite clear on it, as to when we first -- let me get at it this way: When, in your opinion, did they first start emphasizing as a high priority the development of an intercontinental missile?

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Mr. Dulles. Well, I think we have testified as to that. We have given you the German experiment that the Soviets took over in part, very substantial part, in 1945, and the fact that since that time they have been developing their capability; and obviously anybody in this field has the intercontinental missile as his final objective.

Mr. Hamilton. But you have mentioned, for example, as I recall it, in the case of systems, you have used the phrase "redoubled their effort." Has their work in the very long-range ballistic missile been characterized by one of steady emphasis, or has there been a time during the period in which you have had the impression that they, so to speak, started hitting the problem much harder than they had theretofore?

Mr. Dulles. I would say this --

Mr. Hamilton. In other words, it is a difficult question to answer, I know.

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Mr. Dulles. When you have developed a nuclear capability, your ballistic missile takes on greatly new value, and when you establish a thermonuclear warhead, then your ballistic missile goes up greatly in the scale.

If we did not have a nuclear and thermonuclear capability in Russia and in the United States, I would doubt very much whether either of us would be spending a lot of time on guided missiles merely to send a little TNT over.

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Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. I don't know.

Would you bear that out?

General Watson. Yes.

Mr. Hamilton. Did your intelligence information indicate that they accelerated their work on the ballistic missile after they got the A-bomb?

Mr. Dulles. Excuse me, I am sorry.

Mr. Hamilton. All right. If you are refreshing your recollection, you continue to do that.

Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

Senator Jackson. Well, the explosion was in August of 1949, the first A-bomb.

Mr. Dulles. ~~[I have that; is]~~ that <sup>is</sup> correct?

Senator Jackson. In the latter part of August, 24th, 27th of August.

It does not matter.

~~Mr. Dulles. I should know that date, but --~~

~~Senator Symington. We told about it in September; September 17, I think.~~

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Mr. Dulles. That was before I was here.

Senator Jackson. The explosion was in August.

O.K.  
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Mr. Dulles. I think it was August 1949, isn't that correct, for the first Soviet nuclear test?

Senator Symington. I think it was September. I may be wrong.

Senator Jackson. We announced it in September.

Mr. Dulles. We announced it in September, I think, but I can put that in the record perfectly easily.

Senator Symington. Do that. I think it was in September, the explosion; I still think so. I may be wrong.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

Mr. Hamilton. Would you continue?

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Symington. Let's have it for the record.

Mr. Dulles. We will have it in the record. We were talking, though, about the atomic bomb?

Senator Jackson. I was talking about the atomic bomb in 1949.

Mr. Dulles. I think it was August; August, September. We will get that.

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Senator Symington. General Watson would like to make a statement for the record.

General Watson. Yes, sir.

We were discussing previously the time periods for design, detailed design of the BISON and the B-52.

Off the Record

I think it would be correct to state detailed design drawings for the B-52 started in 1948, and that was the kind of comparison I was trying to make, believing it to be of interest to your committee.

Senator Symington. Well, I still cannot quite agree with you. I know the first production order for B-52s that I personally signed was in March of 1949; and it is inconceivable to me that we would not have gone ahead with that.

But let's you and me have a discussion about that at some other time.

General Watson. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. By the way, speaking of information, how long is it going to be before we get the answers to those questions which Senator Jackson asked to be --

Senator Jackson. That is to the counsel.

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Senator Symington. How about that, Mr. Sprague?

Mr. Sprague. I think we will have them, sir, tomorrow.

Senator Symington. Fine.

Mr. Sprague. I told Senator Jackson Monday, but the Air Force is working on them in connection with bringing them up in the light of any changes in intelligence information since last July.

Senator Jackson. They were the same interrogatories I submitted back in July.

Mr. Sprague. They were answered by Mr. Wilson; I believe, back in July.

Senator Jackson. Yes.

Mr. Sprague. We are just bringing them up in the light of new information or new facts.

Senator Symington. So you think we will have them tomorrow?

Mr. Sprague. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Mr. Counsel, will you go ahead?

Senator Jackson. You mean there are so many changes in the answers since last summer?

Mr. Sprague. I haven't been working on them myself, sir.

Senator Jackson. I thought it was just going to be a typing job; retype the answers.

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Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Dulles, how would you characterize the extent of the effort that the Soviets have expended upon the development of the IRBM? Is there any way that we can get at that?

Mr. Dulles. They are apparently developing a family of missiles, and it is rather difficult to tell, in a family, how much attention is given to one child and how much to another.

Mr. Hamilton. The members of the family would be all of the four that we talked about yesterday?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

I would assume that they would put high priority on the intermediate missile. [ ]

I cannot answer how they would rate that priority as against the ICBM. But I would think that they would give it a very high priority.

Have you anything to add, [REDACTED] on that, as to the priority between the ICBM and the IRBM and the short-range missile?

25X1A9a

Mr. Hamilton. While these gentlemen are conferring, am I correct in saying that those views of yours are assumptions and are not based upon any concrete intelligence as to Russian intentions as to priority or effort expenditure, sir?

Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

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Senator Symington. Would counsel yield there a minute?

Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

Senator Symington. I would like to ask a couple of questions.

Do you feel there are missiles, is there any intelligence that justifies any statement that in some fields we are ahead of them? Can you put your hand on it in the missile field? Do we know that in any places?

Mr. Dulles. I avoid comparisons.

Off the Record

Senator Symington. [ ] How about the SNARK?

Mr. Dulles. [ ~~The SNARK and a family of other air-breathing missiles.~~ ] *OFF the Record*

~~Senator Symington. You said at Banana River. Did you see anything else at Banana River, outside of the SNARK?~~

~~Mr. Dulles. Oh, yes, I saw quite a few.~~

~~Senator Symington. I mean of the long-range missiles.~~

~~Mr. Dulles. Well, they were intermediate and long-range.~~ ] *End off the Record*

Senator Symington. I see.

Well, the SNARK is subsonic, is it not?

Mr. Dulles. The SNARK is subsonic, I believe, Isn't that correct?

It is just under --

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Senator Symington. From the standpoint of modern warfare, unless you control the air it would be a pretty worthless unit.

Mr. Dulles. I am no war-gamer; I can't tell you.

Senator Symington. What worries me a little bit is that I have seen some assertions, and I was just wondering what the CIA's position was, that we are ahead in certain fields; and yet I have also seen statements denying the fact that they are ahead in the intermediate-range missile field. [ ]

Mr. Dulles. Well, in our estimates, as I have indicated, we do not go into comparisons.

Senator Symington. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. We just try to keep our eye on the ball --

Senator Symington. I respect that.

Mr. Dulles. (Continuing) -- as to exactly what we think the Soviets are doing and what they have reached.

Senator Symington. I respect that, Mr. Director. But as a member of the Legislative Branch, we cannot help but take the great opportunity of asking you for information in order to clarify ourselves with respect to some of the statements which have been made about the missile field.

For example, and if you were in my position as a Senator or in that of Senator Jackson, you would be somewhat mystified, I think, based on statements that are made about the missile picture as against the

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classified information we get, both from you and from the Department of Defense. That is my only point.

I was just wondering if you knew of any field in which we were definitely ahead. [ ]

Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

Senator Symington. There was a time, six or seven years ago, in the Air Force when we liked the air-breathing compared to the ballistic missile, and that was changed primarily for two reasons, weight and the discovery of the larger vane (?); right?

General Watson. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. That is a story I am quite well acquainted with.

General Watson. Yes.

Senator Symington. It may be they were just a little bit earlier than we were in being smart, and therefore, [ ] went into the ballistic missile. Is that not a possibility?

Senator Symington. And if that is true, it misleads a bit to say they are ahead in carriages and we are ahead in automobiles, or vice versa; we are not talking about the same thing, are we?

Would you not rather have, for example, a finished ICBM which was a ballistic job than a finished Navaho?

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General Watson. That would depend, sir, upon the mission I was trying to accomplish at this point, whether I would select the Navaho to do the job or the ICBM.

Senator Symington. Where is the emphasis now in the Air Force, on the ICBM or on an air-breathing missile?

Mr. Dulles. Here you are getting way out of my field.

Senator Symington. I know, but we are getting into the General's.

Mr. Dulles. This, I think, ought really to go to Defense.

Senator Jackson. That is hard to dispute at this point.

Senator Symington. I think what we asked him at this point is whether it is 11:28. The President stated it. The President stated there was emphasis on the ICBM.

I would like to pursue this with the General for a few minutes. If people -- presumably statements are made based on intelligence reports, and it is clear as light now to the American people, based on the statements of the Command-in-Chief, that the ICBM and comparable units have the highest priority around. If I am wrong on that --

General Watson. That is evident.

Senator Symington. (Continuing) -- then I cannot read right.

Therefore, if we say that they are ahead in things that we have given a lower classification to in this country and they are ahead in things

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that we have given the highest classification, then are we not in effect making a misleading statement, in your opinion? That is my thought.

Mr. Hamilton. I think that is a tough one.

Senator Symington. Well, I will withdraw it, then. But I would just like the record to show that when we asked, Mr. Director, what they are ahead in, you say, for example, that they are ahead in -- or when we ask what they are behind in, excuse me, you say they are behind in something which, unfortunately, we gave a priority to, which was a very high priority, maybe too long, based on what we have now discovered; so that they may have shifted earlier into the ballistic missile field. That was my point.

Mr. Dulles. Well, I said really a slightly different thing. I said that in the intelligence field, we did not go into comparisons.

Off the Record

Now, it is up to others to judge what importance to give to that field.

Take the situation of aircraft carriers. If you ask me whether we were ahead of them in aircraft carriers, I would say we were ahead of them.

Senator Symington. I think I could guess your answer to them.

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Mr. Dulles. Because there is no evidence they have got aircraft carriers.

Senator Symington. But you say what we have done work in, in the meetings here we have talked about, I think Senator Jackson brought out, four types of missiles: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ~~and the evidence here is that they are ahead of us in those -- certainly in three of those first four types, you see.~~

And inasmuch as that is the missile we are talking about -- we are not talking about aircraft carriers or dodo birds or sullies, and things of that character -- it looks to me as if they are way ahead of us in the missile field that counts, from the standpoint of relative strength.

And I was just wondering, and I can appreciate that it is an unfair question to ask you --

Mr. Dulles. I am not drawing any such -- getting into that field, I am not drawing any conclusions as to aheadness.

Senator Symington. Yes.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Dulles, what was our information on missiles prior to a year and a half ago. of the Soviet development? What were your estimates a year and a half ago in this field, or two years ago?

25X1A9a

Mr. Dulles. Do you remember, [ ] I cannot remember. We had estimates on missiles for some time; what is the earliest?

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Senator Jackson. What were you estimating in October, 1954,  
roughly?

Mr. Dulles. It will take just a minute.

25X1A9a Senator Jackson. Take a look at it.

[REDACTED]

Off the Record

25X1A9a Senator Jackson. That is what I am getting at.

[REDACTED]

Actual intelligence.

25X1A9a Senator Jackson. That is what I am getting at. [ ]

[REDACTED]

Off the Record.

Senator Jackson. Well, General --

Mr. Dulles. May I just add, we also had some evidence from  
returned German scientists and from defectors, and sources of that kind.

[ ]

Senator Jackson. Yes, But the lag there was quite substantial,  
was it not? I mean, the information they were able to give occurred  
some time previous; I mean, to get it up to date would be rather difficult.

Did not the Russians-- I always understood they had this program of  
declassifying them on down the line, so about the time they were released,

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they had <sup>not</sup> been on a real hot project for some time, generally speaking.

I do not want to get into --

Mr. Dulles. They have not released much on their ballistic missiles until Mr. Khrushchev spoke in England.

25X1A9a [REDACTED] That is a bit of a boast.

Senator Jackson. Possibly, if it was someone else than Khrushchev, Mr. Bulganin, I might have given a little more credibility to it. I think he was speaking off the cuff, and he is a little impulsive.

We have had some estimates about their warhead capabilities. Actually, they are hitting at the warhead more than anything else.

25X1A9a What I am getting at, General, is, [ ] you do not feel that you are overstating the Russian capability at this time, do you, in this field?

[REDACTED] We do not. [ ]

25X1A9a Senator Jackson. Yes.

[REDACTED] For some of the weapons, of course, if we have no concrete evidence of seeing one, we still can estimate their capability to produce if they wish to follow it up.

Senator Jackson. Well, you operate on the premise [ ] if we can do something, they have the capability of doing it. Whether they are actually doing it is something we would have to know what their policy is.

But you give them credit for the capability, that is, the

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capability of doing what we are doing. So from that premise, you have to fill in a lot of holes, just to be safe. I mean, you can at least state it in terms of a capability, even if you do not have any information.

25X1A9a

 That is right, *when firm intelligence is lacking.*

Senator Jackson. Now, in the B-52 field, you will recall we had some estimates that finally turned out to be [ ] wrong. [ ]

Mr. Dulles. You mean the BISON?

Senator Jackson. I mean the BISON. I am talking about the long-range.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Senator Jackson. One of the estimates on the BISON was [ ] off, it turned out. [ ]

Now, that is what goes on when you have the kind of intelligence that you cannot always corroborate.

Mr. Hamilton. You are not suggesting that is anybody's fault?

Senator Jackson. I am not saying that. But I am just saying that you have a real difficult job here.

Mr. Dulles. We are not always right, Senator. I wish we were, but we are not.

Senator Jackson. I am not critical of anyone.

Mr. Dulles. I know.

Senator Symington. You have been plenty right, though.

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Senator Jackson. What I am trying to get at here, I have listened since 1949 to briefings on all these things. The thing that I have noted, by and large, unless it is in a minor area, we have never overestimated them.

I do not want to be one who is trying to be an alarmist, but we have not overestimated in the big field, I am talking about.

Mr. Hamilton. I think Mr. Dulles testified that it wasn't until about a year ago -- he thought up until about a year ago, as I recall his testimony, that our tendency had been to underestimate.

*Dec note*  
Mr. Dulles. I would say a little more than a year ago; put it two years. I think the tendency was to underestimate the Soviet up to, say, around two years ago.

Senator Jackson. We underestimated the Soviets up to [ ] I sat right in this room when the Air Force briefed us on the BISON.

Senator Symington. That is right. So did I.

Senator Jackson. Then they came back [ ] and admitted, and it is in the record, that they were off. [ ]

I would like to have that at this point, Mr. Chairman, if that statement is not correct, I think we ought to have some kind of a summary of the Air Force estimates.

Now, this is the Air Force, Mr. Dulles. I do not know what the CIA had, but I assumed it would be an agreed report from the intelligence community.

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I would like to know.

Mr. Dulles. I don't know. I don't know what the briefing was.

Senator Jackson. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to have this clarified, if it could be done, by a statement of the Air Force.

Senator Symington. That will be done by placing in the record this [ ] testimony given by the Air Force, I believe the Chief of Staff, given before this committee, and by the Secretary; and the subsequent testimony was given -- was that subsequent to [ ]

Senator Jackson. No. The Estimate I am referring to was in [ ]

Senator Symington, That is the first.

Senator Jackson. And subsequently corrected in [ ]

Senator Symington. In [ ]; that is what I asked. Subsequent to [ ]

Senator Jackson. So my point is, we were underestimating at least in this one crucial field, up to [ ]

Senator Symington. Without objection, that will be put in the record at this point.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

Senator Jackson. I think it is dangerous to overestimate them, obviously, as well as it is to underestimate them, because you can

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start your whole economy off in the wrong direction. But I do believe that there have been some dangerous tendencies in the past, especially where you get into speculative areas, to underestimate.

That was the only comment I wanted to make.

Mr. Chairman, at some time before we finish today, I wanted to ask some questions on personnel.

Senator Symington. Of Mr. Dulles?

Senator Jackson. Yes.

Senator Symington. Mr. Hamilton, how much farther have you got to go?

Mr. Hamilton. I only have a few more questions.

Senator Symington. Let's let Mr. Hamilton proceed to the end of his interrogation.

Senator Jackson. I was talking about their Air Force personnel. Go ahead.

Mr. Dulles. Go ahead, Mr. Hamilton. Excuse me.

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Dulles, do you have any intelligence as to the effort which the Soviets might be currently making to achieve, to use a phrase, I believe, that you used earlier in another context, a major breakthrough in the field of the development of scientific weapons, offensively or defensively?

Mr. Dulles. I think they are making a major effort in that field. I would like General Watson just to say a word in connection with that

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new Russian high-level scientific establishment that you were talking to me about, and about which you made a study.

General Watson. Yes, sir.

I would like to start in by saying that in some cases, I believe we have been hit-or-miss, placing insufficient emphasis on Soviet ability to implement by decisive selection and decisive action an advanced technical concept.

To amplify, during the last six or seven years, tracing the Soviet advancements quite carefully, we have noted a tremendous upswing in the attention and the effort they are paying to attempts to rectify an imbalance between the Western world and themselves in the technological and scientific fields.

And I say this is a considerable effort, and they have been doing it by several devices and several methods. They have taken steps to speed up their decision-making process in the scientific and technological fields, particularly by direction and concentrated effort on those weapons systems they feel they should have in their inventory now and in the future. This direction and concentrated effort is somewhat precise, and their analysis of these problems appears to be somewhat precise.

Funds are being made readily available for such programs, particularly in research and scientific efforts. The incentives are tremendous; and their way of doing business allows for tremendous progress.

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Mr. Hamilton. What kind of incentives did you have in mind?

General Watson. Monetary, and prestige incentives, through awards such as Stalin prizes and Orders of Lenin.

Mr. Dulles. No longer to be called Stalin prizes, however.

General Watson. I suspect there might be a change. (Laughter)

There have been many of the Stalin prizes awarded, and leading technical personalities have been placed in the highest level of society in the Soviet Union.

To reach this level and to be accorded such privileges is greatly sought after, and it is a tremendous motivation. It is not surprising, therefore, that many scientists and technical personnel reach this level.

This has been done and accomplished in large measure, as we see it, through these incentives.

The competition within the Soviet Union for these higher positions is very high, and it is very rough.

On the other side of the coin you have somewhat equal reward for failure in a completely opposite direction. This is made --

Senator Symington. May I ask a question that is pertinent to what you are saying, Mr. Counsel.

Is there any known case where we have to any real degree overestimated the Soviet's capacity to come through with war equipment? We know there

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many cases where we have underestimated them. Is there any case where we have overestimated them?

General Watson. I can't think of any at the moment.

Senator Symington. How about you, Mr. Dulles?

General Watson. I am sure there are some.

Mr. Dulles. I would like to look at that and put it in the record at this point, if there is any clear evidence on that. That is a hard thing to prove, as is the other.

Senator Jackson. That is pretty hard to prove?

Mr. Dulles. If you underestimated and you see things, then you know what you have done. If you have overestimated, you may never know definitely whether you have overestimated or not. So there is a little difference in those two. You can be proved wrong in one case, and in the other case you are always in doubt --

General Watson. There is always a tendency in the intelligence community --

Mr. Dulles. (Continuing) -- is that right?

Senator Symington. Within reason. (Laughter)

For example, if we had started the Korean War believing that they had a great number of MIGs, and then we found they did not have any, that would be a practical illustration. Instead, we started, believing they did not have any, and found they had a great number.

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And you could take case after case where, for example, if we had thought that they would not have improvements, and so forth, in bomber production -- you know, at the time when they were actively arguing about the fact there were no jet fighters in the Soviet, in 1948 here, one day General Vandenberg and I were flying from Frankfurt to Berlin, and we saw a good number without going out of the corridor, they were stacked right there on the field, jet fighters. So there would be some cases.

So I cannot quite agree with you.

Mr. Dulles. That was before my day (laughter) in this particular job.

(The information regarding overestimates is as follows:)

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Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Dulles, what would be your view as to the course the Soviet would take in the event they achieved a major breakthrough which gave them, stated as strongly as possible, the kind of dominance vis-a-vis our position that we had vis-a-vis theirs when we had a monopoly of the atomic bomb and long-range delivery systems?

Mr. Dulles. That requires a bit of crystal gazing, and gets into the field of high policy. But one has certain historical precedents.

The general tendency of a country, once it feels it has a satisfactory military position, is to stiffen up its diplomacy, if it has demands that it wants to make.

The United States in such a position does not have anything that it really wants except peace. These other countries are in a somewhat different position. They may have certain objectives that they think are very important, and when they feel that they are in a secure military position, whether they judge rightly or wrongly, they are inclined to try to take diplomatic advantage of that position.

Hitler is an example. He miscalculated in the long run; not in the short run. But when he felt his military position was

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adequate, he then took steps to try to achieve a position in the world that he wanted Germany to have. And that has been true in the historical past.

You only have the question today as to whether, in view of the really new character that a war would take, whether there will be mutual deterrents, war being so terrible, and the effect of starting a nuclear war so tragic, that it may be that that will change what I might call the historical course of the past and the judgment that leaders will take in any country under the conditions you postulate.

Mr. Hamilton. I was really assuming, it may be an extreme assumption, they made a breakthrough of such a character that they could launch and win a war against us before we could retaliate, which was substantially the position, as I understand it as a layman, that we had when we had the monopoly in the atomic bomb and the long-range delivery system.

Mr. Dulles. Well, it is, of course, a question as to whether they would ever feel they had reached that position, but it would give the type of people that one has in the Kremlin quite a blackmailing position if they ever clearly felt they had reached that situation.

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Mr. Hamilton. Is it your view that they still have as an objective, producing a situation in which the world will be largely communistic or socialistic?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, I believe that is still their objective. They have not changed that objective. I feel that they would vastly prefer to try to achieve that position by measures short of provoking a world war.

And I think they feel that they still have some potential in that direction. If you analyze the speeches at the 20th congress of the Communist Party, you will see that idea running through those speeches. For tactical and over-all political reasons, they are playing down the direct use of force as against the taking over of the free world by popular front parties and by working through Communist elements that they have in various countries.

Now, whether that will remain their technique after they have achieved a further position of military strength is very difficult to predict.

Mr. Hamilton. Yes, I appreciate that.

Would that objective include us, in the sense that you would think that they would have as an objective, making this country communistic or socialistic?

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Mr. Dulles. They have been backing the general theory that there were inherent defects in capitalism, and that those inherent defects would make possible a change even here. I do not think they bank very much upon their ability to subvert us from within, an objective they might easily have with regard to certain European countries which have large Communist Parties and many countries of Asia which in turn have large Communist Parties.

Senator Jackson. Right at that point, the Russian economist-- I cannot think of his name -- who was repudiated a while back, during the Stalin era, for indicating that we would not have a depression, I notice has been elevated to the forefront recently in his statement in which he indicated the reasons why he did not think the historic Marxist concept of the contradictions in the capitalistic system any longer prevailed.

25X1A9a

That was just the other day; I think about three days ago.

25X1A9a

Mr. Dulles. I had not noted that. Had you noted that, [REDACTED]

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] I am sorry, sir, I was looking up something.

Mr. Dulles. Do you remember the name of that --

Senator Jackson. It does not matter. I was just saying this Russian economist, who was in disgrace under Stalin for his statements and publications about --

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Mr. Dulles. Not Lysenko?

Senator Jackson. He is a scientist, he is the geneticist.

Mr. Dulles. Right.

Senator Jackson. I am not talking about him. I am talking about the Russian economist -- I cannot remember these Russian names. He had taken the line, during Stalin's era, that we would not have this depression which was inevitable in Marxist thinking; and now he has come out with a statement which they have given quite a bit of publicity to in Pravda, about three or four days ago, in which he pointed out the fact that changes had been made in the capitalistic system.

He based it on several things -- on defense economy bolstering it up, various steps taken by the Government to maintain an economy, and the collapse that had always been predicted by the Marxist-Stalinists no longer applied.

Mr. Dulles. I will look that up. It is very interesting.

(Add for the Record: The economist referred to was

Vargas.)

Senator Jackson. It was just three days ago.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

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Senator Jackson. It is a big, long story in the New York Times.

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Dulles, what would be your view as to the kind of intelligence the Russians may have about us as far as our military establishment is concerned?

Mr. Dulles. I think they have very good intelligence about us.

Mr. Hamilton. Would that apply with respect to forces or elements of military power that we have in being, like the B-52, SAC --

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Mr. Dulles. Oh, yes.

Mr. Hamilton. Generally?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Hamilton. Would you expect them to know how many planes we had, things of that kind?

Mr. Dulles. I think they could make a very good estimate.

Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. And several years ago we took a series of very able people in the professional field, they were not technicians, and asked them--gave them no intelligence that came from other than available sources, and asked them to make a series of estimates as to the American position, put themselves in the position of being Soviet--

Mr. Hamilton. War-gamers, intelligence officers, so to speak?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, but only using the overt material that was made available in the press--I was going to say Congressional hearings.

Mr. Hamilton. You had better not. (Laughter)

Leaks, I suppose.

Mr. Dulles. And all other, through all other means. And they drew up a very interesting report that was quite surprising, and that

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was circulated. This was done in <sup>1951.</sup> [1952.]

Mr. Hamilton. You mean surprisingly accurate?

Mr. Dulles. Surprisingly accurate.

Mr. Hamilton. And that was without benefit of any espionage?

Mr. Dulles. Without benefit of any espionage, and without benefit of any intelligence that we had gathered by secret means.

Mr. Hamilton. Would you expect them to know, for example, with some degree of accuracy, how many, and of what types, of planes SAC has operational?

General Watson. I would think so.

Mr. Dulles. Yes, I would certainly think so.

Mr. Hamilton. And would you expect them to know how many of various kinds of planes we are producing?

Mr. Dulles. Oh, yes, within--

Mr. Hamilton. Fighter planes, B-52?

Mr. Dulles. Within a margin of error, yes.

Senator Symington. What margin of error?

Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. What would you think on that; ten per cent?

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Senator Jackson. How could they miss on the B-52?

Senator Symington. Just let me have the question answered.

25X1A

[REDACTED] The question is the margin of error?

Senator Symington. That is correct, on our production of planes.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] Using the open sources?

Mr. Dulles. No; all available sources, espionage and everything.

Senator Symington. I do not want to get into espionage. Based on the information that is given out by the trade magazines, and the newspapers, and the local communities producing airplanes, and so forth, what do you think any margin of error would be in what the Russians knew about our production of airplanes? That is the question.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] I would have to give a pure guess and, not having a basis for an estimate, I would certainly think it would be within ten per cent.

Senator Symington. Let me ask you this question: Have you got any reason to think there would be any margin of error at all, and if so, what would those reasons be?

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25X1A9a

[REDACTED] That the published information might be in error  
itself.

Mr. Dulles. And we change our minds.

Senator Symington. Let me pursue this a minute, if I may.

Senator Jackson asked the question, and can I ask the question  
there?

Senator Jackson. Yes.

25X1A9a Senator Symington. How many people in the Boeing plant know  
what the production of the B-52 is, out of some 50,000 people?

[REDACTED] I don't know.

25X1A9a Mr. Dulles. We wouldn't know that.

[REDACTED] We don't know their work assignments.

Senator Symington. General, you have been in a good many plants?

General Bull. Very few.

Senator Symington. In the war, we published the fact that you had  
five or six hundred planes per month, and published the number of  
B-17s and B-24s when we were actually at war.

In plants you put signs on the planes, "No. 32," "33," "34," and  
people walking out saying, "We got old 34 out today." Thousands of

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people in the Boeing plant would know what the production was, per month, of B-52s, would they not?  
25X1A9a

[REDACTED] I would think they would.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

Senator Symington. Yes, I would be glad to.

Senator Jackson. In the case of the B-52, U. S. Highway 99 goes right by the gate. Every plane, every B-52, produced at the Seattle plant can be sighted by a person driving on Highway 99.

One of the jokes that we had out home was, when they had these Russian cultural experts or home experts that were out there, they drove them way around the other side of the field so they would not see it.

25X1A9a But all they have to do is--

[REDACTED] Hire a checker.

Senator Jackson. (Continuing) -- hire a checker, go by day by day, and he couldn't miss. There is only one way they come out.

So in B-52 production, if they are off--

Mr. Dulles. Do they bear distinctive numbers?

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Senator Jackson. No numbers.

Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

Senator Symington. Mr. Director, do you think there is any difficulty in getting information about the B-52 by persons who are not cleared by the FBI?

Mr. Dulles. I assume they could get it.

Senator Symington. I ran a test, if they were working 50,000 people, and the test was that an absolute minimum of 20 per cent of those people would know the production; and I suppose of the 20 per cent, less than one-half of one per cent have to go through any clearance to get a job.

Mr. Dulles. I have said on many occasions, and said it publicly, that I think we tell the potential enemy too much, and I have repeated that again and again.

Senator Symington. Well, I mean, what steps have we taken to prevent--to have clearance by manufacturers of employees in plants? We have no preventive measures, and thousands of people know it. They go down into hotels and into bars, into rooms all over the city,

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and they know what the production of 52s is, and then the matters are all published.

What is the reason for not formalizing that?

Mr. Dulles. You are getting now into the military security problem, which is a terribly difficult problem--and I am not acquainted with it--and into the field of the FBI.

25X1A9a

Senator Symington. Well, [REDACTED] statement is that within 10 per cent, if we made ten B-52s last month, his feeling is that knowledge would be obtained from open sources within one of ten. Do you agree to that?

Mr. Dulles. I would agree to that, yes.

Senator Symington. Fred, you had a question you wanted to ask.

Mr. Rhodes. I just thought you have got to draw a distinction at one point. I know Senator Jackson knows this fact, that at Sandia Base and Kirtland Field, there is evidence the Russians were able to make a rather firm determination as to our ability to mount an atomic attack, and there was evidence that this information went out of the country.

I think there has to be a line where the distinction is drawn, or a line at which you decide that you have got to talk in order of magnitude

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rather than in exact numbers.

I defer to Senator Jackson on that point, because I am sure he is aware of that.

Senator Jackson. I am sure of that. There is no question about that.

Are we through in this area? There was a thing I wanted to get into, to go back to intelligence on the missile, which we did not finish before.

Mr. Hamilton. I was just going to ask one or two more questions about what this appraisal showed in the way the Russians can get from public sources, Mr. Dulles, and I would like to ask one in regard to the estimate this group made as to our weapons situation.

Were they reasonably accurate with respect to that? I am talking about, of course, atomic weapons.

Mr. Dulles. You are talking about this special group?

Mr. Hamilton. Yes, the public sources.

Mr. Dulles. I would like to look at that report again. It was made in <sup>1951,</sup> [1952 or 1953] and I think we have an estimate there as to the margin of error, as of that time, and I will be glad to try to find it.

Mr. Hamilton. I would be interested, after you have refreshed your recollection --

Mr. Dulles. I will give you the figures.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

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Mr. Hamilton. That is all I have, sir.

Senator Jackson. I wanted to finish up on this estimate of

ballistic missiles.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] to get back to where we left off, what were the estimates in October of 1954, on Soviet ballistic missile capability?

25X1A9a

[ [ ] ]

[REDACTED] Ballistic missile.

Senator Jackson. So I will use it in that context.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED]

Off the Record

We also, on the intercontinental ballistic missile, stated we believed that the USSR will make a concerted effort to produce an IBM -- that designation was later changed to ICBM to avoid confusion.

Senator Jackson. With the International Business Machines.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] I will repeat that: -- will make a concerted effort to produce an IBM.

Off the Record

25X1A9a

Senator Jackson. What does "could have available" mean?

[REDACTED] It would mean, to me, that they could have a limited number available.

25X1A9a

Senator Jackson. Limited production?

[REDACTED] Limited number.

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25X1A9a

Senator Jackson. Limited number produced?

[REDACTED] Something short of series production.

As a matter of fact, we had very great difficulty in agreeing upon terms to indicate to any reader the precise moment we were talking about. We have now settled on "series production." At that time there were various judgments in the estimating ranks on just how to describe the status just short of the initiation of series production.

Senator Symington. Inasmuch as I have been listening, but I do not quite understand it, when is the optimum time that you feel, in answer to Senator Jackson's question, that they will have some production of the ICBM?

Mr. Dulles. Now we are dealing with our earlier estimate.

Senator Jackson. This is 1954.

25X1A9a

Senator Symington. When was it, then? I beg your pardon.

[REDACTED]  
Off the Record

Senator Jackson. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

25X1A9a

Senator Symington. May I ask a question there:

[REDACTED] do you feel the Soviets are farther ahead in the IRBM than they are in the ICBM? Is that the significance of what you say there?

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25X1A9a

[REDACTED] I don't think that you can draw that conclusion.

[ ]

25X1A9a Senator Symington. If you said 1400 miles, would that not be an IRBM?

[REDACTED] Fourteen hundred would be a mid-range, yes, sir.

25X1A9a Senator Symington. And if they are going to have that in [ ], and they are not going to have the other until [ ], would it not be fair to say they are farther ahead in the IRBM than they are in the ICBM?

[REDACTED] That is right, yes.

Senator Symington. That is all I asked.

Mr. Dulles. I think the answer would be "yes."

Senator Symington. Mr. Khrushchev said yesterday they would be able to hit any point on earth, I believe was his statement -- a guided missile with a hydrogen warhead, they could hit any point on earth.

If what he says is true, and only time can tell, then they will have been farther ahead in the ICBM even than you think they are now with the IRBM; is that right?

Mr. Dulles. Let me answer that. Let me try to answer that. He did not try to say from what kind of a pedestal he is going to shoot this. He might be assuming a submarine, goodness knows, and I don't think one can put a great deal of estimative weight on his remark.

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Senator Symington. I am only asking for information.


Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

Senator Symington. Which they could, for example, carry in an airplane and dump, is that what you are getting at, and drop?

Mr. Dulles. He was talking about missiles in this statement.

25X1A9a

 Or it could be --

Mr. Dulles. Or it could be carried in an airplane.

Senator Symington. I am trying to follow you and agree with you on what he said. If he says he can reach with a missile to any point on earth, [ ]

Mr. Dulles. No, I think there is possibly a slight confusion. I *do not* have the official text of what Khrushchev said before me, but I gathered he was talking about a guided missile and not an airplane-dropped missile; is that not correct?

Senator Jackson. That is what I understood.

Senator Symington. That was my impression.

Mr. Dulles. That was my assumption.

Off the Record

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Now, as to reaching any point on earth, that depends, of course, where you shoot it from and how far it goes.

Senator Symington. What is your interpretation of the delivery systems which makes you make that statement?

Mr. Dulles. Well, we have given evidence already on their delivery systems, as we believe they now are.

Senator Symington. What delivery system are you thinking about? For example, if they want to hit New York, what delivery system would they use?

Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

Senator Symington. So your thought is, what he was doing, then, was not necessarily referring to a base, but referring to an airplane or submarine, or something of that character; is that right?

Mr. Dulles. Well, I assume that he was referring to a guided or a ballistic missile in the statement he made. Therefore, he was not referring to an airplane. [ ]

Senator Symington. We cannot shoot any [ ] from submarines today, of this length, of the scope or the kind of missile that we are talking about; but in any case, what I want to know is if he made a mistake in what he said, or is there a difference of opinion between

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what he said and what we believe in the CIA? That is what I am getting at.  
Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

Senator Symington. And you do think ---

Mr. Dulles. If that is what he boasted about, I would say he was stretching the truth.

Senator Jackson. Did he not say they "will be able to reach"?

Senator Symington. "Soon," was the word.

Mr. Hamilton. "Soon" was the translation.

Senator Symington. And we feel that there will not be until  
[ ] for any place on earth, which presumably is the ICBM.

Senator Jackson. No.

Mr. Dulles. ICBM wouldn't reach every place on earth.

General Bull. No.

Mr. Hamilton. From Russia.

Senator Jackson. That is 5500 nautical miles from the launching platform, whether it is land or planes, is it not?

Mr. Dulles. That would reach most places on earth that one would want to reach.

Senator Symington. What we are talking about, I would imagine they could hit pretty near everything they wanted to hit with a 5500-mile missile.

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In any case, with the premise that is what he is talking about, it would be interesting to see this --

Mr. Dulles. Mr. Chairman, we honestly don't know what he was talking about. He obviously was miffed at the treatment he got. Khrushchev -- as we have known before -- bursts out and says things which I believe they all regret that he has said after he has said them.

Senator Symington. All I am asking is that there is no evidence to justify what he said, based on the way it was put in the paper; is that a fair statement?

Mr. Dulles. I would say that it was a boast, as he put it in the paper.

Senator Symington. And as far as you know, it was an inaccurate boast?

Mr. Dulles. It was an exaggeration.

Senator Symington. Well, is an exaggeration an inaccuracy?

Mr. Dulles. An exaggeration is an inaccuracy.

Senator Symington. I do not want to get into semantics, because I am sure you are far better educated than I am, but what I would like to do, again, and pursue this, if I may, this man makes a statement which has astounded the free world, which says soon he can drop it on any point on earth.

Mr. Dulles. No, he didn't say "drop it," sir. If he had said

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"drop it" almost any place on earth, I don't think I would have said that theoretically that was an exaggeration. I understood him to say that he could reach that with a guided missile.

Senator Symington. Any place on earth, he could reach with a guided missile. I guess you looked at it a little bit more than I though at the beginning.

If you also remember, he said they were the first ones who had dropped a hydrogen weapon from an airplane. Perhaps the fact he said that makes me feel he was in the dropping stage; but in any case, he says that he can deliver it any place on earth, soon. And would you interpret, to the best of our knowledge, that "soon" means, so far as the ICBM is concerned, [ ]

Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

Senator Symington. So that would be our opinion of his boast or his exaggeration? [ ]

That is the only point I have been trying to get at.

Mr. Dulles. Well, I think that his statement was so general that it is rather difficult to estimate what he was saying, and he might have been talking about taking a guided missile onto a platform or submarine or ship, and using that as a base, and that would shorten his range very much.

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Senator Symington. Mr. Director, let me ask one more question: If what he did mean to say was that soon they could launch an ICBM with a hydrogen warhead, our analysis is now, is it not, in the CIA, that [ ]

Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

Senator Symington. That is what I wanted to be sure of.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I just have one question.

I think there is one area, probably, perhaps the CIA would want to agree on. As I read the article, the thing that really made the news is the fact that they will soon have a warhead with a hydrogen capability.

Now, you would want to say that that probably might not be an exaggeration? He did not say --

Mr. Dulles. I don't think I have ever testified <sup>on</sup> that. ~~that was an exaggeration.~~

Senator Jackson. No. But that is why I asked the question. I am just trying to clarify the record.

Mr. Dulles. That is right.

Senator Jackson. As I read the article, the big part of the news is the fact that they were developing a hydrogen bomb warhead for the missile.

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Then he went on to say that they would have missiles soon which would be able to reach any point in the world.

Well, of course, that is susceptible to all sorts of interpretations. If they have an IREM, for example, on a submarine, they could come up to the coast of the United States and reach any part of the United States from different points.

25X1A9a What did you have on the warhead?

[REDACTED]

Off the Record

Senator Jackson. He is indicating that -- the context here, of course there is no way of knowing what the translation is -- he is sort of creating the world-wide impression that it will probably be sooner than [ / ] That is what it boils down to.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Dulles, what would you say as to the amount of time we would have, how much notice or warning we might have, if the Russians launched a sneak attack by air against the continental United States? That is a matter we talked about, I believe, with [REDACTED]

25X1A9a

Mr. Dulles. Yes. We discussed that a bit informally on Sunday.

That depends in part upon the state of our intelligence. I have here a very brief paper which I drew up, because I understood that you wanted to ask this question. I will just read it.

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[~~Although there can be no complete assurance of advance warning of an air attack approximating a major Soviet effort against the continental United States,~~]

Off the Record

[ ] Over the next several years, Soviet capability for launching an air attack without specific warning can be vastly improved. That is because by that time they will have more of their efficient, long-range bombers, very largely that, and also improve their bases.

Off the Record

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Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Dulles, what does "strategic warning" mean?

Mr. Dulles. <sup>It</sup> would mean several days.

Mr. Hamilton. Before the planes hit the radar net?

Mr. Dulles. Oh, yes. I mean several days.

I say that would be where, today, we feel that we could not give

complete assurance of warning.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] has specialized in that.

25X1A9a

Do you wish to add to that statement, [REDACTED]

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] This explanation of warning is a very difficult thing, because you have many kinds of warning. The field we are talking about, I think, is best described as "advance warning." It is prior to--

25X1A9a

Mr. Hamilton. The time they hit the radar?

[REDACTED] Yes. Radar warning is sometimes called "tactical" or "early warning."

Now, the terms "strategic warning" or "advance warning" have been used to describe warning through political moves and political preparations, or through a detected scientific breakthrough, or

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through preparatory military activities.

But what we are talking about here is their ability to get off the ground and attack us without our certain knowledge.

Mr. Hamilton. Do I understand Mr. Dulles' testimony correctly that now, while the intelligence agencies are making every effort to that end, there can be no assurance that we will have anything but a tactical warning; is that correct?

25X1A9a

 <sup>No</sup>  
[The] complete assurance, sir.

Mr. Dulles. That is correct. We might have.

Mr. Hamilton. Sure, I appreciate that.

Mr. Dulles. But it is going to become more and more difficult.   
[~~as they increase the number of their heavy bombers and move them around from point to point, to differentiate between an ordinary movement, a spoofing movement, and the "real McCoy."~~]

We are not here talking about the danger of the ICBM and the warning in case of the ICBM.

Mr. Hamilton. I appreciate that.

Mr. Dulles. Because that is of even greater difficulty, so far as warning is concerned. [ ]

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Mr. Hamilton. Yes.

Senator Jackson. Would there be a large-scale troop mobilization for Western Europe with such a move? That has always been the thinking in the past.

Mr. Dulles. Just to give an off-the-cuff opinion, I do not believe that the USSR could achieve a major troop mobilization and deployment for general war without our being aware of it. That is a thing that intelligence ought to be able to get with quite an adequate warning.

I believe that the main target of the Soviet Union in any general war would be the United States. [ ]

Senator Jackson. In other words, since the Soviets have developed an air atomic capability of substantial size, you no longer rely on their mobilizing forces as an indication of possible war?

Mr. Dulles. Very secondarily, because we believe they might defer a general mobilization in the interest of striving for surprise in an air attack.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I had one or two questions in another area on personnel.

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Mr. Hamilton. I am through, Senator.

Senator Symington. Will you proceed.

One question in this area I would like to ask, before we are through.

Off the Record

Senator Symington. That is all right. And you said you would furnish it for the record; and in the interests of time, that is all right with me, unless you want to read it this morning.

Mr. Dulles. I read it yesterday, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Into the record yesterday?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. I am sorry. I did not know that.

Mr. Dulles. You might have been out of the room.

Senator Symington. Yes, I think I was at that point.

Let me ask you, if I may, that is a CIA opinion as well as an Air Force opinion now, is that correct? [ ]

Mr. Dulles. Well, it is more than that. This is an <sup>IAC</sup> ~~ABC~~ matter. This is agreed intelligence of all intelligence agencies.

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Senator Symington. That is what I wanted to know.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Senator Jackson. There is something I am a little confused about. What is the change? You said you agreed on a statement that there was a change.

Mr. Dulles. I think the chairman said that--

Senator Jackson. You said something about there being a change now. I am a little confused.

Senator Symington. If you will yield to me, Secretary Quarles testified before us that there was evidence of   

Senator Jackson. You mean Mr. Quarles' statement?

Senator Symington. That is right.

Senator Jackson. Do you see--

Mr. Dulles.

Off the Record

Senator Jackson. I understand. It was    so far as the Air Force is concerned.

Mr. Dulles. I don't think it was the Air Force that was concerned,

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because the Air Force sat in on all our work.

Senator Jackson. Now, Mr. Director, the Secretary of the Air Force testified before this committee that

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Senator Symington. I gave it to you, what his statement was. I will take the time to state what it was. I will get the testimony again, because I think you were trying to clear it up. Somebody else will be looking for this.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Dulles, I take it that the intelligence community sticks by the estimate fixed on the <sup>[ ]</sup> missile that was given to the Military Subcommittee on the Application of Atomic Energy. There is no change in that?

Mr. Dulles. No change in that.

Senator Symington. At this point, I would like to read into the record the testimony of Secretary Quarles before our committee, which I do in justification for delaying this very interesting briefing from you, Mr. Director.

I asked, that is, I asked Secretary Quarles:

[ ]

Mr. Dulles. Well, we presented to Secretary Quarles the estimate of the intelligence community on this point. He reviewed the evidence, and has told me that he agreed with the statement which I put in the record earlier; and in order that the record may be complete at this point, I will just read, if I may, Mr. Chairman, this paragraph:

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Senator Symington. Mr. Hamilton?

Mr. Hamilton. I have nothing more.

Senator Symington. Senator?

Senator Jackson. I have just one question I wanted to get cleared up.

There has been a lot of stress in the past, and up to now, at least, that the one thing we have in our Air Force is a qualitative advantage, both in planes and personnel.

Does the intelligence community feel that man for man -- "pilot," we will say -- pilot for pilot, and technician for technician, that our people are better qualified than the Soviets? I realize that is a comparative thing, but in order to evaluate the quality of the Soviet flier and technician, you have to have some comparative base on which to establish an intelligence position, it would seem to me.

Mr. Dulles. If I may depart a little from my rules of conduct here; but my answer to that question, on the basis of all the information I have, would be "yes."

Senator Jackson. That ours are better?

Mr. Dulles. I would point out, however, that they are coming forward very rapidly, and that they have facilities for keeping their people in the air force, in their air force, for longer periods.

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Senator Jackson. That is what I am coming to.

Mr. Dulles. I am apprehensive that if something cannot be done on our side, that this facility that they have will, over a period of years, tend to give them a personnel advantage over us.

I do not think they have yet achieved that, but I would like very much to get the General's view.

Senator Jackson. I will follow up with this question:

Supposing a Soviet pilot with 4,000 hours, no combat experience in strategic bombing, and an American pilot with 4,000 hours, no experience in strategic bombing, what do you think, General, who has the -- are our bombers --

General Watson. Well, having been trained in the United States Air Force, and also having --

Senator Jackson. Knowing that it is dangerous to underestimate the other side, too.

General Watson. Having examined available intelligence to the best of my ability, and having assessed their training as compared to ours, I would say that theirs falls short of the training that we get. In terms of the types of equipment, training, and flying hours per month, the assortment of air exercises we go through, and so forth, I have not seen anything that compares with the US program at the present time.

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Therefore, I would like to say that I feel that the quality of our crews and their ability to accomplish assigned missions -- as was demonstrated in Korea -- is such that we have a terrific advantage in this respect.

Senator Jackson. We demonstrated it in Korea; but, on the other hand, there was no bombing of American lines.

General Watson. I was suggesting the training of fighter crews for combat.

I will agree with Mr. Dulles that the Soviets have taken over a period of years, extensive steps to hold their personnel, to establish training schools, to accelerate training and to provide many benefits for this corps of officers and airmen within the Soviet air force. In time this means that the quality gap between Soviet and USAF crews and men will be narrowed down considerably.

Senator Jackson. And eventually closed?

General Watson. Well, I would not go that far.

Senator Jackson. All right.

Well, General Twining and General White --

Senator Symington. Wait a minute, now. I do not want to lead the witness into an answer that he does not mean. You say

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if things go along as they are now, you would not go as far as to say eventually closed.

Senator Jackson. Close the qualitative gap.

Mr. Dulles. You mean number for number, now, or irrespective of numbers?

General Watson. I certainly could not make a statement on this going into something esoterical, because I don't know what this country is going to do with regard to steps that they should take. I feel we have to decrease the considerable turnover we are having in trained personnel within the Air Force, and here I am speaking of such crews as the Strategic Air Command and the operational commands, which have this terrific turnover. That has got to stop.

Senator Symington. In other words, what you say based on what you think might happen over here would improve our position; but if our position is not improved, is it fair to say that the gap will be closed?

General Watson. The gap would close, certainly, a lot sooner unless something is done.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Senator Jackson. General, obviously I would assume that they could overcome our qualitative advantage by quantitative advantage.

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General Watson. This is a comparison which is extraordinarily difficult to make.

Senator Jackson. But supposing they develop --

General Watson. I feel very strongly that I would be, as an operational officer --

Senator Jackson. I am referring now to strategic bombing.

General Watson. (Continuing) -- much happier to have a fewer number of well-trained, well-disciplined crews with good gun platforms and firepower, with good bomber systems and bomb power, and so forth, than I would a bunch of crews that were unmanageable and a lot of equipment that fell short of the equipment I have.

I have seen a situation where a half dozen fighter aircraft facing an enemy of double that number in the sky at the moment, or triple that number in the sky at the moment, have fared extremely well because of the definite advantage we have at the present time in qualitative superiority. That overcomes the number differential to a considerable degree.

Senator Jackson. Let's get on the attack. Suppose the Russians have twice as many long-range strategic bombers, jet bombers -- let's put them B-52s or B-52s -- they have got twice

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as many, and that is all you are fighting with, and they rely on surprise, all carrying hydrogen bombs. Does there not come a point when quantity in the hydrogen age, with all the elements of surprise, could be pretty devastating over the qualitative defense?

General Watson. Well, I think it can be said if that number of BISONs could get through the air defense system, I mean the total air defense structure, with that number of hydrogen bombs, and drop these on designated targets, that there would be considerable devastation.

Senator Jackson. Well, what I was trying to say is that when you are talking about getting the offense, as a rule of thumb, say, in the past the Air Force has given, with complete surprise, an 85 per cent capability of the enemy to get through; I mean, there have been all sorts of figures and standard figures a while back, is that not right, an 85 percent breakthrough capability? What I am getting at is, the bombardier does not have to be too accurate in dropping a hydrogen bomb. I mean, he can be off --

Senator Symington. Let him answer the question, if you ask it.

General Watson. Well, sir, I suggest that the bomber crew, the bomber and the airman, have had sufficient national resources invested in the total system put into bombing accuracy, so that

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the airman would subject to considerable criticism if he saw fit to let the bomb fall without due regard for accuracy.

This is an exercise to pinpoint where you want this bomb dropped, to utilize this total national resource to the best advantage in accomplishing the mission. It involves selective delivery of your firepower.

Senator Jackson. If he has got a hydrogen weapon and he drops it, with the right kind of weather, even if he misses the city, according to what has been published in the newspapers he could really raze something, could he not, 7,000 square miles, as I recall, in pretty bad shape. That is what I am getting at.

General Watson. No question about it, thermonuclear weapons could leave a lot of damage. The Soviets realize that and we realize that, and we must assess whether they are going to make a move in the face of this, with the numbers we can get through; or whether we would make a move, in the face of the numbers they can get through.

Senator Jackson. You see, the thing that is distressing to me --

General Watson. No question about it.

Senator Jackson. This is outside the real briefing, and I am going to end up with it.

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(Continuing) -- is this argument is being made constantly, first we would not concede they were ahead quantitatively until they started flying all over the place.

General Watson. At first we did not believe it because we did not have the data to prove it. Now there is good evidence of their numerical strengths.

Senator Jackson. Now we are slipping back, point by point. Quantitatively we are behind, and we say qualitatively is the answer. "Sure, they are ahead of us quantitatively, but qualitatively we have" --

I am just trying to suggest, General, the qualitative argument is sound in many areas, but I am wondering, as a layman, whether it has the same force and effectiveness when you talk about the enemy using a long-range strategic air force with hydrogen bombs and with surprise. That is my only point, you see.

I mean, there is a very different application in that kind of situation.

General Watson. Well, sir qualitatively --

Senator Symington. Will you answer it?

General Watson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. What is the question? I thought it was a statement, not a question.

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Senator Symington. I was only trying to be polite, because I did not want the General, if he had something he started to say, I thought it was only fair that he say it.

If you would rather he not say it --

Mr. Dulles. I was not quite clear as to what the question was.

Senator Symington. It was not a question. He was observing against the observation.

General Watson. I have gotten that, as I understand it.

Senator Jackson. Just a moment. Can I get an answer? I thought he was going to make a comment.

General Watson. No, sir, I have no comment to make on it.

Senator Jackson. I will state it in the form of an interrogatory rather than in the form of a statement.

Isn't there a vast difference when you use the qualitative argument, in a situation where we are talking about an enemy having a substantial and a very large number of long-range strategic bombers which are just as good as ours, carrying hydrogen bombs and making an attack on our country with surprise?

You have used the qualitative argument in connection with fighters that we have, and we have made an admirable record in Korea in shooting down a ratio of eight to one, as I recall those figures.

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General Watson. That is right.

Senator Jackson. I am suggesting, does that argument apply with the same degree of force and effectiveness when we talk about an enemy utilizing surprise in making a raid?

General Watson. May I submit, an enemy bomber force of low quality, training-wise.

Senator Jackson. Let us just assume Soviet training --

Senator Symington. Let him answer the question, if you will, because the time is getting very late, and Mr. Rhodes has a couple of questions. We were not fighting Russians in Korea, in any case.

But will you answer the question now, please, General?

General Watson. I believe the question to be: Can this comparison of quantity be made, quality and quantity in relationship be made, when you have a bomber force equipped with nuclear weapons? And I would say, sir, it would still apply. It still applies.

Senator Symington. O. K.

Senator Jackson. O. K. To the same extent?

General Watson. Well, this --

Senator Jackson. Don't -- that is all right.

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General Watson. I won't answer it.

Senator Symington. I would like to read out of an article just coming out tomorrow, I understand, or today, if I may, Mr. Director, and ask you if you agree with the statement:

(NOTE TO THE DIRECTOR: There follow 4 pages of unclassified discussion on Soviet Air Force manpower, keyed to Reader's Digest article. These left on the record. On Master copy, they are from page 358, line 10, to bottom of page 361.)

Senator Symington. Yes, sir.

Fred, you said you had two questions.

Mr. Rhodes. Two points.

Mr. Dulles, yesterday, Senator Duff, at the close of the session, mentioned the possibility of having some information on the Soviet economy, general economic information; and I believe that has been sharpened a little bit by the questioning of Senator Jackson this morning, as to the matter of the national product, and going into their military effort.

The other thing, I think there has been --

Mr. Dulles. I would be very glad to furnish that, and I think we can furnish a statement on that, which you can add to the record at this point, or wherever the chairman wishes.

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Mr. Hamilton. It would be very interesting.

Senator Symington. Without objection, we will receive that, with appreciation.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

Mr. Rhodes. I am afraid the testimony today, and perhaps some of it yesterday, has made intelligence-gathering and dissemination look like quite an inexact science, and I believe you yesterday indicated that a lot of factoring has to be done in this business.

But I wanted to point out that in the years from 1947 on, that your Agency, and certainly the Atomic Energy Commission and, when Senator Symington was Secretary of the Air Force, a brilliant piece of intelligence work was done in keeping watch over the Soviet atomic energy effort. In fact, Senator Symington established in the Air Force an Atomic Energy Office known -- I don't know the designation, it may be classified -- but in any event there was a brilliant piece of work done.

My question was that since at that time there were many wild guesses as to when the Soviets would be able to produce a bomb, ranging up to 15 years, out of that kind of background isn't it

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true that much of the difficulty we get into is in what we do with the intelligence we have, and not the fact that we are just not getting intelligence?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, I think the answer to that is in the affirmative.

May I go back to the first part of your question.

I have not intended in any way to depreciate the value of intelligence. I would be the last man in the world to do that, because I am a great believer in it, and have given many years of my life to it, and I think the intelligence in this Government is improving steadily.

I have indicated that when we are dealing, particularly, with the projection of programs into the future, a margin of error creeps in, not necessarily so much because the base from which we depart is wrong, but because we cannot judge over the years where they place their emphasis, any more than I could, sitting here, if I knew all the facts, know how many B-52s we would have <sup>five years from now.</sup> [in 1960.]

I think anyone making a guess around this table would probably have a 10 per cent margin of error in any estimate of that kind.

We have tried to be very frank with this committee, and where we felt the intelligence was pretty good and solid, we have tried to indicate that. Where we have made these projections into the

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future, we have very frankly said that there can be a margin of error in those projections.

I don't know whether that covers it.

Mr. Rhodes. Thank you very much; yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. I don't know whether that covers your question, because I am a great believer in intelligence, I think it is one of the front lines of our defense, and I can assure you that in Central Intelligence Agency now I think we have achieved the cooperation, the complete cooperation, of the Service intelligence agencies, who make a very, very large contribution. We are building up a background of intelligence which can be of use to this Government.

Now, as to the use of intelligence, I think that is improving. These national estimates are now really given careful consideration in the planning of policy. They are considered by the National Security Council, they are considered particularly carefully by the Planning Board of the National Security Council, and I think they are having an impact.

But one problem of an intelligence officer always is that of trying to get his best intelligence to the right place at the right time.

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I can say the doors are completely open to us, and I have had no difficulty at all at any time in the five years I have been in the CIA, three years as Director and two years as Deputy Director, I have never failed in reaching the top level at any time with any intelligence I felt was worthy of their consideration.

And that goes for the President and the members of the National Security Council and everyone in the Defense Establishment.

Mr. Rhodes. Thank you, sir. I think that is the burden of what Senator Saltonstall was asking yesterday. Thank you very much.

Senator Symington. I would like to comment on that, if I may, for a minute, before we close.

In the first place, I am very grateful to you for taking all this time, Mr. Director, in coming here and giving us this information. You made it much more possible for us to put out a constructive report, and that is what we want to do.

The second point is that I bow to no one in my respect for the Central Intelligence Agency, which I believe is a matter of record, and something which you know about personally.

I believe without doubt that the Agency is steadily improving, because it was new not too long ago, and it is getting better, and

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I have great respect for it and, above all, for its leadership.

I will say, however, that in my opinion, I do not agree, I most specifically do not agree, in many cases that I know of, that the problem has been what has been done with the intelligence as against when the intelligence was wrong. I do not want to try to get a score of each, but I will give you an illustration, which is that in 1947 we had the decision as to when the Soviet would get the atomic bomb, and one man said they would get it, in his opinion, in 1948. This Government felt that they would get it in 1953. The British Government felt they would get it in 1957.

And when they got it in 1949, and it was our mission, the Air Force mission with which I was connected at that time, we were terribly shocked.

So I think we have great room for improving our intelligence, just like we have in other places.

Now, if what Mr. Rhodes said has to do with the fact that I think we have not taken our intelligence estimates and utilized our economy in order to help preserve our security, I will fully agreed with that. But I know you will also agree with me that we have made some bad mistakes in intelligence in the last ten years, and that almost consistently it has been in underestimation of the possible enemy; is that not a fair statement?

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Mr. Dulles. Over the last ten years?

Senator Symington. Well, let's say the last six or seven years, let's say since the war, since World War II.

Mr. Dulles. Well, I would not want to agree to that as to the very recent past. Over across the board, here and there, there have been errors, and I think there was an error in the BISON. I am not absolutely certain of it yet, because I credit the Soviet with a very great ability, when they want to do so, to exaggerate their position, as well as to hide it when it is in their interest to hide it. And the Soviet have had situations where they have wanted to make us feel they were particularly strong, for their own political purposes; and in other situations they have wanted to hold back information in order to come forward with a dramatic surprise.

So that, while I am inclined to believe we were wrong in certain of the BISON estimates, I can assure you that over recent years, over the last year and a half or so, there has been no tendency to discount the Soviet power and potential.

And, as I say, we go on the basis that they can do what we can do; and the question then is the timing within which they can do it.

And there are certain fields in which they are doing great pioneering work.

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May I thank you for your kind words, and tell you it is a pleasure to be before the committee.

Senator Symington. Thank you, sir; and let me assure you that I have the greatest respect for the intelligence as it has come to us, especially with respect to the quantitative and qualitative development of their scientific people, and I believe that we have a big job to do in this country on the basis of what you have already told us.

I am sure the intelligence is improving steadily, and I only wish that the programming would be in consonance with it, in my opinion.

Nice to have seen you, and thank you very much.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, April 25, 1956).

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