

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 11 August 1969

\*The Director noted receipt of a requirement outlining the topics on which he is expected to brief during the course of his visit to California. DD/I noted that he expects [redacted] will have the necessary briefing materials available for the Director's review by noon today. DD/I asked what support the Director desires during the course of his stay in California. The Director noted that he will be met by an Office of Security [redacted]

[redacted] DD/I asked whether he would like the full text of the PDB, and the Director asked that, if required, the DD/I simply flag for him [redacted] those portions of it which require some special attention. The Director noted that he will depart for Los Angeles at noon on 13 August and will return the evening of 14 August. General Cushman noted that he will depart the morning of 12 August [redacted] and will return to Washington during the day of 14 August.

\*Godfrey briefed on the continuing lull in Soviet military air activity. He noted the biggest puzzle is that the standdown has now continued through 10 August. In response to the Director's question DD/S&T

[redacted]

Godfrey called attention to Finnish President Kekkonen's visit with Kosygin [redacted]

In response to the Director's question D/ONE stated he is not certain who caused the changes to be made in NIE 11/13-69 but

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conjectured that it was State (see Morning Meeting Minutes of 8 August). DD/I pointed to the Soviets and Chinese having signed a protocol settling their River dispute as an indication that they can reach agreement when it serves the best purposes of each.



\*DD/S reported that power surges connected with the electrical storms over the weekend caused a temporary breakdown in OCS and the Signal Center. The Director asked DD/S to determine why they were excavating this morning in the vicinity of the Printing Services Building.

Carver noted increased enemy activity in Vietnam and highlighted reports suggesting some intensified activity during the period 15-20 August, with other reports alleging some large-scale final battle being planned.

Carver called attention to a cable in from Vientiane reporting that the Laotians had taken into custody almost the entire North Vietnamese Station there. DD/P briefed on the comic details of the NVN's ill-advised countersurveillance.

Maury noted that Senator Mansfield is going to Djakarta and that, if he follows past practices, he will not ask for a special briefing.

Maury called attention to the item in the Sunday Washington Post on the expurgated testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

In response to the Director's question Maury doubted that Senator Jackson is in town.

Warner for Houston pointed to the current Green Beret investigation in Saigon and to General Cushman's having advised Russ Blandford that we were not involved in a command relationship with this activity. General Cushman briefed on his conversation with Ed Braswell, and the Director asked that he meet today with appropriate Executive Committee members in order to determine what further action should be taken.




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\*Bross noted that Mr. Morrison in Robert Froehlke's office has indicated that they would like additional details on the ARDF/Laos. The Director asked Bross to see what he can do in the interests of clarifying this matter with Mr. Froehlke.

DD/S&T noted that he will have an "issue" paper ready today on the principal problems that will come up during the course of the 15 August NRO Executive Committee Meeting.

Goodwin called attention to the Sulzberger column in the Sunday New York Times on The Game of Nations by Miles Copeland. Goodwin noted that Walter Pforzheimer has ordered copies of the book, and the Director asked that the order be cut in half.

  
/ L. K. White

\*Extracted and sent to action officer

## Foreign Affairs: The Name of the Game

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80R01284A001800110064-6

By C. L. SULZBERGER

PARIS—It is an open secret that Washington has been up to the elbows in Middle Eastern plots and counterplots, but the degree of involvement and specific details are now for the first time exposed in a book just published in London.

This is called "The Game of Nations," by Miles Copeland, an American management consultant, at one time employed by the State Department, who helped in organizing the Central Intelligence Agency.

Copeland, an excellent Arabist, has spent years in the Middle East where he has impressive contacts, starting with Nasser. Among U.S. activities in that area he describes the following:

### Putsches in Syria

Under Major (later Colonel) Stephen Meade, the U.S. sponsored the 1949 *coup d'état* of Husni Zaim in Syria which began the ceaseless putsches that have since marked the country's political life and produced increasing Soviet control.

American specialists promoted a "Moslem Billy Graham" to mobilize Islam against Communism and sent "a wild-eyed Iraqi holy man" on a tour of Arab countries. Copeland concludes "The project did no harm."

Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt, C.I.A. Middle East expert, was

loaned to Secretary of State Dulles to supervise "Operation Ajax" in August 1953, physically ousting the Mossadegh Government of Iran and restoring the Shah.

An American military attaché helped arrange for a Nazi officer, Lieut. Gen. Wilhelm Farmbacher, to assist Nasser in training his army. American officials were instrumental in getting to Cairo the famous Otto Skorzeny, an S.S. officer, and during his short Egyptian stay Skorzeny brought in "about a hundred Germans." Copeland says: "A certain well-known major general of the American Army" played a part in this affair.

Copeland's most fascinating revelations concern the Nasser revolution in Egypt. According to him Washington decided in 1952 that "Egypt was the place to start" an attempt to produce forward looking, pro-American Arab governments.

That February Roosevelt tried to organize a "peaceful revolution" under the umbrella of King Farouk. In March—four months before Nasser's coup—Roosevelt met representatives of Nasser's conspiracy. The plan to change things under Farouk was dropped.

American officials and Nasser's representatives reached "a private understanding that the preconditions for democratic government do not exist and wouldn't exist for many years"

in Egypt. In July Nasser seized power (with no American assistance) and Nasser's right hand man, Ali Sabri, immediately informed Ambassador Jefferson Caffery that Nasser wanted "friendly relations" with Washington.

Copeland says Caffery arranged with Nasser "for the loan to the Egyptian Government of perhaps the leading practitioner of 'black' and 'grey' propaganda in the Western world, Paul Linebarger, a former expert for the O.A.S. (forerunner of the C.I.A.)."

Nasser asked for limited American military aid—up to \$40 million. Copeland observes: "As I will show later on, it was the State Department's delay in granting this comparatively small amount which caused Nasser to turn to the Soviets—with the result that he got many times over the \$40 million which he originally asked for us."

In August 1953 Roosevelt was sent on a secret mission (says Copeland) to try and end the impasse between Egypt and Britain on Suez base negotiations. In November 1954 two U.S. colonels, Albert Gerhardt and Wilbur Eveland, discussed an arms deal with Nasser "for internal security purposes."

A tentative military agreement was announced in January 1955 but by September, when Washington had done

nothing, Nasser sent a personal warning to Roosevelt that he was about to make an arms accord with Russia. Roosevelt and Copeland flew to Cairo.

When they found they couldn't change Nasser's mind, Roosevelt suggested Cairo should announce the weapons were coming from Czechoslovakia — "the idea being that this wouldn't sound so heretical since the Czechs were also a major source of arms for the Israelis."

### To Improve Relations

Even so Washington kept attempting to restore good relations. Copeland writes: "In 1962, before supplying the Israelis with Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, President Kennedy 'cleared' the matter with Nasser by explaining it to him and getting him to agree that, under the circumstances of the moment, we could not do otherwise."

Everybody knows the ensuing story, marked by continuing war in the Middle East and a steady growth of Soviet influence. As Nasser once ruefully confessed to Copeland: "The genius of you Americans is that you never made clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something to them we are missing."

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# Rep. Rivers Gets To Witty-Gritty

By Richard Homan

Washington Post Staff Writer

**I**N THE INTEREST of national security, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Construction meets behind closed doors whenever it discusses sensitive defense activities with admirals, generals and other Pentagon officials.

Only those with top secret clearance and a "need to know" can get in, and few people qualify for admittance. As a public service, therefore, here are key excerpts from the censored transcript of a recent hearing released by the House Armed Services Committee.

The principals are Committee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.), Rep. Durward G. Hall (R-Mo.), who is also a physician, and a number of Pentagon straight men.

## Together We Can Defend Against Snoopers

**RIVERS:** Don't go out here and let us read something that some snoopers find out and put in the headlines. You better give us all this information so, if you need any defending, we will defend you.

**GEN. REILLY:** Yes, sir.

**RIVERS:** We like to know about these things. Don't you think so, Doctor?

**HALL:** Exactly, Mr. Chairman. We don't want to be detectives up here, but we do want to have enough faith and confidence in the services that this committee has notoriously supported to feel like they can come and tell us.

**RIVERS:** If you don't tell us, you wouldn't tell anybody.

**HALL:** Without us having to detect, or without fear of retribution from a higher command or Secretary. If we can't depend on this, we are lost.

## The Belgians

**RIVERS:** I don't think I have ever been more impressed than I was with the way the Belgians went about construction. Comparing them with the other people I have seen, like for instance the French, in France, those Belgians did a terrific job at Brussels. I never saw such prefab work. I never saw such fast construction in my life.

**GEN. DALRYMPLE:** They didn't have much time as you know.

**RIVERS:** They didn't. I was terrifically impressed. I didn't think those people had such knowhow. They sure surprised me and a lot of other people whom I know.

## What the President of the United States Said When the Committee Saved the Navy Dairy

**RIVERS:** You know what the President of the United States said when the committee saved the dairy? He said the President of the United States could command—how many people do we have on board the Navy, 900,000?

**ADM. CALVERT:** Yes sir, about 900,000.

**RIVERS:** About 900,000 men in the Navy, but he couldn't command 400—how many cows do you have over there?

**ADM. CALVERT:** About 426.

**RIVERS:** I said his record didn't justify it. So we saved that dairy. Now they are really building it. I will say this, though, it is the most powerful ice cream I have ever tasted. It really has the cream in it. We will have to come over and eat some sometime.

## Determining the Number Of Expectant Fathers

**HALL:** Do they have a waiting room for prospective fathers to loiter in while their wives are in labor?

**ADM. ETTER:** Yes sir, there is a small waiting room.

**HALL:** It is not like the one in your sister service; they don't have to sit out on the stairway while waiting? I am not talking about the women; I am talking about the gentlemen in waiting.

**ADM. ETTER:** The number of those waiting depends on the number in labor.

**HALL:** Old Navy logic.

## No Room in the Shelter

**GEN. HUNN:** This is probably the best designed facility in the entire United States as far as protection against nuclear effects are concerned.

**RIVERS:** We don't want any space for allies. We have enough for that. Do

**GEN. HUNN:** Yes, sir.

**RIVERS:** We have enough room for allies. We don't need any more room for them. Advice-giving allies, that is the kind I am talking about.

## The Greeks

**RIVERS:** I don't know whether we will need Mr. Sheridan.

**COUNSEL:** Not tomorrow.

**RIVERS:** We won't need you tomorrow, Mr. Sheridan. What about Mr. Fliakas? What kind of name is that?

**FLIAKAS:** Greek, sir.

**RIVERS:** That sounds pretty good. I am a Greek myself. Do you know what "philos" means? You come here pretty well recommended.

**FLIAKAS:** Thank you. It means friend.

## One Thing About Japan

**RIVERS:** I will tell you one thing, just get it in your head right now: if there is any country getting by without paying their share, it is Japan.

They are getting defense at practically nothing under these treaties. They are contributing nothing under these treaties. Now they want Okinawa. They think they can get this back. This committee is going to try to see if we can't keep that island. The Japs didn't exactly give it to us, you know.

There is no country more affluent at this time than Japan.

The only American that has been over there in recent times that talked hard to these people is Secretary Stans, and he told them what Christ told John on the Isle of Patmos. You ask Mr. Sheridan, he will tell you what that was.

You don't have to go over there with your hat in your hand. They've got the greatest GNP of anybody at the moment. They are the No. 2 nation on earth in automobile construction. Their electronics, and everything else, is no longer second-class stuff, it is first class. I bet everybody you know has one of their radios. A fellow gave me a Westinghouse the other day, I opened it up, it was made in Japan, or Hong Kong, or somewhere like that.

## Education Helps

**HALL:** In other words, this is a vivarium for animal experimentation. It is not for the security dogs.

**GEN. DALRYMPLE:** No, sir, this is a boardinghouse for test animals.

**RIVERS:** What is that word?

**HALL:** Vivarium. That means keeping them in a healthy life for experimental purposes with complete esthetic control.

**RIVERS:** Like a great American said, you can't beat education. I happen to like dogs. I have one at home

that has many more civil rights than I have. You see how knowledgeable he (Hall) is on this committee?

GEN. DALRYMPLE: I didn't know what the word meant either, sir.

### Shared Kitchens Must Be .

#### McNamara's Thinking

RIVERS: I am not going to argue about a kitchenette, but I don't think this way of saving money is going to pay off in the long run. I know what it means to cook. I can cook as good as anybody you ever saw. I can tell you, whenever you cook bacon, everybody in the community is going to smell it, particularly the fellow who shares that kitchenette with you. If a fellow wants to sleep late and you are cooking ham and eggs the aroma gets all over both apartments. I just think you ought to be realistic about it. This is some of McNamara's computer systems analysis thinking.

#### Moderate Fog in Charleston

RIVERS: If I am going to be caught anywhere without a lighted runway, I would rather be in Florida than Sembach, Germany. I would rather even be caught in Charleston. We have fog in Charleston. We don't have too much of it now, don't misunderstand me, we just have enough to make us appreciate what they have over in England.

#### Clarifying the Question

RIVERS: Come up here, sir, and see if you can help us. Do you understand the question?

MR. SCHOENIAN: I didn't understand the question.

RIVERS: We don't want the federal government to be the only people in the community controlling pollution if other people are polluting with the same sort of pollution. Do you understand?

MR. SCHOENIAN: Yes, sir.