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NSC BRIEFING

13 October 1953

REACTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT
ON TRIESTE

USSR protests Anglo-American decision on
Trieste.

The Soviet note of 12 October to Great Britain and the United States charges that the Anglo-American decision is a violation of the Italian peace treaty of 1947.

1. The note points out that the peace treaty calls for establishing a Free Territory, neutral and demilitarized, under a governor appointed by the UN Security Council.
2. It further charges that failure of the US and Britain to live up to their commitment is evidenced by the fact that "Trieste has been turned into an unlawful Anglo-American mili-

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tary and naval base."

3. The note does not mention Yugoslavia. Ambassador Bohlen believes that a similar Soviet failure to print a Belgrade Tass despatch giving Yugoslav reaction represents an effort to avoid appearing to support the Yugoslav position.

Probable Soviet intentions.

1. By capitalizing on the dispute, the Soviet Union may hope to gain success in its long-standing policy of thwarting a Trieste settlement.
2. At the same time, this position enables the USSR to maintain the pose of upholding peace treaties and wartime agreements -- regardless of how unworkable they may be in such cases as Trieste.

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3. The Soviet protest, paralleling in some respects the note of the Yugoslav Government, may also be intended to create suspicions in Allied quarters regarding Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

Communist reaction.

Satellite propaganda may be expected to follow the Soviet line, but prior to the USSR's note there was some confusion.

1. Italian Communist leader Togliatti, who recently came out in favor of a plebiscite, denounced US and British disregard for Italian interests. He warned that the "tense situation will be used to tie Italy more closely to the Atlantic imperialist camp."
2. Some Satellite propaganda pointed out the "great consternation" in Italy, while others alleged that the Western powers complied with Italian demands

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in order to gain Italian acceptance of EDC.

3. A Cominform broadcast from Prague noted a positive aspect of the decision in the promised termination of Anglo-American occupation which would test the sincerity of Italy's "so-called Allies."

Tito attempts to disrupt Anglo-American plan for Trieste by both diplomatic and military moves.

His diplomatic moves include a note to the American and British governments calling for a four-power conference (US-UK-Italy-Yugoslavia) and a memorandum to the United Nations informing it that the Trieste situation is a threat to the peace.

1. The note to the American and British governments charges that the Anglo-American decision on Trieste is

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contrary to the Italian peace treaty a threat to its integrity and independence because it will encourage Italian aggression.

2. Although Yugoslavia has informed the United Nations of this situation, it believes that direct talks with the United States, Great Britain, and Italy the most suitable manner for eliminating this threat to peace.

His military gestures include:

1. Despatch of yet undetermined number of troops to Zone B to reinforce approximately 4,000-man Yugoslav garrison there;
2. Cancellation of all military leaves;
3. Warning that Yugoslav troops will enter Zone A "the moment" Italian troops enter.

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It is not believed that Tito will risk a clash with US-UK forces in Zone A.

His most recent diplomatic moves suggest that the military measures are intended to halt implementation of US-UK withdrawal from Zone A and bolster his internal and international position:

1. He probably expects thus to delay implementation of US-UK plan;
2. He has strengthened his position at home where nationalism is strong.

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Yugoslav Assistant Foreign Minister Bebler [redacted]
[redacted] Yugoslavs con-
sidering whether

- (a) To send Yugoslav troops with Zone A when Italian troops enter;
- (b) To appeal US-UK decision to International Court of Justice

Re possibility that (a) might lead to war, Bebler stated Yugoslav Government hoped that the only result would be "a few skirmishes".

Some positive action necessary; Yugoslav prestige at stake.

Turkish Government expected to urge Yugoslavs to take no military action.

U.S. Forces	4,000
U.K. "	3,000

Zone "A"	boundary with	Yugoslavia	26miles
" "	" "	Zone "B"	13 "
" "	"	Total	<u>40</u> "