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:	NSC	BRIE	FING 18 March 1954	
			IMPLICATIONS IN MOSLEM LEAGUE DEFEAT IN EAST PAKISTAN	
	Ι.	Curr	ent Situation.	
		Α.	Prime Minister Mohammed Ali's Moslem	
			League apparently defeated in East	
			Bengal provincial elections by	
			landslide.	
		в.	United Democratic Front - mostly	
			assorted leftists - wins 🕶 of 🖬	
			seats reported so far out of total	
			of 237 possible. in house of 309 (12 sector.)	
		c.	Eighty-year-old Fazlul Huq will	
			probably be new chief minister East	
	1		Bengal. He has said he would not act	
			without "cooperation" Karachi govern-	- -
	1		ment. He is	25X6F
			who broke with Moslem League in	
			summer 1953.	
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- D. Factors in Moslem League's defeat.
 - 1. Unpopularity local Moslem League leaders.
 - 2. Basic failure Moslem League government improve economic situation.
 - Ethnic differences between East 3. and West Pakistan - East

resentment rule from Karachi.

II. Domestic Repercussions.

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- Moslem League might make post-election Α. deal with elements of Front depending cohesiveness Front, which now loose federation, no common program;
- В. In any case serious blow Mohammed Ali prestige.
- Great encouragement provincialism -C. will make task central government much more difficult.

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l. Likel	ly delay formulation new				
const	titution - in works since 1947.				
2. Confi	use situation in constituent				
assei	mbly in Karachi where East				
Beng	al has 43 of total 75 seats.				
Asse	mbly only representative body				
now	functioning on a national				
level, constitution has not yet					
been	approved.				
Possibility Communist influence.					

D.

total of only 14 25X1X4 1. Communists, crypto-Communists running on Front ticket.

2. Communists, however, likely be strengthened and encouraged by victory with which they associated.

III. Foreign Policy Repercussions.

US military aid not issue - but Moslem Α. League used aid in attempt to build prestige.

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- B. Will be interpreted in India and in
 USSR as popular rejection of aid and
 of Turkish-Pakistani pact.
- C. May raise doubts Turks, others stability Pak government.

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D. But not likely affect Karachi attitude toward West.

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