

NSC BRIEFING

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 April 1954

Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210001-7

THE DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

After a month of feverish maneuvering, which began on 25 February with the ouster of General Nagib, ^{in the Egyptian} ~~the~~ political situation in ~~Egypt~~ ^{stand out.} ~~appears to be unchanged in~~ at least two major aspects, [^] Colonel Nasr and the Revolutionary Command Council are again back in top position, with renewed determination to carry out their "Revolution" without compromising with political factions. General Nagib is also back as a figurehead for the regime. His prestige is less; his position somewhat weakened. He is apparently ill. Nagib retains, however, considerable popular following.

Three new factors have been introduced into the situation as a result of the month-long struggle for power between Nasr ^{representing the Revolution} and Nagib, [^]

Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210001-7

~~TOP SECRET~~

^{representing the Counter-Revolution}

During the month, ~~TOP SECRET~~

First, the ~~unplayed political~~ ~~parties were given~~ ~~early return~~
Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210001-7
to civil government, and some of their leaders who had been under arrest
were released. *at Naguib's direction. Thus,* Most of the leaders of the ultranationalistic Wafd and
the religious nationalistic Moslem Brotherhood are now at liberty.

During the month also,
Secondly, there has been a general increase of activity among both
civilian and military extremists and opportunists as a result of the
over-all loss of prestige by the RCC and by Nagib. And finally, more
popular frustration has been generated by the postponement of a return
to civil government.

The Nagib-Nasr contest represents the clash between the authori-
tarian Revolutionary Council and the popular forces demanding a return
to parliamentary government. Until it is resolved there can be no
political stability in Egypt and no hope for constructive developments
Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210001-7

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ *Nasr and Naguib*

Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210001

... or firm reconciliation between ~~the two men~~ seems possible. At the moment Nagib appears on the decline physically and prestige-wise. Opposition elements, however, may continue to use him as a rallying point.

The rise of Nasr poses all the problems inherent in a military dictatorship. Nasr and the Revolutionary Council are unpopular and lack widespread support. Even in the armed forces certain groups, particularly among the cavalry and artillery, are believed opposed to continuation of the Revolutionary Council's rule.

If Nasr succeeds in establishing himself firmly and absolutely in power, [redacted] he will make a concerted effort to reach an agreement with Britain on the Suez base. With full

Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210001

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1X6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210001-7
control and restore order and thus restore order and permit Britain to approach the conference table. The latest British proposals for a Suez settlement, full evacuation within two years and maintenance of the base by civilian contract labor, if presented with some give and take, could probably be accepted by the Revolutionary Council and sold to the Egyptian people as achieving "unconditional evacuation" of the British forces.

Settlement of the Suez question would provide the Revolutionary Council with an important political victory which it sorely needs. Only then can the regime attempt to tackle the deep economic problems which confront it.

With respect to the changing situation in Egypt, we are better placed there to ~~follow~~ get up-to-date on developments than we usually are elsewhere.

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210001-7

~~TOP SECRET~~