

BACKGROUND - HOT AND COLDVARIATIONS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF
MOSCOW AND PEIPINGNoted by BCI
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- I. As Communist China has shouldered its way onto the stage of international affairs, we have seen apparent contradictions between its foreign policies and those of the USSR. In spite of Peiping's "scene-stealing", the Sino-Soviet partnership is operating within a broad framework of general agreement on strategic objectives. Within this framework there is considerable scope for variations in the formulation and execution of separate policies.
- II. These variations stem from differences in geo-political positions, levels of economic and political development, and external and internal problems which confront the respective governments. Also, there is a marked difference in the prevailing moods of the two leadership groups. The Moscow regime is chiefly preoccupied with the consolidation and strengthening of areas now under its control, whereas the Chinese leaders are still strongly influenced and driven by revolutionary psychology and by unfulfilled territorial objectives.
- III. While both Soviet and Chinese leaders since the Geneva conference have repeatedly professed their desire for a relaxation of tensions, peaceful co-existence, and closer economic and political relations with countries having "different social systems," the nature of the most urgent problems confronting the two

regimes has been the USSR's subtle policy toward the US in contrast to Peiping's belligerent attitude.

Example: On the same day, 13 November, that the USSR voted for the US atom program in the UN Political and Security Committee, Communist China was sentencing the 13 Americans to prison terms on spy charges.

Example: The same day, 6 November, that the Chinese Communist radio announced "we must make sufficient preparations" for "liberation" of Formosa, saw Soviet leader Saburov, in a major speech, issue a warm invitation to Yugoslavia and other countries to resume "normal relations."

IV. The foremost objective of Soviet foreign policy during the past year has been to prevent the incorporation of a rearmed West Germany in the Western alliance. Soviet leaders believed their best means of achieving this objective was to adopt an attitude of conciliation and reasonableness in order to allay West European fears of Soviet expansionist pressure and to deprive the advocates of bringing a rearmed West Germany into NATO, EDC or WEU of their ^{most} forceful arguments. This attitude was manifested in such moves as the Soviet disarmament proposals and favorable votes on the atom pool plan in the UN and repeated calls for four power and all-European conferences.

V. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist statements since the Geneva conference have stressed the peaceful coexistence and "five principles" theme. At the same time, they both have maintained

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a sharp distinction between the application of this line toward the United States and Nationalist China, on the one hand, and America's major allies and the "uncommitted" Asian countries, on the other.

Example: In the first two weeks of December, both Moscow and Peiping condemned US aggressive aims and demanded that the US withdraw its support from Formosa or be fully responsible for the consequences. During the same period, there were indications that Red China and Afghanistan had agreed to establish relations, Peiping announced the appointment of its first ambassador to Norway, Peiping concluded agreements with Burma on trade, improvement of communications across border, and other manifestations of friendly relations, and Moscow was pointedly encouraging the new Japanese government to establish better relations with the USSR and China.

- VI. A survey of Chinese Communist statements and actions shows the Peiping regime to be following a "soft" line toward all governments except the US and Nationalist China, which Peiping is attempting to isolate as the joint enemies of Communist China and of "peace."
- VII. This position appears to have two main motivations. First, the post-World War II course of events has placed the US in a position which represented the greatest threat to the Peiping regime and the greatest obstacle to the achievement of unfulfilled

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ambitions. The Chinese leaders, accordingly, have attempted to extract the maximum advantage from their collisions with US power and interests in the Far East to enhance their own internal position and international prestige. They have sought to force the US to deal directly with Peiping on the prisoners issue. They probably hope to register a major prestige success from the UN Secretary General's mission to Peiping.

VIII. The second main motivation of China's belligerent posture vis-a-vis US flows from the immense internal problems which confront the Peiping leaders. They are following the familiar Stalinist formula of justifying the imposition of demands and sacrifices on their people by constantly holding before them the threat of "US aggression."

IX. The record on recent Soviet and Chinese foreign policy moves clearly demonstrates that the right hand knows what the left hand is doing and vice-versa. In those areas where both Peiping and Moscow have direct interests—Japan, Southeast Asia and India—there appears to be excellent coordination in a joint application of the coexistence bait. In areas where the interests of either Peiping or Moscow are paramount—Formosa on the one hand and Western Europe on the other—the coordination of action is not as smooth but there is no lack of support by one for the other.

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