

NSC-251st Meeting

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June 6, 1955

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the
Conference Room of The White House,
Thursday, June 9, 1955,
at 10:00 a.m.

ITEM FOR CONSIDERATION

ITEM 1 -- EMERGENCY RELOCATION PLAN--NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(NSC 5521)

For consideration of the draft statement on the subject contained in the reference report (NSC 5521). The Attorney General, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator are being invited to participate with the Council in consideration of this item.

ITEM FOR DISCUSSION

ITEM 2 -- SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

For discussion in the light of an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence.

ADDITIONAL ITEM FOR CONSIDERATION

ITEM 3 -- U. S. POLICY ON ALL-VIETNAM ELECTIONS

(NSC 5405; NSC 5429/5; NSC 5519; NSC Action No. 1316-d; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 2, 1955)

For consideration of the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in the reference report (NSC 5519) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 2, 1955.

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NSC BRIEFING

7 June 1955

SOUTH VIETNAM

- I. Problem of rebellious sect forces apparently being successfully dealt with by force of arms.
 - A. Ba Cut, ³⁴⁰⁰ given to loud talks, has not moved to support his fellow Hoa Hao rebel, General Boai. 7,000
 - B. American observers discount possibility that French will resupply rebels.
 - C. Prospect is that Hoa Hao dissidents will soon be reduced from level of military to level of a police problem.

- II. Most pressing question elsewhere on horizon is problem of July 1955 talks with Viet Minh on 1956 all-Vietnam elections.
 - A. Viet Minh stepping up its campaign to put over its own interpretation of Geneva terms (see background).
 - B. Commander-in-chief Giap, on 22 May after Haiphong takeover, made speech citing "new phase" in struggle to implement Geneva agreement.
 1. Said most important problem in sight was to prepare for consultations to be held from 20 July onward, as specified by Geneva declarations.
 - C. Giap blasted alleged US effort to sabotage election plans; claimed Defense Secretary Wilson, on eve of Geneva, had made clear US intent to make Vietnam demarcation line permanent, like Korea.

1. Giap praised French spokesmen for their assurances that Geneva terms would be faithfully adhered to.

D. At press conference in Hanoi on 6 June, Viet Minh Vice Premier (Phan Van Dong) cited Geneva terms in brushing aside question whether consultation conference might not be held.

1. Dong put French on notice, stating "the other signatory of the Geneva agreements, and the interested parties must execute their obligation."

E. Viet Minh spokesmen always take care to state that all guarantees necessary will be given to insure completely free elections.

1. London Daily Worker correspondent, Wilfred Burchett, reliably reported to have stated at Bandung in April that Vietnam was one place where elections could be held on British model since Communists sure of winning.

III. France, as Geneva signatory, showing concern regarding responsibilities contracted for.

A. French see Dien's proposed Saigon 4-Power Conference as good opportunity to put western pressure on Vietnamese to take initiative regarding consultations with Viet Minh.

B. French suggest that Western powers at Saigon meet

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Moletov) make approach to two Vietnam parties or that ICC do so; French prefer former.

- C. French state they have information India is preparing plan to get two Vietnams to meet; they justifiably fear adverse reaction of South Vietnam authorities to any Indian initiative.

IV. Dien government, meanwhile, apparently planning to use two arguments as basis for backing away from any talks with Viet Minh, at least in July.

- A. Main argument is that South Vietnam not a signatory to Geneva agreement, thus not bound by its terms.
- B. Other argument, or stall, is that only a popularly elected National Assembly--which will not come into existence before fall--can deal with such vital matters.
- C. In addition, Dien has recently linked the status of the French Expeditionary Corps to subject of elections.
- D. He regards it essential that Vietnamese sovereignty be unquestioned and complete before any declaration on free elections is made.
- E. At that time, Dien wants to fully dissociate his government from Geneva accords.
- F. He feels this necessary to prevent ICC, which he probably distrusts, from coming in and taking over election arrangements.

V. These South Vietnamese points will scarcely impress Viet Minh or--perhaps more importantly--the Indians.

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- A. Indian ICC chairman, on 31 May, said "if French had authority and it has passed to Vietnamese, the latter are responsible; but we do not know how much has passed to Vietnamese.
- B. Questioned on whether Vietnamese "automatically inherit" responsibility of Geneva signatory, Indian said that is legal question to be studied when it arises.
- C. Canadians on ICC take position that Commission members have no role regarding elections until both sides agreed on all details.
- D. But Indians, with support of Poles, unlikely to accept so passive a role.

SOUTH VIETNAM

- I. Vietnamese Army apparently moving cautiously against Hoa Hao rebels (7,600) under General Soai.
 - A. No major fighting has yet developed; Soai's troops apparently ~~surrounded~~ ^{CONFINED} ~~in~~ ^{To A} small quadrilateral between Bassac and Mekong Rivers.
 - B. Other rebel force (3,000) under Ba Cut, --although given to tough talk--has not moved to support Soai nor has Vietnamese Army moved against it.
 - C. Anti-Soai campaign might end quickly through large-scale rebel defections, or could drag on for weeks as clearing operation.
 - D. But Army's heavy superiority in numbers and weapons leaves little doubt of eventual outcome.

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horizon is problem of July '55 talks
with Viet Minh on '56 all-Vietnam elections.

A. Viet Minh stepping up campaign to put
over its own interpretation Geneva
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I. Giap praised French spokesmen

for their assurances that Geneva terms would be faithfully adhered to.

D. At press conference in Hanoi on 6 June, Viet Minh Vice Premier (Phan Van Dong) cited Geneva terms in brushing aside question whether consultation conference might not be held.

1. Dong put French on notice, stating "the other signatory of the Geneva agreements, and the interested parties must execute their obligation."

E. Viet Minh spokesmen taking care to state they will give all guarantees necessary to insure "completely free elections."

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1. London Daily Worker correspondent,

Wilfred Burchett, reliably reported to have stated at Bandung in April that Vietnam was one place where elections could be held on British model since Communists sure of winning.

III. France, as Geneva signatory, showing concern regarding responsibilities contracted for.

- A. French see Diem's proposed Saigon 4-Power Conference as chance to pressure Vietnamese to take initiative on pre-election consultations.
- B. French suggest that Western powers propose either that two Geneva presidents (Eden and Molotov) make approach to two Vietnam parties or that ICC do so; French prefer former.

C. French state they have information
India is preparing plan to get two
Vietnams to meet; they justifiably
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A. Main argument is that South Vietnam not
a signatory to Geneva agreement, thus
not bound by its terms.

B. Other argument--or stall--is that only
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C. In addition, Diem has recently linked
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I. he regards it essential that

Vietnamese sovereignty be unquestioned and complete before any declaration on free elections is made.

D. Diem also points out that his case different from Adenauer and Rhee who have full backing of Western powers; he wants similar Western agreement on his government.

E. When any declaration on elections made, Diem wants to fully dissociate his government from Geneva accords.

F. He feels this necessary to prevent ICC, which he profoundly distrusts, from coming in and taking over election arrangements.

V. These South Vietnamese points will scarcely impress Viet Minh or--perhaps more importantly--the Indians.

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NSC BRIEFING

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7 June 1956

BACKGROUND--GENEVA REFERENCES TO ALL-VIETNAM ELECTIONS

- I. The agreement for the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, which is the document actually signed at Geneva by representatives of the commanders-in-chief of the Viet Minh army and the French Union forces in Indochina, makes only one brief reference to future elections.
 - A. This is contained in article 14(a) which states:

"Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Vietnam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there by virtue of this agreement."
- II. The main Geneva reference to elections in Vietnam is contained in the final declaration issued by the Conference Secretariat, the validity of which the South Vietnamese delegation refused to acknowledge.
 - A. Article 7 of this document states:

"The conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general

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elections by secret ballot. In order that the restoration of peace may have made sufficient progress and that there may be present all the necessary conditions to permit the free expression of the national will, general elections will take place in July 1955, under the control of an international commission composed of representatives of the states which are members of the international commission for supervision and control provided for in the accord on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will take place on this subject between competent representative authorities of the two zones after July 20, 1955.

B. The French Foreign Office recently stated that its legal office has interpreted this article as meaning that Vietnamese-Viet Minh contact should take place on 20 July 1955, and not just at some time subsequent thereto.

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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

- I. Although general tension¹⁵ mounting throughout French North Africa, situation¹⁵ different in each of three political divisions.
 - A. In "protectorate" of Tunisia, French have recently concluded agreement with "native" Tunisian government, granting limited home rule.
 - B. Haggling over interpretation of agreement, together with local disorders, likely to complicate and delay transfer of governmental functions from French to Tunisian control.
 - C. Prospect of more self-government for Tunisia encourages nationalist campaign in "protectorate" of Morocco and nominally "metropolitan" Algeria, where security situation steadily deteriorating.
- II. In Tunisia, which has been a French "protectorate" since 1881/3:
 - A. Ponderous series of conventions (signed Paris 3 June) define extent of home rule.
 1. Due for ratification by National Assembly in July; Embassy Paris thinks chances good.
 2. Tunisian approval (by Bey) expected to be automatic.
 - B. Under conventions, France will retain control over Tunisian foreign affairs, defense; will begin to transfer police services (after 5 years) judicial services (after 10 years) to Tunisian control.
 1. In interim, French interests to be protected by High Commissioner's office.

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III. Proposed conventions opposed by:

- A. Reactionary French settler element (principally French members Tunisian civil service). Bureaucrats are exerting maximum possible pressure prevent French Assembly approval.
- B. Extremist wing of otherwise moderate Tunisian Neo-Destour ("Constitution") party (under leadership Salah ben Youssef). Extremists have strong ties with Arab League.
- C. Other Tunisians in opposition include small but fanatic Old Destour Party (8,000), and smaller (1,500) ineffective Tunisian Communist Party.

IV. Conventions supported by:

- A. Minority of unorganized French business and professional residents Tunisia.
- B. Majority of 800,000-strong Neo-Destour party, whose president (Habib Bourghiba) has acted as behind-the-scenes guide of compromise settlement. However, Bourghiba has clearly stated conventions only first step toward full independence.
- C. Many French officials privately admit inevitability of Tunisian independence.
- D. Implementation of conventions probably will be strife-ridden.

- V. In Algeria, picture complicated by fact that three coastal divisions (Constantine, Algiers and Oran) have been considered departments of France (residents nominally voting citizens) since 1848 (/ Four interior divisions are under military occupation).

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- A. French had to impose state of emergency 7 April: since then guerrilla attacks in eastern Algeria (Constantine) stepped up drastically.
 - B. French have reinforced Algeria with more than 20,000 troops, withdrawn from forces committed to NATO--total in Algeria now more than 110,000.
 - C. US consul characterizes French security measures as inept, unsuccessful. Army apparently guarding Europeans in towns, while countryside Moslems unprotected against outlaws.
 - D. French-Moslem antagonism increasing steadily and North African native troops can no longer be relied on.
 - 1. Some "captures" of native units believed desertions.
 - 2. Algerian light infantry units being rotated to Germany, replaced by French units.
 - E. French government yielding to extremist settler demands, allowing formation of settler militia--essentially vigilante gangs--to "aid" in police activities.
 - F. Essence of problem is that Algerians who seek independence are considered de facto traitors, since French make juridical claim that Algeria c'est la France.
- VI. In Morocco, which has been a French "protectorate" since 1912:
- A. Sharp upsurgeⁱⁿ last two years' terrorism, concentrated Casablanca area, began late May '55. Moslem resentment over heavy-handed French repressive measures now acute: Europeans in Casablanca said to face danger of massacre.
 - B. Paris apparently at last convinced^{of} need to solve burning "dynastic issue" by replacing unpopular sultan (Ben Arafa--

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imposed by French, August 1953).

C. However, Paris rejects possibility re-enthroning French-deposed Mohamed ben Youssef.

1. French can find no acceptable qualified candidate among many Alaouite princes.

2. May resort to device of Regency Council.

D. No action to better Moroccan conditions probable until after Tunisian conventions approved by French Assembly.

1. Protectorates Minister July, told Foreign Affairs Commission of French Assembly: "Never has the maxim 'to govern is to choose the lesser evil' been more apt."

VII. North African Nationalists' capabilities difficult to assess.

A. Almost no information available on quantity, type arms available.

B. Weapons captured by French usually light, of World War II or earlier vintage: very few automatic weapons discovered.

C. Nationalists probably doing some smuggling--by sea or overland. Also probably Arab States collaboration.

1. Logistics problem involved makes massive overland supply from Libya or Egypt improbable.

2. Most likely source--"private enterprise" gun-running by sea.

D. Nationalists in different parts of French North Africa probably do not now have sufficient military equipment to launch coordinated rebellion.

1. However, can continue tie down significant portion France's military strength.

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E. Inflammatory radio broadcasts from such disparate points as Cairo, Damascus, Spanish Morocco and Budapest--all in colloquial Arabic--are claimed by France to be major factor in current unrest, disorders.

IX. Outlook colored by variety of factors:

A. More than 200,000 French troops and police in area give reasonable assurance France can maintain some sort of position in North Africa.

B. However, frustrations over course of events in Indochina may make French exaggerate present ^{AFRICA} threat, in hopes of getting unqualified US support.

C. Problem further complicated by anti-Americanism, suspicion US intentions prevalent among French settlers and officials in North Africa who see US ousting French.

1. At same time, American popularity declining among natives; Communists exploiting French use of American arms.

D. Meanwhile, rising terrorism poses threat to all Europeans, including more than 15,000 Americans now in Morocco.

E. Only place where situation likely to improve is Tunisia, where France may avert serious disorders by firm implementation agreed-upon autonomy.

F. Restoration of Algerian Moslem confidence--end to "second-class citizenship" for natives--appears prerequisite to restoration order there.

G. Unless essential dynastic change made in Morocco, there is increased possibility organized guerrilla operations there.

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I. Although general tension mounting throughout French North Africa, situation different in each of three major areas.

A. In Tunisia (a French "protectorate" since 1881/3) ~~ponderous~~ series of "conventions" (initialed Paris 3 June) now define extent of "home rule."

B. France will control Tunisian foreign affairs, defense, but will begin to transfer police services (after 2 years), judicial services (after 5 years) to Tunisian control (full transfer will not be completed for 20 years).

C. French High Commissioner (new post) will be in charge foreign affairs, defense; will also be watchdog over continuing French economic, cultural "interests."

II. Tunisian conventions opposed by:

A. Reactionary local French (principally French members Tunisian civil service).

- B. Extremist wing of otherwise moderate Tunisian Neo-Destour party, which has ties with Arab League.
- C. Small but fanatic Old Destour Party (8,000), and smaller (1,500) ineffective Tunisian Communist Party.
- D. Conventions supported by minority of unorganized French business and professional residents Tunisia and majority of 800,000-strong Neo-Destour party.
- E. Party president *Neo Destour* (Habib Bourghiba) has acted as behind-scenes guide of compromise settlement.
- F. However, Bourghiba has clearly stated conventions only first step toward full independence, and many French officials privately admit its inevitability.

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iii. In Algeria, Nationalist strife complicated

by fact that three coastal divisions (Constantine, Algiers, Oran) have been considered "departments" of metropolitan France since 1848 (four less populous interior divisions are under French military administration).

A. Thus French say "Algiers, c'est La France", and consider all who seek Algerian independence de facto traitors.

B. However, French law ¹⁹⁴⁷ has effect of dividing some 9 million Algerian population into 10% "first-class," 90% "second-class" citizens, largely along racial/religious lines.

1. Although all "inhabitants" were declared French "citizens" in '47, only Europeans (plus Moslem favored few) possess full French "civil status."

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C. Thus, Algeria elects 30 to French

National Assembly and 120 to local Assembly, but representation is split 50-50 into two "Colleges" so that half the total is elected by only 350,000 voters (mostly French), and other half by the Moslem electorate (some 800,000 "qualified" voters out of total 8 million).

1. Example--four interior districts have total population of 800,000, of which 12,000 "non-Moslem."
2. Area's "first-class" registered voters (I College) total 12,000, while "second-class" voters (II College) total 110,000.

IV. Nationalist-inspired terrorism came to surface in Algeria in late '54: by April this year, French had to impose state of emergency.

- A. Since April, guerrilla attacks in eastern Algeria (Constantine) stepped up drastically.
- B. French are reinforcing Algeria with more than 20,000 home troops withdrawn from forces committed to NATO, also calling up 9,000 resident reservists-- total in Algeria will be more than 110,000.
- C. French-Moslem antagonism increasing steadily and North African native troops can no longer be relied on.
 - 1. Some "captures" of native units believed desertions.
 - 2. Algerian light infantry units being rotated to Germany, replaced by French units.
- D. US consul ^{Algeria} characterizes French security measures as inept, unsuccessful. Army apparently guarding ~~guarding~~ Europeans in towns, while countryside Moslems (neutral or friendly) are left unpro-

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V. In Morocco (a French "protectorate"

since 1912), ^{THERE} has been sharp upsurge in two-year-old terrorism, concentrated Casablanca area, since late May '55.

- A. Moslem resentment over heavy-handed French repressive measures now acute: Europeans in Casablanca said to face danger of massacre.
- B. Paris apparently at last convinced of need to solve burning "dynastic issue" by replacing unpopular sultan (Ben Arafa--imposed by French, Aug '53).
- C. However, Paris rejects possibility re-enthroning French-deposed Mohamed ben Youssef.
 - 1. French can find no acceptable qualified candidate among many Alaouite princes.
 - 2. May resort to device of Regency Council.

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D. No action to better Moroccan conditions

probable until after Tunisian conventions approved by French Assembly (expected in July).

1. Protectorates Minister told Foreign Affairs Commission of French Assembly: "Never has the maxim 'to govern is to choose the lesser evil' been more apt."

VI. North African Nationalist's overall capabilities difficult to assess.

A. As to military potential, ~~almost no information available on quantity,~~
~~type arms available.~~

1. Captured weapons usually light, of World War II or earlier vintage: very few automatic.

B. Nationalists probably doing some smuggling--by sea or overland. Also ~~probably~~ Arab States collaboration.

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1. Logistics problem makes massive

overland supply from Libya or
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2. Most likely source--"private
enterprise" gun-running by sea.

C. Nationalists in different parts of
French North Africa probably do not
now have sufficient military equip-
ment to launch coordinated rebellion.

1. However, can continue tie down
significant portion France's
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D. | Meanwhile, inflammatory radio broad-
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VII. Outlook for future colored by variety of
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A. More than 200,000 French troops and

police in area give reasonable assurance France can hold on to some sort of position in North Africa.

B. However, frustrations over course of events in Indochina may make French exaggerate present threat, in hopes of getting unqualified US support.

C. Problem further complicated by anti-Americanism, suspicion US intentions prevalent among French in North Africa who see US ousting French.

1. At same time, American popularity declining among natives; Communists exploiting French use of American arms.

D. Meanwhile, rising terrorism poses threat to all Europeans, including more than 20,000 Americans now in Morocco.

1. US personnel number 13,689 military, plus 4,718 dependents; 4,700 other

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- E. Only place where situation likely to improve is Tunisia, where France may avert serious disorders by firm implementations agreed-upon autonomy.
- F. Restoration of Algerian Moslem confidence--end to "second-class" citizenship for natives--appears prerequisite to restoration order there.
- G. Unless essential dynastic change made in Morocco, there is increased possibility organized guerrilla operations --like Algeria's--there.

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7 June 1955

SOVIET BLOC'S FACSIMILE NATO

- I. The "Treaty of Cooperation, Mutual Assistance and Defense," signed in Warsaw on 14 May by the USSR and all 7 Eastern European Satellites marked the culmination of a drive to erect a facsimile NATO that had begun with the incalling of Satellite bigwigs to Moscow in Dec '54.
 - A. The treaty provides for the establishment of two organizations: a combined military command and a political consultative committee.
- II. Comparison of the Warsaw Treaty with NATO shows how closely the Soviet instrument is modelled after the West's. A few clauses even appear to be almost direct translations.
 - A. Both agreements provide for "joint measures" in case one of the signatories is attacked.
 - B. Both recognize the ultimate authority of the UN.
 - C. Both pledge the contracting parties to seek to settle all disputes "without use or threat of force" and not to join any "contradictory" alliances.
- III. As the overall agreement mirrors NATO, so the combined military command is facsimile of SHAPE.
 - A. A unified headquarters will be established in Moscow, with Soviet Marshal Konev as Commander-in-Chief. Each Satellite defense minister, or his appointee, will serve with the rank of deputy to Konev.

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- B. A permanent staff, composed of representatives of the General Staffs of each participating country, will also be located in Moscow.
 - C. Not all Satellites countries will have their military units included in "the complement of the joint armed forces."
 - 1. Specifically, participation of East German forces was deferred to a later date.
 - 2. Also, it is not known what proportion of existing Satellite forces will be assigned to the "joint forces."
- IV. From a military standpoint, creation of this combined command is largely a formalization of existing Soviet-Satellite relationships, although the new machinery may make things work better.
- A. Interesting to note that ^{total} ~~all-up~~ Satellite ground force strength totals slightly over 80 divisions (not including USSR).
 - B. This is almost exactly equal to NATO members' total ground divisions (not including US).
- V. The political consultative committee will be composed of political representatives of each signatory country (thereby creating a facsimile of the Atlantic Council).
- A. This Committee will "effect the consultations envisaged in the treaty....and examine other questions arising in connection with the implementation of the present treaty."

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B. With such broad powers, the political consultative committee could logically be made responsible for planning and coordination of political and economic-- as well as military--policies of the Satellites.

1. There has been speculation that the Committee would have such broad powers.

VI. Although creation of this elaborate counterpart to NATO may have been inspired in part by military considerations, there is substance for speculations that the USSR has broader aims.

A. Ambassador Bohlen has suggested that the USSR's public confession of error during the Belgrade pilgrimage was in part designed to permit a new sort of relation with its Satellites.

VII. This broader Soviet aim may be brought into open at time of Summit meet.

A. Alterations of Soviet control mechanism in the Satellites might be designed to parry any Western efforts to make the status of the Satellites a subject of Big Four negotiations.

B. Soviet troops stationed as "joint armed forces" in the Satellites can no longer be called occupying forces, which would tend to offset Western objections that the Satellites are not independent.

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VIII. Indeed, the whole "fascimile NATO" is expendable, and, at the Summit, the USSR might offer to abolish its new organization in exchange for the disbandment of NATO, or even go so far as to offer to withdraw Soviet troops from some Satellites in exchange for similar US troop withdrawals from Western Europe.

A. The fact that East German participation was deferred to a later date strengthens the Soviet position in demanding West Germany's withdrawal from its NATO commitments.

B. A further indication of such possible bargain offers at the Summit came when the Soviet pilgrims at Belgrade asked how the Yugos would feel about Bulgaria joining the Balkan Alliance.

SOVIET BLOC'S FACSIMILE NATO

I. The Warsaw "Treaty of Cooperation, Mutual Assistance and Defense" (signed 14 May by USSR, all 7 Satellites) was culmination of Soviet campaign to erect "facsimile NATO" which had started with in-gathering of Satellite bigwigs at Moscow (Dec '54).

A. Treaty provides for two organizations: combined military command, and political consultative committee.

New Dip. Weapon —
II. Comparison of Warsaw Treaty with NATO

shows Soviet instrument closely modelled after the West's, with some clauses almost direct translations.

A. Both agreements provide for "joint measures" in case one of signatories is attacked.

B. Both recognize ultimate authority of UN.

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C. Both pledge contracting parties to

seek settlement all disputes "without use or threat of force," and not to join "contradictory" alliances.

III. As Warsaw Treaty mirrors NATO, so the combined military command is parallel to SHAPE.

A. Unified headquarters will be in Moscow, under Soviet Marshal Konev (C-in-C). Defense minister in each Satellite, or his appointee, will hold rank of deputy to Konev.

B. Treaty does not create special role for Soviet Marshal Rokossovski (Polish Defense Minister and only Soviet officer who holds such a post in any Satellite).

1. Early rumors held that Rokossovski would get some sort of NATO-like "regional command," but Treaty provides for no such commands.

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C. Moscow will also be seat of "permanent

staff," composed of representatives from General Staffs of each participating country.

D. Not all Satellites military units will be included in the "United Armed Forces": to date, no allocations have been announced.

1. Additionally, participation of East German forces has been deferred to a "later" date.

F. Soviet "line of communication" troops (now in Hungary and Rumania with total ground strength: 59,000) are nominally stationed there by treaty only while USSR maintains Austrian "occupation zone!"

1. Troops could now remain indefinitely, and new Soviet forces could enter any other Satellite under Warsaw Treaty terms, as matter of "sovereign" agreement that such "United Armed Forces" were required

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IV. From a military standpoint, creation of

this combined command is largely a formalization of existing Soviet-Satellite relationships (chart), although the new machinery may make things work better.

A. Interesting to note that Satellite ground force strength (not including USSR) totals slightly over 80 divisions.

B. This almost exactly equal to NATO members' total paper ground strength (not including US).

V. Although this elaborate "facsimile NATO" possesses military utility, there is substance for speculations that the USSR has broader than merely military aims.

A. Political consultative committee, for example, will be composed of political representatives from each signatory (i.e.: facsimile of Atlantic Council).

B. Committee will "effect the consultations envisaged in the treaty...and examine

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C. Under this broad charter, the Committee

could plan and coordinate political and economic--as well as military--policies of all Satellites.

D. Ambassador Bohlen has suggested that public Soviet confession of error during Belgrade pilgrimage was in part designed to permit a new sort of relation with its Satellites.

VI. This broader Soviet aim may be brought into open at time of Summit meet.

A. Alterations of Soviet control mechanism in Eastern Europe might be designed to parry any Western efforts at Summit to negotiate on status of Satellites.

B. Soviet troops stationed in Satellites as "United Armed Forces" could not be called occupying forces: Warsaw Treaty emphasis on "sovereignty" of signatories would tend to offset Western charges that Satellites not independent.

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be used at Summit as expendable bargaining point.

- A. USSR might offer to abolish new organization in exchange for the disbandment of NATO.
- B. Might even go so far as to offer withdraw Soviet troops from some Satellites in exchange for similar US troop withdrawals from Western Europe.
- C. Fact of deferred East German participation strengthens Soviet position for demanding West Germany's withdrawal from NATO commitments.
- D. Indication of such possible bargain offers at Summit came when Soviet pilgrims at Belgrade asked Yugos if they would favor Bulgaria's joining Balkan Alliance.

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8 June 1955

ICFTU CONGRESS

- WFTU - Formed 45 - Commie dominated -*
CIO - TUE Withdrew - Formed ICFTU
- I. Most significant development at last month's ICFTU Congress at Vienna was decision to establish a Director of Organization ^{to} ~~and~~ step-up ICFTU anti-Communist activities.
- A. Since organization, ICFTU has made substantial progress in uniting free trade unions of world.
1. Today, has 109 affiliates in 75 countries (combined membership-- 54,500,000).
- B. However, resources have not been adequate to fight Communist infiltration, manipulation of world labor movements (especially in underdeveloped areas).
- II. Some members have insisted that ICFTU could best meet Communist threat by concentrating on improvement of workers' social, economic

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A. However, at same time, a number of

established trade union centers have been captured by Communists and fellow-travelers.

B. This demonstration of inadequacy in approach gives particular significance to ICFTU's creation of Director of Organization.

III. This new official will have the dual job of organizing and strengthening trade unions (particularly in underdeveloped areas) and also directing more aggressive anti-Communist campaign.

~~A. Will replace present Regional Activities Fund Committee (to be abolished).~~

B. Director will be selected by committee of three (Meany, Geddes, and Khatib of Pakistan), which is expected to announce choice in Sep '55.

C. Among candidates are Becu, and Pat Conroy (Canadian labor attache in

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lateral foreign operations when new arrange-
ments go into effect.

- A. New system will be financed by increase in annual dues of ICFTU affiliates.
- B. Meany has informally agreed to contribute substantial part of fund.
 - 1. For both AF of L and CIO, amount would total \$150,000.

V. Other actions at Vienna Congress included:

- A. Acceptance into ICFTU membership of the Union Marocaine du Travail (organized in defiance of French law prohibiting indigenous trade unions in Morocco).
 - 1. Under this law, native workers must join existing French unions which, in many cases, forced them into Communist-controlled CGT.
 - 2. Action is significant since it lends support to nationalist aspirations

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3. ICFTU has been attacked by WFTU

for allegedly supporting
colonialism.

B. ICFTU rebuke of two international
trade secretariats (Miners' Inter-
national Federation and International
Federation of Building and Woodworkers)
for accepting Tito-controlled affiliates
into their membership.

C. Summary rejection of WFTU invitation
for "unity of action" by all inter-
national labor organizations.

1. ICFTU Secretary General suggested
that WFTU's affiliates make a
genuine effort to introduce free
trade unionism in their own
countries before making further
overtures.

VI. One of most noteworthy aspects of Vienna
Congress was emergence of US leadership in
ICFTU affairs. Factors contributing to

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gations of intention to remain in ICFTU,
make it a more effective organization.

- B. Forthcoming merger between AF of L and CIO.
- C. Delegates' awareness of heavy US financial contributions.
- D. Atmosphere of unity among US and Canadian delegations and lack of friction between US and UK delegations.

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CIO and TUC withdrew from the WFTU on
18 January 1949. The ICFTU was officially
established at a Congress in London on 7 Dec. 1949.

The main AFofL & CIO delegates were as
follows to the Vienna Conference of the ICFTU:

AFofL:

George Meany
Irving Brown
David Dubinsky
Jay Lovestone

DAVE BECK

CIO

James Carey
Jacob Potofsky
O. A. Knight
Victor Reuther
Michael Ross
Mc Donald
Emil Rieve

Thos. Kennedy

NSC BRIEFING

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8 June 1955

E. Finally, American influence shown in ~~the~~ meeting of challenge from both German and Jap delegations. Germans came to Vienna under mandate to resist rearmament proposal prior to unification. Jap delegation proposed resolution calling for ban on mass destruction of weapons.

F. US delegation proposed alternative resolution calling on democracies to "improve their efforts to obtain collective security to strengthen their capacity to deter and prevent aggression and war through adequate defense measures." Resolution also called for system of enforceable international control and inspection of atomic resources and denounced Soviet Union ^{for opposing} ~~proposing~~ such a system.

Q in DSA passed +
G. ~~Final~~^h resolution supported both German
and Jap delegations. Also as result American
proposal, tentative plans being made for a Labor
Conference On Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
to precede UN general conference 4 August.

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