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11 July 1972

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Vietnamese Affairs Staff Contribution  
to DCI Briefing Book

1. Three of the four WSAG projects extant at the time of your departure were completed and sent to Kissinger, the other WSAG principals, Secretary Laird and General Bennett. Attached hereto are reading copies of the three memoranda in question:

25X1 a. The Impact of Events Since 8 May 1972 on North Vietnamese Capabilities to Continue the War  
[redacted] 3 July 1972. This is the requested summary or distillate of our two earlier memoranda of 8 and 27 June, i.e., the original capabilities piece (8 June) and the detailed answers to Kissinger's and his staff's questions thereon (27 June).

25X1 b. The Effect on the North Vietnamese Economy of a Reduction of Imports to 2,700 Tons Per Day  
[redacted] 6 July 1972. This is the requested response to Kissinger's "What do you mean by 'minimum levels?'" question.

25X1 c. Population Control Map of South Vietnam (No. 0791/72), 8 July 1972. This is our cut at Kissinger's request (growing out of his interest in our previous control maps) for a picture of how things actually stood at the present. This project was conducted with enough Defense consultation to keep Laird, the Chiefs, and DIA happy but not enough to get the project untracked or keep us from meeting our deadline.

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2. Colonel Kennedy's comments indicate the above documents have been well received and well regarded. We still have, however, an undercurrent of the problem that showed up in April and with which you are quite familiar. Joe Alsop called me on 6 July (prior to taking off for Miami). Among other things, he said (with a rather self-satisfied purr) that an "unimpeachable source" had told him that an Agency "estimate" (his word) had alleged that the attacks on the North were having no effect whatsoever on the Communists' military capabilities and that said estimate had been "remanded for redrafting." I told Joe rather tartly that his source might be unimpeachable, but in this instance his source was wrong. The Agency had never claimed or said that the attacks on the North were without effect and, further, no "estimate" or any other paper on Indochina had been "remanded for redrafting." This incident is of little intrinsic importance, but since it does not take much imagination to guess the identity of Joe's "unimpeachable source," the incident does serve as a telltale symptom of the way some winds are still blowing.

3. On pending business, we are still working on the fourth -- and in some ways, diciest -- WSAG project, namely the ceasefire maps. These are due by COB 12 July, a deadline we will meet with relative ease. We have been working harmoniously with State and Defense on this and have a package assembled that makes reasonable sense, reflects a consensus judgment, and is responsive to the White House request. We are all well aware, of course, that even if the White House likes this package as a first cut, the project will almost certainly have to be re-done several times if the subject remains a live one.

4. Thanks to the Democratic Convention and other matters of greater immediate interest, there have been no further developments on the [REDACTED]-related front of major consequence since our 3 July cables. Goldsmith has asked some questions, explaining that he was sure Stennis would want to be briefed, but these were not hard to stall until after your return. Hersh had another article in the Sunday (8 July) New York Times News of the Week in Review section, but this was essentially an abridged re-hash of his 3 July story with no new allegations. So far, the Agency is truly innocent of everything we have actually been charged with. We have, for your perusal, a detailed memorandum on the charges surfaced to date in light of the background of what has actually been done by the military services and by us.

5. Laird has been in high good humor, grumbling a bit about publicly expressed White House (read Kissinger) optimism regarding possible progress in negotiations (an optimism for which no supporting evidence has crossed my desk) but with no

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apparent heartburn about anything connected with the Agency. He seems to have liked our WSAG output and seems well pleased with the extent to which we have worked with his associates on these projects.

6. The psychological warfare effort perks along in a way the White House, according to Kennedy, considers praiseworthy. We were probably at least partially responsible for the rumor about Chinese and Soviet pressure on Hanoi to negotiate, which UPI played out of London. This ricocheted around for several days and sent the Dow Jones up 28 points. The White House apparently considers it the fruit of successful Agency efforts and is very pleased.

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Attachments

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