App

RUSSIAN EMIGRÉ POLITICS

GEORGE FISCHER
EDITOR

FREE RUSSIA FUND, INC.
1951

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

. . .the Soviet rulers can only be the gainers when by careless thinking and by careless expression we imply an inner solidarity between the regime and the people it rules - a solidarity that neither the regime nor the Russian people feel and that can only lead us into grievous mistakes of policy. . .

R. Gordon Wasson, *Toward a Russian Policy* (1951)

"Do you really think we were right to come over - all of us who left the Soviets for this life on a dustheap, or should we have stayed with our own people". . .

In the end one did not wonder that the defections, which might have crippled the Russians in East Germany, have instead been reduced to a mere trickle. One wondered, rather, why all governments nowadays, even with the best intentions, seem to be so utterly incapable of generosity or kindness or the fine gesture. This seems, indeed, to be one of the marks of our time.

Joseph Alsop, *New York Herald Tribune*
March 21, 1951

PREFACE

After years of unconcern, the free world has begun to show some interest in a unique and little known group, referred to as "non-returners" and "defectors." These are the several hundred thousand Soviet citizens who have left the USSR in the past decade, since Germany attacked the USSR in 1941. But why, it may be asked, should the free world take an interest in the subject of this manual, Russian emigre politics?

The answer, to begin with, is that such a vast defection is unparalleled in recent history, and the full significance and makeup of this Soviet exodus can be understood fully only when its political evolution is taken into account. Moreover, a knowledge of Russian emigre politics becomes crucial as free society learns to appreciate these Soviet exiles both as invaluable sources on the USSR and as fervent and equally invaluable allies in Freedom's resistance against Soviet imperialism. As we turn to Soviet exiles for aid and counsel, it behooves us to have a more than superficial insight into the internal ideological and organizational groupings

which claim their allegiance or sympathy. This is as essential in order to command their respect as it is to preclude avoidable misjudgments and indiscretions on our part.

Lastly, knowledge of the political life of Soviet exiles appears important in the terms of the long-range future. In its own deliberation on a free post-Stalin Russia, the outside world will turn in times both of peace and war to the Soviet exiles for counsel as well as for an indication of what the ideological trends might be inside the USSR. This is probably unavoidable--and not at all undesirable. But unless such a step is accompanied by a thorough grasp of the background and extent of each emigre grouping, it can do far more harm than good.

A consideration, such as the above, as to what interest the Soviet exiles and their political evolution may have for the outside world, inevitably leads to another, no less vital question. This is the position free society is to take in the broadest terms toward that time when the Soviet exiles now in our midst will be able to return to their homeland. For only when the free world has evolved a far-reaching, clearly defined position on the kind of post-Soviet Russia it hopes for, can the free world adopt the required consistency and constructiveness in its ever increasing and ever complex relations with the Soviet exiles. Therefore, to place the subject of Russian Emigre Politics in its proper perspective, this manual opens with an introduction by George F. Kennan, "America and the Russian Future."

Until recently, it had been wellnigh impossible to obtain an even approximate description of the political life of exiles, recent and post-1917, from the Soviet system. In the early months of 1951 three essays appeared on the subject, however, which, taken together, appear to succeed in presenting a general picture. It is these three essays which form the bulk of Russian Emigre Politics.

If Russian Emigre Politics presents - perhaps for the first time - such a general picture, it could not hope to fulfill several other, and closely related needs. Thus Russian Emigre Politics neither affords popularized ac-

counts suited for a wider public, nor is it a systematic reference work with the required documentation and bibliography. Perhaps most importantly, the essays contained in Russian Emigre Politics were not able to place the political life in the psychological context so essential for the understanding of any body politic. All these are shortcomings which can be remedied only as more and more painstaking analysis and research is undertaken and published; the same must be said for most errors in fact or interpretation which may be found in Russian Emigre Politics.

The reader of Russian Emigre Politics is doubtlessly aware of the classical characteristics of emigre life in general, portrayed so memorably in Alexander Herzen's memoirs of the nineteenth century, Life and Thoughts: the striking isolation from the environment and the inflamed emotions, as well as the unceasing intrigues and controversies made the more important by the other characteristics of such exile existence. But at least two special features should be mentioned regarding the period of greatest current interest which is covered in Russian Emigre Politics, the period following World War II. One of these added ingredients of emigre life, particularly among recent exiles from the USSR, has been the near-paranoid dread of Soviet agents and of Soviet invasion of Western Germany, which remains the center of Russian emigre politics. Uppermost also is the exiles' immense, embittering hardships and isolation--individual as well as organizational--in the face of what the exiles fervently believe to be of crucial importance to the free world: a sustained, large-scale anti-Stalin campaign by the exiles themselves. Adumbrated by such uniquely contemporary factors, the emigre existence of exiles from Stalin's Russia has led to frustrations and deformations which form an essential background to the material in Russian Emigre Politics.

Lastly, two qualifications. One of these qualifications pertains to the unusually complex and controversial nationality question. The political life of exiles from the Soviet system may be said to flow in two currents, currents which to date have seldom if ever merged or even met. One of these currents might be termed the "na-

tional," and is in reality itself a number of separate currents representing various nationalities incorporated into the USSR. The "national" current encompasses those emigre political groupings which now, in exile, demand more or less total independence from Russia proper once the Stalin regime is overthrown. The other current in emigre politics may be called, in part for lack of a better term, the "Russian" one. This current embraces those groupings which are made up to a considerable extent but not exclusively of exiles of "Great" Russian origin. Adherents to this "Russian" current either favor a united (some a loosely federated) post-Stalin Russia or advocate that this explosive and presently divisive nationality issue be settled by free popular plebescite after the overthrow of the Soviet regime, preferably under the auspices of the United Nations.

A habit has grown up in the West of describing all Soviet nationalities within the USSR as well as in the emigration by the single term "Russian". On the whole, this habit is totally innocent and merely a semantic short-cut. But emigre adherents to the "national current", often hostile to "Great" Russians as the "oppressing race", strongly object to the practice. The title, Russian Emigre Politics, calls for an explanation in view of this--particularly since its publisher, the Free Russia Fund, Inc., is concerned with aiding exiles of all Soviet nationalities and not solely Russians. The reason this title was selected is simply that it deals with only one of the described currents in emigre politics, the "Russian" one. Far greater American knowledge of the other, the "national" current is not an iota less important. But unfortunately even greater paucity exists in factual Western studies of the various national groupings --each to be explained by immensely complex and in every case different historical, psychological and ethnic factors. It is to be hoped that this void on the "national" current in emigre politics will be filled soon. Meanwhile it appeared important, as a badly needed first step, to publish a collection on Russian emigre politics.

Secondly, in a subject as intensely controversial to its participants - and as ever perplexing to outside observers - as emigre politics, differences are apt to

arise in the interpretation or selection of even the least significant fact or statement. Paucity of published material makes this still more likely in the case of a collection like Russian Emigre Politics. Therefore it should be made particularly plain that the publisher of this manual, Free Russia Fund, Inc., does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any part of the volume. The Free Russia Fund believes, however, that the publication of a manual such as Russian Emigre Politics will contribute to a better understanding of the entire subject.

GEORGE FISCHER

The attention of the reader is called to the extensive index of Russian Emigre Politics. The index was prepared to correlate the separate contributions to the manual, and to spell out and translate names of organizations.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE

by

George F. Kennan

The author: George F. Kennan had extensive service in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow before, during, and after World War II, and subsequently held the posts of Counsellor of the U. S. Department of State and Chief of its Policy Planning Staff. He is at present serving as Consultant to the Ford Foundation and President of the Free Russia Fund.

Reprinted from
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AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE

By George F. Kennan

THE very virulence with which Americans reject the outlook and practice of those who now hold power in the Kremlin implies in the strongest possible way the belief in, and desire for, an alternative—for some other Russian outlook and some other set of practices in Russia to take the place of those we know today. Yet we may be permitted to ask whether there is any clear image in our minds of what that outlook and those practices might be, and of the ways by which Americans might promote progress toward them. At the present time, in particular, when the coexistence of the two systems on the same planet has led to such immense strains and anxieties everywhere, and to so much despair of its successful continuation, there is a tendency on the part of many people to permit the image of a different and more acceptable Russia to become eclipsed by, or even identified with, the question of victory or defeat in a future war. Some Americans are already reverting, merely in contemplation of a possible war, to the American bad habit of assuming that there is something final and positive about a military decision—that it is the ending of something, and the happy ending, rather than a beginning.

There could, of course, be no greater error than this, quite apart from any consideration of the blood and sacrifice which war involves. A war against Soviet power which could be said to be relatively successful militarily (and we would do well to remember that no such war could be more than relatively successful) would in itself assure little or nothing in the way of progress toward the achievement of the sort of alternative we might wish; at the most it would only make more immediate various aspects of a problem which already exists and which every American who objects to Soviet behavior must, in consistency, have in mind anyway, war or no war. That is the problem of the kind of Russia which we would prefer to see; the kind with which we ourselves could, let us say, live easily; the kind which would permit the existence of a much more stable world order; the kind to which it would be both realistic and suitable for us to aspire.

This problem of the possibility of a different and preferable Russia is not really a question of war or peace. War in itself will not bring about such a Russia. Indeed it would be most unlikely

to lead in that direction unless accompanied by many wise and strenuous efforts besides the military one. And a continued absence of major war will not preclude the coming of a different Russia. All of that depends upon a great many other things which would have to be done by a great many people, either in war or in peace. Not all of these things can be done by Americans. So far as direct action is concerned, the bulk of them cannot be. But our possibilities for influencing the outcome are significant; and we must remember that there may be times when our efforts may be capable of swinging the balance one way or the other. For that reason our own relationship to the Russian future is something worth our most strenuous thought and attention. And in our efforts to determine it, two things are of major importance: 1, that we should know what we want; and 2, that we should know how to conduct ourselves in order to facilitate, rather than to impede, the coming into being of what we want. The word "facilitate" is used advisedly; for we are dealing here with a foreign country, and our rôle can be at best a marginal one, supplementary to a far more important rôle which others must play.

II

What sort of Russia would we like to see before us, as our partner in the world community?

Perhaps the first thing to get straight here is the sort of Russia there is no use looking for. And such a Russia—the kind we may *not* look for—is easy to describe and envisage, for it would be a capitalistic and liberal-democratic one, with institutions closely resembling those of our own republic.

If we look first at the question of the economic system, we see at once that Russia has scarcely known private enterprise as we are familiar with it in this country. Even in pre-Revolutionary times the Russian Government always had a close hold on a number of economic activities, notably transportation and the armament industry, which in our country have traditionally, or at least normally, been private. There were, to be sure, in the earlier period of Russian history, distinguished families of private Russian entrepreneurs, famous for their bold commercial pioneering in the undeveloped areas of the realm. But by and large indigenous private capital remained more conspicuous in the exchange than in the production of commodities. The great domestic business was trade, rather than manufacture. And business

did not stand in so high repute as in the West. There was a traditional, and deeply Russian, merchant class; but it was not generally noted or respected for breadth of outlook or for any enlightened concept of its own responsibility to society. The portrayals of it in Russian literature are generally negative and depressing. The members of the landed gentry, whose tastes and prejudices were authoritative in the social field, often looked down on business, and themselves tended to avoid participation in it. The Russian language, in fact, never acquired a word comparable to our expression "businessman;" it had only the word for "merchant," and this term did not always have a pleasant connotation.

As Russia became industrialized, in a sudden rush of activity which took place around the turn of the century, there were clearly apparent the absence of an adequate tradition of responsibility and restraint on the part of the capital-owning class and a general lack of preparedness, on the part of the state and of society generally, to cope with the new strains. This industrial development, proceeding largely on a basis of individual enterprise rather than of widely distributed corporative ownership, was marked by sudden accumulations of fortunes in the hands of individuals and families not always well prepared for such affluence. Often the mode of expenditure of wealth appeared to other people as little creditable as the means by which it had been accumulated. Individual capitalists and workers lived in close proximity—indeed, many of the factory owners lived in the compounds of their factories. Such conditions often bore greater resemblance to the pattern of early Industrial-Revolution capitalism, as Marx had described it, than to conditions in advanced Western countries. This fact may well have had something to do with the success of Marxism in Russia. The Russian industrial capitalist was generally visible in the flesh, and as often as not he had the rotundity, and sometimes (not always) the vulgarity and callousness, of the capitalist of the early-Communist caricature.

All these things go to show that whatever private enterprise may have been in Tsarist Russia, it had not yet come to hold anything resembling the respect and significance in the eyes of the people that it had acquired in the older mercantile countries by the beginning of this century. Perhaps with time it would have. The prospects were steadily improving. Examples of efficient and progressive industrial management existed in Russia before the Revolution, and were increasing.

But all this, it must be remembered, was a long time ago. Thirty-three years have elapsed since the Revolution. Those years, in the strenuous conditions of Soviet life, have witnessed the passing of a full generation. Of the people capable of influencing the course of events in Russia today only an insignificant minority recall the pre-Revolutionary days at all. The younger generation has no comprehension or concept of anything but the state capitalism that the Soviet régime has enforced. And what we are talking about here is something not even in the present but in the indefinite future.

Bearing all this in mind, we see that there is no Russian national understanding which would permit the early establishment in Russia of anything resembling the private enterprise system as we know it. This is not to say that some such understanding will not some day develop. It may, if circumstances are favorable. But it will never be a system identical to our own. And no one will usefully be able to force the pace, particularly no one from outside.

It is true that the term "Socialism" has been used for so many years in close intimacy with the term "Soviet" that it is now hateful to many people, both within and without the borders of the Soviet Union. But it is easy to draw wrong conclusions from this phenomenon. It is conceivable that retail trade and the performance of the small individual services which have so much to do with the pleasantness of daily life may some day return in large measure to private hands in Russia. In agriculture, as we shall see presently, there will certainly be an extensive return to private ownership and initiative. There is a further possibility that the system of mutual production-coöperation by groups of artisans (*artels*)—a system peculiarly rooted in Russian tradition and understanding—may some day point the way to economic institutions which could represent a highly important and promising innovation in the approach to modern problems of labor and capital. But large sections of economic life known to us as the normal provinces of private enterprise will almost certainly remain in national hands for a long time to come in Russia, regardless of the identity of the political authority. This should surprise no American, nor should it offend any. There is no reason why the form of Russian economic life, beyond certain major exceptions that will be mentioned below, should be considered a matter of vital concern to the outside world.

Agriculture deserves a special place in our thinking on this sub-

ject. Agricultural enterprise is the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. Left in private hands, it constitutes a concession to human freedom and individual initiative—a concession which the true Bolshevik finds abhorrent. Forcibly collectivized, it requires an elaborate apparatus of restraint if the farmer is to be made to stay on his land and to produce. The forced collectivization of the farming population is probably today the greatest single cause of discontent in the Soviet Union, except possibly the excessive cruelty of the police, with which it is intimately connected. It may be taken for granted that one of the first acts of any future progressive authority in Russia would be to abolish this hated system of agricultural serfdom and to restore to the farmers the pride and incentives of private land ownership and free disposal of agricultural commodities. Collective farms may continue to exist; and they probably will, for the most abhorrent feature of the present system is not the concept of producer-coöperation itself but the element of restraint that underlies its application. The collectives of the future will be voluntary coöperatives, however, not shotgun marriages.

Turning to the political side, it was said above that we could not expect to see the emergence of a liberal-democratic Russia along American patterns. This cannot be too strongly emphasized. It does not mean that future Russian régimes will necessarily be unliberal. There is no liberal tradition finer than the strain which has existed in the Russia of the past. Many Russian individuals and groups of this day are deeply imbued with that tradition, and will do all in their power to make it the dominant element in the Russian future. In that effort, we may wish them well without reservation. But we will be doing them no favor if we permit ourselves to expect too much to happen too fast, or look to them to produce anything resembling our own institutions. These Russian liberals will have no easy road to walk. They will find in their county a young generation that has known nothing but Soviet power and has been trained to think subconsciously in the terms of that power even when it has resented and hated it. Many features of the Soviet system will stick, if only for the reason that everything has been destroyed which might seem to have constituted an alternative to them. And some features will deserve to stick, for no system that lasts over decades is entirely without merits. Any program of government for a future Russia will have to adjust itself to the fact that there has been this Soviet

interlude, and that it has left its positive marks as well as its negative ones. And no members of future Russian governments will be aided by doctrinaire and impatient well-wishers in the West who look to them, just because they are seeking a decent alternative to what we know today as Bolshevism, to produce in short order a replica of the Western democratic dream.

Above all, it behooves us Americans, in this connection, to repress, and if possible to extinguish once and for all, our inveterate tendency to judge others by the extent to which they contrive to be like ourselves. In our relations with the people of Russia it is important, as it has never been important before, for us to recognize that our institutions may not have relevance for people living in other climes and conditions and that there can be social structures and forms of government in no way resembling our own and yet not deserving of censure. There is no reason why this realization should shock us. In 1831 de Tocqueville, writing from the United States, correctly observed: "The more I see of this country the more I admit myself penetrated with this truth: that there is nothing absolute in the theoretical value of political institutions, and that their efficiency depends almost always on the original circumstances and the social conditions of the people to whom they are applied."

Forms of government are forged mainly in the fire of practice, not in the vacuum of theory. They respond to national character and to national realities. There is great good in the Russian national character, and the realities of that country scream out today for a form of administration more considerate of that good. Let us hope that it will come. But when Soviet power has run its course, or when its personalities and spirit begin to change (for the ultimate outcome could be one or the other), let us not hover nervously over the people who come after, applying litmus papers daily to their political complexions to find out whether they answer to our concept of "democratic." Give them time; let them be Russians; let them work out their internal problems in their own manner. The ways by which peoples advance toward dignity and enlightenment in government are things that constitute the deepest and most intimate processes of national life. There is nothing less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which foreign interference can do less good. There are, as we shall see presently, certain features of the future Russian state that *are* of genuine concern to the outside world. But these do not include

the form of government itself, provided only that it keep within certain well-defined limits, beyond which lies totalitarianism.

III

What, then, do they include? To what kind of a Russia may we reasonably and justly look forward? What attributes are we, as responsible members of the world community, entitled to look for in the personality of a foreign state, and of Russia in particular?

We may look, in the first place, for a Russian government which, in contrast to the one we know today, would be tolerant, communicative and forthright in its relations with other states and peoples. It would not take the ideological position that its own purposes cannot finally prosper unless all systems of government not under its control are subverted and eventually destroyed. It would dispense with this paranoiac suspiciousness we know so well, and consent to view the outside world, ourselves included, as it really is and always has been: neither entirely good nor entirely bad, neither entirely to be trusted nor entirely to be mistrusted (if only for the simple reason that "trust" has only a relative significance in foreign affairs). It would consent to recognize that this outside world is not really preoccupied with diabolical plots to invade Russia and inflict injuries on the Russian people. Viewing the outside world in this way, the statesmen of a future Russia could approach it with tolerance and forbearance and practical good humor, defending their national interests as statesmen must, but not assuming that these can be furthered only at the expense of the interests of others, and vice versa.

No one asks for a naive and childlike confidence; no one asks for a fatuous enthusiasm for all that is foreign; no one asks that the genuine and legitimate differences of interest which have always marked, and will always continue to mark, the relations between peoples be ignored. We must expect Russian national interests not only to continue to exist but to be vigorously and confidently asserted. But in a régime that we could recognize as an improvement over what we know today we would expect that this would be done in an atmosphere of emotional sanity and moderation: that the foreign representative would not continue to be viewed and treated as one possessed of the devil; that it would be conceded that there might be such a thing as innocent and legitimate curiosity about a foreign county, which could be permitted to be gratified without fatal detriment to that country's national life;

that it would be recognized that there might be individual foreign business aspirations which did not aim at the destruction of the Russian state; that it would be admitted, finally, that persons desirous of travelling across international borders might have, and are even apt to have, motives other than "espionage, sabotage and diversion"—such trivial motives, in fact, as the enjoyment of travel or the peculiar impulses that move people to wish to visit relatives from time to time. In short, we may ask that the grotesque system of anachronisms known as the Iron Curtain be lifted from the world, and that the Russian people, who have so much to give and so much to receive as mature members of the world community, cease to be insulted by a policy that treats them as children, too immature to have normal contact with the adult world, too undependable to be let out alone.

Secondly, while recognizing that the internal system of government is in all essential respects Russia's own business and may well depart drastically from our own, we are entitled to expect that the exercise of governmental authority will stop short of that fairly plain line beyond which lies totalitarianism. Specifically, we may expect that any régime which claims to contrast favorably with that which we have before us today will refrain from enslaving its own labor—industrial and agricultural. There is a reason for this: a reason even more solid than the shock we experience at witnessing the sickening details of this type of oppression. When a régime sets out to enslave its own working population in this way, it requires for the maintenance of the arrangement so vast an apparatus of coercion that the imposition of the Iron Curtain follows almost automatically. No ruling group likes to admit that it can govern its people only by regarding and treating them as criminals. For this reason there is always a tendency to justify internal oppression by pointing to the menacing iniquity of the outside world. And the outside world must be portrayed, in these circumstances, as very iniquitous indeed—iniquitous to the point of caricature. Nothing short of this will do. Carefully hiding the realities behind the Iron Curtain, the régime depicts "abroad" to its own people in every lurid hue of hideousness, as anxious mothers attempt to intimidate their children and fortify their own authority by embroidering the image of that sinister "something" which "will get you if you don't watch out."

In this way, excess of internal authority leads inevitably to unsocial and aggressive conduct as a government among govern-

ments, and is a matter of concern to the international community. The world is not only heartily sick of this comedy by reason of the endless and wearisome falsehoods it involves, but it has learned to recognize it as something so irresponsible and dangerous that, maintained for any length of time, it easily becomes a major hazard for world peace and stability. It is for this reason that we, while recognizing that all distinctions as between freedom and authority are relative and admitting that 90 percent of them are no business of ours when they affect a foreign country, still insist that there is an area here in which no government of a great country can move without creating the most grievous and weighty problems for its neighbors. That is precisely the area in which the régime of Hitler found itself at home, and in which the Soviet Government has moved for at least these past 15 years. We may state bluntly that we can recognize no future Russian régime as one with which we could have a satisfactory relationship unless it keeps out of this danger area.

The third thing we may hope from a new Russia is that it will refrain from pinning an oppressive yoke on other peoples who have the instinct and the capacity for national self-assertion. In mentioning this matter, we are entering upon a delicate subject. There is no more difficult and treacherous one in the entire lexicon of political issues. In the relationships between the Great-Russian people and nearby peoples outside the confines of the old Tsarist Empire, as well as non-Russian national groups that were included within that empire, there is no conceivable pattern of borders or institutional arrangements which, measured against the concepts prevailing to date, would not arouse violent resentments and involve genuine injustices in many quarters. If people in that part of the world are going to go on thinking of national borders and minority problems in the way that they have thought of them in the past and continue to think of them today, Americans would do well to avoid incurring any responsibility for views or positions on these subjects; for any specific solutions they may advocate will some day become a source of great bitterness against them, and they will find themselves drawn into controversies that have little or nothing to do with the issue of human freedom.

What is plainly necessary, and the only solution worthy of American encouragement, is the rise of such a spirit among all the peoples concerned as would give to border and institutional arrangements in that troubled area an entirely new, and greatly

reduced, significance. Whether that spirit will actually arise, we cannot tell. And precisely because we cannot tell this, Americans should be extremely careful in committing their support or encouragement to any specific arrangements in this sphere; for we cannot know what they mean until there is clarity as to the spirit which will underlie them. How can we know whether a given national group will require an independent status, or a federal status, some special brand of local self-government, or no special status at all, until we know something about the psychological climate in which these arrangements would operate? There are peoples of non-Russian ethnological character on the borders of the Great-Russian family whose economic existence is intimately bound up with that of the Great-Russians. The future should see a minimum of disruption of these economic ties, and that in itself would normally warrant a close political connection. But its nature would always have to depend on what sort of attitudes prevailed on both sides of the line: on the degree of tolerance and insight which the peoples involved (and not only the Russian people) might be able to bring to the establishment of these relationships.

We are all agreed, for example, that the Baltic countries should never again be forced against the innermost feelings of their peoples into any relationship whatsoever with a Russian state; but they would themselves be foolish to reject close and coöperative arrangements with a tolerant, nonimperialistic Russia, which genuinely wished to overcome the unhappy memories of the past and to place her relations to the Baltic peoples on a basis of real respect and disinterestedness. The Ukraine, again, deserves full recognition for the peculiar genius and abilities of its people and for the requirements and possibilities of its development as a linguistic and cultural entity; but the Ukraine is economically as much a part of Russia as Pennsylvania is a part of the United States. Who can say what the final status of the Ukraine should be unless he knows the character of the Russia to which the adjustment will have to be made? As for the satellite states: they must, and will, recover their full independence; but they will not assure themselves of a stable and promising future if they make the mistake of proceeding from feelings of revenge and hatred toward the Russian people who have shared their tragedy, and if they try to base that future on the exploitation of the initial difficulties of a well-intentioned Russian régime struggling to overcome the legacy of Bolshevism.

There is no use underestimating the bitterness of these territorial problems, even assuming the utmost of goodwill and relaxed tolerance on the part of the peoples concerned. Some of the dispositions taken at the close of the Second World War (made even worse today by the deliberate policy on the part of certain governments to turn the provisional prematurely into the permanent) represent distinctly unhealthy situations, not conducive to a peaceful future. Some day these dispositions must be changed; and it will admittedly require tact on the part of all concerned, and forbearance bordering on the miraculous, if these changes are to be effected without a further compounding of violence and bitterness. For that unhappy situation the peoples of Europe have to thank the calculating cynicism of the Bolshevik leaders and the amiable indulgence of the Western Powers.

But one of the greatest of the German oppositionists in the time of Hitler, writing at the risk of his life to a friend in England during the recent war, said:

> For us Europe after the war is less a problem of frontiers and soldiers, of top-heavy organizations and grand plans than . . . a question of how the picture of man can be restored in the breasts of our fellow-citizens.[1]

Would that the Nazi gallows had spared this man for the present and the future; he was both right and courageous, and such people will be desperately needed if the future of the region from the Elbe to Bering Strait is ever to be happier than it has been in the past. An American who wishes his influence to be beneficial in that part of the world would do well to impress on any friends he may have from the Iron-Curtain countries the folly of a continuation, by them or anyone else, of these dreary and profitless manipulations with so-called national boundaries and with the naïve loyalties of bewildered linguistic groups which have passed for statemanship in that area in the past. There are more important things than where the border runs, and the first of these is that on both sides of it there should be tolerance and maturity, humility in the face of the sufferings of the past and the problems of the future, and a realization that none of the important problems of the future for any of the peoples of Europe is going to be solved entirely, or even primarily, within the country's national boundaries.

These, then, are the things for which an American well-wisher

[1] "A German of the Resistance. The Last Letters of Count Helmuth James von Moltke." London: Oxford University Press, 1948.

may hope from the Russia of the future: that she lift forever the Iron Curtain, that she recognize certain limitations to the internal authority of government, and that she abandon, as ruinous and unworthy, the ancient game of imperialist expansion and oppression. If she is not prepared to do these things, she will hardly be distinguishable from what we have before us today, and to hasten the arrival of such a Russia would not be worth the care or thought of a single American. If she is prepared to do these things, then Americans will not need to concern themselves more deeply with her nature and purposes; the basic demands of a more stable world order will then have been met, and the area in which a foreign people can usefully have thoughts and suggestions will have been filled.

IV

So much, then, for the kind of Russia we would like to see. How should we, as Americans, conduct ourselves in order to promote the realization of, or at least an advance toward, such a Russia?

In our thinking on this subject we must be careful to distinguish between direct action, *i.e.* action on our part directly affecting persons and events behind what is now the Iron Curtain, and indirect action, by which we mean action taken with respect to other things—with respect, let us say, to ourselves or to our relations with other people—and affecting the Soviet world only obliquely and incidentally.

Most regrettably, as the world is today, the possibility for direct action by Americans toward the ends discussed above must be examined both in terms of a possible war and in terms of the continuation of the present state of "no major war." The first of these contingencies must unfortunately be discussed first, for it has become the dominant prospect in the minds of many people.

If war comes, what we can do directly to promote the emergence of a more desirable Russia? We can hold steadily and clearly in mind the image of the kind of Russia we would like to see and assure that military operations are shaped in such a way as to permit it to come into existence.

The first part of this task is a negative one: not to let ourselves be diverted by irrelevant or confusing concepts of war aims. We can avoid, this time, the tyranny of slogans. We can avoid confusing ourselves with grandiose and unrealistic, or even meaningless, phrases designed simply to make us feel better about the

bloody and terrible business in which we are engaged. We can remember that war—a matter of destruction, brutalization and sacrifice, of separations, domestic disintegration, and the weakening of the deeper fabrics of society—is a process which of itself can achieve no positive aims: that even military victory is only the prerequisite for some further and more positive achievement which it makes possible but by no means assures. We can have the moral courage, this time, to remind ourselves that major international violence is, in terms of the values of our civilization, a form of bankruptcy for us all—even for those who are confident that they are right; that all of us, victors and vanquished alike, must emerge from it poorer than we began it and farther from the goals we had in mind; and that, since victory or defeat can signify only relative degrees of misfortune, even the most glorious military victory would give us no right to face the future in any spirit other than one of sorrow and humbleness for what has happened and of realization that the road ahead, toward a better world, is long and hard—longer and harder, in fact, than it would have been had it been possible to avoid a military cataclysm altogether.

Remembering these things, we will be less inclined to view military operations as ends in themselves, and should find it easier to conduct them in a manner harmonious with our political purposes. If it should fall to us to take up arms against those who today dispose over the Russian people, we can try not to give that people the impression that we are their enemies, or consider them ours. We can try to make them understand the necessity of such hardships as we cannot avoid inflicting on them. We can endeavor to hold constantly before them the evidences of a sympathetic understanding for their past and interest in their future. We can give them the feeling that we are on their side, and that our victory, if it comes, will be used to provide them with a chance to shape their own destiny in the future to a pattern happier than that which they have known in the past. For all of this it is important that we bear in mind what Russia has been, and can be, and not permit political differences to becloud that picture.

National greatness is a difficult thing to define. Every nation is made up of individuals; and among individuals, as is known, there is no uniformity. Some are charming, others irritating; some are honest, others not exactly so; some are strong, others weak; some command admiration, others, by general agreement, are anything but admirable. This is true in our own country; it is true

in Russia. Just what, in these circumstances, national greatness consists of, is hard to say. Certainly it rarely consists of those qualities in which a people thinks itself great; for in nations, as in individuals, the outstanding virtues are generally not the ones for which we fancy ourselves distinguished.

Yet that there *is* such a thing as national greatness is clear; and that the Russian people possess it in high degree is beyond question. They are a people whose progress out of darkness and squalor has been a painful one, marked by enormous sufferings and punctuated by heart-rending setbacks. Nowhere on the face of the globe has the tiny flame of faith in the dignity and charity of man flickered more precariously under the winds that tore at it. Yet it has never gone out; it is not extinguished today even in the heart of the Russian land; and whoever studies the struggle of the Russian spirit through the ages can only bare his head in admiration before those Russian people who kept it alight through their sacrifices and sufferings.

The record of Russian culture to date has proven that this struggle has a significance far wider than the confines of the traditional Russian territory; it is a part, and an extremely important part, of the general cultural progress of mankind. We have only to look at the people of Russian birth or origin living and working in our midst—the engineers, the scientists, the writers, the artists —to know that this is true. It would be tragic if our indignation over Soviet outlooks and policies led us to make ourselves the accomplices of Russian despotism by forgetting the greatness of the Russian people, losing our confidence in their genius and their potential for good, and placing ourselves in opposition to their national feelings. The vital importance of this becomes even clearer when we reflect that we in the outside world who believe in the cause of freedom will never prevail in any struggle against the destructive workings of Soviet power unless the Russian people are our willing allies. That goes for peace, and it goes for war. The Germans, though not fighting at that time in the cause of freedom, learned to their sorrow the impossibility of combatting simultaneously both the Russian people and the Soviet Government.

The greatest difficulty here, of course, lies in the mute and helpless position in which the Russian people find themselves as subjects of a totalitarian régime. Our experiences with Germany have demonstrated that we have not succeeded very well, as a nation, in understanding the position of the man who lives under

the yoke of modern despotism. Totalitarianism is not a national phenomenon; it is a disease to which all humanity is in some degree vulnerable. To live under such a régime is a misfortune that can befall a nation by virtue of reasons purely historic and not really traceable to any particular guilt on the part of the nation as a whole. Where circumstances weaken the powers of resistance, to a certain crucial degree, the virus triumphs. If individual life is to go on at all within the totalitarian framework it must go on by arrangement with the régime, and to some extent in connivance with its purposes. Furthermore, there will always be areas in which the totalitarian government will succeed in identifying itself with popular feelings and aspirations. The relationship between citizen and political authority under totalitarianism is therefore inevitably complicated: it is never pat and simple. Who does not understand these things cannot understand what is at stake in our relations with the peoples of such countries. These realities leave no room for our favored conviction that the people of a totalitarian state can be neatly divided into collaborators and martyrs and that there will be none left over. People do not emerge from this relationship unscathed: when they do emerge they need help, guidance and understanding, not scoldings and sermons.

We will get nowhere with an attitude of emotional indignation directed toward an entire people. Let us rise above these easy and childish reactions and consent to view the tragedy of Russia as partly our own tragedy, and the people of Russia as our comrades in the long hard battle for a happier system of man's coexistence with himself and with nature on this troubled planet.

V

So much for what we do if, contrary to our hopes and our wishes, a war so much talked about should prove impossible to avoid. But supposing we are faced with a continuation of the present state of absence of major warfare? What should our course of action be then?

First of all, have we any grounds to hope, in these circumstances, that there might be changes in Russia of the kind that we are here envisaging? There are no objective criteria for the answer to this question. There is no "proof" one way or another. The answer rests on something which is partly a matter of opinion and judgment, but partly, admittedly, an act of faith. The writer believes the answer to be a positive one: that we are indeed justified

in hoping, and holding it possible, that there may be such changes. But in substantiation of this view it is possible to say only the following.

There can be no genuine stability in any system which is based on the evil and weakness in man's nature—which attempts to live by man's degradation, feeding like a vulture on his anxieties, his capacity for hatred, his susceptibility to error, and his vulnerability to psychological manipulation. Such a system can represent no more than the particular frustrations and bitterness of the generation of men who created it, and the cold terror of those who have been weak or unwise enough to become its agents.

I am not speaking here of the Russian Revolution as such. That was a more complicated phenomenon, with deeper roots in the logic of history. I am speaking of the process by which something claiming to be a hopeful turn in human events, claiming to lead toward a decrease rather than an increase in the sum total of human injustice and oppression, evolved into the shabby purgatory of the police state. Only men with a profound sense of personal failure could find satisfaction in doing to others those things which are always involved in such a system; and whoever has had occasion to look deeply into the eyes of a Communist police officer will have found there, in that dark well of disciplined hatred and suspicion, the tiny gleam of despairing fright which is the proof of this statement. Those who begin by clothing a personal lust for power and revenge with the staggering deceits and oversimplifications of totalitarianism end up by fighting themselves—in a dreary, hopeless encounter which projects itself onto the subject peoples and makes of their happiness and their faith its battlefield.

Men of this sort can bequeath something of the passion of the struggle to those of their close associates who inherit their power. But the process of inheritance cannot be carried much further. People can move along, themselves, as by some force of habit, on the strength of an emotional drive acquired at second hand; but it is no longer theirs to transmit to others. The impulses that thrust men of one generation into so despairing an attitude toward themselves and toward the popular masses in whom they like to see themselves reflected become progressively uninteresting to succeeding generations. The cruelties, the untruths, the endless deriding of man's nature practised in the concentration camps: all these institutions of the police state, though they may first

have something of the lurid fascination that manifestations of danger and anarchy always exert in a well-regulated and composed society, sooner or later end up—like some stale and repetitious pornography—by boring everybody, including those who practise them.

Many of the servants of totalitarian power, it is true, having debased themselves more than their victims and knowing that they have barred themselves from any better future, may cling despairingly to their unhappy offices. But despotism can never live just by the fears of the jailers and hangmen alone; it must have behind it a driving political will. In the days when despotic power could be closely associated with a dynasty or an inherited oligarchy, such a political will could be more enduring. But then, by the same token, it had to take a more benevolent and constructive interest in the people over whom it ruled and from whose labors it fed. It could not afford to live by their total intimidation and degradation. Dynastic continuity compelled it to recognize an obligation to the future, as well as to the present and the past.

The modern police state does not have these qualities. It represents only a fearful convulsion of society, springing from the stimulus of a given historical moment. Society may be grievously, agonizingly ill from it. But society—being something organic, marked by change and renewal and adjustment—will not remain this way indefinitely. The violent maladjustments which caused the convulsion will eventually begin to lose their actuality, and the instinct for a healthier, less morbid, more interesting life will begin to assert itself.

These, then, are the reflections which give the writer, for one, faith that if the necessary alternatives are kept before the Russian people, in the form of the existence elsewhere on this planet of a civilization which is decent, hopeful and purposeful, the day must come—soon or late, and whether by gradual process or otherwise—when that terrible system of power which has set a great people's progress back for decades and has lain like a shadow over the aspirations of all civilization will be distinguishable no longer as a living reality, but only as something surviving partly in recorded history and partly in the sediment of constructive, organic change which every great human upheaval, however unhappy its other manifestations, manages to deposit on the shelf of time.

But how those changes are to come about is something which cannot be foreseen. If there are, indeed, such things as laws of

political development, they will surely play a part here; but then they would be the laws of development peculiar to the phenomenon of modern totalitarianism, and these have not yet been adequately studied and understood. Whether such laws exist or not, developments will be modified both by national character and by the tremendous part which the fortuitous unquestionably plays in the shaping of human events.

These things being so, we must admit with respect to the future of government in Russia, we see "as through a glass, darkly." Superficial evidences would not seem to leave much room for hope that the changes we would wish to see in the attitudes and practices of government in Moscow could come about without violent breaks in the continuity of power, that is, without the overthrow of the system. But we cannot be sure of this. Stranger things have happened—though not much stranger. And, in any case, it is not our business to prejudge the question. It is not necessary for us, merely in order to shape our own conduct in a way conducive to our own interests, to decide what we admittedly cannot really know. We should allow, here, for all possibilities, and should exclude none. The main thing is that we keep clearly in mind the image of what we would like to see in the personality of Russia as an actor on the world stage, and let that be our guide in all our dealings with Russian political factions, including both that which is in power and those which are in opposition to it. And if it should turn out to be the will of fate that freedom should come to Russia by erosion from despotism rather than by the violent upthrust of liberty, let us be able to say that our policy was such as to favor it, and that we did not hamper it by preconception or impatience or despair.

Of one thing we may be sure: no great and enduring change in the spirit and practice of government in Russia will ever come about primarily through foreign inspiration or advice. To be genuine, to be enduring and to be worth the hopeful welcome of other peoples such a change would have to flow from the initiatives and efforts of the Russians themselves. It is a shallow view of the workings of history which looks to such things as foreign propaganda and agitation to bring about fundamental changes in the lives of a great nation. Those who talk of overthrowing the Soviet system by propaganda point, by way of justification of their thesis, to the intensive workings of the Soviet propaganda machine and to the various facets of subversive activity con-

ducted, inspired or encouraged by the Kremlin throughout the world. They forget that the outstanding fact about such activities, on the record of the 33 years over which they have been assiduously conducted, has been their general failure. In the end, military intimidation or invasion has been generally necessary for the actual spread of the Soviet system. It may be argued that China is an exception to this statement; but to what extent China can really be said to be part of the Soviet system we do not know, and to attribute the revolution which has taken place in China in these recent years primarily to Soviet propaganda or instigation is to underestimate grievously, to say the least, a number of other highly important factors.

Any attempt at direct talking by one nation to another about the latter's political affairs is a questionable procedure, replete with possibilities for misunderstanding and resentment. That is particularly true where spirit and tradition differ and the political terminology is not really translatable. This appreciation in no way weakens the importance of the "Voice of America," the function of which, with respect to Russia, is to reflect as faithfully as possible the atmosphere and attitudes of this country, in order that the Soviet citizen may form a fair judgment of them. But this is an entirely different thing from urgings toward this or that political action. We may have our own hopes or ideas as to the implications for the Soviet citizen of the view of American realities which is apparent in the broadcasts of the "Voice" and in such other evidences of American life as reach his consciousness; we may think we know what we would do in the light of this evidence; but it would be a mistake for us to be too explicit and to make these things the basis of suggestions and promptings to him about what he should do in the internal political life of his own country. We are too apt to talk in our terms rather than his, and from an imperfect understanding of his problems and possibilities. And our words, accordingly, are apt to convey meanings entirely different from those which we meant them to convey.

For these reasons, the most important influence that the United States can bring to bear upon internal developments in Russia will continue to be the influence of example: the influence of what it is, and not only what it is to others but what it is to itself. This is not to say that many of those things which are now preoccupying the public mind are not of unquestioned importance: such things as physical strength, armaments, determination and soli-

darity with other free nations. It is not to deny the urgent and overriding necessity for a wise and adroit foreign policy, designed to release and make effective all those forces in the world which, together with our own, can serve to convince the masters of the Kremlin that their grand design is a futile and unachievable one, persistence in which promises no solution of their own predicaments and dilemmas. In fact, there can be no question but that these must remain major preoccupations if war is to be avoided and time is to be gained for the working of more hopeful forces. But they can only remain sterile and negative if they are not given meaning and substance by something which goes deeper and looks further ahead than the mere prevention of war or the frustration of imperialistic expansion. To this, there is general agreement; but what is this "something"? Many people think it only a question of what we urge upon others, in other words, a question of external propaganda. I would submit that it is primarily a question of what we urge upon ourselves. It is a question of the spirit and purpose of American national life itself. Any message we may try to bring to others will be effective only if it is in accord with what we are to ourselves, and if this is something sufficiently impressive to compel the respect and confidence of a world which, despite all its material difficulties, is still more ready to recognize and respect spiritual distinction than material opulence.

Our first and main concern must still be to achieve this state of national character. We need worry less about convincing others that we have done so. In the lives of nations the really worthwhile things cannot and will not be hidden. Thoreau wrote:

> There is no ill which may not be dissipated, like the dark, if you let in a stronger light upon it. . . . If the light we use is but a paltry and narrow taper, most objects will cast a shadow wider than themselves.

Conversely, if our taper is a strong one we may be sure that its rays will penetrate to the Russian room and eventually play their part in dissipating the gloom which prevails there. No iron curtain could suppress, even in the innermost depths of Siberia, the news that America had shed the shackles of disunity, confusion and doubt, had taken a new lease of hope and determination, and was setting about her tasks with enthusiasm and clarity of purpose.

CHAPTER II

FROM OLD EMIGRATION TO NEW

RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER THIRTY YEARS' EXILE

by

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RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER THIRTY YEARS' EXILE

by Ryszard Wraga

I

The growth of the part played by the Soviet Union in international politics and the continuous Bolshevik aggression in the domestic affairs of all nations of the world have increased the interest of public opinion in Communism and Soviet policy. The international bibliography devoted to Russian affairs during the last thirty years greatly exceeds, both as to number of items and variety of subjects dealt with, the bibliography on the same problems for the period beginning at the end of the eighteenth century (reign of Catherine the Second) and ending in the year 1917. But there is still a gap in this vast literature consisting of many dozens of thousands of items and written in all the languages of the world: namely there are no comprehensive studies on Russian emigration. Russian emigration is not only interesting to research workers as an international political problem in itself; it also deserves thorough study because the history of this emigration is the history of the struggle of different Russian political and social groups against Bolshevism and the Soviet Government. Moreover the methods of Soviet policy within the last thirty-three years appear nowhere else more strikingly and revealingly than in the history of this contest.

An unbiassed and comprehensive study of Russian emigration might be most valuable for European and American politicians who, it seems, would be able to find amongst other interesting features many traces of their own mistakes and ill-advised steps. The necessity for such a study is especially great nowadays, as the number of people emigrating from the ever-expanding territories of the Soviet Empire is continually growing, and new emigrations start the struggle against Bolshevism without realising that preceding emigrations such as the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Tartar, Caucasian, Turkestanian, and others from the European and Asiatic territories invaded by Russia have acquired very valuable experience in this matter.

The subject of Russian emigration is so wide and so important that it cannot be exhausted in this essay, which is only a modest attempt to recall some events and give some relevant guiding ideas.

II

Both the origins and structure of Russian emigration are very intricate matters. Its core was formed in 1920-1922, and at that time it could be roughly divided into two main groups:

— Partisans of the old Tsarist régime and adversaries of any kind of revolution.

— Partisans of the February Revolution of 1917—disparagingly called by the Bolsheviks a "bourgeois-democratic revolution" being at the same time adversaries of the Bolshevik upheaval in October, 1917.

In time, as well as these two groups, a third began to grow, to which belonged those who at the beginning had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Bolshevik upheaval, or were even its partisans and only opposed it later when Bolshevism began to evolve into a totalitarian police régime (the so-called "Communist Fascism") and State capitalism.

The last war brought into being a fourth numerous group: that of the enemies of the state of things existing in Soviet Russia, enemies of the final political and social forms imposed on Russia by Stalin and his clique during twenty years of his dictatorial rule.

Thus, while the first group in its struggle against Bolshevism rallied to the programme of restoring Russia's former status, the second set as its target "the defence of the achievements of the February Revolution of 1917" and democractic principles, and the third took up the defence of "Leninist principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat," considering them to be the safeguards of democracy and progress. The overwhelming majority of the fourth group advances first of all a negative target—"Away with Bolshevism."

I stress the fact that this classification is very rough and oversimplified, but it gives an idea of the strong and weak points of the ideology and aims of the particular groups.

The strength of the first group was due to the fact that its outlook was backed by the concrete vision of the Russian monarchy, with its social, economic and administrative structure and its traditional policy in domestic, foreign and alien nationalities' affairs. Its weakness came from the unqualified defence of the past and the aim for the restoration of the monarchy, which was a desperate and utopian enterprise. For the whole Russian Empire and for the Russians themselves the 1917 Revolution was an absolute necessity, and it was impossible to put back the clock. This revolution had been developing in the course of the last two centuries, corresponding to the inmost feelings of the Russian masses and being the only progressive way of cutting the Gordian knot tied by the military and imperialistic policy of Tsardom and Russian autocracy to bind together the fate of the many nations who had nothing in common with each other.

The strength of the second group arose from the conviction that the revolution was an accomplished and positive fact, corresponding to the interests of the Russian nation. Its weakness was due to the fact that although the majority of its members had been responsible for the outbreak of the revolution and had taken an active part in it, the group was not prepared to establish the theory of revolution and organise it for constructive purposes. The group consisted mainly of the intelligentsia, with all the inherited tragic features of the progressive and revolutionary Russian intelligentsia which could not control the government and never had real access to the people.

The strength of the third group was due to having lived through the experience of the chaotic February Revolution, adrift without a clear programme. Moreover this group was well acquainted with the theory and practice of the Leninist revolution. Its weakness was its inability for a long time to take a definite line so far as the struggle against Bolshevism was concerned, from fear that together with Bolshevism some "basic achievements of revolutions" might be destroyed.

The fourth group, mostly formed in recent years, possesses by far the widest knowledge of the theory and practice of Bolshevism. On the other hand, having no possibility of setting up a positive programme (or programmes) and the framework of an organisation while staying in the home country, only in exile did it begin to establish the lines of a programme and to constitute a compact political and social organisation.

These circumstances also determine the existence of two generations within the present Russian emigration: the old (which either took an active part in the 1917 Revolution or witnessed it) and the new one (brought up politically in Bolshevik surroundings).

III

The great bulk of the *old* Russian emigration consists of former partisans of the so-called "white movement," the overwhelming majority of whom had served as officers and other ranks in the armies of Denikin, Wrangel, Judenitch, Koltchak and others fighting against the Bolsheviks in 1918-1920 on all possible fronts, wherever such fronts might have materialised. The core of this war emigration, being its elite, was formed from these 135,000 "whites" who left from Crimean ports for Istanbul in the middle of November 1920.

The abundant documentation on the civil war in Russia during the revolution enables us to state the main causes of the defeat of the "white movement." Not only was it led by partisans of the old régime, but its main bulk was of men who took an absolutely hostile stand towards the revolution as such and aimed at restoration. Their programmes were purely reactionary. The responsible leaders were professional soldiers who were incapable of bringing to accord the purposes of dictatorship in purely military matters and the requirements of the civil administration and policy. The aims of restoration and the reactionary programmes of individual military dictators opened a rift between the armies and population, a rift which kept increasing on account of the predatory behaviour of these troops. Because of that the greater part of the working population, both in town and country, sided with the Bolsheviks.

The same aims for restoration caused the hostile attitude towards the "white movement" of all separatist national movements, to which the revolution promised or guaranteed the winning of full independence (Poland, Finland, Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Caucasian and Turkestan peoples), or self-government. The "white movement" pursued two targets at the same time: the destruction of Bolshevism and the reconstitution of "one, indivisible Russia." (The first aim was worded in a deliberately insincere way: it was not only the destruction of Bolshevism which was aimed at, but the destruction of any form of revolution). As we have said above, *the dymanic revolutionary forces in Russia were (and are) infinitely stronger than those of the counter-revolution. In the struggle against Russia the victory belongs to those who succeed in gaining control of these revolutionary forces.* It was the Bolsheviks who scored the victory in 1919-1920.

The leaders of the "white movement," as usually happens with professional soldiers, depended entirely on military forces in trying to destroy Bolshevism. Such estimates, which unfortunately continue to be made by some Western politicians, are fallacious and ill-

advised. Carrying on the war against Bolshevism by purely military means, the " whites " left the Bolsheviks complete freedom so far as political and social ideology were concerned.

IV

The stand taken by the Western powers towards the " white movement " forms a separate chapter in the enumeration of the reasons for its defeat. These powers had no definite programme, nor did they pursue any political aims in relation to either " Whites " or " Reds." The official or semi-official statements made by these powers from time to time could not do any harm to the Bolsheviks. Just the opposite—they roused the feelings of the Russian masses on the Bolshevik side. When Lenin proclaimed the programme of spreading revolution all over the world, the West started to back up the most reactionary elements in order to weaken Bolshevism if it was impossible to destroy it completely.

The " intervention of the capitalistic countries " conceived in this way, being also belated and too weak so far as technical and material assistance was concerned, gave the opposite result : it strengthened Bolshevism, at the same time undermining the confidence and trust in the West of the nations of the Russian Empire. It also had a very serious bearing on the subsequent feelings of the "white movement " partisans towards Europe, when they had already settled in the West as political exiles. These feelings were by no means friendly or sympathetic. In the eyes of the Russian emigrés Europe stood for political selfishness, materialistic outlook and indifference. Compelled by circumstances to disperse amongst European communities, the Russian emigration kept aloof from them for a long time ; feeling uneasy in new surroundings and finding no understanding there for its words of truth about Bolshevism, it grouped and organised within its own " ghetto," which of course weighed heavily on its political outlook, possibility and prospects of action.

V

It is a constant phenomenon of all political emigrations that they consider themselves to be the true representatives of their nations. They try to set up a political organisation which may serve as a substitute for the State which they were forced to leave. The most valuable asset of the Russian emigration was the circumstance that it did not consist of only one social class or stratum. Within each of the four above mentioned groups are representatives of all social classes, from members of the Ruling House to the lowest and most destitute social elements. This enabled the Russian emigration to foster the feeling that it really represented the whole nation. The drawbacks were due first to the fact that the strength of the particular social strata did not correspond either to their proportional strength in post-revultionary Russia or even to that which existed in the pre-revolutionary period ; the second and main drawback was the lack of an indisputable State central authority brought from the home country around which the life in exile could have been organised. In this respect some emigrations of other nations of the former Russian Empire were in a more favourable position, such as the Ukrainians or Georgians.

The problem of "legitimism" in the struggle against the Bolsheviks is of great importance. Bolshevism made impossible any organised mass movements of resistance both in political and social spheres, and therefore is afraid of the existence beyond the frontiers of political organisations in exile, particularly of those preserving the character of State organisation, possessing legal titles for action and recognised as such by the oppressed nations.

This problem was most complicated so far as the Russians were concerned. The monarchy was overthrown by the revolution. The monarchist cause was compromised not only by the subsequent setting up of a few provisional governments and the recognition of the revolution by the people in the form of elections to a "constituent assembly" (Utchreditelnoie Sobranje), but also by the existence of many doubts which arose in relation to the dynastic titles in exile, this issue being very confused even for the monarchists themselves. The members of the last provisional government, headed by A. Kerensky, "did not pass the historic test" according to general public opinion, even in the eyes of the most fervent partisans of the February Revolution, and for that reason they would not claim to act as representatives of State legitimism. The democratic groups (headed by Milyukov) brought forward schemes for replacing the State organisation by a very wide understanding between the representations of the democratic parties.

The parties of the Left, Social-Democrats (Mensheviks) and Social-Revolutionaries (Eser) kept aloof: the first because they believed in the evolution of Bolshevism in a democratic direction and could not decide to pass to a decisive fight against it—the others, unwilling to abandon their revolutionary tenets, refused to look for allies amongst other Russian political bodies.

None of the former Russian military dictators had established on Russian territory any leading political body which might be attractive, if only for a part of the Russian emigration. Those who were still alive joined the political camp of the monarchists.

A so-called "Committee of Russian Ambassadors" acted for some time in exile, but it could not of course replace a supreme legitimate State authority. For these reasons the problem of legitimism could not be solved in a way which might win the approval of a relatively large proportion of the emigrés. Even the monarchists were unable to agree amongst themselves, and there were two pretenders to the throne for several years: Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholayevitch (uncle of Emperor Nicholas the Second), who died in 1922, and Grand Duke Cyril Wladimirovitch (first cousin of the Emperor Nicholas the Second) who died in 1939. Even the deaths of both pretenders and the recognition as "head of the dynasty" of Grand Duke Vladimir (son of Grand Duke Cyril) did not solve the problem of legitimism amongst the monarchists. Today they are grouped much more under the banner of the monarchist idea than around a person.

VI

The acts of recognition by the Western powers, quickly following one another, of the Bolsheviks as the legitimate rulers of Russia, the definite consolidation of the Soviet government and administration

inside the home country, constituted a great setback for the whole Russian emigration. Hopes of the repetition of Allied intervention in Russia—fostered for some time in military circles—vanished, giving way to the conviction that the defeat of Bolshevism could occur only through domestic developments in Russia itself. Because of that the grudge against Europe, which originated at the time of the ill-starred policy of " intervention," was increased on account of the backing given to the Bolsheviks by the former " interventionists."

Like the initial anticipations of repeated interventions, the subsequent beliefs in " co-operation with the nation in overthrowing Bolshevism " relaxed more and more the framework of political organisation of the emigrés. The main issues discussed in exile were : " Monarchy or Republic ?" " Is Bolshevism capable of evolving in the direction of State nationalism ?" " Should the struggle against the Bolsheviks be carried out by any means, including provoking intervention from outside, or should it remain a *domestic* Russian problem, while the emigration takes the defence of the *Russian State* in spite of its being ruled by the Bolsheviks ?"

Side by side with lively political discussions, the splitting of political groups kept increasing. When the First Assembly of Monarchists was held in Reichenhall on the 2nd June 1921, and a Supreme Monarchist Council was set up, which still exists, it was attended by the representatives of 75 Monarchist groups. At the second Assembly of Monarchists in Paris in November 1922 the number of these groups had risen to 120.

The attempts of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, (the so-called " Cadets," headed by Professor P. Milyukov) to set up the National Committee only caused the disruption of this party also, which played a great part in the last year of the Russian Monarchy and in the period of the February Revolution. The Republican-Democratic Union (R.D.O.), organised by the same Milyukov, believed in the " evolution " of Stalinism and propagated the principle of leaving the problem of Bolshevism to the Russians themselves as a problem of Russian domestic policy. This Union was in fact a body torn by internal dissensions. The so-called " populist socialists " split into two groups : the group of S. Melgunov who, until the present day, has unreservedly advocated a relentless fight, based on a broad front of democratic parties against Bolshevism, and the group of A. Peshenov, who opposed any form of action by the emigration. Disagreements started also amongst the Social-Democrats. In Czecho-Slovakia in 1922 a separate group was formed, organised by the Social-Revolutionaries S. Maslov and A. Argunov, but this also split into two groups in 1934. Social-Democrats (headed by L. Martov, F. Dan and A. Abramovich) for a long time (even after Martov's death in 1924) advocated only an internal fight for the realisation of democratic forms by all mass-movements, and otherwise preached " obedience to the Soviet constitution." In time disagreements started amongst them also : between the partisans of the conciliatory attitude, represented by O. Bauer on the one side, and the followers of K. Kautsky who recommended the struggle against Bolshevism by all available means, on the other. It must be pointed out that the group of Social-Democrats gathered round the paper " The Socialist Courier " (Sotsyalisticheskiy Vestnik), founded in

1921 and still appearing, is the group of emigrés which distinguished itself by a perfect understanding of the international situation and a thorough knowledge of Soviet problems. For a long time it maintained great cohesion and consistency in carrying out its programme.

The discrepancies between the different organisations of the right, centre and left have been so considerable that the establishment of a supra-national body including all groups, even for purely representative purposes has been out of the question. Even charitable and social welfare bodies were torn by great discrepancies in views and programmes. Their number rose to 180 in 1932.

In time new political organisations and groups appeared, which considered that the old ones, originated in pre-revolutionary times, were unable to deal with the task of the fight against Bolshevism. The first of these, calling itself the " Confraternity of Russian Truth " (headed by Prince G. Leuchtenberg, Sokolov-Kretchetov and General Krasnov) was founded in Berlin in 1921 and was active until 1932. In 1923 an energetic group, " Struggle for Russia " (Borba za Rossiyu), headed by M. Fedorov and S. Melgunov and consisting of members of moderate opinions, was founded. Its activities ceased in 1931. In later years societies of emigré youth came into being, such as that of the right wing and Monarchist camp, " Union of Young Russians " (leader Kazim Bek), that of the centre, " National-Labour Alliance of the New Generation " (Natsyonalno-Trudovoy Soyuz Novago Pokolenya), led by V. Baydalakov and M. Georghievsky; and a definitely Fascist " Union of Russian Fascists," (A. Vonsiatsky). The " Russian All-Soldiers Union " (R.O.W.S.) organised in 1933 by General Baron P. Wrangel, was intended to be a body above parties, a kind of Order of Knights, which was to take the place of the disbanded " white " army. The official doctrine of this body was summed up in a slogan: " Nepredreshenstvo "—which means that all decisions referring to the future political and social status of Russia had to be reserved. Nevertheless, " R.O.W.S." stood for " a great, national Russia," and in practice was controlled by Monarchists, like the whole " white " movement in the past. For many years " R.O.W.S." arrogated to itself the right to take all action for military sabotage and intelligence on Russian territory, and also, so far as the Monarchist camp was concerned, the monopoly of political and organisation activities.

VII

After some years an interesting feature appeared in the social and political outlook within Russian emigration, gradually undergoing Fascist influence. There were many reasons for this evolution:

— Awareness of the necessity for discipline amongst the organisations and groups to carry out the struggle against Bolshevism.

— The attractiveness (especially to the younger generation) of the Fascist ideas ever more fashionable in Europe, and the hope that a Fascist Europe would be able to oppose to Bolshevism a serious political and military threat.

— Realisation that Communism in Russia itself was being transformed into Communo-Fascism and, taking their bearings from this, the forces gathered against Bolshevism should be organised on similar lines, and adopt similar Fascist ideology.

This Fascism appeared mostly in a half camouflaged form, but slowly infected not only the right wing Monarchist organisations but also the moderate ones, and even some of the leftist groups. Only Socialist organisations were free from Fascist influence. Fascism also spread in the purely military circles of R.O.W.S.

VIII

The necessity for seeking support amongst the various great powers or amongst international bodies was responsible to a great extent for the disintegration of the Russian emigration and the mutual relations amongst its groups. It was not always political considerations which prompted the search for assistance from some quarters : very often it depended on the necessity for winning some sort of protection from the government of the country on whose territory this faction or group of emigrés was settled. It is superfluous to say that such a state of things forced the Russian emigration and its political leaders to take some complicated—and frankly not always straightforward—steps, the more so as the support had to be found, as was only natural, in military quarters, the intelligence services, and not always reliable bodies and anonymous organisations.

The most straightforward and direct line was adopted by the Socialists (both S.R. and S.D.), as they took their bearings from the Second International and found relatively disinterested assistance from the Socialists of other countries. The most intricate was the policy of the Monarchists, as they had to adapt their tactics to opposed political trends, co-operating in Germany in the destruction of the Versailles Treaty, working in France for the revival of Russo-French friendship (directed against Germany), in Great Britain taking advantage of family ties between the Ruling Houses, etc. The R.O.W.S. also had to pursue a most flexible policy.

IX

In spite of splitting into many organisations, in spite of internal friction due to different political and social outlooks, the Russian emigration had great value and importance as an anti-Bolshevik factor. First of all its number was imposing : in 1930-1939 the total number of Russian emigrants amounted to one million, of which more than 400,000 were in France and more than 150,000 in Germany. For the above mentioned reasons the Russians, apart from a few exceptions, were seldom assimilated. Their homesickness and desire to return to their motherland and fight Bolshevism, their activity and energy in this respect, not only did not diminish as the years passed but on the contrary rather increased. It must also be kept in mind that this emigration had amongst its leaders men of world renown, having wide connections in international political, industrial and financial quarters, in international social and scientific organisations. Although it was beyond their power to provoke a change in the international conjuncture, they could still influence the views of some statesmen of the world and even of whole countries.

For all these reasons, *from the very beginning the Bolsheviks made an enormous effort to destroy the Russian emigration as a political force.* They continued abroad the same action which they had carried out against the " white movements," democratic opposition, S.R.'s and S.D's

during the civil war. The "amnesty" proclaimed in 1921 by the Bolsheviks gave some quantitative results (121,000 emigrés returned to the Soviet Union in 1921 and 60,000 in the next nine years), but these results were very poor so far as quality was concerned. They therefore started propaganda action "from inside," within the emigration itself. They inspired two trends in 1921-1922—one political, "Change of signposts" (Smyena Vekh), headed by Professor Ustryalov, and the other pseudo-scientific, with Prince Trubetzkoy, Professor Alexeyev, Professor P. Savitsky as its leaders. The "Smyenovekhovtsi," spread propaganda mostly amongst the Russian intelligentsia, recommending a change of attitude towards Bolshevism and a return to the motherland "in order to work with the whole people for the reconstruction of the country." This was at the time when Lenin introduced the "NEP" policy, and Ustryalov's theories found many adherents. Amongst them was Count Alexy Tolstoy, who afterwards became one of the most prominent Soviet writers. The Eurasian theories were more perfidious: for instance, their followers asserted that it was Bolshevism which created ideal conditions for the perfect merging of two elements within the Russian State, European and Asiatic, and eliminating the Western influence. They violently opposed any struggle against Bolshevism either by military force or by revolution.

But the greatest destruction in the ranks of Russian emigration has been due to continuous direct Soviet provocation, today more intense than ever. It was directed mainly against the organisations which showed the highest spirit and energy and had the greatest possibilities for underground activity on the territory of the Soviet Union. Such were above all, as we know, the R.O.W.S. and the Monarchist organisations.

In 1922 the Bolsheviks founded in the Soviet Union a sham Monarchist organisation (M.O.S.R. or M.O.R.), which they put in touch with the central monarchist bodies and R.O.W.S. As the latter organisation had in turn been interconnected with different European General Staffs, the Soviet intelligence service obtained chances to influence and insight into the greater part of the Russian emigration as well as many foreign intelligence services. This organisation, known later as "Trust," continued until 1927, when the Bolsheviks themselves disclosed what they were doing, and this compromised many political and military leaders of the emigrés in the eyes of the West. "Trust" also caused great confusion in European intelligence services, as for several years it had supplied them with false and biassed information.

Unfortunately the leaders of Russian emigration did not draw the necessary conclusions from the "Trust" incident. Above all they did not understand that *no emigration acting on foreign soil can be safe from agents provacateurs and enemy plots.* "Truth" was not liquidated by the Russians, but only hushed up. Many spies and enemy agents remained in the ranks of R.O.W.S. and political organisations, especially monarchist ones, often holding high posts. New batches of spies kept arriving. With the assistance of their agents, the Bolsheviks in 1930, kidnapped in Paris General Wrangel's successor, General A. Kutepov, and in 1937 the latter's successor, Chairman of R.O.W.S. General E. Miller. "The Confraternity of Russian Truth" was

also a victim of enemy plots. Soviet influence also penetrated the organisation of "Young Russians." Nor were the organisations of the centre and left wing spared in this respect. The Soviet action had the most harmful consequences for Russian emigration, causing still greater disruption and dissension, and discouraging and demoralising many people. It also undermined the trust of international political quarters in Russian emigration.

Nevertheless it must be pointed out that Western policy towards this emigration to a great extent helped the Soviet practices of corruption. Very soon, after the defeat of the "white movement," the emigration began to be considered as a "malum necessarium." Official political contacts with it were considered rather embarrassing, and were left to lower, less responsible officials or to the intelligence services—the only purpose of the latter being to obtain information about Soviet Russia.

X

We should add to the above picture of Russian emigration on the eve of the Second World War, very rough and incomplete, that in spite of its great shortcomings so far as organisation was concerned, this emigration performed a great work in the matter of the direct struggle against the Bolsheviks, notwithstanding the Soviet penetration and plots. It showed a great spirit of self-sacrifice, patriotism in the masses and self-denial in the service of the cause of its country. There was no lack of volunteers for the most daring and dangerous anti-Bolshevik enterprises from amongst both the older and younger generation. Even the relative ease with which the Russian agents provacateurs gained access to the emigration organisations can to some extent be explained by the daring eagerness which characterised the Russians on any occasion when the liberation of Russia from Bolshevism was at stake. The importance the Bolsheviks themselves attached to the problem of "White emigration" may be found in the fact that for thirty years of Soviet rule in Russia it never happened that a political trial failed to implicate, directly or indirectly, the Russian emigration in anti-Soviet plots.

The action of Boris Savinkov (who did not hesitate to go to the U.S.S.R. in 1924, where he was arrested a couple of years later, and committed suicide), the activities of S.R. organisation, the strenuous work of the "Mensheviks," the deeds of R.O.W.S., "Struggle for Russia" and "Peasant Russia" groups, besides the intensive efforts of the emigré organisations of other nations of the Soviet Union—all these were responsible for considerable setbacks for the Soviet Union, and above all for fostering the spirit of resistance and anti-Bolshevik feelings amongst the masses in Russia. In the last years before the war, N.T.S.N.P. (National Labour Alliance of the New Generation) started energetic work both abroad and in the home country, applying revolutionary methods and drawing the necessary conclusions from the experiences of the R.O.W.S.

The work done by the Russian emigration in matters of propaganda and information on Russian affairs abroad was by no means less considerable, and perhaps it was relatively even greater. Russian philosophy, literature and art were made popular in the West. Russian scientists occupied many Chairs of Slavonic and Russian

studies (especially in the U.S.A. and the U.K.) This emigration also greatly contributed to rousing the interest of the West in Bolshevism as an international problem, and gathered vast documentation about Soviet Russia.

But we must not overlook some shortcomings in this sphere of activities of Russian emigration. The greatest was due to the fact that scientists, writers and publicists (apart from Socialists perhaps), in venting their hatred of the Bolsheviks gradually became incapable of taking an unbiassed and dispassionate view of Russia's past. This past and its constitutional, social and economic structure appeared to their eyes in ever brighter colours, especially as the Bolshevik tyranny was tightening its grip on the homeland. Russian historiography has always been under State control, and primarily served State interests. The work of the Russian historians in exile brought no change in this respect. Fighting on every front to defend the past, the State interests and nationalistic aims, Russian emigration began to lose sight of its main political aim—the destruction of Bolshevism.

XI

International tension in the years 1935-1937 gave a new lease of life to Russian emigration. Hopes of a new world conflict revived, together with the belief—as is usual in any emigration—in the radical change of the destinies of the motherland. The greater part of the Russians realised the inevitability of a clash, sooner or later, between Germany and Russia. The pro-German trend of the Right and Monarchist wing of the emigration gathered momentum, and at the same time the "resistance" feelings in democratic quarters became more active. Milyukov, leader of the Russian democrats, was quickly approaching the definition of "Soviet patriotism" which was professed by a considerable proportion of the moderate democrats both during and after the war. On the contrary, the left-wing of the emigration, without changing its attitude towards Stalinism, took a relentless attitude towards Nazism.

The war, and especially the second stage after Hitler's invasion of the U.S.S.R., roughly speaking divided Russian emigration into two camps: those collaborating with the Germans, and those who sided with the Western Allies. There were many shades and variations in each camp. Some sided unreservedly with Hitlerism, and others considered such collaboration incidental, an opportunity to deliver a deadly blow to Bolshevism and set up a Russian military force allied to Germany. There were some who wholeheartedly joined the Allies against enemy No. 1, National Socialism; but there were others who counted on the effects of war and contact with the West as factors which might drive Stalinism, if not into complete surrender, in any case into a momentous evolution, and therefore wished to be "on the side of the Russian nation fighting against the invader." Certain organisations were split by the front lines, and often the same political bodies broke into two groups, depending on geographical position, one collaborating with one side and the other with its adversary.

The position became extremely complicated when the Germans organised the so-called "Russian Liberation Army" (R.O.A.) under General A. Vlasov's command, and in the last stage of the war set up the "Committee of Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" (K.O.N.R.).

The history of the formation of Vlasov's army is beyond the scope of this essay, but it is worth while to emphasise that it is still under lively discussion not only by Russian emigration but also by world opinion. Without entering into closer examination or stating our views on General Vlasov's action, we wish only to stress that it was the best proof of how much hatred of the Bolshevik rule and system, how much utter despair, was stirred up by Bolshevism amongst all the peoples of the Soviet Union. Vlasov's Army was unquestionably a spontaneous, popular move, and it is extremely *tragic that the victorious West helped the Bolsheviks to liquidate the leaders and the greater part of the partisans of this movement.*

XII

The old Russian emigration was still further broken up and weakened as the outcome of the war. Some outstanding personalities and leaders, such as General A. Denikin and Professor Milyukov, were no longer alive. A short-sighted move by "Soviet patriots," initiated by Liberals and headed by former Ambassador Maklakov, played havoc in the ranks of the old guard. The part played by the Soviet Union during the war, the great publicity staged by British and American propaganda for "Stalin's democracy," the belief in post-war changes in Russia itself in the direction of democracy, bowed many of the staunchest personalities (such as I. Bunin, W. Berdyaev, etc.). The ranks of R.O.W.S. thinned and its adherents had the impression that they had missed a historic opportunity, from which it had expected so much. Even the Mensheviks who for many years had remained a most coherent and united group were weakened by passing over in 1940 to the specific "Soviet patriotism" of one of their most outstanding leaders, F. Dan.

The Orthodox Church abroad was also disrupted. Before the last war it had played a very considerable part as a co-ordinating factor for the major part of the Russian emigration. After the Moscow patriarchate became an obedient servant of Muscovite imperialism, some of the clergy abroad swelled the ranks of the Soviet agents.

But at the same time Russian emigration received a strong and valuable reinforcement from the former soldiers of Vlasov's army who had survived Soviet destruction, from Soviet prisoners unwilling to return home in spite of the Soviet terror and strong pressure from the Allies, as well as from other refugees who have kept on arriving until the present day from Soviet Russia and the Russian occupied territories. They brought a perfect knowledge of the Soviet system, based on personal experience, great intrepidity and endurance as well as readiness for a relentless fight. They did not possess schemes for organisation nor complete political programmes, as was only natural.

Very quickly the *old* and the *new* emigration began to merge. The new emigrés were attracted by the moderate and left wing, but more by the first of these. The new structure of Russian emigration is therefore totally different from the old one. The Monarchist organisations, thinning more and more, have lost their influence, trying in vain to make closer contact with the new emigrés. R.O.W.S. is dying, in spite of trying every means to establish new ex-servicemen's associations, in which only a few of the new emigrés have enlisted, mostly former soldiers of Vlasov's army. The sparse ranks of the

Mensheviks and S.R. are also thinning, and occupy the political stage only thanks to the personal ascendancy of some leaders' great political experience and knowledge of Soviet problems. The names of A. Abramovitch, W. Czernov, B. Nikolaevsky, S. Shwarz, W. Zenzinov and D. Dallin today enjoy world renown. But with the Popular Socialist, S. Melgunov, they are the only outstanding figures in exile. Neither the left nor the moderate wing have any such authoritative personalities.

Active Russian political emigration can be reduced nowadays to four groups :

— " Union of Struggle for Freedom of Russia," headed by S. Melgunov and A. Kartashov, operating in France and Germany.

— " League of Struggle for Freedom of the People," headed by A. Kerensky and B. Nikolaevsky, with headquarters in the U.S.A. and branches in France and Germany.

— " National Union of Labour " (Russian solidarists), headed by W. Baydalakov, S. Poremsky, E. Romanov and others, operating mainly in Germany and the U.S.A.

— " Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia " (S.B.O.N.R.), operating primarily in Germany.

The first two bodies consist of a restricted number of persons, forming an élite ; the members are mostly old emigrés. " National Union of Labour," formed from a former National Union of Labour of the New Generation, and S.B.O.N.R. are mass-organisations, the new emigrés being in the majority in both of them, especially in S.B.O.N.R.

At present the active part of the political emigration is passing through a great crisis regarding the framework of organisations. *The policy of personalities and political authorities is giving way more and more to the policy of organised teams*, within which common ideas and programmes for the struggle for liberation are crystallised. The extremist groups of both right and left are vanishing.

Two subjects amongst those at present discussed in Russian emigration circles deserve special attention : the problem of the responsibility of the Russian nation for Bolshevism, and the problem of a " one and indivisible Russia."

XIII

Russian emigrés are indignant if one identifies Bolshevism with the Russian nation, or considers the period of Soviet rule as an integral part of the history of the Russian Empire. There is the same indignation when one states that the Soviet Government enjoys the support of the Russian nation. It is of course true that the publicists of other nations subjugated by Bolshevism, like Western publicists, are sometimes guilty of excessive simplification. The machinery of totalitarian régimes such as Hitlerism or Bolshevism is totally different from every régime of despotism and tyranny so far known in history. The means of terror are so overwhelming that the passivity of the people does not necessarily mean that the tyrant should be considered as the genuine representative of the national will. Moreover the passivity of the Russian population is rather relative. In the Soviet Union *Bolshevism is acting against the interests of the Russian nation, as it is against the interests of other nations subjugated by it.* Russian hatred of the

Bolsheviks is immense, and the revolutionary passions accumulated in the Russian masses against the Government and its agencies are infinite. *The question which arises today is not how to stir up or rouse this force, but how to organise and direct it.*

But at the same time there are in Soviet Russia some phenomena which show that in certain respects the line of conduct of Bolshevism towards the Russian nation is different from that pursued in relation to other nations of the Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks consider themselves to be the historical continuation of the Russian State. By their policy and insistent propaganda they have succeeded in convincing the Russian masses that their main preoccupation is the maintenance of the unity and integrity of the Russian Empire which, thanks to them, has been greatly expanded . In this matter, as happened at the time of the Tsarist imperialistic policy, they have won the support, above all, of the Great Russian element, which for centuries has been accustomed to sacrificing individual and social interests for the benefit of the State. The truth is that the Soviet Government is based on the Party, bureaucracy and political policies, consisting mainly of Russian elements. The truth is that the national slogans of Soviet propaganda are agreeable only to Russian ears. The truth is that the Soviet army, trained in the aggressive spirit, is commanded above all by Russians who took over the tradition of the late Tsarist army. The truth is also that both the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union follows the traditional paths traced by the Russian Empire. And it is further true that although Bolshevism treats in the same ruthless way all the nations of the Soviet Union, the strength of resistance against Bolshevism is much greater amongst other nations of the Soviet Union : the Baltic peoples, Ukrainians, Tartars, Caucasians and Turkestanians, and even amongst the long suffering and quiet Byelorussians—than amongst the genuine Russian population. And if Stalin could state after the end of the war that the Russian nation was the only one of the nations of the Soviet Union which did not betray the trust of the Soviet Government, we are bound to state that there was some truth in this, in spite of all the perfidy and demagogy of this phraseology.

But the bitter truth finds confirmation not only in the statements made by Stalin and his minions. In spite of everything, it is in the ranks of the Russian nation that Bolshevism, in its present form of State Fascism, has enlisted the greatest number of partisans and followers. Unfortunately confirmation of this fact may be found only too often in the circles of Soviet emigration itself. We well know the declaration of the most prominent representatives of the Russian Monarchists, according to which Bolshevism continues the old policy of the Russian Empire and that the only thing which should be done is to replace the " Bolshevik hierarchy " by a " popular Tsar." Many political bodies of Russian emigration, and moreover the reactionary ones (such as the " Young Russians ") used to state joyfully that the " Socialist régime of Bolshevism " is evolving in the direction of State centralism. Even the democratic leaders, the most absolute adversaries of Bolshevism at the period of Militant Communism, such as Professor P. Milyukov, considered that the tactical moves of Soviet policy meant surrender for the benefit of State and nation.

As we see, the *problem of the " responsibility of the Russian nation "*

for Bolshevism and the interdependence between Bolshevism and the Russian nation is a rather intricate matter, and it is no wonder that it is discussed in Russian emigré circles.

XIV

This problem is closely connected with another of paramount importance from the point of view of the universal struggle against Bolshevism. I wish to speak here of the attitude of Russian emigration towards the so-called " unity and indivisibility of the Russian State." The whole emigration is agreed on the necessity of the utter extirpation of Bolshevism. It also shares the view that there is only one universalistic idea which might appeal to the masses of the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc—*the idea of freedom*. But at the same time not one group of the Russian emigration is ready to consent to the definition of freedom which refers not only to the freedom of man—individual—but also includes the *complete freedom of all nations, great and small.*

It looks as though the Russian emigration considers itself as the guardian of the " one indivisible Russian Empire," estimating that the integrity of this State should not be sacrificed even for the sake of destroying Bolshevism. What is more, reading the press and listening to the statements of the Russian emigrés, one has the impression that they consider the Bolshevik achievements, so far as they concern territorial expansion and the administrative and economic centralisation of the Soviet Empire, are *positive* historical assets which must be saved from destruction.

The political programmes of the Russian groups are as like as two peas. At the best some vague and chaotic schemes for a kind of federation, lacking any precision, are fearfully put forward. If a far-sighted politician or thinker (such as Professor G. Fedotov) raises a timid protest against a continuation of the policy of Russian imperialism, more or less camouflaged, immediately a united front from left to right rises up against it. The complete unanimity on this point between the old and new emigration is really striking.

There is no need to underline the extent to which such an attitude of Russian emigration reduces and sometimes even suppresses altogether the value and meaning of the programme for the struggle against Bolshevism. As mentioned above, such an attitude was one of the main reasons for the defeat of the " white movement." *The idea of freedom can play its part only if no reserves or conditions restrict its scope.* How could it be possible to appeal to the idea of freedom for a nation while at the same time imposing on it some specific forms of relationship with other nations ?

Russian emigration, both old and new, does not seem to be aware of the deep changes which have taken place in the national and political conscience of the nations subjugated by Soviet Russia. The two-faced policy of the Bolsheviks (fostering the outward peculiarities of particular nations and a simultaneous ruthless centralism and tightening of the State authority) has stirred the ambitions of these nations for national and political independence and roused in them the strong desire to decide their own destinies in full independence. The Russian emigrés are too inclined to over-simplify these issues and qualify them as " preposterous attempts of chauvinistic nationalisms

aiming to dismember Russia." Such an attitude, which is in its turn a blatant example of Russian chauvinism, renders impossible any understanding between the Russian forces and the ever-growing anti-Bolshevik forces of other nations for the purpose of fighting Bolshevism.

It is very characteristic of the present time that while all the emigrés of the nations subjugated by Bolshevism advocate a relentless struggle against it, mutual national antagonisms—especially those between the Russian emigration and the emigrations of other nations —have deepened to such an extent that the formation of a united anti-Bolshevik front by all these nations is much more difficult now than it was in the first post-revolutionary years. There is no need to remark that such a chauvinistic attitude on the part of the Russian emigration provides many opportunities for Soviet plots and intrigues.

XV

In the present position of the world, when the "cold war" is in full swing and the continuous aggression of the Soviet Union is driving us into a third world war, Russian emigration faces immense tasks. *Stalin's policy puts the Russian nation in mortal danger.* It appeals to the Asiatic nations to destroy capitalism. Whatever may be the final issue of this experiment in relation to the Asiatic nations, this policy relegates the Russian nation to the background. Having been used as Category I serfs, the Russians are now down-graded to Category II serfs. *The fate of Russia and of the Russian nation will be at stake in the future world war.*

The bulk of the Russian emigration is well aware of the trend of events and of its own duties and tasks. But it is insufficiently prepared for the emergency from the point of view of organisation and programme. There are too many remnants of nationalism and the worship of a "great, strong State" in theories and programmes. Western indifference towards the struggle against Bolshevism in many cases justifies the attitude of the Russians and their distrust of the Occident. But this should not affect their position. Concurring in the view *that only revolutionary methods can bring positive results in the struggle against Bolshevism*, the Russians should expurgate from their programmes all reactionary, chauvinistic, conservative and imperialistic features.

Russian emigration is split into different factions and coteries and torn by internal dissensions. It unfortunately failed to find a common language with the emigrations of other nations from behind the iron curtain. It also seems that so far it is *incapable of producing enough strength to get rid of the old and new Soviet cells.* The latter are numerous, and will undoubtedly keep increasing.

The common foe gains ever greater experience in this matter: he understands much better than the West or the emigrations themselves the danger which might arise from the emigrés of the subjugated nations if they became united in organisation and action.

CHAPTER III

WORLD WAR II

VLASOV AND HITLER

by

George Fischer

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DOCUMENT

VLASOV AND HITLER

GEORGE FISCHER[1]

WHILE documents, memoirs, and other data on the second World War are being made public at an ever more dizzying pace, one of its aspects remains largely shrouded in mystery. This is the nature and extent of wartime defection from the U.S.S.R.—*the largest from any country in the second World War*—and official German reaction to it. Despite the continuing sparseness of specific data and research, however, one general conclusion is becoming ever more accepted. This conclusion—dramatically substantiated by such Nazi propaganda classics on the Soviet population as the pamphlet *Der Untermensch*—has been summarized by the military editor of the *New York Times:* "Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers surrendered with little fighting, and scores of thousands—including the Soviet general Vlasov—deserted to the German side in the first months of the war; but instead of encouraging this spontaneous revulsion against Communist totalitarianism . . . instead of acting as liberators, not conquerors, the Nazi Party, by its war of annihilation and its cruelty to Soviet prisoners and to the conquered areas of Russia, consolidated the opposition of all Soviet peoples and kindled the flame of hate, which later devoured the Reich."[2]

All studies of Soviet defection in the second World War devote much space to what is unmistakably its most tangible and significant manifestation. This is the German-backed Russian Army of Liberation, headed by ex-Soviet Lieutenant General Andrei A. Vlasov. The Russian Army of Liberation and its "civilian arm," the Russian National Committee (in 1944 enlarged into the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia), are together commonly known as the "Vlasov movement." It was based on a massive agglomeration of Soviet prisoners of war as well as forced laborers and voluntary exiles, military and civilian, from the U.S.S.R. No precise figures are known. But German documents indicate that, by the spring of 1942, some 200,000 Soviet volunteers were serving in the German armed forces—some undoubtedly, at first at least, to escape starvation—and that by 1943 the total mounted to 800,000. Vlasov's surviving chief of chancery has stated, furthermore, that when the Russian Army of Liberation was at last authorized by Adolf Hitler's Germany, it received over one million voluntary enlistment offers.[3]

[1] The author is greatly indebted to the Society of Fellows and the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. Together, in the last three years, they have made possible extensive research as well as five surveys of Soviet refugees in Europe. The complete results of the research by this writer are to be published in a forthcoming study, "Soviet defection in World War II."

[2] *Der Untermensch* (Berlin, 1942); Hanson W. BALDWIN, "What kind of a war?" *Atlantic*, July 1949, p. 24. See also the firsthand account of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war by a Soviet general, now a refugee in the West (Alexei MARKOFF, "How Russia almost lost the war," *Saturday evening post*, May 13, 1950, pp. 31, 175–78).

What was the real nature and scope of this Vlasov movement? Five years after the end of the second World War, we know pitifully little of the answer. Today many think of the Vlasov movement mainly in terms of its symbolization of a twisted, Soviet-bred morality. To them Vlasov's morality is likely to seem repugnant—they cannot conceive how a decent person could in the second World War have fought alongside Hitler, even against Stalin. But the story of Vlasov and Hitler—the story of mass Soviet defection and the vital Nazi failure to exploit it wisely—is also as revealing and important a case study of twentieth-century authoritarianism as any accessible to date.

General Vlasov's past is that of an exemplary Soviet career as a regular army officer, a Communist party member, and one of the heroes of the Red Army's defense of Moscow.[4] Vlasov's two major early statements on his startling changeover emphasized that, while evading capture to the last as commander of the Soviets' Second Assault Army near Leningrad, he "reached the decision that it was my duty to call upon the Russian people to destroy the Bolshevik system."[5] A Russian expert of the German foreign ministry soon after Vlasov's capture concluded that "he is not . . . a mere seeker after political glory and accordingly will never become a purchasable hireling and will never be willing to lead hirelings."[6]

On the ideology of the Vlasov movement, revealing evidence can be gleaned from its two major doctrinal statements. The first, Vlasov's own "Smolensk program," of December 1942, came out for: (1) replacement of collective farms by individual ownership of land, (2) private trade and handicrafts, (3) elimination of forced labor and repression, and (4) freedom of religion, conscience, speech, and assembly.[7] The second programmatic statement, the November 1944 "Prague manifesto" of Vlasov's Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, called for: (1) overthrow of the "Stalin tyranny," (2) return to the liberties of the February 1917 "people's" revolution, (3) immediate and honorable peace with Germany, and (4) the creation of a new, free, Russian state, "without Bolsheviks and exploiters."[8]

Only after many more firsthand documents become available will any overall conclusions be warranted. But on the German policy toward Soviet defection in the second World War the picture

[3] Wallace CARROLL, "It takes a Russian to beat a Russian," *Life*, Dec. 19, 1949, pp. 82–85; Colonel K. G. KROMIADI, *Posev* [Sowing] (Limburg, Germany, August 20, 1950); and Vladimir PETROV, *My retreat from Russia* (New Haven, 1950). A detailed personal account of this topic is also presented by Karl MICHEL in *Es begann am Don* (Bern, 1946), and *Ost und West: der Ruf Stauffenbergs* (Zurich, 1947). Michel was a German officer on the eastern front during the second World War.

[4] *Pravda* [Truth], Dec. 13, 1941 and Jan. 24, 1942, as well as a homily by Ilya EHRENBURG in the Red Army's *Krasnaia Zvezda* [Red star] of Mar. 11, 1942; C. L. SULZBERGER, in *New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1941; Eve CURIE, *Journey among warriors* (New York, 1943); V. OSOKIN, *Andrei Andreevich Vlasov: kratkaia biografia* [Andrei A. Vlasov: a brief biography] (Dabendorf b./Berlin, 1944), trans. in George FISCHER, "General Vlasov's official biography," *Russian review*, Oct. 1949, pp. 290–301.

[5] For full text of these Vlasov statements see B. DVINOV, *Vlasovskoe dvizhenie v svete dokumentov* [The Vlasov movement in the light of documents] (New York, 1950), pp. 79–81; and W. WLADIMIROW, *Dokumente und Material des Kommittees zur Befreiung der Voelker Russlands* (Berlin, 1944), pp. 47–53. These two collections, together with the two Nuremberg trial series, represent the richest available material on this subject.

[6] CARROLL, *loc. cit.*, p. 85.

[7] FISCHER, *loc. cit.*, pp. 285–86.

[8] *Volia Naroda* [The will of the people] (Berlin), organ of Vlasov's Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, Nov. 15, 1944.

emerging from the available evidence is approximately the following.[9]

From the outset, elements in the wehrmacht and in the German foreign office were intent upon demoralizing Soviet resistance by sponsoring a "free Russia" movement. This group for a time grew stronger, as Soviet resistance stiffened in 1942–43, and gained such narrowly utilitarian converts as Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. Also, Alfred Rosenberg, as minister for eastern (i.e., Soviet) occupied territories, was interested in this, but he was dominated by a driving urge to see the Great Russians enveloped by a German-backed "cordon sanitaire" of separatist border regions of the U.S.S.R. Opposing both the "free Russia" and the "cordon sanitaire" schemes was a powerful Nazi party hierarchy, notably Rudolph Hess's successor as chief of Hitler's chancery on party affairs, Martin Bormann, and Ernst Koch, gauleiter for East Prussia, who became the omnipotent and brutal *Reichskommissar* for the occupied Ukraine. This group—which included Goebbels at first and Heinrich Himmler, chief of the Schutzstaffel, the Gestapo, and later also all-powerful minister of the interior, until 1944—insisted on adhering to the *Untermensch* policy toward the U.S.S.R. This policy held that since Slavs generally, and the Soviet nationalities as well, were *Untermenschen*, their land, resources, and manpower were to be used solely and wholly as German needs dictated it.[10]

This policy means that, even if sympathy for Vlasov was apparently widespread among the millions of Soviet nationals under Hitler's wartime control, one other fact is also clear: German official distrust, minute supervision, and occasionally outright suspension of activities at no time enabled the Vlasov movement to unfurl its banner, anti-Stalin and yet non-Nazi, to any impressive extent. As Hitler's Germany crumbled, the Vlasov movement was promised, at last, a full-fledged "free Russian" army and organization. But none of the Soviet-manned German units, including the SS, ever served under Vlasov's command, despite German and Soviet propaganda to the contrary; and even at the end Nazi suspicion and obstruction kept the Russian Army of Liberation down to one division. Disgusted, this division, after only one battle on the Oder, marched off, to become, most dramatically, the liberator of Prague, before Allied troops arrived. General Vlasov and eleven other ex-Soviet generals and colonels associ-

[9] A special factor which complicates conclusive judgment on Vlasov and wartime Soviet defection in Germany is the intense controversy which has raged on this question throughout the Russian émigré press during the past years. This controversy has served to permeate all eyewitness accounts with an undeterminable amount of excessively partisan "whitewash" or, in a few cases, animosity. Notable examples of the Russian émigré controversies are two sharply conflicting interpretations of the Vlasov movement, both by veteran socialist (Menshevik) exiles: B. I. NICOLAEVSKY, "Porazhenchestvo 1941–1945 godov i Gen. A. A. Vlasov" [The defeatist movement in 1941–45 and Gen. A. A. Vlasov], *Novy zhurnal* (New York, 1948), XVIII, 209–34, and XIX, 211–48; and Grigori ARONSON, *Pravda o Vlasovtsakh* [The truth about the Vlasovites] (New York, 1949). Some support is lent to Aronson's emphasis on the movement's antisemitism by a smattering of Julius Streicher-like articles in the wartime Vlasovite organs, for example, *Dobrovolets* [Volunteer], Feb. 2 and Apr. 23, 1944. The counter-argument is that these publications were Nazi-controlled but that neither Vlasov himself nor the movement's major statements espoused antisemitism.

[10] *Trial of the major war criminals before the international tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1947), XI, 477–509, XIX, 117–23, XXVI, 614–16, and XXIX, 117–20; *Nazi conspiracy and aggression* (Washington, 1946), III, 61–65, 83–89, 126–46, 242–51, 716–17, IV, 55–58, 65–75, 655–59; and Joseph GOEBBELS, *The Goebbels diaries*, ed. Louis LOCHNER (New York, 1949), pp. 226, 261, 284, 302, 328, 331. See also CARROLL, *loc. cit.*, WLADIMIROW, and *Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg*, ed. Serge LANGE and Ernst von SCHENK (Chicago, 1949).

ated with him were executed in Moscow in 1946 after capture by United States Army units, while thousands of his followers were seized by the Soviets or turned over to them by the West.[11] Thus, aside from the movement's propaganda role among front-line Soviet troops, its one other role is probably in the realm of considerable ideological crystallization among Vlasovite leaders and followers. Despite continuing intellectual flux and isolation, this is an aspect which has made the Vlasovite survivors the politically most purposeful and integrated elements in the vast and amorphous postwar Soviet emigration.[12]

What was Hitler's position on wartime Soviet defection? Only recently has a unique document become available to provide a satisfactory answer. It is the original German transcript, in full, of a lengthy meeting of Hitler and top military aids on German policy regarding Soviet disaffection, interlarded with revealing digressions by Hitler on disagreements within his own hierarchy. The document is entitled "Conference of the Fuehrer with Field Marshal Keitel and General Zeitzler, 8 June, 1943, in Berghof."[13]

In short, the story told by the document establishes that Hitler, in 1943, had rejected all schemes to exploit Soviet disaffection for anything but demoralizing propaganda within the Red Army. Recurrently harking back to Erich Ludendorff's "mistake" of consenting to the creation of Josef Pilsudski's Polish Legion in the first World War, Hitler insisted on limiting General Vlasov's function to that of front-line propaganda, narrowly prescribed by German supervision. Any German promises regarding Russia's future were to be made both reluctantly and with tongue in cheek. Contrary to Vlasov's plea for an autonomous, all-Russian army under his command and with Russian officers, military use of Soviet deserters would be either in small national detachments within German units or as *Hilfswillige*, i.e., noncombat volunteer helpers.[14]

[11] Cf. *Pravda* and *New York Times*, Aug. 2, 1946; V. POZDNIAKOV, "Pervaia Pekhotnaia Divizia Vooruzhennykh Sil Komiteta Osvobozhdenia Narodov Rossii, po vospominaniam komandira 2-go Polka" [The First Infantry Division of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, based on the memoirs of the commander of the Second Regiment] (Cambridge: Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1949); and *Tretiia sila: istoria odnoi popytki* [The third force: the history of one attempt], by A. S. KAZANTSEV, managing editor of the Vlasovite central organ in 1944–45, *Volia Naroda* (appearing in serialized form in the "solidarist" émigré weekly newspaper in Germany, *Posev*, beginning Apr. 23, 1950), *Volia Naroda*, Nov. 15, 1944 and Jan. 31, 1945; and Ivan H. PETERMAN, "Prague's four fantastic days," *Saturday evening post*, July 14, 1945.

[12] On the postwar Soviet refugees—"defectors" and "nonreturners"—see George FISCHER, "The new Soviet emigration," *Russian review*, Jan. 1949; O. ANISIMOV, "Sovetskoe pokolenie" [The Soviet generation], *Novy zhurnal* (New York), Vol. XXII (1949); Merle FAINSOD, "Controls and tensions in the Soviet system," *American political science review*, June 1950, pp. 266–82. For the revealing creeds of the two émigré political organizations most influential at present among Soviet refugees see the neo-Vlasovite SBONR's [Movement for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia] *Borba* (Munich), Nos. 6–7 (1949) and 3–4 (1950) and the 58-page *Programma Natsionalno-Trudovogo Soiuza* [Program of the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists] (Limburg, 1948).

[13] The 22-page typed German original of this document was kindly made available to me by B. Gourewitsch, Russian émigré writer in New York. Three brief extracts in English from the document may be found in *Nazi conspiracy and aggression*, III, 959–60. These were presented at the war crimes trials at Nuremberg as United States Document No. 1384-PS. For a Russian translation of the document see DVINOV, pp. 89–102.

[14] That Hitler did not change his views on Vlasov toward the end of the war is brought out by his statement on January 27, 1945, as described by Felix GILBERT in *Hitler directs his war: the records of his daily military conferences* (New York, 1950), p. 111: "Hitler speaks very contemptuously [of the Vlasov army], regretting that its members wear

What does the content of this document add to existing data? Above all, it confirms earlier evidence that Hitler had rejected the possibility of defeating the Red Army through dramatically exploiting widespread Soviet disaffection. That this decision by Hitler proved to be a grave error, which changed the entire course of the war, is underscored by a second conclusion derivable from the Hitler conference document. Hitler not only failed to encourage further Soviet disaffection, but he decisively turned his back on the mass of Soviet defectors already willing to fight with him against Stalin. Vlasov was the outstanding representative of this group. Thus the document tends to establish clearly that the movement was never given the opportunity to provide large-scale assistance to Hitler. In turn, this shows Vlasov's wartime undertakings to have been a largely frustrated effort.

Bred in the U.S.S.R., Soviet defection in the second World War appears to most Western students pathetically disoriented both morally and politically. And yet today something else remains as its principal significance. On the one hand, there is its phenomenal size and, on the other, the continued insistence of its leaders, even under Nazi control, on national independence and on the democratic symbol of Russia's February 1917 revolution. The Hitler conference document provides a unique insight into the inability of Hitlerism to appreciate or intelligently support the unprecedented and unmatched Soviet defection in the second World War.

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German uniforms. . . . 'Every wretch is put into a German uniform. I have always been opposed to it.' "

CHAPTER IV

POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS

POLITICAL TRENDS AMONG RUSSIAN EXILES

by

The National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

The author: The National Committee for a Free Europe is a private American organization whose present focus of activities are the Eastern European Countries under Soviet rule. Its activities include Radio Free Europe, the Mid-European Studies Center in New York, and the Crusade for Freedom under General Lucius D. Clay. The committee does not sponsor activities in the Soviet area, aside from occasional studies such as the following.

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POLITICAL TRENDS AMONG RUSSIAN EXILES

The international tension has presented the Russian exiles on both sides of the ocean with the necessity of integrating their forces within some sort of united front. However, Russian consolidation efforts are confronted with difficulties even more complicated than those existing within other Eastern and Central European exiled groups.

The obstacles can be found not only in the existence of innumerable groupings but also in the wide gaps separating them, which in some cases seem insurmountable. The emigres who left the country following 1917 were unanimous in their condemnation of the October (Bolshevik) Revolution, but at the same time were divided into two warring camps, from the very outset, in their attitude toward the earlier February Revolution, when the Tsar had abdicated. The situation became still more complicated after the appearance of new waves of Soviet emigres who for various reasons found themselves abroad during and after the second World War.

From 1947 on efforts to consolidate Russian exiled groups were initiated from various sides, but led only to short-lived combinations which could not withstand the test of reality. Up to date, there have been about a dozen of various inter-group "unions," "centers," "movements," etc.--most of them originating in Western Germany, particularly in Munich; some in other countries--but none of them solved the problem of consolidation. However, there is a noticeable trend in these efforts which show the direction where the solution may be found in the future. Despite all the failures, Russian emigre life seems to be undergoing a slow crystallization of some currents around which a unification of relatively broader dimensions may be achieved.

GENERAL TREND

The end of the war found the monarchists--the elite among the old emigration--in the controlling position of Russian emigre life in Western Europe, a position which was uncontested for some time because of their

long-established connections. But the changing international picture soon created the need for movements with a mass following and with political platforms which would better serve the purpose of cooperation with the West. Thus the remnants of the Vlasov army soon became the subject of contention among various exiled political groups, with each trying to exploit the so-called "Vlasov Movement" as a springboard in the struggle for power.

It is interesting to observe how the evolution of the contest in the past four years developed from an almost complete domination of the officer corps of the Vlasov army by the intransigeant monarchists to gradual emancipation of large sections of the Vlasovites from such control and to formation of anti-monarchist trends among them with democratic and republican tendencies. This caused the monarchists to change their political face--at least in public statements--from traditional restorationism to a more timely constitutionalism as well as to professions of readiness to recognize the will of the people after the liberation of Russia.

A popular vehicle for this adjustment was found in the so-called Fourteen Points of the Vlasov Movement's Manifesto, adopted in Prague in November, 1944, which permit various interpretations to suit the purposes of all groups. However, these maneuvers did not secure a controlling position for the monarchists, whose supremacy in Russian exiled life now appears to belong to the past. The formation of groups with democratic programs such as SBONR and SVOD can be viewed as an influential factor in Russian exiled life.

At present there are three general political trends among Russian exiles which seem unlikely ever to be brought within one fold. At the extreme right are the restorationists who abhor all revolutionary changes which have occurred since 1917 and insist upon a return to an absolute monarchy in Russia. On the left are those groups which recognize the February Revolution and are even willing to accept some of the changes brought about by the Bolshevik Revolution. The middle sector of so-called "non-predetermination" (nyepredreshenchestvo) consists of a large number of factions

which for various reasons--some sincere, and some for purposes of disguising their true identity--avoid taking a clear stand on the question of the future order in Russia, leaving its determination to the Russian people themselves. From this sector--which has become the hiding place for many reactionary groupings--have come most of the unsuccessful consolidation campaigns in recent times.

THE MONARCHISTS

The predominant position of the monarchists during the first post-war years had its source in the close contacts of their leaders with the occupation administration in Western Germany. They were old-timers acquainted with the life of the country, were entrusted with administrative posts in the DP camps and elsewhere and were employed by the intelligence and information services. Their leader, General P. Glasenap, succeeded in gaining influence over a large part of the Vlasov officers by offering them minor jobs and financial support. It is said that a "silver fund," transported abroad after the Revolution by General Wrangel, was released to General Glasenap with the approval of the American authorities, and to date this still constitutes the basis of his influences, now on the wane.

Glasenap was also the first to tie the Vlasovites with the older monarchists by establishing two centers in which both elements had to be united. These were: the Union of the St. Andrew Flag (SAF), deriving its name from the Vlasov army flag, which was designed to serve as a joint military center for the officers of both the Vlasov army and the White armies; and the Russian All-National State Movement (RONDD), intended as a political front.

Glasenap's campaign--now relegated to the role of extreme rightist opposition in the monarchist movement --at the beginning of 1948 became a stimulating organization which attracted about one-half of Vlasov's officers. Its aim was military dictatorship in Russia, imposed with the aid of foreign force. It was interested only in the military aspect, leaving the political program to

emerge later in accordance with the situation. At one time Glasenap promised in an interview to organize twenty full divisions from among the exiles.

Glasenap and his colleagues were removed to the background, where he became the leader of the diehard absolutists, after other monarchist leaders realized the necessity for making concessions to the feelings of the exiled masses and, still more, to the Western World in order to retain leading positions for themselves. The center of these new tendencies became the Highest Monarchist Council (VMS), an old-time directing body of the monarchist movement. In 1948 the Council was placed under new leadership, headed by P. Skarzhinsky, which soon declared itself for "constitutional monarchy."

On November 5th, 1949, the Congress of monarchist organizations throughout the world took place in Munich, at which a broader ideological foundation was adopted for the modernized monarchist movement. A declaration was issued by the Congress--voted unanimously and without discussion--which reiterated the movement's aim to restore the monarchy in Russia under the sceptre of Grand Duke Vladimir Cyrilovitch. However, the declaration stressed that the movement does not aim at the "forcible restoration of the monarchist regime," and would recognize "any expression of the people's will." Amplifying this new idea, the declaration said further:

> The monarchists will loyally serve a republican Russia, reserving for themselves the right for lawful propaganda for the monarchist ideals. However, they expect the same loyalty from their adversaries in the event the monarchist order is re-established.

The declaration caused in Glasenap's faction an outburst of indignation against the "revisionists-liberals." On the other hand, it was met with little credence in democratic exiled circles, as it was viewed as a camouflage merely intended to deceive the exiled masses. As a matter of fact, the Congress itself gave reasons for such suspicions by adopting an amendment to the constitution of the Monarchist Movement, in which the

absolute authority of the Grand Duke was proclaimed in these words:

> The orders of the Legitimate Successor of the Russian Tsars are obligatory upon all organs and members of the Movement.

Simultaneously with these program changes, new tactics were adopted by the "constitutional monarchists," represented by the Highest Monarchist Council. In the last few years the Council is concentrating its efforts toward the creation of a mass organization, using for these purposes intermediaries and avoiding publicity by direct action. In particular, attempts to make use of the Vlasovites as the core of an organization with a mass following--about which a few words will be said below--revealed themselves as designed and directed by the Council.

Since the beginning of the campaign by the "constitutional monarchist" faction, the rightist opposition in Germany has held itself to bitter criticism in publications allegedly financed by Glasenap. Some of his closest political friends--like the journalist N. Chukhnov, and V. Karalin--appeared in the United States, where they found sympathetic groups in the Russian Anti-Communist Center (RAC), organized in 1949 by Prince Sergei Byeloselsky-Byelozersky and around the New York daily Rossiya. N. Chukhnov, who edits a mimeographed sheet here called Znamya Rossii (The Banner of Russia), assures his readers that Byeloselsky-Byelozersky could unify around himself about eighty percent of the Russian emigres. A strong bulwark of the extreme monarchist movement can be found here in the Russian Orthodox Church heirarchy.

Another center of this extremist trend is the Council of the Russian Soldiers Abroad (SRZV or ROVS), with headquarters in Paris, which is headed by General Archangelsky. It is regarded as the nucleus of the future Russian national army by its adherents.

THE VLASOV LIBERATION MOVEMENT

The continuous efforts of the monarchists to build up their prestige by gaining the mass support of the

former members of General Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army (ROA), carried on by the Highest Monarchist Council since early 1948, have not brought the expected results. Instead, they contributed greatly to hasten the process of differentiation among the Vlasovites and to rally democratic elements among them within a separate group. Soon it became evident that the so-called Vlasov Movement consisted of various trends which could not be treated as a single political entity.

The first attempt to create a monarchist-controlled large-scale organization through a compromise between the old emigration and the Vlasovites led in April, 1948, to the formation of a center known as the Anti-Communist Center of the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia (ACODNR), with headquarters in Munich. The new center unified for awhile on the basis of the fourteen points of the Vlasov 1944 Manifesto--interpreted as a non-predetermination program--a large segment of the emigration, beginning with Glasenap's Union of the St. Andrew Flag (SAF) on the right to the younger Vlasovite elements on the left. The latter were originally organized in the Union of the Youth of the Peoples of Russia, the later SBONR.

The leaders of the center played for a while with the idea of becoming an "equal contracting partner" of the Western Allies and spoke of organizing an army and preparing an administrative apparatus for Russia. But soon afterwards the unity broke up, when, first, the extreme monarchists of General Glasenap's brand left the center and then when the youth group followed suit for reasons of its own. Neither was satisfied with the center, which had revealed itself to be a tool of the Monarchist Council.

Last July the attempt was repeated in the creation of a new rallying center of all "non-predetermination" groups under the name of the United Vlasovites (KOV). A new feature was the proclamation of the "Leader" of the United Vlasovite movement in the person of General Andrei Turkul--a former White Army officer who also served in Vlasov's army during the last war.

After his election to the new position on August 8th, 1950--the fourth anniversary of Vlasov's death--at a

meeting in a DP camp near Munich, reportedly attended by 700 old and new emigres. Turkul immediately received the blessings of the Highest Monarchist Council in an address given by the Council's head, P. Skarzhinsky. This tipped the hand of the real wire pullers behind the action.

From the beginning the new center was boycotted by General Glasenap's extremists and by the younger elements among the emigres who in May, 1948, assumed the name of the Union to Fight for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (SBONR) and who in the latter part of 1948 gave up all cooperation with the monarchists. This appears to have put an end to all attempts to bring together all emigre trends within one group by the exploitation of Vlasov's fourteen points as a platform. Recognizing this final split, the monarchist bi-weekly Nasha Strana (Our Country) of Buenos Aires wrote on November 25th, 1950:

> The personnel makeup of the Vlasov movement in the last years has undergone a tremendous political evolution. Its Zhilenko elements (G. Zhilenko, one of Vlasov's generals) left for the SBONR, its Chukhnov elements (Chukhnov --General Glasenap's principal publicist) apparently remained with Glasenap. The sound center grouped itself around General Turkul.
>
> It is utterly clear that the February Revolution, to say nothing of the October Revolution, is unacceptable to any monarchist. But it is also utterly clear that the orientation upon the old ruling class is unacceptable to any sensible monarchist.....In one word, as the Romans said, tempora mutantur.....

THE SBONR AND THE SVOD

By turning their backs upon the Anti-Communist Center in 1949 and upon General Turkul's United Vlasovites in 1950, the SBONR and the SVOD--two organizations representing the democratically minded younger elements among the new emigres--determined to go their own way and to seek their own connections.

The SBONR (Union to Fight for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) and the SVOD (Union of Soldiers of the Liberation Movement) are two arms of the same movement among the new Russian emigration, the first being its political and the second its military branch. The membership of both organizations largely consists of the same people.

The history of both organizations, reaching back to 1947, impresses one as a period of searching for new ways which gradually resulted in their drift from the old White movement to political independence and the recognition of the February Revolution. Both regard themselves as true followers of the Vlasov movement. However, they interpret this movement as a revolt of former pro-Soviet elements and a return to the February Revolution program, while the monarchists try to present Vlasov as the successor to Denikin and Wrangel, the leaders of the White movement.

Toward the end of 1947 the SBONR (then known as the Union of the Youth of the Peoples of Russia) was still publishing in its monthly organ, Borba (Combat), the directives of the Highest Monarchist Council. Early in 1948, when the monarchist-inspired Anti-Communist Center was formed, SBONR and SVOD applied for admission as the center's "mass organizations" and remained within it until August, 1949, when SBONR was excluded for "abandoning the position of non-predetermination."

On November 13th, 1949, SBONR held a congress which summed up the evolution within the group during the preceding two years and defined its new political outlook. The SBONR spokesmen declared the group's position to be against monarchism, fascism and the Fuehrer principle, as well as against the separatist tendencies among Russian national groups. The aims of SBONR were formulated as follows: "To build up Russia on republican-democratic and federalistic foundations." An "ideological doctrine" was presented to the congress along these lines and was approved.

The congress took a negative stand toward cooperation with the monarchists, but assumed an unbiased position toward the socialist movement, stressing that

"it was following with due attention the role of the socialist parties in Western Europe as a center of struggle against bolshevism."

Around the same time the SVOD held its congress, at which the breach with organizations of "restorationist-monarchist" trends was proclaimed.

Last November a conference of the German division of SBONR was held in Munich under the slogan, "With the people and for the people." The speakers described the group's program as: "A struggle for a free Russia for democracy, social equality and national self-determination." They stressed the necessity for "consolidation of all progressive, genuinely democratic forces," and they condemned "non-predetermination" and also "blocs and coalitions without principles."

In addition to Germany, SBONR has branches in the USA, Canada, Argentina, Britain, Brazil, France, Venezuela. Besides the monthly organ Borba, published since 1947 in Germany, the group prints bulletins and other publications in Canada, Argentina and Brazil.

The SBONR leaders claim that the group conducts propaganda work among troops of the Soviet Occupation Army in Germany and Austria. SBONR's last report on activities in Germany stresses that last November, on the anniversary of the October Revolution, the group distributed 12,000 anti-Soviet leaflets among Red Army men.

SBONR reports point to a recent increase of professional and cultural workers of the new emigration in its membership rolls. Upon this element it bases its hopes for developing publications and other propaganda weapons.

THE NATIONAL FREEDOM LEAGUE

An important factor in turning away the younger elements of the now emigration--represented by SBONR and SVOD--from cooperation with the monarchists and in guiding them toward the adoption of a new democratic program, was the establishment of contacts with their leaders by spokesmen for the League to Fight for National Freedom, a political group formed in March,

1949, in New York by Alexander Kerensky and old-time Socialists.

The League calls itself "a union of groups and individuals of various political trends for the purpose of fighting for a democratic-republican federation of the peoples of Russia." It bases its program upon the "achievements of the February Revolution" and leaves the details of the future order in Russia to a constituent assembly. Its membership includes persons known for their part in the February Revolution and the provisional government which emerged from it. However, the League's influence seems to have reached some segments of the new emigration through its own bulletin, published from time to time as a section in the New York daily Novoye Russkoye Slovo, and through the monthly Socialist magazine, Socialitichesky Viestnik, also issued in New York.

The contacts between the League and the SBONR began in 1948, when the latter was still a part of the monarchist-led Anti-Communist Center in Munich. In fact, the revelation of these contacts caused the final breach between SBONR and the Center. After protracted negotiations as well as internal disputes on both sides, the League and the SBONR last Spring entered into cooperation. Their first joint public appearance took place at the mass meeting in the New York Manhattan Center on November 5th, 1950.

Cooperation between the two groups was achieved not without difficulties on both sides. In particular, opinions were divided within the Socialist faction in the League concerning the attitude toward the Vlasov movement. Boris Nikolaevsky, who worked the most for cooperation, took the position that the Vlasov movement should be vindicated. In one of his articles, printed in the Socialistichesky Viestnik of February 28th, 1948, he wrote:

> The Vlasov movement, from the very beginning, was an attempt to create an anti-bolshevik movement on the basis of a democratic program, a federalistic and all-Russian program.....

The Socialist minority, represented by B. Dvinov and G. Aronson on the other extreme, condemned Vlasov's activities during the years 1942-1944 and branded the 1944 Manifesto of the Vlasovites as a crude attempt to whitewash themselves in the last moments before Hitler's downfall. Dvinov, who wrote a strongly critical book on the Vlasov movement, came out recently against exaggerated statements about the proportions of the Vlasov army. It is his claim that the army never exceeded 25,000 men.

The majority in the Socialist group took a compromising position, namely, that a large part of Vlasov's followers did not sympathize with Hitler and that "cooperation with them is advisable provided that they now sincerely aspire toward democracy."

PARIS LIBERATION UNION

Another small gathering of intellectuals--which has some influence, through its publications, upon political trends among the exiles--is the Union to Fight for the Liberation of Russia (SBOR), with headquarters in Paris. The group, identified with Professor S. P. Melgunov, campaigns in its publications for a democratic Russia, but takes no stand on the future form of the Russian order. Besides, it is at odds with the Socialists because of its campaign for consolidation with the inclusion of the so-called "constitutional monarchists."

THE SOLIDARISTS

Besides the SBONR and the SVOD, another group with claims to a "mass following" among Russian exiles is the National Labor Union (NTS), known in recent times as the Russian Solidarists.

Because of its ideological and organizational peculiarities, the group appears to stand apart from other camps, reactionary or democratic, and represents a camp of its own. It is attacked by the Socialists for the fascist-like features in its program, and by the monarchists for other program features allegedly borrowed from the bolsheviks. The SBONR congress of 1949

placed the Solidarists among those groups it considered "unfit for cooperation for democratic-republican groups."

The organization, originating about fifteen years ago in Yugoslavia, was the result of a rebellion against White emigration politics by its frustrated children who saw their fathers drifting away from realities. It became the largest Russian youth center between the wars. The original program of the NTS was based upon the ideas of Mussolini's corporate state. The organization built upon this program had the character of an "order" with members divided into various "degrees of dedication."

After the war, NTS underwent and is still undergoing ideological changes in the direction of democracy, but its program, published in its most recent form in 1948, still retains many traces of fascism. It sees the future Russian society built upon national-labor units with an "elite" layer in the leading position and a "state head" with wide authority at the top.

The Solidarists succeeded in bringing a considerable number of new emigres within their fold after the war, which fact is also recognized by their adversaries. But the core of the group reportedly remains the same as before the war, and its leaders are charged with proceeding in the same authoritarian manner as before.

Much talked about are the attempts of the Solidarists to establish contacts with the Societ population. The claims of the group itself in this respect, as contained in the Look magazine interview with K. Boldirev, head of the Solidarist division in the USA, drew strong criticism, particularly for such statements as the alleged participation of the group in the assassination of Kirov and its promise to organize a revolution in the USSR for $100,000,000. However, even its adversaries acknowledge the group's contacts with the Soviet population during the war and its present campaign among members of the Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Germany.

During war time the NTS people were permitted by the Germans to work among Russian slave laborers and Russian prisoners and, as they assert, sent agents into German-occupied territory on their own account. The

latter activity caused German reprisals against the group in 1944, with arrests of some of their leaders, including the international chief of the group, V. Baydalakov, now in the USA.

Sources outside of the Solidarist group dismiss as false its assertions concerning the existence of a widespread organizational network in the USSR at present--as claimed by E. Romanov, editor of the group's organ, Possev, in his interview published in the July 25th, 1950 issue of the Christian Science Monitor. But they admit that the group is active among the occupation armies in Eastern Germany. Charging that the Solidarists plan to secure for themselves a monopoly over the material and moral support of the Western Powers, (R. Abramovich) wrote in the August-September issue of the Socialistichesky Viestnik this year:

> Mr. Romanov asserts that in 1949 the NTS sent three million proclamations and leaflets behind the Iron Curtain. Of course, the NTS is printing some proclamations and leaflets and is dispatching them "to the East." Actually, such leaflets (sent over not only by the NTS but also by other organizations) go only as far as the Eastern Zone of Germany, and that only in small quantities. There they sometimes land in the hands of Russian soldiers and officers--which is very well. But to present this useful but modest work as flooding Soviet Russia with millions of NTS leaflets is intolerable bragging.

The monarchist writer, N. Melnikov, criticizing the Solidarist platform, conceded in the Bulletin of the ACODNR of March-April, 1949, that the group has a "useful part in the anti-Communist struggle" and that it has succeeded in rallying a "considerable number of devoted fighters for freedom." Another monarchist writer, I. Solonevich, wrote in the Buenos Aires Nasha Strana of September 16, 1950:

> I demand from the Solidarists answers to the questions (concerning their program)...but

it would be a crime to interfere with the work of their R. Redlich, who is causing the Soviets a great deal of trouble in both zones of Berlin.

In general, the Solidarist organization has apparently achieved a considerably disciplined and effective state. Its organ, Possev, published in Limburg a.d. Lahn (Germany), now a weekly, has appeared regularly since 1945, a unique achievement in Russian exiled life. In addition, the group publishes a quarterly literary magazine, Grani, and also issues mimeographed bulletins and pamphlets for internal use.

An internal revolt among the Solidarist youth was recently reported, caused by the departure of several leading persons in the movement to the USA, including President V. Baydalakov and the movement's ideologist, S. Levicky, now reportedly in Washington, D. C. They were charged with "desertion" at the youth conference held last December in Bad Homburg, near Frankfurt.

LATEST CONSOLIDATION DRIVES

(A) The "Free Russia Congress" Plan

Simultaneously with the monarchist-inspired campaign for a new "mass organization"--which last Summer led to the formation of the United Vlasovites group with General Turkul as its head--another campaign was started in Munich for a Russian all-emigre congress. A "non-party" committee emerged in Munich, which announced a plan of a "Free Russia Congress" and invited the participation of all groups, from General Glasenap's faction on the right to Kerensky's League on the left. The establishment of the Committee's headquarters in a reportedly luxurious mansion in Munich and the American jeeps given to the disposal of its members gave rise to speculations that the campaign has the backing of the U. S. occupation administration. The composition of the Committee showed that the Highest Monarchist Council was again the controlling power in the project.

Kerensky's National Freedom League refused to participate in the enterprise from the outset, branding

it in its Bulletin (Sept. 10, 1950) as "a resurrection of old White schemes." Glasenap's intransigeant monarchists took also a negative attitude, when its spokesman, N. Chukhnov, wrote in his Znamya Rossii that the congress was being organized "with foreign money." The SBONR and SVOD answered the invitation with the demand that a majority in the Committee be given to the new emigration.

According to latest available reports, the Committee succeeded thus far only in the organization of a mass rally in Munich last November 6th, the anniversary of the October (Bolshevik) Revolution. The rally, called the Intransigeance Manifestation, was attended--according to the report in Volya Naroda (The People's Will), the Munich organ of the United Vlasovites--by 700 people. The list of nine participating organizations included, in addition to several groups, controlled by the "constitutional monarchists", also the Solidarists as well as SBONR and SVOD. However, the report remarked that the speeches of SBONR and SVOD representatives "disturbed the prevailing atmosphere by introducing some elements of polemics with those who think differently."

According to the same report, the manifestation proved that "the masses of the Russian political emigration insist upon the creation of a united and wide Russian Front Abroad against Communists." But the meeting offered no evidence that this consolidation scheme would be more successful than similar attempts made previously by the same circles.

(B) The "Russian Democratic Bloc" Plan

The Solidarist Possev of December 17th, 1950 carried a joint declaration, signed by Professor S. Melgunov in behalf of his Union to Fight for the Liberation of Russia (Paris) and by V. Baydalakov in behalf of the Solidarist group (National Labor Union), in which an appeal was raised to build up a "Russian Democratic Bloc." The appeal was directed to six groups, including--in addition to both initiating groups--also Kerensky's National Freedom League, SBONR, "Vlasovite non-pre-

determinationists," and "Constitutional Monarchists." It excluded from participation in the bloc the organizations "based on the platform of totalitarianism, both absolutist and Marxist."

The appeal met critical comments in an article by Boris Nikolaevsky, the Socialist leader, printed in the Bulletin of the National Freedom League of December 24th, 1950. Nikolaevsky objects to the plan because, in his opinion, its wording appears to block the participation of the Socialists while holding open the way to undemocratic rightist groups. The denial of admission in the projected bloc to all groups standing on the "Marxist platform," he says, would exclude all Socialist parties in Western Europe, parties which represent an important factor in the European anti-Communist movement. In its application to Russian groups, the plan would deny entry to anti-Communist Socialists, he asserts.

On the other hand, according to Nikolaevsky, the project would admit monarchists who call themselves "constitutional monarchists," as in the case of the Highest Monarchist Council in Munich, although they are in fact adherents of the absolutist regime. The same applies to the Vlasovite group under General Turkul, he says.

Another defect in the project, in Nikolaevsky's view, is its failure to make room for other nationalities of Russia, such as the Ukrainians. The author insists that no consolidated body can ignore the nationality problem.

Nikolaevsky's article found a visibly irritated reply in an article by S. Melgunov, printed in the New York Novoye Russkoye Slovo of January 15th. Melgunov states that he never intended to exclude the Socialists of Nikolaevsky group from joining the bloc because, in his opinion, they do not stand on a Marxist platform in their fight against Bolshevism. It would be a different thing, he adds caustically, if the Socialist returned to their partly pro-bolshevik position of 1920s, or "if Nikolaevsky again fell victim to his illusions, expressed a few years ago in Paris, that Marxism has won in the whole world."

(C) The Socialist View

The Socialistichesky Viestnik carried in its December 1950 issue an article by S. Schwartz presenting the group's view on the consolidation issue.

Schwartz sees the necessity of limiting admission to the consolidation center only to certain political groups. He denies participation to all groups which desire to restore the monarchy and the social order of Tsarist times. All compromise is rejected with groups playing with the idea of a Fuehrer. "Only groups about which there can be no doubt as to their democratic and republican character and their progressiveness in social and economic problems could enter such a body," Schwartz points out.

Additional requirements of the proposed center, raised in Schwartz's article, are: it should not pose as an exiled government or a nucleus for the future government of Russia; it should not concern itself with the organization of an armed force; and it should seek ways to attract representatives of nationality groups.

APPENDIX

NEW AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR A FREE RUSSIA

April, 1951

April, 1951

NEW AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR A FREE RUSSIA*

I. FRIENDS OF FIGHTERS FOR RUSSIAN FREEDOM

A. Officers

Chairman, Organizing Committee:
Mrs. Henry Hadley
Secretary and Treasurer:
Mrs. Ivan Tolstoy

B. Address

15 West 67th Street, New York 23, New York

C. Background

The formation of this group was announced in the "New York Times" and other newspapers on February 19, 1951. In program and sponsors, it resembles an attempt in 1949 which did not materialize--the FRIENDS OF RUSSIAN FREEDOM, with Professor George S. Counts as Chairman Pro Tem of the Organization Committee. The objective of the Friends of Fighters for Russian Freedom, as stated in its "Statement of Principles

*The closest published approximation to a complete listing of organizations in the United States of and for exiles from the USSR is contained in *Russian-American Calendar-Guide, 1951* (New York, 1951), pp. 65-96. This volume is published by Nicholas Martianoff, 1326 Madison Avenue, New York 28, New York. No comparable source exists for Western Germany, which remains the political center of recent exiles from the USSR. Specific inquiries may be addressed to the Institute for Research on the History and Institutions of the USSR, Augustenstrasse 46, Munich, Germany. This is a non-partisan venture of Soviet exile intellectuals. Its director is Boris A. Yakovlev, formerly Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Architecture and co-editor of a collection of autobiographical accounts by wartime Soviet exiles, *Thirteen Who Fled* (New York, 1949).

and Purposes," are as follows: "At home, it will resolutely point out that it is not the Russian people, but rather the Soviet regime and the Communist conspiracy that are the enemies of all people and threaten world war . . . Abroad . . . it will organize practical support and guidance, reception centers, etc., for Soviet citizens fleeing from their native land." The group held a luncheon-meeting in New York on March 20, 1951. U. S. Senator Brian McMahon spoke at the meeting, of which Dr. Harry Gideonse, President of Brooklyn College, was Chairman.

II. AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE U.S.S.R., INC.

A. Officers

President: Eugene Lyons
Vice-President: Allan Grover
Secretary: William L. White
Other members: William Henry Chamberlin, Professor William Yandell Elliott, Isaac Don Levine

B. Temporary Address

c/o The President, 40 East 54th Street,
New York 22, New York

C. Background

The account of the formation of this group, in the "New York Times" of March 7, 1951, stated that it "will give Russian refugees 'moral and material support' in their fight against the Stalin regime . . . The committee said it would channel its support through a centralized body, representing 'all democratic elements' among emigres from the Soviet Union. Negotiations for the creation of this body, with headquarters in Western Germany have begun."

The committee's description as "a newly formed American Committee for a Free Russia", by David J. Dallin in the February 12, 1951 "New Leader," called forth a rejoinder in the March 26, 1951 "New Leader" from Albert C. J. Simard, M.D. (40 Central Park South, New York). Dr. Simard described himself as Chairman of the Board of Directors of an entirely different group, the AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR FREE RUSSIA, Inc. He stated that the "Appeal" of his group had first been published in "Commonweal" on December 31, 1948, and that it was incorporated in the State of New York on March 9, 1949.

III. FREE RUSSIA FUND

A. Officers

President: George F. Kennan
Treasurer: R. Gordon Wasson
Other members, Board of Trustees:
Frank Altschul, Professor Philip E. Mosely, John E. F. Wood
Director: George Fischer

B. Address

542 Fifth Avenue, New York 19, New York

C. Background

This group was formed at a meeting on March 23, 1951. Its immediate purpose is "to increase the usefulness to free society" of exiles of all Soviet nationalities through the support of their cultural, academic and mutual aid organizations in the United States.

INDEX

INDEX