

POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION **EPSILON 72**

SIMULATION DOCUMENTATION



STUDIES, ANALYSIS, AND GAMING AGENCY
ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION

EPSILON 72

30 October - 3 November 1972

SIMULATION DOCUMENTATION

Prepared By
STUDIES, ANALYSIS, AND GAMING AGENCY
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FOREWORD

Simulation Documentation is the second of three volumes documenting EPSILON 72, a senior-level interagency, politico-military simulation, which examined United States/NATO security policies in the mid-1970s. EPSILON 72 was conducted in the Convention Hall, Sheridan Barracks, Garmisch, Germany from 30 October - 3 November 1972. This volume contains the initial scenario, team move messages, scenario projections of the Control Group, and an edited transcript of the Critique proceedings.

Participants were divided into two teams -- BLUE and GREEN -- and a Control Group. The two teams represented the National Command Authority of the United States; the Control Group represented other nations, international organizations, and other influencing factors. In the course of three meetings (moves), the teams considered an initial scenario and two scenario projections. Following each team meeting, the Control Group interfaced the decisions reached by the teams and prepared scenario projections portraying a new, but related, crisis situation. Following the three moves, a Critique was held. Team motivations and actions were discussed and general observations and conclusions were summarized.

The material contained in this document does not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency; or any other Government agency.

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MOVE I

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FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. I

GREEN

DATE 31 DEC 75

INITIAL SCENARIO - PART I

The situation described in this scenario is hypothetical and is intended to provoke thought and to stimulate discussion. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency; or any other government agency.

All scenario times are Washington time.

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INITIAL SCENARIO - PART I

THE WORLD OF 1976

The dawn of 1976 broke on a hopeful world. With few exceptions, international peace had reigned since the end of United States involvement in Vietnam in early 1973. Israel and Egypt had nearly clashed in mid-1973 and though the world had held its breath, the crisis ended with a compromise solution to the Sinai dispute. Southeast Asia simmered, but remained docile under the watchful eyes of the major powers. The multipolar world which emerged in the early seventies -- the United States, the Soviet Empire, the European Community, China and Japan, and the Third World -- apparently had committed itself to military detente and was engaged in peaceful, but fiercely competitive, political and economic rivalry to achieve its goals. Not since the Congress of Vienna had the world enjoyed such outward appearances of peace and accommodation.

In this atmosphere, some statesmen alluded to the growing obsolescence of post-World War II military structures. The weights of balance had changed, they claimed, and so must attitudes which unquestioningly supported the perpetuation of costly security alliances. Facades remained, however, and only a few keen observers could discern that the alliance system of World War II was moribund.

In many nations economic pacts took precedence over military treaties; and, energies once devoted to security were being redirected to commercial competition. The European Economic Community (EEC), numbering 11 regular members and 10 associate states, dominated the trade and monetary transactions of the continent. It not only kept pace with the ambitious goals set for it in the early seventies but also functioned as the stimulus for a growing network of institutions politically European in character. The impetus of the Community added fuel to the drives for economic survival in most other nations of the world. By 1976, this competition produced a vastly complicated, intertwining

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skein of bilateral, multinational and regional enterprises which transcended governments and ideologies.

In the midst of this "new era," few observed the ominous crests lowering on the horizon.

THE INTERVENING YEARS, 1972-1976

The United States.

In his 1973 State of the Union address, President Nixon set the direction for his second term in office by proposing wide ranging, long-term measures to deal with the chronic issues of welfare reform, environmental protection, unemployment, and law and order. He cautioned Americans that these programs would require money, alluding to likely tax increases, and demanded belt tightening within the government itself.

The President's speech was praised by Congress and the nation; however, as the year progressed, it became obvious that his declarations meant many things to many people. Congress shared the President's basic concepts but acted on its own bills, carefully tailored to suit an electorate it would soon face. Opposing any tax increase and responding to the rising popular clamor for military reductions, lawmakers reduced the 1974 Defense Budget to \$74 billion and cut foreign aid by 4 percent.

The Chief Executive berated such actions, but it was clear that the nation, preoccupied with burgeoning domestic crises, supported its legislators. Heedless of the growing fiscal deficit, a restless public applauded Congress and demanded even more action to cure unemployment and to arrest inflation which had grown to an annual rate of 6 percent by the end of 1973.

The New York Times, on January 27, 1974, chastized the protectionist trade and tariff attitudes growing in Congress and lamented, but understood, the antagonistic

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reactions of Europe and the EEC to this creeping retaliation. It pleaded for a more reasoned and cooperative approach to international monetary reform and observed that "political irresponsibility could soon climax in a recession of despair for the United States -- and the world."

This gloomy prediction was underscored as third quarter national and business indicators showed unemployment rising to 6.8 percent and the wholesale price index up by 3 percent. Publicly, government economists blamed the "Indian Summer slump"; but privately, they admitted an international recession was in the making.

In contrast to the disappointments experienced on the domestic scene, the Administration moved quickly, in 1973, to maintain its carefully cultivated momentum in the field of foreign affairs. In short order it was announced that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would be welcomed by the United States into the United Nations and that recognition would soon be extended to Pankow. In late fall, 1973, diplomatic relations were established with the People's Republic of China (PRC), accompanied by a concurrent extension of US/USSR bilateral trade agreements, technological exchanges and the granting of most favored nation status.

Such fast-paced international play allayed some unspoken world anxieties that the United States was becoming increasingly isolationist. But an undercurrent persisted. With Vietnam largely a bitter memory, congressional and domestic pressures forced the Administration to reduce the armed forces to 2,150,000 men. Even though US commitments in Europe were unaffected, most European statesmen nodded their heads knowingly. Only French Minister of Defense, Debre, openly voiced latent European sentiments by noting, "It is inevitable that the United States will soon leave Europe, and Europeans must assume responsibility for themselves. For these reasons, we must act in a concert of peaceful coexistence as Europeans and accommodate both East and West to the extent that it is in the interests of an united Europe."

Sensing a growing challenge to the credibility of its commitments, Washington sought to assuage Allied fears by

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reaffirming US determination to adhere to its security obligations while expanding the role of its European partners in NATO's decisionmaking processes. Included in a series of dramatic announcements, was a public admission by US military spokesmen that the United States is committed to consult with NATO partners prior to selective release and/or employment of nuclear weapons in Europe during wartime -- time and circumstances permitting. As a further concession, the United States reaffirmed that as the structure of Europe changed so would that of NATO. Despite these declarations, Europeans remained doubtful. Their doubts culminated two months later when, at the December Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Ministerials, Moscow announced -- "in the interests of world peace" -- the immediate unilateral withdrawal of three Soviet divisions from East Germany and called upon the United States to likewise reduce its European forces as a "demonstration of good faith and sincerity."

By February, 1974, the Administration, under duress of a euphoric Congress and in the context of a thinly veiled measure to stimulate torpid Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations, announced the initial withdrawal of 60,000 troops from Europe. Government spokesmen privately admitted to their European counterparts that additional cuts might not be far distant if the pressures of an increasingly introspective public continued. By the end of 1975, as predicted, American forces in Europe had been reduced to 150,000 men. In efforts to offset the impact of these moves, Washington emphasized improvements for the remaining forces, expanded REFORGER/CRESTED CAP units, and insisted that the relative strategic parity achieved by SALT I would not be depreciated in the ongoing SALT II talks.

The Soviet Empire.

The Soviet Union was not immune to the forces of change. Under General Secretary Brezhnev, Moscow altered its modus operandi, and, by early 1973, was in the forefront of the drive toward detente, peaceful coexistence, and economic competition.

The Soviet "Charter for Peace in Europe," presented at

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the 1973 CSCE Ministerials, acknowledged the current trend in world affairs and anticipated that problems, hitherto unresolved, could be settled in a framework of negotiations. "Since a lasting peace in Europe demands that all nations adhere to certain basic principles," the Soviet representative declared, "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics takes the first step. It renounces the threat or use of force in Europe; espouses non-intervention in the internal affairs of others; and, acknowledges the right of national self-determination. As proof of its sincerity, the Soviet Union will, immediately, withdraw three Army divisions from the German Democratic Republic (GDR), with the hope that others will follow her example." He concluded, amid cheers, by calling for permanent machinery in the CSCE to work out the preliminaries for an accord in which all Europe would be guaranteed lasting security.

Throughout 1973, the Soviet Union acted as a benign -- even cooperative -- power, and openly advocated expanded relations between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). At the same time, the United States and the USSR contracted extensive bilateral economic commitments, met in MBFR sessions -- but agreed on little except minor confidence building measures --, and pursued SALT II negotiations. At the close of the year, world hopes for peace mounted as Moscow announced new initiatives to lessen tensions with the PRC. In restrained, but positive language, Peking agreed to seek all possible ways to "reconcile past misunderstandings." Early 1974 was set for initial consultations.

Whatever the carefully controlled appearances indicated, all was not well within the Soviet Empire. By 1974, the two-edged sword of detente had caused serious wounds within the Pact. Not unaffected by Western Europe's elation, Eastern Europe cautiously tested the current. Motivated by "consumerism," bilateral economic arrangements with the West and with the Third World grew while discreet forays were made into independent foreign affairs. National identities began to resurface and following the publication of the Soviet "Charter for Peace," Pact nations were partially persuaded that the Soviet Union would tolerate further expansion.

The first test of Moscow's sincerity came in early 1974, when long-subdued nationalist groups called for a reduction of Soviet troops stationed in Poland. Underground newspapers reasoned that "if troops could be removed from the GDR, they could also be withdrawn from Poland." Demonstrations resulting from this movement were widespread but, initially, not serious. The "new age" of Polish freedom, however, seemed doomed from the beginning as press censorship and the activities of the Military Internal Service (WSW) increased following a Kremlin visit by First Secretary Edward Gierek, in February. Anti-Soviet and government activity went underground once again.

Despite international concern over the "Polish problem", the USSR continued to impress the world with its "new image." On April 16th, Borba reported that President Tito had died of a cerebral hemorrhage, and announced that Marko Nikezic had assumed the reins of government. Almost immediately, as expected, Yugoslavia was thrown into bloody factional struggles. The Soviets watched anxiously -- but did not interfere. By mid-May, order had been restored and a pro-West, nationalist-minority, coalition government was firmly entrenched with Nikezic at its head.

The significance of the Polish and Yugoslav incidents was not lost on the Pact countries or Moscow. The attitude of the Soviet Union encouraged both East and West that the Brezhnev Doctrine had been discarded from the Soviet repertoire. But, within the Kremlin, there were individuals who recognized the dangers of tolerance.

As the world economic situation worsened in 1974, the Soviet Empire became restive. By fall, discontent had again surfaced in Poland. Workers demanded higher wages, more foodstuffs, and an end to the increased quotas exacted on industries by CEMA regulations. Unobtrusive assistance by Soviet military police units was required in quelling the most serious violence in Poznan. Other Eastern European nations were not spared similar disturbances. The GDR, hurt seriously by the poor economic situation, was kept busy quieting the increasing demands of its inflation-plagued workers and the ever louder harangues of underground reunification organizations.

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In November 1974, the world indirectly learned of the Kremlin's changing attitudes as Premier Kosygin announced his retirement. He was replaced by Kirill Mazurov -- a long-time critic of Brezhnev policies. Shortly thereafter, Communist Parties throughout the world were informed that the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Republics (CPSU), originally scheduled for 1976, would be held in October 1975.

As though by design, when the 25th CPSU convened, Polish disaffection erupted in a wave of anti-Soviet rioting and terrorism. In a cable of 24 October 1975, the US Ambassador reported that dissident actions were reaching critical proportions, particularly in the northern urban areas, and that the Polish Government was markedly concerned over recent terrorist bombings of Soviet military installations. Describing the situation as serious, the ambassador commented that it posed a grave challenge to Moscow's leadership and control of the Pact countries. In his opinion, the Soviets would react positively in order to preserve their empire. Just six days later, the Evening Star headlined, "Brezhnev resigns, Polyansky Secretary."

Despite its "new look," much of the world regarded the Soviet Empire with uneasy suspicion. Although Moscow had adhered to her SALT I agreements, was negotiating offensive weapons limitations in SALT II, and had removed troops from East Germany, Soviet conventional superiority in Europe had not measurably declined nor had Russia's relative parity in strategic nuclear weapons been altered. In fact, lessening of Sino-Soviet tensions had resulted in a re-deployment of Soviet divisions to positions within easy reinforcement distance of Central Europe.

The Red fleet continued to expand to the point that the 1975 Janes' identified it as "the most powerful and flexible navy in the world." One nuclear-powered aircraft carrier was to be launched in 1976 and was planned to be operational by mid-1977. Bunkering and repair facilities were established worldwide and US strategists decried the maritime facility permitted by the Icelandic Government in Dyra Fjord, following the "Cod Wars" of 1972 and 1973.

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Soviet defense spending rose to an annual rate of 9 percent of the GNP. Spending for strategic and general purpose forces remained at 1972 levels. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds increased significantly each year, and rumors persisted that the Soviets had surreptitiously developed radically new weapons systems of frightening potential -- to include "clean" tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear shells, and an operational Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) system.

The European Community.

Convinced that detente was an increasing reality in the first years of the decade, whereas war was a declining probability, Western Europe devoted itself to economic enhancement and European integration. Accepting the divisions of World War II, Europeans sought a "new Europa."

By late 1972, it did not take a gifted political observer to sense that Western Europeans "expected" reductions of US forces in Europe. Searching for a rationale, Le Monde observed editorially in 1973 that:

Politically, the US presence was divisive; as it decreased, Soviet attitudes became more amenable. Economically, the United States needed European trade no less and with US troops reduced, European governments paid less to assist in offsetting the balance of payments. Militarily, if the United States could not defend Europe conventionally, it would do so with tactical nuclear weapons; in that case, Europe, not America, would be destroyed. But if US troops were reduced to a "hostage-level," war in Europe would, of necessity, escalate to the strategic level; thus, better the two of them than us.

The first fruits of this new outlook appeared in an expanding EEC. The Community's growth had not been without problems, but it had been steady. Individual products still created intra-community antagonism; the common commercial policy for trade with the Pact nations -- signed in 1975 -- was ineffective in halting bilateral arrangements; and, monetary problems still existed. Generally, however, the EEC welded Free Europe together.

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The evolving configuration of an economically oriented Europe presented particular problems to the United States and to the USSR. The United States found itself being cut off from competitive trading with Europe. Protectionist countermeasures implicit in such incidents as the "sugar and cheese" war of 1972 and recalcitrance in the stormy General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) sessions of 1973, served only to congeal European defensiveness, reduce US influence in Europe, and drive the United States into competition for other mutual markets. Soviet Russia, by the same token, once it had swallowed the EEC pill, found it disruptive to CEMA arrangements and a catalyst for nationalist, separatist, and realignment tendencies within the Bloc.

With the entry of Ireland, Denmark, and the UK into the EEC in 1973, a complex, historically predictable order was established in Europe. Joseph Kraft, in his Washington Post column of April 26, described it as "a galactic pecking order, with the FRG, France and the UK at its center, the EEC in the first planetary belt and the rest of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance revolving elsewhere in the gravitational field." "The trouble," he commented, "as with all developing galaxies, is that, eventually, only one sun must provide order to the constellation."

The truth of Mr. Kraft's observation was soon borne out. President Pompidou, sensing an historic opportunity for French leadership, sought European hegemony by taking up the US challenge to seek new meanings for NATO. The first move, following bilateral approaches, was at a Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting in early 1974 where France proposed a reorganization of NATO. Coordination of national forces, nuclear and conventional, rather than integration, was advocated. A two-headed SHAPE was proposed; that is, a European Defense Force Commander and a counterpart US Commander. Though national forces were to be loosely integrated under these commanders, they remained under the ultimate direction of their individual nations. France further urged that a French/UK and US nuclear force be established on the same principle, with the FRG to be included in the FR/UK force in an advisory capacity. As the French explained, "Thus the realities of the European situation would be harmonized without destruction of history's

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greatest alliance." The French proposal was formally submitted for consideration in the spring of 1975 -- without prior coordination with the United States -- at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Ministerial.

Throughout 1975, France continued her "special relations" with the Soviet Union. Acting as the "main link" between the USSR and Europe, particularly in the CSCE, Pompidou sought to realize De Gaulle's vision for France. Relations with the United States were cool, but calculated not to wholly alienate the United States from France -- or Europe -- in spite of increasing politico-economic differences.

The FRG position in the new Europe was unique. Its special relationship with the United States, through NATO, had been severely weakened in 1973 by US diplomatic and economic ventures. Reluctantly, Germany recognized this; however, her position remained uncomfortable.

In order to extricate herself from the dilemma, caused by US withdrawals, and preserve some vestige of the US/FRG special relationship, Germany supported the US rationale that strategic and tactical deterrence was important -- not numbers. At the same time, in the context of a commitment to the European community, Germany indicated her independence from the United States. The Bundeswehr was restructured -- at 1972 levels -- with emphasis on equipment modernization, anti-tank defenses, military terrain improvements, air defense and mobilization. In mid-1975, a new concept of "point resistance" -- defense of vital areas as opposed to extended border defense -- was instituted and the Bundeswehr redeployed primarily to areas surrounding major cities. The defense budget, adjusted for inflation, remained at its 1972 GNP percentage level.

Politically, the FRG accommodated with the East, but German strategy attempted to effect a neutral buffer in Central Europe. By recognizing Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1974, and admitting the existence of the GDR (following the admittance of both states to the United Nations in 1973), Germany was vigorously building a strong link with the east. Although particular emphasis was focused on cooperation with East Germany, which responded with popular

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enthusiasm, the Honecker regime remained wary of the growing closeness of the two nations.

Britain, although formally committed to Europe, found it difficult to abandon its traditional ties with the United States. Characteristically, the Economist observed in June 1974, "Britannia remains at anchor, sails furled, sawing to-and-fro on the tides of the Atlantic." The appraisal was accurate as, for the most part, Britain's venture in Europe was an economic affair.

Militarily, the UK did keep its hand in both Europe and NATO by maintaining its defense budget at 4 percent of the GNP. Though numbers fluctuated, at the end of 1975, British troop commitments in Europe were one and a half divisions. Britain also agreed to consider the French initiative for a French/UK/FRG nuclear force, but awaited a US nod before making a bona fide commitment.

In foreign affairs, London cautiously hoped that the FRG would eventually emerge as the dominant European power, but was careful not to alienate French favor. Preferring to let others deal with the USSR, London concentrated on intra-European affairs, acting, in particular, as Europe's ear to the United States.

Predictably, the actions of the minor powers of free and neutral Europe were governed by those of France and Germany. In general, the Southern Flank aligned itself with France in community matters and foreign affairs, while the Northern Tier, and smaller central states, cast their lots with the FRG. Largely, however, economics and domestic problems engaged their attentions. Since most were swayed by detente to reduce their defense budgets, none of the NATO countries had met their 1970 European Defense Improvement Plan (EDIP) targets by the end of 1975.

As for the Northern Tier -- Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland -- careful political observers noted indications for possible future alarm. A National Intelligence Estimate, entitled, "Nordic Survey 1974," summarized the causes:

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The politico-military importance of the Nordic countries and the northern sea lanes to US security policy has long been undisputed. Although Scandinavians have strong Western leanings, they have generally shown tendencies to "Nordic isolationism" since Norway opted against EEC entry in 1972. This is best exemplified by growing interest in reviving the NORDEK Union. Unsatisfactory EFTA arrangements have added strength to this movement. Norway, Denmark, and Iceland still support NATO, but Norway and Denmark have failed to meet EDIP schedules, and have chronically complained that NATO has neglected their defenses. Iceland, though formally adhering to NATO, has had continuing differences with its members over fishing rights and with the United States over basing rights -- which they have periodically threatened to cancel. Iceland has demonstrated increasing trends toward neutralism and has made known its willingness to "co-operate, impartially, with all peaceful nations." Sweden and Finland have, pragmatically, kept their Western orientation in low profile.

Soviet pressures are not new to the Nordic countries. Indications since mid-year are that a particularly subtle campaign of intimidation has been re-instituted. The Icelandic Government, in return for economic assistance and credits, has acceded to a Soviet request for ship bunkering facilities on its west coast. Finland, which has had to look increasingly to the USSR for economic and technical assistance (failing to achieve fully effective European Free Trade Association (EFTA) solutions), has been forced into closer and more binding ties with CEMA and the Kremlin. The Soviet Union has requested, and been granted, military overflight rights by the Finnish Government. The Norwegian Government has privately complained to the United States that the Soviet Union has expressed concern over intelligence activities in the North Cape area. In addition, the Soviet Union has made claims to Barents Sea oil exploration rights and to perennially disputed claims in the Svalbards.

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The Far East.

China and Japan dominated the Far East during 1972-1976. The new power center, created by President Nixon's "shocks and summitry of '72," burgeoned rapidly. Japan possessed economic power and military potential, while China garnered military power and economic potential. Necessity, therefore, compelled a modus vivendi which dictated mutual cooperation for the development of Asia.

By the end of 1975, Japan was the number two economic power of the world with an adjusted defense budget two and a half times the 1972 level. China, on the other hand, preferred to concentrate on domestic and economic development and, for the most part, qualitative defense spending.

Within Asia, there was rapid adjustment to the new order. Following Japan's abrogation of the Taiwan Treaty, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek resigned and turned the government over to his son, Chiang Ching Kuo. Tradition was assuaged by suitable recriminations and Taiwan quietly eased into the stream of economic competition and international cooperation. By the end of 1973, Japan had signed a peace treaty with the USSR.

The two Koreas had agreed to cooperative arrangements leading to eventual confederation; in fact, both were admitted to the UN in 1974. China, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and both Koreas entered into an "Asian economic development association" in 1975. Australia, Taiwan, Burma, and the Republic of Vietnam were expected to enter by the end of 1976.

Asian foreign affairs were largely those of Chinese and Japanese making and predominantly of an economic nature. Japan cultivated markets throughout the world with particular attention directed to the United States and the USSR. The former was to ensure that Japan remained a member-in-good standing of the US security commitments; the latter was insurance against the Chinese. While consultations conducted throughout 1974 and 1975 did not result in dramatic changes between the two giants, the resultant atmosphere brought about a relaxation of tensions throughout the Far East.

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The Third World.

Egypt and Israel continued their dispute, occasionally coming to the brink of armed hostility. Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Yemen, Oman, and South Africa experienced internal wars or rebellions. In each case, the major powers isolated or ignored the crises, leaving the individual states to settle their own disputes.

Though the aura of detente extended to military engagement, no holds were barred in economic enterprises. The lesser developed Third World was flooded with proposals for developmental assistance in exchange for trade in resources. Competition for allegiance to the United States, USSR, China or Europe was keen, but never firmly won. The Third World had learned that it could enjoy the best of all worlds by overcommitment to none.

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CHRONOLOGY

INITIAL SCENARIO - PART I

JANUARY 1973: EEC expanded to include Ireland, Denmark and the UK.

MARCH 1973: US announces willingness to admit GDR to UN.
US announces intention to recognize GDR.
MBFR preliminary meetings convene.

SEPTEMBER 1973: US grants MFN to USSR.
US defense budget/foreign aid cut.
US recognizes PRC.

OCTOBER 1973: Chiang Ching Kuo assumes ROC leadership.
FRG and GDR admitted to UN.

NOVEMBER 1973: US armed forces reduced to 2,150,000 men.
US announces NATO consultation agreement.
Russo-Japanese peace treaty.

DECEMBER 1973: CSCE Ministerials; Soviet "Charter for Peace".
USSR announces withdrawal of 3 divisions from GDR.
Permanent CSCE committees established.
US inflation 6 percent per annum.
USSR initiates consultations with PRC.

FEBRUARY 1974: US announces withdrawal of 60,000 troops from Europe.

MARCH 1974: USSR/PRC consultations begin.
French propose NATO reorganization.
Polish demonstrate for USSR troop withdrawals.
President Gierek visits Moscow.

APRIL 1974: Tito dies; Njkezic assumes government.

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MAY 1974: Iceland allows USSR bunkering rights.

SEPTEMBER 1974: World economic situation deteriorates.
Pact unrest grows; Polish demonstrate.
US unemployment 6.8 percent; recessionary atmosphere.

OCTOBER 1974: Two Koreas enter UN.

NOVEMBER 1974: Mazurov replaces Kosygin.

MAY 1975: French present NATO reorganization proposal to NAC.

JULY 1975: German defense reorganization.

OCTOBER 1975: EEC common commercial policy for trade with Pact signed.
25th CPSU convenes; Polish rioting.
Polyansky replaces Brezhnev.

DECEMBER 1975: US troops in Europe number 150,000.

FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 102

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. I

GREEN

DTG 200400 MAY 76

INITIAL SCENARIO - PART II

The situation described in this scenario is hypothetical and is intended to provoke thought and to stimulate discussion. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency; or any other government agency.

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INITIAL SCENARIO - PART II

PORTENTS OF DISASTER

JANUARY 1976

The gravity of Poland's internal situation increased. Rioting, strikes, and terrorism were widespread with the most serious incidents occurring in the urban centers and areas surrounding Gdansk, Warsaw, Stettin, and Poznan. Unconfirmed reports indicated that First Secretary Gierek had urgently requested Soviet troops as reinforcements for the Polish Army, if that organization was incapable of restoring order. On 23 January 1976, US intelligence confirmed that secret alert orders were being issued to Soviet commanders in Eastern Europe and the Russian Western Military Districts.

Polish Army units were dispatched to Gdynia and Gdansk during the last week of January to quell the most serious disorders. Their arrival touched off increased violence and prompted the dispatch of three additional Soviet divisions to Warsaw. Concurrently, intelligence sources reported the massing of large numbers of Soviet troops along the Russo-Polish border and the arrival of a Baltic Fleet naval task group in the Bay of Danzig.

Despite these warning Soviet gestures, resistance activities throughout Poland increased and the nation teetered on the brink of open insurrection. By the end of March, five more Soviet divisions from the Northern Zone of East Germany had crossed the Oder River and taken up positions in the West-Central and Northwestern areas of the nation.

The harsh settlement of the Polish insurrection became the subject of international concern as its borders were sealed and the flow of news ceased. Anger over Moscow's reported "Cossack tactics" led to anti-Russian demonstrations in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and most Western

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European capitals. Large-scale sympathy strikes erupted throughout the GDR with particular virulence in Rostock, Guestrow, and Schwerin.

As the situation in the GDR worsened, Secretary Honecker appealed for order in the Northern Laender and deplored the subversion of the militants. Accompanying his entreaties, GDR army units were placed on full alert and diverted to the most troubled areas to assist police units. Concurrently, a vitriolic press campaign was instituted in which blame for the unrest was placed upon the revanchist and subversive activities of the FRG. Honecker warned of severe penalties for terrorists and alluded to possible travel and commerce restrictions between the GDR and FRG unless Bonn terminated its "blatant attempts to undermine the People's Democratic Republic."

Honecker's increasingly repressive measures were unsuccessful in stemming the rising tide of violence. The April 4th issue of the East German underground newspaper, Der Angriff, reported that a "liberation bomb squad" had attacked the Soviet airbase at Putnitz -- 15 miles outside Rostok -- resulting in damage and the death of four Russian officers. Der Angriff cited Soviet charges that the GDR's 8th Infantry Division had failed to provide adequate security for the base. Four members of the bomb squad, who had been captured, were hailed as "heroes" and a general strike was called in tribute to their sacrifices.

On 26 April, the date set for the strike in Rostok, the 8th Infantry Division, under a new commander, was again assigned to maintain order and to return workers to their jobs. When faced with the necessity of using force against their countrymen, however, large numbers of soldiers refused to carry out orders. Hastily formed companies of Soviet airmen were used as replacements to assist the remaining loyal GDR troops and police.

By the end of April, Moscow had lost faith in Honecker's ability to maintain internal order and the mutinous conduct of the 8th Division raised serious doubts as to the "political dedication" of the East German Army. Accordingly, with the Polish situation temporarily under control, two Soviet divisions (earlier moved from the GDR) were returned

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to Neustrelitz and Schwerin, while an additional division was deployed to the Putnitz area. The Soviet naval task group in the Bay of Danzig was reported to be under way for Rostock, and "usually reliable" sources stated that other forces were being readied in the USSR for movement to East Germany.

On 3 May, White House intelligence briefers painted a bleak picture. The US Ambassador to Moscow reported almost continuous Politburo meetings and a major increase of military activity throughout the country. In addition to 15 Soviet divisions already located in the GDR, six more were being readied for movement to that beleaguered nation and Exercise OKEAN, slated to commence in the Norwegian Sea on 19 May, had been rescheduled for 10 May. Rumors had reached the Embassy that the Soviet Foreign Minister had requested permission from the Finnish Government to conduct maneuvers in the Lake Inari region. AMEMB Oslo confirmed the rumor and added that the Finnish Ambassador to Norway had stated his government had no choice but to grant permission. In addition, the Oslo report noted that the Norwegian Prime Minister had informed the US Ambassador that a Soviet note to the Norwegian Government "requested" a shutdown of the radar sites at Vardo, Mageroy, and Berlevaag during OKEAN -- to preclude interference with shipboard navigational systems. The somber briefing concluded with a quote from the Norwegian Ambassador's report: "Moscow's request, coming on the heels of the unexpected presence of Soviet troops in Finland, has caused serious apprehension within the government and created widespread popular anxiety over Soviet intentions."

Feverish activity in the East, and fretful anxiety in the West, marked the next two weeks. Reports from Finland and Norway confirmed that two divisions of a Soviet Army had crossed into Finland and were maneuvering in the Ivalo/Kaamanen area. On 10 May, OKEAN units departed ports in the Baltic, Barents, and Black Seas and by 12 May, six Soviet divisions had redeployed to the northern GDR. Unconfirmed intelligence rumored other troop movements within the USSR.

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Accompanying these dramatic events, Honecker declared a state of national emergency. All inter-Germany travel was suspended; vehicular traffic from Berlin was monitored -- and slowed --, air traffic into Berlin noted a marked increase in "escorts," and some pilots reported periodic jamming of radios and radars. In daily press releases and official communiques, Moscow reiterated that its primary concern was the internal stability of Poland and the GDR -- and the safety of Soviet lives and property. While Western officials hoped that this was true, continued Soviet troop movements toward the GDR border were not reassuring and precautions were taken. On 14 May, as a result of NAC meetings the previous week, SACEUR declared a state of Military Vigilance.

Early on 18 May, Bundeswehr border patrols observed increases in the numbers of refugees in the Luebeck frontier area. Interrogation of one escapee revealed large-scale Soviet involvement in GDR attempts to crush the rebellion. A clandestine East German radio station announced that during the trials of the "Putnitz Bombers," an attempt had been made to free the prisoners and that Soviet guards had randomly fired into East German crowds. The broadcast further reported that "battalions" of East German troops and police were engaged in pitched battles with Soviet troops. Later, the same day, Bonn received word that hundreds of fleeing refugees and East German troops were attempting to cross the border into the FRG near Luebeck. Soviet and loyal GDR army units were reported in hot pursuit. Subsequent communiques indicated that FRG border units, ignoring standing orders, had crossed the frontier in several locations to assist wounded refugees in making their way to the border. Major General Ernst Streicher, Commander of the FRG 6th Armored Infantry Division, was ordered to move his division to the Luebeck area and take charge of the situation.

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THE CRISIS

By evening of the 19th, The Sixth Division closed into positions along the frontier and established headquarters five kilometers southeast of Luebeck. Shortly thereafter, Division headquarters was notified that Soviet forces had sealed the border and that civilian refugees, FRG border police, and deserting GDR troops were being "slaughtered" as they tried to escape. Appalled by reports of "unrestrained and barbaric Soviet massacre of fellow Germans," a battalion of the division crossed the frontier to assist the refugees. Although temporarily surprised by the move, Soviet units quickly reacted by counterattacking and surrounding the relief column. By 2200 hours, communications with the battalion were lost.

During the early morning hours of 20 May, Washington's worst fears over the deteriorating European scene were realized. A FLASH message from Bonn reported that, despite orders to the contrary, major elements of the 6th FRG Armored Infantry Division had crossed the GDR border near Stronau and penetrated to a depth of six kilometers to establish an "escape corridor for their brothers to flee the Soviet terror." Within hours a follow-up message revealed that these elements had been surrounded by Soviet units and that the remainder of the 6th FRG Division was committed in an attempt to extricate them.

While Washington officials contemplated the awesome implications of the FRG's move, messages from Norway and Denmark deepened the growing fears of impending disaster.

Following inconclusive queries on the Hot Line to clarify Moscow's intentions, President Nixon called a meeting of the National Security Council for 0400 hours. As meeting time approached, Washington officials anxiously scanned incoming reports for information upon which to base recommendations to the President.

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American Embassy, Bonn, 200010 MAY 76.

The Luebeck incident is out of hand. Unauthorized border crossing by Bundeswehr has resulted in serious encounter with Soviet troops. Soviet Ambassador has told Barzel that this is overt act of war; he demands immediate cease fire and surrender of FRG troops engaged in GDR and no further assistance to GDR army rebels or civilian refugees. Barzel is alarmed. He has repeated an order to 6th Division Commander to withdraw immediately but, to date, no answer. Soviet Ambassador informed of this. At same time, Barzel has ordered an armored division to Luebeck area for contingency support while tactical air units at Husum have been placed on alert. I have just received report that the 6th Division is being severely mauled and is attempting to retire to the border in company with large numbers of GDR troops who have joined them against Soviets.

Comment: Situation is extremely grave. If Soviets do not believe Barzel's protestations, they may act irrationally -- even to the point of pursuing FRG troops across the frontier. As a result of the widely distributed reports of Soviet brutality in the GDR and Poland, I also have some doubts that FRG Army can be completely restrained, if this situation is not resolved quickly. The atmosphere within military circles here is electric. I have advised Soviet Ambassador that this incident must be kept in perspective and must not lead to impulsive reactions on either side. Urgently request further instructions.

American Embassy, Moscow, 200030 MAY 76.

I have just returned from a scathing meeting with Polyansky. He curtly informed me that an FRG division has crossed into the GDR in support of rebellious East German military units and that FRG and GDR troops are now fully engaged against Soviet forces. He demanded that I make clear the Soviet position and asserted that the action of the FRG has created an intolerable situation for the security of the GDR and the Soviet Union. He bluntly stated, that in his opinion, he did not feel that the "Bonn Fascists" would stop in this attempt to reunite the two Germanies and that this action left the USSR no choice but

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to assist the GDR. When I attempted to explain that the FRG incursion had been undertaken without the sanction of the Bonn Government, he cut me off sharply and stated that the FRG action constituted a "clear" act of aggression against a sovereign member of the Warsaw Pact. Though this matter could easily lead to war throughout Europe, Polyansky stressed that it was a situation created by the FRG and should not involve the rest of Europe, NATO, or the United States.

Comment: I have the impression that Soviets know FRG incident can be handled without war but I am not sure that they want to -- if the crunch can be limited to FRG. I admonished Polyansky that an immediate cease-fire is in order so that situation can be sorted out and settled amicably. He replied that he would agree to cease-fire, but only if FRG/GDR combatants unconditionally surrender. Information here indicates that full mobilization might be put into effect. Request guidance.

American Embassy, Oslo, 200100 MAY 76.

Prime Minister is in receipt of a protest from Moscow warning that the surveillance sites at Vardo, Mageroy, and Berlevaag are creating serious navigational interferences for Soviet ships and hampering the safe and unmo-
lested conduct of forces engaged in legitimate exercises. While still in consultation, PM received further information that Soviet units are proceeding toward Norwegian border in areas of Karasjok, Norway, and Utsjoki, Finland.

Comment: I do not believe that USSR will invade Norway unless it feels a full-scale conflict is in the making; however, my information is scant. PM ties Soviet move with FRG problem and is contemplating mobilization. He called for immediate NATO reassurances of support in the event of an overt Soviet move against Norway, and warned that if these assurances were not forthcoming, "Norway might be better in an uncommitted position." I believe that PM is serious about this. He is meeting with Ambassadors from Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in four hours. Request immediate guidance.

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American Embassy, Copenhagen, 200130 MAY 76.

Danish Government is in receipt of Soviet note protesting electronic activity on Bornholm Island. Fonmin has told me Denmark will not reply to Soviet note pending consultation with Norway, Finland, and Sweden; and, pending discussion of the matter in the NAC. Request instructions.

USNATO, 200200 MAY 76.

FRG has requested immediate NAC meeting. German and Nordic situations have created utmost consternation. Sentiment is overwhelmingly pessimistic. FRG is being branded as culprit and I have heard talk that some allies are ill-disposed to support her in this critical confrontation. Consensus on Norway and Denmark situation is that protests are a Soviet move to divert attention from center. Request guidance re USG position both issues.

It is now 200400 May 1976.

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CHRONOLOGY

INITIAL SCENARIO - PART II

JANUARY 1976: Polish uprisings intensify.
Soviet eastern European/Western Military District Commanders put on alert.
Polish Army units dispatched to Gdynia/Gdansk.
Soviet Naval Task Group moves to Bay of Danzig.

MARCH 1976: Five Soviet Divisions move from GDR to Poland.
Poland sealed off.
Sympathy strikes/demonstrations in GDR.

APRIL 1976: GDR dissension increases.
GDR Army units placed on full alert.
Soviet installation at Putnitz bombed by terrorists.
General strike in Rostok: GDR military units refuse to obey orders.
Three Soviet divisions deployed to GDR.
Soviet Task Group in Bay of Danzig moved to Rostok.

MAY 1976:

- 3 May - Soviets "request" shutdown of Norwegian radar sites.
- 10 May - Exercise OKEAN commences.
- 12 May - Six additional Soviet divisions deploy to GDR.
- 13 May - All inter-Germany communication ceases.
- 14 May - SACEUR declares state of Military Vigilance.
- 18 May - GDR military/police clash with Soviet Army units.
- 18 May - FRG border guards cross GDR frontier to assist fleeing refugees.
- 19 May - GDR border sealed.

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19 May - FRG 6th Division attempts to open GDR
border to assist refugees.
20 May - Soviets protest activity of Norwegian/
Danish surveillance sites.
20 May - Soviets demand FRG cease-fire.
20 May - President Nixon calls emergency NSC
meeting.

FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO. 101
TO CONTROL MOVE NO. I
REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102 DTG 200400 MAY 76

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.

a. US and NATO objectives are to contain the situation, restore the status quo and hold the Alliance together. There is some uncertainty as to FRG/Soviet motivations and objectives, but:

(1) Assume the FRG is not attempting reunification. Assume also the FRG 6th Division is out of hand, and the FRG is really trying to get the situation back under control.

(2) Assume no clear Soviet offensive intentions; moves are essentially reactive and defensive; tentative initial assumption is that Soviets wish to reestablish the status quo -- however, there is considerable uncertainty on latter point.

2. Implications to US.

a. A real danger of war exists, even though it is improbable from the evidence so far that the Soviets have a clearly aggressive intent.

b. A serious challenge -- at least politically -- is presented to NATO and we consider that NATO continues to be important to US interests. If Germany and Northern Flank countries, particularly, feel abandoned, the entire NATO structure could face disintegration.

3. US Domestic Reaction.

a. Assuming the situation has resulted from one FRG division going berserk, there would be little support in any quarter for US military action.

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b. Assuming this is simply a quarrel between the two Germanies, the probable reaction will be "a plague on both your houses" -- the US is too much involved in domestic problems to intervene. Anticipating that Soviet moves will be simply defensive, the US public would probably be as relaxed about suppressing rebellion in East Germany as it was in the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

c. Finally, assuming that this is not a crisis generated through inadvertence, but rather Soviet aggression motivated by their desire to destroy NATO, the American public would certainly be more concerned and would support stronger reaction.

4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.

a. There is general agreement that the situation was brought on by the unauthorized action of German Sixth Division.

b. The assumption at this point is that Soviet moves are defensive and rational, but there are ominous signs in the north.

c. A principal Soviet objective may be to isolate the FRG.

d. Certain prudent alert measures are in order -- stopping short of provocative moves.

e. The US position will set pace for the rest of NATO.

OBJECTIVES

1. Short Range.

a. Urge the USSR to do everything necessary to keep the situation contained, stressing that the FRG Sixth Division activity is unsanctioned.

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b. Make clear that NATO is prepared, for its part, to do what is required to keep situation under control.

c. Seek clarification of Soviet intentions.

d. Reassure Norway and Denmark of our intention to live up to our NATO obligations, including military support in the event of aggression.

e. Prepare to react militarily if we find that the USSR has wider objectives, without yet moving new forces to Europe.

f. Explain to the US public that the incident appears to be local but that it may be more and that US may have to respond militarily if Soviets strive to take advantage of the situation.

g. Avoid a world war and do what we can within NATO framework to achieve this end.

h. Permit acceptable courses of disengagement open to both sides.

2. Long Range.

a. Continue to deny domination of Europe by the USSR.

b. Regard a strong NATO as an essential instrument in this objective and deter war in Europe.

c. Deplore the continued USSR repressive moves in Eastern Europe. After the current situation is resolved, initiate political and economic actions vis-a-vis the USSR designed to induce it to adjust its repressive policies and allow self-determination by Eastern European nations.

d. Continue most-favored-nation relationship with the US dependent upon Soviet abandonment of military supported repression.

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STRATEGY

Our strategy is fourfold:

1. We will move quickly and clearly but in an obviously restrained manner to achieve our principal short-range objective, i.e., contain the confrontation between the USSR and the FRG in the Luebeck area.
2. Consequently, we must leave acceptable courses of action open both to the USSR and to the FRG.
3. Simultaneously, we will take positive steps to support the Northern Flank as a separate but related issue to the central confrontation on the FRG/GDR border.
4. In carrying out this strategy, we will attempt to convince the USSR that they cannot isolate the FRG from its Allies.

SPECIFIC MOVES

1. Political.

a. Send our Ambassador to deliver to the USSR Chief of State a Presidential letter giving the USG assessment that the situation is local and should be treated accordingly. We will emphasize to the Soviets that the whole texture of US-USSR relations -- economic -- political -- would be jeopardized by continuation or worsening of the present situation. Inform Soviets that continued military moves and reinforcements on their part will make it inevitable that NATO will do the same and lead to escalation of the crisis.

b. Have our Ambassador tell FRG that we recognize the situation has gotten out of hand and that we stand behind their effort to bring matter under control. We assume FRG

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already has directed FRG troops to stand down and they have so informed the USSR.

c. Discuss situation with NATO -- give them whole scenario and tell them what we think should be done to confine the situation. Get agreement on course of action.

d. In NATO, and bilaterally, tell Norway and Denmark of our assessment and provide reassurances that we support them in not making concessions regarding radar sites.

e. Give Eastern European countries our assessment and obtain theirs as well as Yugoslavia's and Finland's -- compel them to think what their courses of action should be.

f. Tell PRC what we have told USSR and seek PRC views on the situation.

g. Inform UN through our UN Ambassador about our perception of the situation (for info only, not for action).

h. Have every US Ambassador advise the foreign office how we assess the situation and what course of action we have or are taking. (Purpose of notifying and keeping all these other nations informed is to avoid any action on their part which would complicate situation -- and to solicit their efforts in cooling the situation -- if necessary.)

i. Tell USSR that we have discussed situation with FRG. FRG is ordering cease-fire and FRG troops in GDR should be turned over for immediate repatriation.

j. We have asked Soviets that the OKEAN exercise be curtailed -- stopped -- and that reinforcement of ground forces be halted as evidence of a Soviet desire to keep situation contained.

2. Military.

a. We will take the following actions at once:

(1) Alert REFORGER forces in CONUS, assemble aircraft, increase fleet operational readiness, raise alert level of air defense and strategic forces.

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- (2) Increase intelligence collection efforts.
- (3) Assure adequate monitoring of OKEAN.
- (4) Recommend NATO forces move to stage of Simple Alert.
- (5) Recommend NATO assemble ACE mobile force for possible deployment to Norway.

b. Allow 24 hours for Soviet response to Presidential letter delivered by our Ambassador in Moscow. If response is unsatisfactory, take such other actions as are consistent with bringing US and NATO forces to a higher level of readiness, e.g.:

- (1) Move available US forces to Europe to fill out divisions.
- (2) Improve readiness and posture of all US ground, air and naval units (short of mobilization).
- (3) Be prepared to implement higher levels of NATO alert if required.
- (4) Depending upon nature of evolving confrontation, consider higher DEFCON level.

CONTINGENCIES

Actions by Others.

1. If our assessment is correct, and Soviets seek opportunity to destroy alliance and to extend hegemony over FRG.

Actions by US.

1. Maximize alert condition of forces. Move forces from CONUS to Europe. Apply economic sanctions to Soviets.

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Actions by Others.

2. If Danes and Norwegians give in to Soviet demands.
3. If our assessments are correct but Soviets respond in ways to maximize discomfort to alliance, split alliance, etc.
4. If FRG troop disaffection spreads.
5. If FRG overtly or covertly supports action of rebellious forces.
6. If East European uprising spreads.

Actions by US.

2. Take whatever unilateral military action is necessary to deter Soviet attack or occupation of these countries.
3. We reject Soviet demands. (Sharp division of view within team as to degree of domestic support for continued support of NATO in these circumstances.)
4. Cooperate with other NATO members, including FRG, to get FRG rebels under control (seizing ammo, supplies, etc.)
5. Cut off supplies and support to FRG forces. Propose plan to Soviets to neutralize Germany. If Soviets refuse, use force to prevent Soviet military conquest of West Germany. (Serious question whether US and domestic support could be gained for this course of action given genesis of fighting, i.e., FRG initiative.)
6. US should be prepared to provide all possible moral and economic support for East European populations, short of direct use of US military forces unless this

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Actions by Others.

Actions by US.

could be done with high probability of success, i.e., avoidance of war with Soviets.

(Question raised as to whether, given wide magnitude of uprising, US position could or should be so contained.)

DISSENTING OPINION

Ref.: Blue ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, US Domestic Reaction, paragraphs 3a and 3b.

If presented properly as a temporary difficulty which we are trying to contain and solve quickly, it should be possible to obtain US public support for the modest measures we are proposing.

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FROM GREEN

MESSAGE NO. 101

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102

DTG 200400 MAY 76

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.

a. Soviet Long Range Objectives.

(1) Extend hegemony in Europe -- whenever possible through Finlandization and neutralization, and extend influence throughout the rest of the world.

(2) Remove NATO as an obstacle to the pursuit of the above interests.

(3) Maintain the power base currently jeopardized by events in Poland and East Germany.

(4) Eliminate the threat of Pan-Germanism.

b. Soviet Motivations.

(1) Unrest in Eastern Europe obliges USSR to take military action to deal with serious internal security situation.

(2) Spontaneous action by FRG troops engages USSR in direct action against FRG troops which have entered GDR.

(3) Soviet intentions unclear in that they may be interested only in maintaining status quo in their area of influence, or, they may feel required to destroy FRG.

2. Implications to US.

The US has an enormous stake in the evolving situation.

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There may be a rapidly developing direct military threat against the US, e.g., the Soviet request for shutdown of Norwegian radar sites and other moves in the northern zone. Soviet intentions are unclear and further information is urgently needed. In any case, there is a most serious indirect threat. We want a gradual evolution in Central and Eastern Europe, which we envision over a period of time, perhaps a generation, but 1976 is too soon to force events. We still must support the existence of two Germanies. Given our internal and world situation -- and the present set of circumstances -- it is both untimely and unwise to force an exploitation of Soviet difficulties now. We must maintain the integrity of Norway, Denmark -- and of NATO. We must not allow the Soviets to maneuver West Germany out of NATO and "Finlandize" Europe. The Soviets must be reassured insofar as their sense of security and interests in Eastern Europe are concerned. The current situation must be recognized as a test of our commitment to the defense of Western Europe and of the protection of US military units in Europe. We must avoid a resulting unfavorable security tilt against the US and we should eschew setting in train a chain of events leading inevitably to a major military and, perhaps, nuclear confrontation.

3. US Domestic Reaction.

The mood of the country is assessed as nervous, fearful, and uncertain. A full spectrum of opinion is being expressed in strident, emotional terms in Congress and the communications media. The stock market, already depressed by unfavorable economic news, takes a further nosedive. On the eve of bicentennial celebrations and quadrennial political conventions, the need for strong decisive leadership is called for from all quarters. Some say to ignore Europe and its problems while others contend that we cannot retreat from our commitments to NATO and Western Europe without a collapse of the entire structure for peace in the world. All eyes will be on Washington -- what will the President do? And can an anxious, divided country be united to support him in his decisions?

4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.

Within NATO, the crisis is assessed as deeply threatening to vital allied interests relating to NATO territorial

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integrity, to a stable peace, and to the continuation of the process of detente and the development of a web of improved relationships between the Communist nations and the West. There is consensus that failure to prevent Soviet invasion of West Germany would be fatally damaging to the solidarity and continued existence of the NATO Alliance.

At the same time, the feeling is strong that detente must be achieved through peaceful means, and strong opposition exists to being drawn into armed conflict connected with the unrest in East Germany and Poland.

There is, also, a strong sense of condemnation of the Soviets for the failures on their part which have resulted in the eruption of this crisis.

While there is sympathy with the deep emotions being felt in West Germany, there is a strong consensus that West Germany should withdraw its forces from East Germany and re-establish border control.

Although there is concern over the reduced level of NATO military capabilities resulting from the reductions of the past few years, there is a feeling that the Soviets must still respect NATO's ability to exact a significant "price of admission" in case of Soviet attack, and also should recognize the uncertainties and the risks of further escalation to all-out war that would inescapably attend any outbreak of NATO-Soviet hostilities. Several of the nations stated that they were taking measures to improve the readiness and combat-effectiveness of their forces.

There is agreement within NATO that active, high-level communications should be undertaken with the Soviets, conveying to them the following:

- NATO stands behind the Norwegian and Danish Governments in refusing to accede to Soviet demands to close down the surveillance radar sites. The Soviets are warned that any military threat or action against either of these countries will bring them immediately into conflict with NATO as a whole.

- The conflict in the border area around Lubeck should be brought to a halt immediately. On their side, the

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Soviets, in dealing with the unrest that is occurring, should limit themselves to methods which do not involve widespread bloodshed. On the NATO side, efforts must be made to achieve the earliest possible withdrawal of West German military forces now in East Germany and to reestablish control of the border.

- The NATO nations retain their strong interest in preserving and continuing to extend the improved relationships that have been developing with the Soviet Union. The gains that have been made must not be lost to the present crisis.

OBJECTIVES

1. Short Range.

a. Reestablish SACEUR's control over West German forces and effect removal of those FRG forces presently engaged in the GDR.

b. Maintain the territorial integrity of NATO -- preferably by peaceful means.

2. Long Range.

a. Restore the era of negotiation and detente thereby creating an environment in which this type of crisis is unlikely to occur.

b. Promote a gradual evolution of independence within East European countries on a peaceful basis.

c. Toward "b," seek resolution by the Soviets of the underlying issues in East Europe which brought about this crisis.

d. Create a growing web of common interests between the Soviet world and the Western World, in order to reduce the prospects that such a crisis could occur in the future.

D4

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e. Maintain balance of power -- US, Europe, USSR, Japan and China.

STRATEGY

Diplomatic.

1. With Soviets:

a. Seek to continue policies of beneficial change as in arms control and economic relations, consistent with CSCE obligations and those of SALT II and MBFR.

b. Regard move in Norway as a grave threat to US and NATO and a departure from the foregoing era of negotiations. The Soviets should withdraw request to shut down the surveillance radars.

c. Assure the USSR that NATO has no intention of intervening or upsetting status quo in Eastern Europe.

d. Request the USSR to exercise full control over their forces and those of GDR.

e. Assure Moscow that we will restrain West Germans and return FRG forces to full control of SACEUR.

f. Inform the Soviets that they must not threaten peace of world; that we will honor our commitments and that they must control Eastern Europeans in a way so as not to evoke such emotional reactions in the FRG.

2. With NATO: Reaffirm basic commitments.

3. With Red China:

a. Convince Peking that situation is dangerous.

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b. Ask Chinese Communists to tell Soviets that they would consider imbalance of power in Europe as a threat to Red China.

4. With UK and France:

a. Determine their positions and coordinate.

b. Ascertain views of France regarding events in FRG. What diplomatic approaches will France make to USSR? Will France consider any Soviet move against West Germany as a threat to France?

c. Attempt to concert a joint US-UK-French-FRG position.

d. Also reassure smaller NATO countries and try to get their acceptance of US, UK, French positions.

5. In US:

a. Alert people to serious situation.

b. Reaffirm solidarity of Atlantic Alliance.

c. Downplay economic difficulties with Europeans.

Military. Discreetly increase alert status while reassuring Soviets we are not threatening -- allow Soviets margin of operations; don't threaten escalation and don't force them "to the wall."

SPECIFIC MOVES

1. Political.

a. All ambassadors to our NATO allies will inform host governments of our strong commitment to NATO, a Free Europe,

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and our determination to stand by them and West Germany. Without this continuing reassurance, some of our allies (especially in the North) might move closer to "Finlandization" or attempt a deal with the Soviets while there is still time -- assuming that the US will not protect them following frictions of the trade wars of 1973-76, and CSCE I, II, III.

b. Call on our Ambassador to France to urge the French to rejoin the NATO Military Committee and to permit US use of the French LOC.

c. Hot Line: Notify Polyansky of our determination to stand by West Germany west of the Iron Curtain, and to make every effort leading to the withdrawal of the German division from the GDR.

d. Secretary of State will contact Soviet Ambassador and inform him of same. Threaten also to break off CSCE, SALT talks, return troops to Europe, etc.

e. Inform China of our intentions.

f. Keep subject out of UN for the time being so as to preclude the precipitous formation of hardened positions.

2. Military.

a. Order immediate increased intelligence collection effort not only against Soviet forces but also against Soviet homeland in order to ascertain order of magnitude Soviets seem prepared to exert in present situation.

b. Alert discreetly, and in non-provocative manner, Strategic Air and Naval Strike Forces as well as forces of US Readiness Command. Open military talks with French on possibility of using LOC facilities across France during such a crisis.

c. Have SACEUR prepare and alert non-German units for possible move to Lubeck area to interpose them between Soviets and Germans. (West Germans and defecting East Germans.)

d. As an alternative to interposition of non-German troops, consider use of Third World or Latin American forces.

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e. Prepare NATO-committed Air and Naval Forces in US for movement to Europe.

f. Study possible later withdrawal of units of FRG Army from immediate contact with GDR border and replacement in such positions by non-German forces.

g. Recommend SACLANT position forces vicinity of Norway.

h. Recommend SACEUR move AMF forces to Norway.

i. Consider move of certain USAFE forces to Norway under bilateral arrangements.

j. Recommend NAC consider implementing certain Simple Alert measures, possibly all.

k. Start "filling out" US units in Europe and readying forces to open up LOCs.

l. Do not put selected SAC units in orbit at this time.

3. Economic.

No immediate overt economic moves. Initiate internal review of oil situation (particularly security of North Sea sources), stockpiling, trade situations vis-a-vis USSR.

4. Psychological.

Speech by President or Secretary of State "pouring oil on troubled waters" and calling on German and Soviet Governments to restore situation peacefully. Have US media and Radio Free Europe (RFE) publicize above speech heavily.

5. Other.

Persuade Japanese and Chinese Governments to make statements along lines of US position.

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CONTINGENCIES

Actions by Others.

If USSR:

1. Directs full mobilization of Warsaw Pact forces (including strategic) and deploys naval units to "battle area."

2. Assuming FRG's inability to restrain elements of the Bundeswehr from crossing into East Germany, announces that it considers this action as an invasion and a clear move by German Fascists toward German reunification and that it will take necessary action against FRG to prevent reunification.

Actions by US.

We will:

1a. Place US forces on full alert, deploy augmentation forces to Europe, deploy naval forces.

b. Recommend NATO declare higher state of alert for ACE and LANT units.

c. Keep all diplomatic channels open fully to prevent misinterpretation or miscalculation.

2. In this event we will:

a. Exert strongest possible representation at every level (political and military) to FRG and Bundeswehr of need for withdrawal from GDR and placement of all military units under control of SACEUR.

b. Deploy augmentation forces (implicit in this action is an increased capability to help control dissident Bundeswehr units).

c. Announce to FRG we intend to withdraw direct support to Bundeswehr unless they can immediately restrain/regain control

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Actions by Others.

3. Introduces major elements of Soviet and GDR forces into West Germany in "hot pursuit" in order to "punish an aggressive FRG".

4. Destroys Norwegian and/or Danish surveillance stations.

5. And/or GDR take actions which have direct impact on US forces but fall short of actual military attack (most probable would be blockade of Berlin).

Actions by US.

over dissident elements (e.g., withdrawal of nuclear weapons from FRG military units).

3. We announce our intention of not standing by while Warsaw Pact forces invade NATO territory. US forces are placed on full alert and augmentation of European units is accelerated. Strongly recommend to NATO that all ACE and LANT forces be placed on General Alert. Provide direct support of Bundeswehr forces that are under the control of SACEUR.

4a. Shore up surveillance, (air/naval surveillance as necessary to preserve movement/order of battle intelligence).

b. Make strongest possible declaration in concert with NATO partners that this action constitutes unsupportable aggression against the entire NATO Alliance -- that further action will be met with appropriate response.

5a. Conduct quadripartite consultation (US, UK, French and FRG) to establish common position and unified action.

b. Increase state of alert,

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Actions by Others.

6. If Norway and/or Denmark:
Capitulate to Soviet demands
to shut down surveillance
stations and announce "un-
committed positions" (due
either to lack of assurance
of support by NATO or ques-
tion of credibility of such
assurance as is given).

Actions by US.

especially in FRG.

c. Airlift resupply of
Berlin (to the extent
possible, recognizing that
Berlin's requirements in
1976 cannot be met solely
by airlift).

d. Tell the Soviets in
strongest possible terms
that international agree-
ments must be respected
and guaranteed access to
Berlin must be restored or
whatever action necessary
to achieve access will be
taken.

e. Explore areas of counter-
pressure (outside Berlin) to
exploit Soviet vulnerability
(e.g., Turkish withdrawal of
passage through Bosphorous/
Dardanelles).

6a. Same as 4a.

b. Encourage reassociation
with NATO through diplo-
matic/military channels.

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MOVE II

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FROM <u>CONTROL</u>	MESSAGE NO. <u>201</u>
TO <u>BLUE AND GREEN</u>	MOVE NO. <u>II</u>
REFERENCE <u>BLUE & GREEN MSGS 101</u>	DTG <u>220200 MAY 76</u>

FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION

THE MOMENTUM OF EVENTS

United States.

Following the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on the morning of 20 May, anxious Washington officials labored feverishly to defuse the portentous crisis. Messages were dispatched to major world capitals stating the US position and assessment of the situation. The US Ambassador to Moscow was instructed to personally inform the Soviet Foreign Minister that the United States desired "most urgently" that the crisis in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) should end. It was pointed out that any escalation of the already explosive situation might well end the fragile detente which had been so carefully nurtured over the past five years.

US Ambassadors to Norway and Denmark were instructed to reassure those nations of US support in the event of overt Soviet aggression and to reiterate the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision to support both nations in resisting Soviet pressures against northern Norway and Bornholm Island. Despite this affirmation of support, dispatch of the ACE Mobile Force was not considered. Simultaneously, embassies in East European states, Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were urged to sound out those nations' leaders as to their evaluation of Soviet intentions in Europe.

US military commanders, on orders from the White House, alerted REFORGER/CRESTED CAP units in the United States,

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increased worldwide intelligence collection efforts, and readied CONUS-based forces for possible higher alert phases in the immediate future. Selected naval units were dispatched to the North Atlantic. Additionally, the Commander in Chief, European Command, was urged to press for the maximum readiness posture possible within the selected alert measures -- short of complete Simple Alert -- authorized by the NAC earlier in the day. As an additional measure, queries were proffered to France in an effort to clarify the French position and solicit increased support for NATO, including availability of the French LOC.

Late on the same day, President Nixon (after conferring with congressional leaders) addressed a concerned nation to state that the rash incursion of West German troops into East Germany, and their subsequent involvement with Soviet troops, had created an inflammatory situation of major proportions in Europe. He stressed that although the crisis was still controllable, there was danger that it could change at any moment. The Chief Executive emphasized that the earlier meeting of the NAC had revealed an unanimous Allied desire to localize and cool the conflict as quickly as possible.

The President further informed the public that he had been in direct contact with Secretary Polyansky and had urged him to cooperate with the United States in effecting a cease-fire in order that involved nations could decide upon rational steps to restore order and preserve peace. Mr. Nixon asserted that he had assured the Soviet Union that the United States Government (USG) would do everything possible to restrain further Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) military actions, and that Chancellor Barzel had tentatively agreed to a cease-fire in return for immediate repatriation of the entrapped FRG forces. The President indicated his belief that the leaders of the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace, would be amenable to this proposal. Concluding his statement, he called on the heads of all governments to join with the United States in taking prompt actions to "prevent the spectre of war from again engulfing the world."

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USSR.

Activity in the Kremlin continued unabated as fighting raged within the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Soviet Ambassadors worldwide received carefully worded instructions to notify their capitals that the Soviet Union had no intentions of destroying the era of peace which detente had brought to the world and that Moscow's sole objective was to restore order between the two Germanies. The Honecker Government was directed to call for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council and to request condemnation of the FRG's illegal acts.

During the morning of 21 May, the Soviet Foreign Minister informed the United States that the Soviet Union did not intend to enlarge the conflict. Stating that his country would agree to an immediate cease-fire, he requested that the United States act as intermediary with the FRG and, that if a cease-fire were enacted immediately, all prisoners would be returned to their homeland as soon as order could be restored in the area of conflict.

Later that day, the United States and the Soviet Ambassadors to Bonn were informed that the Barzel Government officials had agreed to the Soviet terms but insisted that United Nations teams be allowed to supervise the cease-fire and ensure that no harm came to the GDR rebels, refugees or entrapped West German units.

Follow-on reports from the US Ambassador to Moscow confirmed that the Kremlin had received the West German request and was taking it under advisement. The Ambassador's note summarized the day's activities as confused and stated that he had been unable to determine Soviet intentions beyond those already reported in official communiques. He added, however, that informed sources had notified him of large-scale Soviet troop movements along the railheads leading through Poland toward the GDR; and of orders to Soviet military commanders in the GDR to begin movement westward as precautionary measures.

By evening of the 21st, the world learned that the Soviets had rejected FRG conditions for the cease-fire.

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European Community.

The NAC meeting which had convened earlier on the 20th, presented an expression of solidarity to the world. Public response of the Allies unanimously decried the conflict which had broken out and vociferously pledged their intent to localize and resolve it. Within the confines of secrecy, however, stormy debate raged. The FRG was berated and branded irresponsible. France denounced the FRG action as a "German problem." UK sentiments echoed similar views but urged the Allies to stand ready to support their unfortunate sister state if it were not able to solve the problem without direct NATO involvement. Only the United States, Norway, Denmark and Belgium maintained that whatever the causes, the issue was already a NATO problem. Startled by its lack of support, the FRG undertook -- unwillingly -- the unilateral approach forced upon it. The Soviet Ambassador to Bonn was informed that communications had been reestablished with the surrounded Sixth Division and that it would be ordered to cease-fire if the Kremlin would agree to its safe passage back into the FRG.

The Soviet refusal to accept Chancellor Barzel's cease-fire conditions during the following night created consternation among the Allies -- and the world. By noon of 21 May, it was clear that Moscow had no intention of accepting less than an unconditional surrender of the beleaguered FRG forces. FRG fears of a Soviet invasion mounted as intelligence sources confirmed that Soviet reinforcements were moving toward positions along the GDR border and FRG military commanders prepared for redeployment of forces to positions in northern Germany.

THE CRISIS

In late afternoon of the 21st, Chancellor Barzel bitterly informed a hushed Bundestag of the Soviet refusal to repatriate members of the trapped FRG units. He solemnly noted that as the duly elected Chancellor of the Bundesrepublik, "he neither could nor would expose these men to the proven

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horrors of Soviet imprisonment." Accordingly, he declared, "I have ordered General Fritz Kraemer's Ninth Armored Division to proceed into the GDR and extract the remnants of the Sixth Division." Shouts of dismay and anger interrupted Barzel's announcement but members were left with little choice but to support the fait accompli.

Within hours, reports from the field acknowledged that the Ninth Armored Division was heavily engaged with Soviet and GDR forces. Intelligence reports from the frontier indicated that Soviet troop strength in the border area had been greatly reinforced. By 2200 hours, General Kraemer reported that his units were in full retreat, pursued by superior Soviet forces. Kraemer further revealed that he had been unable to make physical contact with the main elements of General Streicher's Sixth Division. Shortly after midnight of 21 May, a subsequent report noted that the Ninth Division was establishing a defensive line south of Luebeck in the Krummesse area, approximately eleven kilometers west of the border and that these positions were already under intense assault by elements of at least five Soviet tank and rifle divisions.

At 0100 hours on the 22nd, President Nixon was informed that Secretary Polyansky had instituted Hot Line communications. Frantic translators relayed the Secretary's message to the President:

"I have, with deep regret, instructed my Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany to inform the leader of that criminal nation that Soviet army units have been ordered to pursue and destroy all aggressive forces who have openly violated the territory of the GDR. Since that state has chosen to reverse its decision to agree on a cease-fire -- ardently desired by the Soviet Union -- and has deliberately ordered additional Fascist troops into battle against the Soviet comrades of the GDR, the Soviet Union has no choice but to ensure the total destruction of these piratical forces. In order to end once and for all the insatiable appetite of the German Government to impose war on the free nations of the world, the Soviet Union demands the demilitarization and the immediate beginning of negotiations leading to the perpetual neutralization of both Germanies."

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The Secretary's message closed with a reassertion that Soviet immediate objectives were limited solely to the destruction of those "revanchist" forces which had invaded the sovereign territory of the GDR. He stated that the Soviet Union intended no territorial aggrandizement nor contemplated extension of the conflict to any nation other than West Germany. He informed the President that he intended to notify the other capitals of the FRG's latest act of revanchism and would make clear to all the "totally justifiable reactions" of the Soviet Union which were to restore order in Europe and to ensure future peace for the world.

By 0200 hours, the NSC again convened and White House aides summarized the President's Hot Line conversations with Secretary Polyansky. Concurrently, the nation's leaders scanned the most ominous of the messages which had begun flooding the communications channels.

AMEMB BONN 220130 MAY 76.

I lodged strong protests with FRG concerning Barzel's order to Ninth Division. Barzel was adamant and would not rescind order. All possible pressures to restrain Barzel have been ineffective. Less than one hour ago Barzel again summoned me and stated that Kraemer's force is in retreat with Soviet units in hot pursuit. He also indicated he was fully aware of Polyansky's desire to destroy FRG units, and his demands for FRG demilitarization. Barzel has threatened to order the redeployment of three additional divisions to the Krummesse area and undoubtedly will request US divisions in central region to relocate north to the Fulda area to assume positions vacated by German units. He is also contemplating demanding a NAC emergency session to stress the Soviet threat and to request movement of UK and Belgium forces closer to FRG/GDR border areas. He will ask USG to support latter request at this session. Request guidance.

AMEMB COPENHAGEN 220140 MAY 76.

I have just returned from a meeting with the Prime Minister who has informed me of a Soviet ultimatum to cease all surveillance activities on Bornholm Island. I am not

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aware of either the specific details of the ultimatum or the time limitations associated with it. However, I have in the past half-hour received two alarming -- but as yet unconfirmed -- reports: (1) that a Soviet naval contingent is proceeding toward the Bornholm area; and, (2) that a Soviet attack has taken place on similar-type sites in Northern Norway. The Prime Minister is in a virtual state of shock over these developments and could offer no assurance that his government would resist the Soviet ultimatum without unqualified guarantees of US and/or NATO military support. I am to meet with him within the next two hours and urgently request guidance.

AMEMB OSLO, 220150 MAY 76.

Soviet Union has informed Norwegian Government that it has landed naval infantry units at the surveillance sites located at Mageroy, Berlevaag and Vardo.

The note, of which I have copy, informs the Norwegian Government that the "provocative presence of these spy stations" and the Norwegian Government's "refusal to consider the safety of Soviet naval and air units exercising at sea has made it necessary for the USSR to take extreme measures."

The Soviets have stated that they intend to dismantle the electronic sites at these locations and then withdraw. On the other hand, the note further states that if remaining surveillance sites in Finnmark do not cease operations, Moscow may be forced to take additional appropriate measures.

Prime Minister regards these notes as most serious. He understands that the Danish Government has received a similar note concerning Bornholm Island. The Prime Minister asked me bluntly: "Are the United States and NATO going to assist us now or not?" When I attempted to assure him that they would, he interrupted to say that he would accept no less assistance than immediate deployment of the ACE Mobile Force, to be reinforced shortly thereafter by those NATO naval and ground forces normally earmarked for such contingencies. He further stated that the time for words had passed and that he must have immediate military support.

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He added that unless NATO and the US assured him of this help, he would recommend that Norway comply with the Soviet request and abrogate its commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

COMMENT: There is no question but what the Prime Minister is under tremendous political pressure and anti-NATO/Left Wing groups have been increasingly vocal in their demands for Norway's immediate withdrawal from the Alliance. Unless a positive response to this open Soviet challenge is forthcoming, I am convinced that the neutralism of Norway is assured. Urgently request guidance.

The time is now 220200 May 1976.

CHRONOLOGY

FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION

MOMENTUM OF EVENTS

20 May		NAC supports Norway/Denmark against Soviet protests. President Nixon addresses nation.
	- 2100	
21 May	- (AM)	Soviets agree to cease-fire.
	- (AM)	Barzel agrees to cease-fire supervised by Red Cross.
	- (Early PM)	Soviets reject Barzel cease- fire conditions.
	- (Mid PM)	Intelligence reports Soviet troop movements.
	- (Mid PM)	FRG threatens military move- ment to north.

CRISIS

21 May	- 1600	Barzel orders Ninth Division into GDR.
	- 2200	Ninth Division in retreat.
22 May	- 0100	Polyansky orders Soviet troops to pursue Ninth Division.
	- 0130	Barzel orders reinforcements to assist Ninth Division: Barzel requests US/NATO assistance.
	- 0140	Soviets issue ultimatum to Denmark.
	- 0150	Soviets land at Mageroy, Berlevaag, Vardo.

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 201

DTG 220200 MAY 76

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.

a. Soviet Objectives:

(1) There is less ambiguity now than there was yesterday surrounding Soviet's intentions--it seems reasonably clear that the USSR at least wants to take advantage of situation to separate Germany and the Northern Flank from NATO.

(2) If USSR interprets NATO reaction as weak, then Soviets will be tempted to press for neutralization of Germany and to create feeling among other nations that the USSR can't be stopped in its de facto domination of Europe.

b. US-NATO Objectives: US and NATO objectives remain to bring about an immediate cease-fire in Germany and make it quite clear to the USSR that it must withdraw from the Northern Tier immediately--that we cannot tolerate Soviet presence on Northern Flank.

2. Implications to US.

a. If we don't react militarily and politically, we can kiss NATO goodbye.

b. If we do, we risk war.

3. US Domestic Reaction. The National Security Council experienced some difficulty in assessing US domestic reactions. However, from its discussion, the NSC concluded that:

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a. The President's speech of 20 May tended to create in the minds of the public the view that the situation in FRG/GDR was an FRG responsibility to be resolved between FRG and USSR with US assistance short of military involvement.

b. The subsequent actions involving the FRG 9th Division and its pursuit onto FRG territory by Soviet troops would undoubtedly initiate a shift of public opinion in favor of FRG and also tilt it more sharply against the USSR.

c. The foregoing tilt of public opinion against the USSR would be reinforced by Soviet actions in Norway.

d. The nation is deeply concerned, but feelings are mixed and subject to being coalesced by Presidential leadership.

4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.

a. Alliance waiting on US initiative.

b. So long as US assumes its role of NATO leadership with decisive and sensible proposals designed to limit the confrontation, the alliance will follow the lead--probably including the French.

c. If the US is indecisive, the Allies will make their own accommodations with the situation and NATO will no longer be a viable alliance.

OBJECTIVES

1. Short Range.

a. To restore peace in Europe on the basis of the status quo ante.

b. To keep military action as contained as possible.

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c. To press for Soviet withdrawal from Germany (FRG) through political and limited military action.

d. To deter any further Soviet military action against the Northern Flank and press for Soviet withdrawal (if they remain) through combined political and military action.

e. To deter any further FRG independent military action outside its own territory.

f. To stimulate further popular dissension in Eastern Europe.

2. Long Range.

a. Continue to deny domination of Europe by the USSR.

b. Regard a strong NATO as an essential instrument in this objective and deter war in Europe. Achieve a strengthening of the political consultative process and an improved military posture.

c. Deplore the continued USSR repressive moves in Eastern Europe. After the current situation is resolved, initiate political and economic actions vis-a-vis the USSR designed to induce it to adjust its repressive policies and allow self-determination by Eastern European Nations.

d. Continue most-favored-nation relationship with the US dependent upon Soviet abandonment of military supported repression.

STRATEGY

1. Contain the military action, taking necessary military measures on our own side.

2. Launch all-out major political action to gain world-

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wide support for the necessary moves including the UN, Third World, etc.

3. Through strong leadership in NATO, project an image of strength and resolve.

4. Do all possible to convince the USSR our goal is only re-establishment of the status quo ante.

SPECIFIC MOVES

1. Political.

a. The President of the United States will address a joint session of Congress on May 22 in order to inform America and the world that the situation has changed considerably since his message of May 20th--in that there are now clear indications of Soviet aggressive interests. He would conclude that the situation is so critical that he has declared a state of emergency and will begin taking precautionary military actions.

b. Inform the Soviets that we still do not condone the actions of the 6th Division but find the rescue efforts of the 9th Division more understandable. Also, that we view their landing troops in Norway and issuing an ultimatum regarding Bornholm Island as unjustified and a clear threat to NATO. Propose that there should be an immediate cease-fire in Germany and the return of all Soviet troops to their own territory. This communication to be couched in such forceful terms that it could be assumed by the Soviets that we are prepared to meet force with force.

c. Request a meeting of the UN Security Council and submit resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Soviet troops.

d. Send an important highly visible delegation to Peking for consultation with the Communist Chinese.

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e. Hold very frank high level talk with the Germans including military participants, pointing out the grave dangers in present situation. Insist on full German support to achieve cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. Warn FRG that we will not tolerate any further military actions beyond their borders.

f. Inform all NATO governments, particularly Oslo and Copenhagen, of the specific US political and military moves in process. Seek full NATO support including Reinforced Alert.

g. Seek French support, including the EC, NATO and bilateral military channels.

h. Approach the Norwegians concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons (see military moves).

2. Military.

a. Set DEFCON II; seek NATO Reinforced Alert and institute movement of Belgian and Netherland troops forward while moving nuclear weapons to field positions. Additional national instructions will be issued for security of weapons in area of combat operations.

b. Call up 1,000,000 Reserve and Guard forces under declaration of National Emergency including deployment of fillers.

c. Deploy REFORGER/CRESTED CAP forces to Germany and Norway (2 USAF squadrons with nuclear weapons, assuming Norwegian government approval). Alert 2 plus 10 and LOCPORT.

d. Alert services for need to deploy forces from the Pacific.

e. Deploy ACE Mobile Force to Bornholm Island.

f. Deploy US Army battalion as adjunct to UK force in Germany. Ask UK to deploy division behind FRG 9th Division and allow it to withdraw through the combined US-UK force.

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g. Direct Strike Fleet LANT (with embarked Marine Amphibious Brigade) to proceed to northern Norwegian Sea.

h. Assemble and target US Special Forces.

i. Deploy submarine forces to northern Norwegian Sea.

3. Economic.

a. Assuming that there is a significant level of US/USSR trade essential to USSR, stop US trade immediately pending satisfactory outcome.

b. Request Allies to do same.

c. Freeze Soviet assets in US -- seek Congressional action, if necessary.

4. Psychological.

a. Exploit political moves.

b. Through RIAS, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, inform people of GDR, Poland and USSR of Russian aggression and repression. Feed the fires of rebellion.

c. Initiate controlled leaks from Washington and the field on further moves by US.

5. Other. None.

CONTINGENCIES

Actions by Others.

1. If military action escalates.

2. If Soviets agree to accept cease-fire in place.

Actions by US.

1. Respond with appropriate military action.

2. Accept or reject.

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Actions by Others.

3. If Allies refuse to positively react to US leadership.

4. If Soviets launch broader campaigns of intimidation on southern flank, Iceland, Berlin or at sea.

Actions by US.

3a. We continue with such Allies as are prepared to join us.

3b. Disengage.

3c. Attempt to develop Allied consensus for a political solution, e.g., acceptance of neutralization of FRG.

4. We take appropriate measures to counter.

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DISSENTING OPINION

1. Ref.: Blue ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, US Domestic Reaction, paragraph 3: More than a third dissented believing that in the circumstances postulated, i.e., given FRG troop initiative and the Presidential statement laying blame on the FRG -- and the US domestic attitude would be strongly opposed to taking vigorous action in support of the FRG.

2. Ref.: Blue ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes, paragraph 4: See Dissenting Opinion, paragraph 1 above, US Domestic Reaction. Allied attitudes also expected to be very negative to supporting the FRG.

3. Ref.: Blue OBJECTIVES, Short Range, paragraph 1f: Paragraph 1f is inconsistent with 1a and 1b. Further, the US is asking the USSR to abandon its repressive tactics in Eastern Europe. Stimulation of more dissension would exacerbate the situation and cause more Soviet military repressive actions.

4. Ref.: Blue OBJECTIVES, Long Range, paragraphs 2 and 2d:

a. A minority view held that there should be post-hostilities negotiations to create a sanitized zone on either side of the FRG/GDR border in which there would be no stationed or indigenous military forces allowed.

b. About one third dissented believing that this objective (paragraph 2d) should be dropped in the light of increasing evidence of USSR aggressive intent. At a later time the most-favored-nation relationship with the USSR would be reconsidered.

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FROM GREEN

MESSAGE NO. 201

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 201

DTG 220200 MAY 76

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.

In the past 24 hours, our ambassadors have reported an intense Soviet diplomatic initiative branding FRG as an "aggressor" and demanding neutrality in this situation to weaken NATO support of this "isolated FRG invasion." In several capitals this is having a major impact, particularly because of internal dissension, and exaggerated reports by US media of political dissension in US. At least some Soviet intentions are clear:

a. To fragment NATO by selective pressures, hopefully short of armed conflict where feasible; to neutralize Norway and Denmark; to disarm FRG.

b. Full scope of Soviet objectives may extend beyond Norway, Denmark and FRG.

c. However, the extent of risks the Soviets are prepared to take is not yet clear.

d. The Soviets are carrying out a pre-planned program, as revealed by the chronology of events, for which the FRG incursion into the GDR has provided an opportune pretext.

e. The Soviet move against Bornholm may have some association with the Soviet incursion into the FRG; however, it serves as a possible means to neutralize Denmark.

f. Large scale moves in USSR, in spite of Soviet forces in GDR more than adequate to handle the local FRG incursion, indicate the current situation in FRG is not ad hoc.

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g. In view of the unstable situation in rear of Soviet frontal forces, Soviet intentions appear to be more far-reaching than just maintaining hegemony in Europe.

h. The USSR moves create a two-dimensional problem for NATO and US:

(1) The landing on Norwegian soil and threat against Bornholm reveal a broad aggressive tendency, and

(2) While it has acted with irresponsibility in invading West Germany, its actions there have some plausibility because of the indefensible West German troop movement into the GDR.

2. Implications to US.

a. The Soviets are now confronting us directly and challenging US leadership of NATO and the free world.

b. They are attempting to deal a deathblow to NATO, which is essential to US security.

c. It is contrary to US interests to have a demilitarized Germany in light of the high probability of its eventually being brought into the Soviet sphere from the vacuum its demilitarization would create.

d. The Soviets are abandoning, at least for a time, their policy of detente with the West; and

e. They are forcing a test as to which of our allies are really with us and how far these allies -- and we -- are prepared to go.

3. US Domestic Reaction.

The past forty-eight hours have seen an intensification of feeling and public expression about the crisis in Europe. The President's speech calmed the nation temporarily, but the Soviet movement into the FRG has prompted large scale demonstrations in Washington and other major US cities -- both for and against a strong US and NATO response to the Soviets.

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4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.

a. NATO has reached a point of decision on its viability. In assessing reactions of the US public and those of our NATO allies, it should be remembered that few of the NATO national governments have the political leverage of those of Adenauer, De Gaulle or Roosevelt. A decreasing proportion of the population remembers World War II while increased numbers of the electorate remember Vietnam. Reflecting the 1972 situation, government majorities are thin or depend on coalitions to govern. Thus, the US and Allied governments have greater challenges in leading their publics to the consensus necessary to support the risky course upon which the alliance is embarked.

b. The US restatement of faith in, and support of the NATO Alliance and the strong US position in the present circumstances gives promise of obtaining the full support of our NATO allies. Over the past 25 years, they have backed strong US leadership.

c. The President's action in putting US armed forces in Norway and asking the UK to do the same in Bornholm; his recommendation to the NAC to declare a state of Reinforced Alert; his placement of USEUCOM forces under SACEUR Operational Command; and other US measures addressing the situation, reflect US leadership and responsibility and have given courage and stiffening resolution to the NATO Alliance.

d. NATO will undertake to have France associate and harmonize its military actions with those of other Alliance members, as a minimum, and to come under the military structure again.

e. There is strong pressure on SACEUR to specify actions he would propose with assessments of their likely effectiveness.

f. The NATO Military Committee and the Defense Planning Committee will have before them an assessment from SACEUR -- including his actions, intentions and recommendations. Contained in this assessment are specific measures requiring consideration and decision -- to include the actions listed under Political Moves.

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OBJECTIVES

In addition to those listed in Message 101:

1. Short Range.

a. To clarify the intentions of individual allies and to promote NATO solidarity and resolve.

b. By NATO, UK, and US deployments and other positive political and military actions, encourage Norway and Denmark to remain in NATO, thus to put USSR on notice that further aggression will be against the US as well as the full NATO Alliance.

c. By positive NATO actions discourage the USSR invasion of FRG.

2. Long Range. No change.

STRATEGY

The underlying presumptions of US strategy are the reliability of our society, the responsiveness of our armed forces, and the viability of our deterrent powers. Keeping the situation as cool as consistent with our objectives, we recognize that a new global situation has been created; we cannot return to the status quo ante. We must separate the issues of Norway and Denmark, where no provocation has occurred from the German situation, where an excuse for Soviet action occurred.

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Our actions will fall into two categories:

1. Blocking Actions:

a. Appropriate alerting of US and other NATO forces.

b. Landing of US forces in North Norway, not in confrontation with USSR troops, with mobile radars to take the place of those captured by the Soviets; thereby asserting a direct US interest and concern for US security.

c. Landing of US or UK forces in Denmark (including Bornholm) to require the Soviets to face the decision whether to directly confront allied forces there.

2. Exploiting actions:

a. President alerts the world to the present grave challenge, calls on world to draw conclusions from circumstances described; states world has become too small for such 19th Century power politics and "salami strategy."

b. Using forums of the UN (not however to cut off Soviet lines of retreat) and in CSCE, inform Soviets that they may jeopardize economic relations.

c. We will use the Norway-Denmark situations to give earnest of US leadership in NATO, to hold the two nations in NATO and to encourage the Alliance solidarity necessary to deal with situations on the northern flank and the FRG on a solid NATO basis.

SPECIFIC MOVES

1. Political.

a. Submit following proposals/requests to the North Atlantic Council (the Military Committee and Defense Planning Committee) for their consideration and decision:

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(1) That the Allied Mobile Force (Land) be formed and deployed to Northern Norway; that the Allied Mobile Force (Air) be formed and elements moved into Northern Norway and Denmark (including Bornholm); and that mobile radars be moved into both North Norway and Bornholm.

(2) That Reinforced Alert be declared throughout ACE.

(3) That steps consistent with (2) above be taken on a unilateral or bilateral basis pending definitive action in the NATO DPC (including, for example, the move of UK forces into Norway and Bornholm).

(4) That SACLANT, under his MARCONFORLANT plans, deploy a Marine battalion with its air support to North Norway; and plans and prepares to provide military support to SACEUR for closure of the Baltic Straits.

(5) That an approach be made to the French to commit the II French Corps (in Germany) to ACE operational control and to ask for dispersion of Allied aircraft to France.

(6) That, regarding the situation in the Luebeck area, NATO take action to achieve a cease-fire and a stand-still followed by the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces to the GDR, and the relief in place of FRG units in the area by Canadian, French, and other allied forces.

b. US Ambassador will inform host governments that the situation is a clear test of NATO solidarity; that US reguarantees the integrity of FRG and all other NATO territory, that US support is complete and can best be measured by US actions -- to include those in Norway and in placing our forces under SACEUR's operational command.

c. US Ambassador to USSR will inform Foreign Minister that we will not stand by while integrity of NATO is threatened; NATO has value to US; we cannot allow the precedent for such Soviet action to be established.

d. Drawing from the President's speeches, US Ambassador to UN will present the US-NATO case to the UN Security Council and to the world.

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e. Request the British and Danes to send UK Marine Commando forces to occupy Bornholm with radars (and aircraft).

f. President on Hot Line and in speech to world rejects Soviet demands for demilitarization of Germany and demands that Soviets withdraw "immediately" from all invaded territory. In private, President specifies things the Soviets must do: (1) "immediately" and (2) later.

g. Continue to press Soviets not to export their internal troubles in East Europe to NATO territory.

h. Demand FRG return its forces to SACEUR control, cease independent FRG military actions; prepare for a cease-fire, standstill, and the relief in place of FRG units in the crisis area by other allied forces.

i. Explore with French, Canadians, Brazilians and Italians the need for forces to be interpositioned between the West German and Soviet troops.

j. Consult with UK and France on the US-UK-French Tripartite responsibility for Germany as basis for re-approach to Germans (h above) and Soviets -- proposing to Soviets: Cease-fire, standstill, disengagement, and interposition between FRG and GDR/Soviet forces of other forces. These may be (as determined in discussion with allies) Canadian Air Mobile Group (moved in advance to a nearby area, as presently practiced); French forces, or perhaps Brazilian or Italian.

2. Military.

a. Place SAC on highest alert short of orbit; mobilize Reserve forces, CRAF, Reserve fleet; prepare to reinstate Selective Service; intensify all sources of intelligence/surveillance of USSR/Warsaw Pact.

b. Order all SSBN to sea on stations.

c. Order CINCLANT to land Marines with mobile radars in the Finnmark area of North Norway and to restore radar coverage as feasible. Do not chop these forces to SACLANT unless NAC approves proposal outlined in 1a(4).

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d. Chop USECOM forces to operational command of SACEUR.

e. If NAC fails to declare a state of Reinforced Alert, have SACEUR declare Orange or Scarlet Alert which-ever he deems most appropriate, taking no steps inconsistent with execution of operations plans.

f. If Denmark agrees, move an Allied airborne or air-mobile battalion-size unit to Bornholm to show additional flags; alternatively, if UK agrees to go, support the move of UK force (about a battalion) with radar and with air elements, to Bornholm.

g. Start actual movement of US specialists and fillers as well as some NATO-committed units to Europe (all Services), including REFORGER/CRESTED CAP.

h. Conduct intensive troop information campaign throughout US forces to explain nature of crisis and need for action. The purpose of this campaign would be to counter what would undoubtedly be a major Soviet effort against not only US public opinion but against US Armed Forces.

i. Approach French on use of French airfields for dispersion and land areas for stockpiling.

j. Further prepare to open LOC in France or Belgium as determined by results of negotiations with both.

k. Take actions to reposition US nuclear forces consistent with defense plans but avoiding any measures which would exacerbate the crisis.

l. Review tactical nuclear planning in contemplation of actions: (1) under SACLANT and SACEUR operational command; and; (2) by the US with only a few allies.

m. Assist SACEUR in continuing assessment of southern flank through use of USECOM integral theater intelligence capability.

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3. Economic.

a. Suspend all trade with USSR and urge same course on the EEC.

b. Institute monetary exchange controls and urge same for EC.

c. Reinstitute wage and price controls in the US and urge same course in EC.

d. Approach OPEC governments with the aim of preparing for controlled petroleum purchasing agreements.

e. Initiate stockpile purchasing consistent with (c) above.

f. Seek agreement with EC to suspend tariff and non-tariff barriers between US/Canada/EC.

g. Consider imposing full margin requirements on stock exchange trading.

4. Psychological.

a. Presidential statement calling on FRG and Soviet Governments to act responsibly, cease-fire, disengage forces, etc.; highlight danger to peace; focus on Soviet moves in Norway (and Bornholm) and announce dispatch of US and allied forces to Northern Norway and Bornholm to establish and protect electronic capabilities; stress apparent regression in Soviet policy, call for NATO unity and concerted action.

b. All US Government media to stress Soviet responsibility for posing dangers to peace through failure to deal with problems in Eastern Europe in an enlightened manner.

c. Use the UN as a psychological forum to explain the US-NATO position to the world.

d. Take steps to explain to the public and our Armed Forces the need and justification for US and NATO actions taken and contemplated.

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5. Other. None.

CONTINGENCIES

Action by Others.

If USSR

1. Refuses to cease actions in Northern Germany and reiterates its demand for demilitarization and neutralization of Germany, stating it will not settle for anything less.

Actions by US.

US Will

1. Make a clear and credible threat of escalation. First, by involving other nations in the fight in Northern Germany. (US participation will be essential.) Massive air support will be provided to retreating forces to include attacks against all Soviet units in the FRG. Initially, the attacks would be restricted to FRG territory. If our actions do not have the desired effect, the air attacks would be expanded to include GDR territory. Immediate consideration will be given to use of tactical nuclear weapons on a very controlled and selective basis to achieve both a military effect as well as to demonstrate resolve. Such immediate consideration is necessary in order that we are fully prepared to prevent overrun of Northern Germany

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Action by Others.

2. Declares that deployment of US forces to Northern Norway is a clear threat to the Soviets and announces movement of Soviet units into Finnmark.

3. Expands the conflict to other parts of Germany where

Actions by US.

and the inevitable destruction of NATO.

2. Face the reality of the situation, i.e., we cannot prevent the invasion of Northern Norway (Finnmark). Any force the US can bring to bear in the near term would be relatively small. Large deployments would take time and would fragment our military capability. US forces are needed in other more critical places. However, the invasion of Norway cannot be isolated from larger issues. It must be considered as part of the larger problem of an invasion of NATO. The President will signal to the Soviets that we consider the invasion of Norway an attack on the US and that our response will not necessarily be in kind nor limited to the specific area (Finnmark) under attack. In this regard, we will examine carefully areas of Soviet vulnerability particularly in the North with a view towards exerting countermeasures.

3. Take action to bring NATO forces to bear,

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Action by Others.

FRG forces are deployed and to other areas such as the Mediterranean.

4. Takes Hamburg and announces it has accomplished its immediate military objective and now will take only defensive actions. States further that it will withdraw its forces as soon as agreement is reached on measures to prevent a recurrence. Takes no further action in northern areas.

Actions by US.

under NATO control, to repel invasion; and take those actions outlined in Contingency 1. The Soviet action should demonstrate to all nations that the Warsaw Pact is attacking the NATO Alliance and that cohesiveness is essential to the survival of all.

4. Reject Soviet statements. Will continue military operations as long as Soviets refuse to withdraw their military forces from NATO territory (Norway and the FRG). The Soviet action is designed to present US Allies with a fait accompli, and to convince them that they are better off not escalating war on broad front. If the US/NATO accepted the Soviet terms, the Soviets and our Allies would be convinced that the Warsaw Pact can take action with impunity. The result would be the dissolution of NATO. We must reestablish the integrity of NATO territory.

MOVE III

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO BLUE

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE BLUE MSG 201

DTG 232200 MAY 76

SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION

THE ROAD TO CHAOS

During the 22nd of May, the juggernaut of war gathered momentum as the tempo of fighting increased along the German frontier. Soviet divisions struck westward in pursuit of the battered and retreating FRG 9th Division while all contact with the ill-fated FRG 6th Division had been lost and fleeing refugees reported that it had been cruelly annihilated. Brushing all opposition from their path, Soviet forces engulfed Luebeck and advanced on a wide front into West Germany to a depth of thirty kilometers. US and UK units, with the consent of Chancellor Barzel, were frantically preparing to move northward and interpose themselves between FRG and Soviet forces in the frail hope that the disaster could be halted without further bloodshed. Soviet and FRG tactical fighters carried out sustained close air support missions on an around-the-clock basis in the areas of heaviest fighting. Adding to the already desperate situation, ominous intelligence reports cited the massing of great numbers of Soviet troops along the entire GDR and Czechoslovakian borders.

In Norway, Soviet naval infantry units dug in around the surveillance sites which they had so recently overrun. Valiant groups of stunned Norwegian troops hopelessly attempted to retake the lost installations. Mobilization was ordered by the King and available forces were rushed northward to man the pre-selected Tromso Defense Line. As US tactical air units -- without nuclear ordnance -- were enroute to Bodo, Canadian and United Kingdom air forces were preparing for deployment to Norway.

H1

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As hopes for peace faded, dissension deepened among the Allies. The NAC, which had been in continuous session, seemed paralyzed by indecision. The United States Ambassador to NATO, in an unusual plea to the Council, expressed the deepest fears of his government by stating, "If the Allies did not act unanimously in this most critical test of NATO, the entire Alliance would become meaningless." In unequivocal terms, he assured the Council that the Alliance had the total support of the United States. He urged that all members employ all means to press the Kremlin into accepting a cease-fire and withdrawing to their antebellum positions. With the obvious reference to the German delegate, he closed his remarks by stressing, "Every member of the Alliance must act immediately, at whatever national cost, to end the conflict that might well, within hours, bring the world to war."

Though the United States had made known the action it intended to take, it could rally little enthusiasm and less support for them in the Council. The motions to declare a Reinforced Alert and to deploy the AMF to Norway were taken under advisement in an obvious attempt to forestall approval which would commit the Alliance to a crisis that many still felt might not involve them. In further moves, the United States urged both unilateral and bilateral actions while the Council debated its willingness to live up to its treaty obligations.

France was entreated to join its sister states, to provide forces, and again put its lines of communications into the common cause of Europe -- but to no avail. With the exception of British and Canadian air units, no nation was willing to support Washington's call for military commitments. Norway, in a concession to US desires (following SACEUR's declaration of State SCARLET for US forces), declared State SCARLET for that country; Denmark declared State ORANGE. Further US motions to conduct mining operations in the Baltic and to deploy mobile radars to Norway were flatly rejected by the NAC.

At 2100 hours on the evening of 22 May, the President, as he had done two days previously, after conferring with the Congress, addressed a deeply divided and distraught nation by television. "My fellow Americans, the situation

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in Europe has changed dramatically since I last spoke to you. The crisis which we had hoped to contain and bring to a swift conclusion has become even more serious. The Soviet Union has failed to heed the pleas of the world. In spite of all gestures of goodwill, it has continued to challenge the peace of the Free World. I have been in constant communications with the leaders of that intransigent nation. I have called upon them -- and the leaders of other concerned nations -- to consider the devastation and misery that war inescapably brings to mankind. Repeatedly, I have urged an immediate cease-fire and an immediate restoration of the status quo ante. I have offered every concession honorable for the United States, but to no avail.

Consequently, to prove our resolve to the world, I am forced to declare a state of national emergency. With the consent of Congress, I have directed that our reserve units and National Guard units report for active duty. I have further ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy our continental NATO-committed forces to the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, I have directed that a naval carrier task group, accompanied by Marine units, be deployed to the Norwegian Sea. I have further instructed our nation's military commanders to move our submarine forces to sea and to ready our nuclear and conventional forces throughout the world in preparation for any contingency. In order to demonstrate further our resolve, I have directed the cessation of all trade with the Soviet Union and the freezing of all of that nation's assets in this country. Additionally, I have called for stringent domestic and international economic and trade measures to take effect immediately.

I am well aware of the concern and reluctance of our citizens to commit ourselves to such involvements, but the strength of America has been in its willingness to uphold the rights of free men everywhere and to honor its treaty obligations in the cause of freedom. I know of no better way to convince our enemies and to reassure our allies than demonstrating by such measures that, however abhorrent, we are prepared to stop aggression, and, by force, should that become necessary."

H3

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Throughout the night of the 22nd and 23rd the sense of futility and foreboding grew as diplomatic efforts to stem the conflict failed. US and Soviet ambassadors worldwide vied with one another to rally support for their country's positions. The Soviet Union incessantly repeated protestations that it sought no more than the demilitarization and neutralization of the two Germanies in the interests of world peace. At an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, the United States deplored Moscow's actions, recommended an international peacekeeping force, and applauded a PRC resolution denouncing the USSR and the GDR as "aggressor nations." Shortly thereafter, France proposed an immediate cease-fire and establishment of a fifty kilometer "force free" zone between the two Germanies. Neither resolution was accepted and the Security Council became mired down in a morass of bitter harangues, charges and countercharges.

THE CRISIS

Events on the morning of the 23rd of May did little to relieve the Free World's anxiety. Although the New York Times had reported widespread rioting and terrorism in the GDR and Poland, there was no evidence that this unrest had caused any hesitation in the Kremlin's relentless westward drive into the FRG.

Soviet units were reported to be in the Bad Bramstedt area, remaining north of Hamburg, but still pursuing the routed 9th Division. Rumors circulated that Chancellor Barzel had ordered the 1st Armored Division from Hanover to assist his retreating forces. Governments were relieved, however, when the FRG reported to the NAC that the Federal Republic of Germany was committing its military forces to SACEUR's operational control. Their optimism was short-lived, however, when shortly after noon, US intelligence sources reported tank elements of the 1st Division were approaching the Hamburg area on Autobahn E4. By mid-afternoon, the 1st Division commander reported to Bonn that he had made contact with flank elements of two Soviet

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divisions. By 1700 on 23 May, UPI verified the new FRG clash. Stunned diplomats contemplated the awesome implications as Europe slipped closer to war. Events in the "Northern Tier" did little to allay their fears that NATO's once-formidable image was crumbling. The Norwegian Prime Minister informed the US Ambassador that he had delivered a note to the Soviet Government officials informing them that all surveillance sites in the Finnmark area were being closed and evacuated. However, the note stated that the Norwegian Government had no intention of capitulating to the Soviet Union and would continue to fight to the last man so long as the invading troops remained on Norwegian soil. The US Ambassador was further advised that Norway had no intention of reestablishing the sites which had been evacuated in Finnmark unless the US Government would agree to use its air units in Bodø to assist the Norwegian military forces in dislodging the Soviets from their strongholds in Mageroy, Berlevaag and Vardo.

Denmark, after consultation with the Norwegian Prime Minister, informed the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the surveillance site on Bornholm Island had been closed and would remain inoperative. At the same time, the US Government and NATO members were informed that although Denmark had mobilized its military forces, it did not desire military assistance and that any consideration of using Allied military units to thwart Soviet pressure on Bornholm Island would not be approved by the Danish Government.

Wearied and near-disheartened Washington officials again awaited latest reports from the field in the effort to prepare new options for presentation to the NSC:

AMEMB BONN 232000 MAY 76.

I have been in constant touch with Barzel. He demands immediate NATO and/or US assistance. I have advised him of folly of attempting to repulse Soviets and have stated in strongest terms that he should call off FRG forces and declare immediate cessation of all FRG military action.

COMMENT: FRG is in upheaval; political opposition, parties and populists may openly rebel against Barzel and form government willing to grant Soviets extensive concessions for sake of peace. Request advise.

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AMEMB MOSCOW 232100 MAY 76.

I have just learned of FRG insanity. Polyansky informed me of 1st FRG Division's venture when I went to relay US demand for cease-fire. Although he is concerned over FRG action, and the fact that NATO will not tolerate a violation to its territory, he appeared to be calm and confident. He indicated that FRG action is futile and cannot deter Soviets from their firm and only goal of final demilitarization and neutralization of the two Germanies. Satirically, he asked whether I thought Allied responses to US appeals were really sufficient to back our demands for a cease-fire and withdrawal.

COMMENT: I am appalled at FRG move and must agree with Polyansky that I cannot see advantage in it. Although Radio Free Europe (RFE) and others have reported dissension in Pact, I see no signs that this is having adverse effect on Soviet intentions -- or available military strength. Polyansky is committed to emasculation of Germany and has Pact in enough control to carry it out. In short, I believe that our demand for amicable settlement of crises, which would be agreeable to all, is no longer valid. Request instructions.

SACEUR 232130 MAY 76.

I have received confirmed report that a US nuclear storage site (SAS) has been overrun by the Soviets. Exact disposition of weapons unknown. Last communications with site indicated emergency destruction procedures begun. No report of successful completion. Will advise if further contact established. Am expediting movement of US/UK forces into position between FRG/Soviets, but believe this objective infeasible in light of latest FRG engagement with Soviets. I have assumed OPCON of FRG forces. Request advise.

The time is now 232200 May 1976.

H6

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CHRONOLOGY

22 May	-	Soviets penetrate 30 km into FRG
	-	Luebeck engulfed
	-	Soviet-FRG close air support committed
	-	Soviets reinforce GDR and Czech borders
	-	Norway mobilizes
	-	US air units arrive Bodo
	-	NAC refuses AMF deployment; rejects resolution for reinforced alert
	-	SACEUR declares SCARLET alert
	-	Norway declares SCARLET alert
	-	Denmark declares ORANGE alert
	-	President addresses nation; declares state of national emergency
23 May	-	Soviets advance to Bad Bramstedt
(Noon)	-	Barzel orders 1st Division against Soviets
(Early PM)	-	German forces chop to SACEUR
(PM)	-	Norway shuts down all Finnmark sites
(PM)	-	Denmark rejects Allied assistance
(PM)	-	SAS site overrun
(Late PM)	-	Barzel requests US/NATO assistance

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FROM BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301

DTG 232200 MAY 76

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.

a. Soviet: To achieve, at least, the neutralization of Germany, but probably in the context of the wider objective of establishing Soviet domination of all of Western Europe.

b. US-NATO: To obtain a cease-fire and withdrawal of Soviet forces in both Germany and the north in order to frustrate Soviet domination of Western Europe.

2. Implications to US. No change.

3. US Domestic Reaction.

Faced with the fact of continued Soviet aggression, the consensus of US opinion will be to support the President -- especially if Congress is consulted and concurs with each major step.

4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.

a. NATO does not accept the situation as being a basic threat to the Alliance.

b. National self-preservation is an overriding factor and it seems clear that there will be no concerted NATO reaction regardless of future Soviet moves.

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OBJECTIVES

1. Short Range.
 - a. Restore peace in Europe.
 - b. Keep military action as contained as possible.
 - c. Test Soviet willingness to use force against US units.
 - d. Press for Soviet withdrawal from Germany (FRG) through political and limited military action.
 - e. Deter further Soviet action in the Northern Tier.
 - f. Take advantage of the PRC hostility towards the USSR to pose a threat to the USSR's eastern flanks.
 - g. Take advantage of fortuitous PRC resolution in UN to provoke a debate on USSR repressive policies in Eastern Europe.
2. Long Range.
 - a. Continue to deny domination of Europe by the USSR.
 - b. Strengthen the consultative process and military posture of the Alliance.
 - c. Capitalize on the PRC resolution at the UN which condemned USSR and GDR by using it to shape public opinion against the repressive policies of the USSR in Eastern Europe.
 - d. Condition American public opinion to permit the maintenance of a credible US military structure on the continent and at home.
 - e. Stimulate further popular dissension in Eastern Europe.

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STRATEGY

No change.

SPECIFIC MOVES

1. Political.

a. By moving US and UK troops into the path of the Soviets, we make them face a political as well as a military choice. If US troops should come under fire, a nuclear war could eventuate.

b. Simultaneously, we should bring the strongest pressure on NATO to react to the crisis.

c. Make high-level approaches to governments of members of the European communities pointing out once again the gravity of the situation. Important emphasis would be put on implications of the Soviet demand for neutralization of Germany. Such a development would undermine the achievements and future progress toward European Union. Thus, the Europeans themselves have a major stake in achieving a solution to the current crisis which will restore the status quo ante. This objective can be achieved without full-scale war only if the Americans and Europeans put up a strong, solid front against Soviet moves and demands.

d. Instruct our ambassador in Peking to suggest how Chinese communists' interests could be served by strengthening their forces on the Soviet border.

2. Military.

a. Move US and UK ground forces into positions which Soviets must engage if they are to continue military operations.

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

b. Position US forces for early counterattack if Soviets do not accept a cease-fire or withdraw rather than engage non-German forces.

c. Order US air and naval forces to use force against any further Soviet landings in Norway.

d. Order US air units in Norway to provide air cover for Norwegian air forces.

3. Economic. None.

4. Psychological.

Continue world-wide effort to make clear our peaceful motives and objectives and expose Soviet moves as undermining stability and detente.

CONTINGENCIES

Actions by Others.

1. If Soviets stop attack and hold present positions.
2. If Soviets continue advance.
3. If Warsaw Pact commences general attack in Europe.

Actions by US.

- 1a. Negotiate.
- 1b. Counter attack.
- 2a. Attack with all conventional weapons available.
- 2b. Use tactical nuclear weapons in salient.
- 3a. Execute USCINCEUR War Plan.
- 3b. Give up defense of continental Europe.

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Actions by Others.

4. If European Allies agree to neutralization of both Germanies.

Actions by US.

4a. Continue fighting with Canadian, UK and FRG forces.

4b. Agree and stop fighting.

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DISSENTING OPINION

1. Ref.: Blue SPECIFIC MOVES, Military, paragraphs 2 and 2c.

a. One member of the Blue Team took the position that by Move III, Soviet motivations strongly suggested an intent to destroy NATO, preferably by political means, but probably not stopping short of use of military means. In order to demonstrate absolute US resolve to meet Soviet force with force and then to confront the Soviets, without further delay, with a choice of pulling back or taking on a full scale war, this member would have brought maximum available conventional force (air and ground) to bear against Soviet salient in FRG. He would not have waited for further repositioning of US and UK forces. He would not have surrounded the Soviet force, thus giving it the opportunity to fall back, if it chose not to reinforce for a full scale invasion.

b. This move is not consistent with the tactics of positioning US forces so that USSR is faced with decision to directly attack US units.

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FROM CONTROL

MESSAGE NO. 302

TO GREEN

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE GREEN MSG 201

DTG 232200 MAY 76

SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION

THE ROAD TO CHAOS

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SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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in Europe has changed dramatically since I last spoke to you. The crisis which we had hoped to contain and bring to a swift conclusion has become even more serious. The Soviet Union has failed to heed the pleas of the world. In spite of all gestures of goodwill, it has continued to challenge the peace of the Free World. I have been in constant communications with the leaders of that intransigent nation. I have called upon them -- and the leaders of other concerned nations -- to consider the devastation and misery that war inescapably brings to mankind. Repeatedly, I have urged an immediate cease-fire and an immediate restoration of the status quo ante. I have offered every concession honorable for the United States, but to no avail.

Consequently, to prove our resolve to the world, I am forced to declare a state of national emergency. With the consent of Congress, I have directed that our reserve units and National Guard units report for active duty. I have further ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy our continental NATO-committed forces to the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, I have directed that a naval carrier task group be deployed to the Norwegian Sea to cover debarkation of accompanying Marines charged with the mission of restoring surveillance by means of mobile radars. I have further instructed our nation's military commanders to move our submarine forces to sea and to ready our nuclear and conventional forces throughout the world in preparation for any contingency. In order to demonstrate further our resolve, I have directed the cessation of all trade with the Soviet Union and the freezing of all of that nation's assets in this country. Additionally, I have called for stringent domestic and international economic and trade measures to take effect immediately.

I am well aware of the concern and reluctance of our citizens to commit ourselves to such involvements, but the strength of America has been in its willingness to uphold the rights of free men everywhere and to honor its treaty obligations in the cause of freedom. I know of no better way to convince our enemies and to reassure our allies than demonstrating by such measures that, however abhorrent, we are prepared to stop aggression, and, by force, should that become necessary."

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Throughout the night of the 22nd and 23rd the sense of futility and foreboding grew as diplomatic efforts to stem the conflict failed. US and Soviet ambassadors worldwide vied with one another to rally support for their country's positions. The Soviet Union incessantly repeated protestations that it sought no more than the demilitarization and neutralization of the two Germanies in the interests of world peace. At an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, the United States deplored Moscow's actions, recommended an international peacekeeping force, and applauded a PRC resolution denouncing the USSR and the GDR as "aggressor nations." Shortly thereafter, France proposed an immediate cease-fire and establishment of a fifty kilometer "force free" zone between the two Germanies. Neither resolution was accepted and the Security Council became mired down in a morass of bitter harangues, charges and countercharges.

THE CRISIS

Events on the morning of the 23rd of May did little to relieve the Free World's anxiety. Although the New York Times had reported widespread rioting and terrorism in the GDR and Poland, there was no evidence that this unrest had caused any hesitation in the Kremlin's relentless westward drive into the FRG.

Soviet units were reported to be in the Bad Bramstedt area, remaining north of Hamburg, but still pursuing the routed 9th Division. Rumors circulated that Chancellor Barzel had ordered the 1st Armored Division from Hanover to assist his retreating forces. Governments were relieved, however, when the FRG reported to the NAC that the Federal Republic of Germany was committing its military forces to SACEUR's operational control. Their optimism was short-lived, however, when shortly after noon, US intelligence sources reported tank elements of the 1st Division were approaching the Hamburg area on Autobahn E4. By mid-afternoon, the 1st Division commander reported to Bonn that he had made contact with flank elements of two Soviet

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divisions. By 1700 on 23 May, UPI verified the new FRG clash. Stunned diplomats contemplated the awesome implications as Europe slipped closer to war. Events in the "Northern Tier" did little to allay their fears that NATO's once-formidable image was crumbling. The Norwegian Prime Minister informed the US Ambassador that he had delivered a note to the Soviet Government officials informing them that all surveillance sites in the Finnmark area were being closed and evacuated. However, the note stated that the Norwegian Government had no intention of capitulating to the Soviet Union and would continue to fight to the last man so long as the invading troops remained on Norwegian soil. The US Ambassador was further advised that Norway had no intention of reestablishing the sites which had been evacuated in Finnmark unless the US Government would use its air units to assist the Norwegian military forces in dislodging the Soviets from their strongholds in Mageroy, Berlevaag and Vardo.

Denmark, after consultation with the Norwegian Prime Minister, informed the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the surveillance site on Bornholm Island had been closed and would remain inoperative. At the same time, the US Government and NATO members were informed that although Denmark had mobilized its military forces, it did not desire military assistance and that any consideration of using Allied military units to thwart Soviet pressure on Bornholm Island would not be approved by the Danish Government.

Wearied and near-disheartened Washington officials again awaited latest reports from the field in the effort to prepare new options for presentation to the NSC:

AMEMB BONN 232000 MAY 76.

I have been in constant touch with Barzel. He demands immediate NATO and/or US assistance. I have advised him of folly of attempting to repulse Soviets and have stated in strongest terms that he should call off FRG forces and declare immediate cessation of all FRG military action.

COMMENT: FRG is in upheaval; political opposition, parties and populists may openly rebel against Barzel and form government willing to grant Soviets extensive concessions for sake of peace. Request advise.

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AMEMB MOSCOW 232100 MAY 76.

I have just learned of FRG insanity. Polyansky informed me of 1st FRG Division's venture when I went to relay US demand for cease-fire. Although he is concerned over FRG action, and the fact that NATO will not tolerate a violation to its territory, he appeared to be calm and confident. He indicated that FRG action is futile and cannot deter Soviets from their firm and only goal of final demilitarization and neutralization of the two Germanies. Satirically, he asked whether I thought Allied responses to US appeals were really sufficient to back our demands for a cease-fire and withdrawal.

COMMENT: I am appalled at FRG move and must agree with Polyansky that I cannot see advantage in it. Although Radio Free Europe (RFE) and others have reported dissension in Pact, I see no signs that this is having adverse effect on Soviet intentions -- or available military strength. Polyansky is committed to emasculation of Germany and has Pact in enough control to carry it out. In short, I believe that our demand for amicable settlement of crises, which would be agreeable to all, is no longer valid. Request instructions.

SACEUR 232130 MAY 76.

I have received confirmed report that a US nuclear storage site (SAS) has been overrun by the Soviets. Exact disposition of weapons unknown. Last communications with site indicated emergency destruction procedures begun. No report of successful completion. Will advise if further contact established. Am expediting movement of US/UK forces into position between FRG/Soviets, but believe this objective infeasible in light of latest FRG engagement with Soviets. I have assumed OPCON of FRG forces. Request advise.

The time is now 232200 May 1976.

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CHRONOLOGY

22 May	-	Soviets penetrate 30 km into FRG
	-	Luebeck engulfed
	-	Soviet-FRG close air support committed
	-	Soviets reinforce GDR and Czech borders
	-	Norway mobilizes
	-	US air units arrive Bodo
	-	NAC refuses AMF deployment; rejects resolution for reinforced alert
	-	SACEUR declares SCARLET alert
	-	Norway declares SCARLET alert
	-	Denmark declares ORANGE alert
	-	President addresses nation; declares state of national emergency
23 May	-	Soviets advance to Bad Bramstedt
(Noon)	-	Barzel orders 1st Division against Soviets
(Early PM)	-	German forces chop to SACEUR
(PM)	-	Norway shuts down all Finnmark sites
(PM)	-	Denmark rejects Allied assistance
(PM)	-	SAS site overrun
(Late PM)	-	Barzel requests US/NATO assistance

CRITIQUE

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FROM GREEN

MESSAGE NO. _____ 301

TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. _____ III

REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301

DTG _____ 232200 MAY 76

ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.

a. Objectives: Possibly to their own surprise, the Soviets have found NATO less unified than expected and military non-nuclear resistance weak. They are striking for the North Sea to control Schleswig-Holstein and the Kiel Canal, thereby bypassing the Danish Straits. The Soviet action threatens the Bremerhaven LOC as well as the LOC through Belgium. Soviet objectives in North Norway remain unclear but see assessments in Messages 101 and 201.

b. Motivation: It appears that the Soviet intent is to swing through and take Germany, and neutralize and conquer the bulk of NATO forces before we have the resolve to use tactical nuclear weapons. Later a defenseless neutralized Europe will fall easily into the Soviet orbit. Their motivation can be expressed in a quote from Churchill: "They seek the fruits of victory without the cost of war." -- or all-out war.

2. Implications to US. Same as Msg 201 plus:

a. Soviets continue to challenge US leadership and security interests throughout Europe. We have no expectation that Denmark will successfully defend against the Soviets either in the south or on Bornholm Island.

b. In FRG, position of NATO partners is clarified, although unfavorably.

c. The initial range of US actions has failed to stop Soviet aggression.

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d. US is confronted by need to take action outside of NATO context, that is, bilaterally or multilaterally.

e. The President is prepared to proceed with US military actions to gain maximum support of Alliance members.

f. Gravest implication resides in the fact that if Soviets do not become realistic and do not desist from rash adventurism, the world faces nuclear war.

g. The President has made it crystal clear that this unwarranted aggression by the USSR must be repelled at any cost.

3. US Domestic Reaction.

a. Congress and people rally to the strong leadership revealed by the President.

b. Demonstrations against US involvement in the war are violent in many areas but are met and controlled by resistance at local levels. Americans recognize Soviet actions for what they are -- sheer and brutal aggression.

4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.

See Message 201. At the moment, NATO is not functioning as an organization to meet the crisis. From a military standpoint it has failed. Although the position of France is not clear, France is keenly concerned over the threat to its security by the invasion of the FRG and in the crunch will support US actions. The FRG and the UK although resisting the US in its specific actions to meet the crisis will also support the US in the crunch.

OBJECTIVES

1. Short Range.

a. Restore territorial integrity of FRG.

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- b. Deny Baltic exits to USSR.
- c. Secure Iceland.
- d. Keep NATO together for such future values which may be derived from it.
- e. Continue to seek a cease-fire on terms consistent with foregoing objectives.
- f. Make a cease-fire more attractive to the Soviets by political and military actions against USSR interests.

2. Long Range.

These actions of the Soviets have brought into question the entire basis of US policy toward the USSR over the last fifteen years. This policy needs to be reformulated and the full range of Soviet and US options needs to be considered.

STRATEGY

We will combine a series of worldwide moves to make it absolutely clear to the USSR and the world that the US will, if necessary, use any appropriate level of military force rather than allow a Soviet conquest of West Germany or its demilitarization and neutralization.

SPECIFIC MOVES

1. Political.

- a. Renew demand to USSR for cease-fire and withdrawal of troops; otherwise, US air forces will forthwith begin action against Soviet forces on FRG territory and other Soviet forces and installations, wherever located, which appear to be involved in or supporting Soviet actions.
- b. Inform FRG that allied forces are joining FRG forces

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in North Germany and that the inter-allied commander of forces engaged is directing operations aimed at restoring territorial integrity of the FRG.

c. Inform Norwegian Government that US, UK and Canadian forces are enroute to join Norwegian forces in defense of Norway.

d. Inform Danish Government that unless it is prepared to secure approaches to the Baltic, US and other forces will move to do this forthwith.

e. Face NATO with aforementioned US actions and pose specific requirements and proposals for NATO actions in support thereof.

f. Concert action with other governments, particularly Japan and China, to increase pressure on USSR.

g. Consult with Allied governments to close Mediterranean and Bosphorous passages.

h. Inform Austrian Government that we will not be the first to violate Austrian neutrality.

i. Approach Pact governments and urge them, in their own interests, to counsel restraint on the part of USSR.

MILITARY MOVES

2. Military Moves.

a. Obtain concurrence of UK and FRG to have US/UK and FRG officers, who command NATO headquarters, take control in a tripartite role, using the mechanism of these headquarters with or without the support of the staff offices from other NATO nations. Designate SACEUR/CINCEUR as the Inter-Allied Commander in Chief. These three nations provide the lion's share of the military forces in Central Europe and all of the nuclear weapons in the Allied Command.

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b. Move combat units out of Casernes and into their wartime locations.

c. Overtly increase the alert posture of nuclear units in the FRG and the UK.

d. Use available air reconnaissance aircraft to reconnoiter Soviet forces in FRG to demonstrate intention to provide better intelligence on situation in the battle areas and to obtain information on lucrative targets in event air support is subsequently provided.

e. Take necessary actions to protect our forces. (Deploy Hawk battalions to combat locations, disperse air units to standby bases, etc.).

f. Evacuate US dependents from Europe.

g. Request French make airfields available for dispersion and French land areas for stockpiling, and allow US to use the French LOC.

h. Mine the Baltic approaches.

i. If cease-fire is not achieved, action will be taken as outlined under Contingencies in Message 201.

3. Economic. Same as in Message 201 and:

a. Institute excess profits tax.

b. Expedite stockpile purchasing of all critical materials not available in North America.

c. Institute a substantial increase in all income tax rates.

4. Psychological. Same as in Message 201.

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CONTINGENCIES

Actions by Others.

If USSR:

1. Initiates preparations for nuclear preemptive strike.
2. Announces it will not use nuclear weapons first.
3. Launches a mass Soviet airborne attack in the North German plain or South of Paris.
4. Conducts an airborne landing in Iceland and Svalbards.
5. Sets up a puppet West German Government which appeals to them for help.
6. Issues an ultimatum to Turkey demanding free passage through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean.
7. Produces Communist provoked insurrections in NATO countries or at least widespread civil disturbances with attacks on SAS sites.
8. Agrees to a cease fire but demands retention of occupied FRG territory as punitive damages.

Actions by US.

US Will:

Insufficient time prohibited team members from addressing this aspect of the contingency equation.

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EPSILON CRITIQUE

The following is a transcript of the EPSILON 72 Critique. The text has been edited for minor changes in syntax and the deletion of non-substantive phrases in consonance with SAGA's policy of non-attribution and established classification restrictions.

GEN STRACK. Good afternoon, gentlemen. I want to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has been involved in the support of EPSILON 72. I would particularly like to single out the Conference Director and the Team Captains for their fortitude and efforts.

DIRECTOR. I speak for all of us -- when I express appreciation for the fine staff work which has made this whole thing possible. I particularly appreciated the efforts and interest shown by the Control Group.

Control decided to do everything we could to paint a sobering picture; I don't think we totally succeeded, but we tried hard. I'd like to run through quickly Control's philosophy. We did not worry too much about plausibility; but tried to make each situation a challenge. However, we didn't want to become so implausible that people would have a mental block about playing the game. Challenge versus ambiguity -- we had a bit of an argument in Control as to whether we would pose more difficulty by making an obvious challenge or an ambiguous situation. I hope we achieved a happy medium. Our objectives, of course, were to create some difficulties for you leading to the kind of team dialogue which would be most useful.

We talked about bringing in the tactical nuclear weapons question early in the game but decided that it wasn't that kind of exercise in the initial stages. We chose to wait and see what happened. We were interested to find today, however, that both groups did discuss nuclear weapons.

What were some of the impressions Control received? First of all, the threat and the need for firm US action were recognized pretty clearly by both teams. In the

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discussion this morning, one member of the Control Group suggested that maybe the word "action" was wrong and maybe what we should have said was US "statements." But in the team messages this afternoon, the word "action" is probably the right word. There was remarkably little unproductive discussion. One of the Control members suggested we ask, "How much unilateral US action would be necessary, feasible or likely to cope with the crisis situation?" -- again this morning's session addressed that question. One member suggested that one lesson from the game was that we should be doing more contingency thinking and holding more open discussions on these types of questions -- Is the NATO structure adequate for the present day under the kinds of stress that we tried to play? Is Norway really worth defending?

I'd now like to call on Blue and Green Teams for a brief resume of their approaches and rationale.

BLUE. Let me say a few things about the scenario in terms of how our team reacted to it. At the outset, it's fair to say that most of us felt that the NATO/Soviet reaction was really not that unreasonable. A German force -- which was not authorized to do so -- was provoked into crossing into Eastern Europe. The Blue Team, and we assumed our Allies, were as upset about this action as were the Soviets. It didn't surprise us that the Soviets engaged this German group in force. Of course, we had grave uncertainties about Soviet intentions. Some of us questioned whether, in the circumstances postulated, we would have either domestic US or Allied support to do very much in response to the German moves -- even though the Germans were getting clobbered. We tried, however, to hedge a little bit until the extent of Soviet actions and motivations was more clearly determined.

We intended our Presidential statement to portray the hopeful assessment that the Soviets probably had no aggressive intentions. However, this statement also was to warn the Soviets clearly that if they attempted to capitalize on the situation, we would react vigorously. The second half of the message apparently was lost somewhere in Control -- maybe it was our fault for not making it clear enough. As a result, the President's statement

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almost certainly would have crystallized US public opinion against doing anything to help the Germans.

As the scenario progressed, it became clear that the Soviets were going to move aggressively into Western territory. Accordingly, a key move on our part was to attempt to interpose British and US forces in the line of advance of the Soviet units. By this action we thought that we could test the real motivations of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Control decided that they did not want that to happen. By the Third Move, we came to another critical juncture in our deliberations prompted by the ambiguity of Soviet motivations. We repeated our attempt to interpose British and US forces to clarify Soviet intentions.

There was one minority view, however, that held that Soviet aggressive intentions were pretty clear by that time. This faction would have been willing to exercise immediately whatever conventional capability we had against the Soviet salient into West Germany -- not with the intent of cutting it off, but rather, driving it back. Under this particular view, we should hit them as hard as we could with whatever conventional capability we had . . . but not with nuclear weapons. The remainder of the team, however, felt that it was much too dangerous to adopt this tactic at that point. In their opinion, the Soviets had not really disclosed just how serious they were about driving forward militarily and to take the action just described would be the equivalent of inviting the full intervention of Soviet units mobilizing on the Czech border.

Even by the Third Move, there were still some differences as to how the team should react. Some concluded that the Soviet motivation was, at a minimum, the neutralization of Germany. On the other hand, some viewed the Soviet move as a punitive action to get rid of the 6th FRG Division. All of our team felt that to agree to the neutralization of Germany was tantamount to ending the effectiveness of NATO. It would not only have taken the Germans out of NATO but it would have demonstrated clearly our inadequacy in terms of applying military force against Soviet pressure.

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I would like others to talk a little about the Norwegian excursion. I felt we acted much too mildly in this instance. Granted, it was a small exercise, relatively speaking, and diversionary from the main thrust in the center of Europe, but there were Norwegians getting killed and there were Soviet troops occupying Norwegian territory. Trying to figure out when to send a couple of aircraft squadrons and, once we got them there, trying to decide whether we would commit them or not took a long time. Under actual circumstances, I believe we would have done both much more rapidly.

Here are a few of the lessons learned with regard to the game: We concluded that a unilateral military reduction of forces will lead, first, to political instability and, secondly, to a sharp reduction in the availability of military alternatives to the Alliance. This was perfectly obvious for those of us who have been working on this problem before the game, but surely underscored by the game. The second point was that wars can start by inadvertence. In this circumstance, it's the war-fighting capability rather than deterrence that counts. All of us think of NATO totally in terms of a deterrent posture. There could be circumstances, perhaps those postulated by the game, where initial deterrence breaks down and you had better have something to cope with the threat or you are in a very difficult situation.

We really did not go into the question of tactical nuclear weapons in great detail. However, none of our members, military and civilian alike, projected any real role for nuclear weapons in the limited action with which we were confronted. We certainly didn't consider initially employing them; in fact, we did just the opposite. We moved our nuclear forces out of the area of Soviet advance so they would not get mixed up in the action. Beyond that, the discussion demonstrated some grave uncertainty about the willingness of the political leadership to use nuclear weapons even in a larger military engagement, giving question, first, about escalation and, secondly, about the ultimate utility. We waltzed around this question. We could not get anybody to stand up and tell us that if you apply nuclear weapons: (1) the conflict will not escalate; and, (2) if it did escalate to higher levels that we would end

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up with achieving any political objectives which were worth a damn.

As far as the Alliance structure is concerned, we did not see any alternative to NATO in Europe -- not just as a political association but as a military association as well. We contemplated the alternatives for defending Europe but really did not see any. If you don't have your Allies with you, you don't have a prayer of defending that continent. We concluded that the Allies were likely to react on their own interests; but it was questionable that they would perceive their interests in the way the scenario suggested -- i.e., as not needing to stand together and each going his own way. Generally, we believed that the scenario portrayed a much lower level of Allied cooperation than would be the case in real life -- given the 25 years of political/economic cooperation that had occurred in Europe. But at least this was a question which warranted further study.

Regarding Eastern Europe, there was unanimity that you don't go monkeying around in Eastern Europe unless you are really prepared for all-out war. In every move, we considered stirring up unrest in these nations. The scenario provided us lots of opportunities. However, we thought that such action would have signalled an attempt or willingness on our part to go all out to tear down the political structure that existed in Europe over the last two and a half decades. Clearly, so far as the Northern Flank is concerned, the vulnerability which we all have known to exist was readily demonstrated.

Two final points: Alliance solidarity could certainly be adversely affected, and seriously so, by a series of actions such as US force reductions; reduced defense budgets; US preoccupation with internal problems; and a period of extensive US-USSR bilateral dealings to which the Allies were not a party. Finally, we might consider the utility of either a different deployment of Allied military forces or of contingency plans which would bring Americans and other forces like the British into a very quick confrontation with the Soviets in the event a Soviet-German conflict developed.

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DIRECTOR. To defend Control, I'll comment only that we were just trying to be as ambiguous as possible. Blue made a very valid point that nobody has been able, certainly in this game and so far as I know in real life, to ever guarantee that there will not be an escalation if tactical nuclear weapons are ever employed. I am also glad to hear Blue say that they surfaced no alternatives to NATO. Control did not come up with any good alternatives either except, as suggested, a form of multilateral force that could be moved quickly. We wondered why some multilateral moves or multilateral forces weren't employed earlier while you were trying to guess Soviet motivations.

GREEN. I'd like to summarize our approach and actions quite independently of Blue's discussion rather than noting points of commonality.

We affirmed that the Soviets' long-term objectives included extending their hegemony in Europe. By neutralizing and "Finlandizing" portions of Europe, always at the lowest possible risk, the USSR desired to create a vacuum in Europe. By demilitarizing West Germany, the Soviets could hope that it would fall into their sphere of influence. The FRG incursion was a convenient pretext with which to begin the removal of NATO as an obstacle to their objectives and to export their problems of unrest in Eastern Europe to West German cities. Neither the extent of the Soviets' objectives nor the extent of the risk they were prepared to take in pursuit of the objectives became clear to us. However, the chronology of events and the rapid pace of Soviet moves showed that the Soviets were not engaged in an ad hoc action but rather were taking advantage of an opportunity to carry out portions of a prepared program.

We believed that NATO and Allied views at the outset would endorse statements and promise actions which supported Norway and Denmark. In regard to the FRG incident, a feeling persisted that NATO members would view the FRG as being at fault for providing the Soviets the pretext for their adventure. Based upon this fact, many NATO members would decline to provide support to the FRG. When the time came for concerted NATO action -- that is by providing SACEUR with the means and authority to expel

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the Soviets from FRG territory -- unanimity was not achieved. NATO, as a collective entity, failed to take up the gauntlet thrown down by the Soviets.

Our short-range objectives were to establish control over the German forces and restore the territorial integrity of NATO. We had to clarify the intentions of our Allies. We had to encourage Norway and Denmark to stick with NATO not only by assurances but by actions. We had to discourage by all means, both military and political, further USSR moves into the FRG and Norway and had to seek a cease-fire on conditions consistent with NATO objectives and the North Atlantic Treaty. Later, we had to focus on the necessity of denying the Baltic Straits to the Soviets and securing Iceland.

Long-term objectives were to restore, as much as possible, the era of detente and, through negotiations, achieve an environment in which this type of crisis would not re-occur. We also sought to continue the promotion of a gradual evolution of independence in Eastern Europe and the resolution by the Soviets of the underlying issues which had triggered the crisis. We sought to increase the common interest of the Soviets to reduce the prospects of recurrence of such crises. The Soviet actions called into question the entire basis of the United States policy toward the USSR for the past 15 years. This policy must be reexamined and reformulated to provide the United States with a full range of options.

Our strategy on the diplomatic side was twofold: First, to seek the support of our Allies in concerted NATO action; to keep them steadfast by assurances of US support, including the offer of US and UK forces to Denmark and Norway; and to bring France into the military actions and structure of NATO. Second, to inform and warn the Soviets of US resolve and to use the various world forums to fix responsibility and develop pressures on the Soviets to pull back. To the Soviets, we proposed a cease-fire and a standstill followed by a disengagement through the interposition of Allied and Third nation forces. We were prepared to discuss with our Allies the interposition of Canadian, French and Brazilian forces, in that order, to cool the situation.

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We took a series of military moves as companion pieces to assure preparatory actions to meet the threat on a NATO-wide basis. We turned over operational control of US forces to SACEUR and ordered the independent US commitment of Marines with mobile radars to North Norway to reestablish the radar surveillance interrupted by the Soviets. US interests were directly involved, since these radars in North Norway provide a capability to detect attacks upon the CONUS. We placed SAC on a high state of alert and ordered SSBNs to their sea stations. We repositioned our nuclear forces in Europe and reviewed our nuclear plans and alert procedures for use either under the NATO command, if it should be activated, or by the United States with selected Allies. US forces were ordered out of their kasernes, and as the incursion progressed in the Third Move, air reconnaissance was initiated over North Germany to assist our units. Concurrently, evacuation of US dependents from Europe was commenced. We sought to carry out these moves in such a manner as not to exacerbate the situation. The French were again asked for the use of dispersal airfields and support for LOC positioning and movements. We ordered mining of the Baltic Straits.

If a cease-fire were not achieved, we were prepared -- if necessary -- to provide massive air support to include an attack on all Soviet units in the FRG. If the drive was not halted by these air actions, in conjunction with the ongoing US/UK movements north, we would consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons on a selective basis to halt the drive and expel the Soviets from the FRG. We also began preparations for other contingencies such as: Soviet pre-emptive nuclear strikes; a possible major Soviet airborne attack in the North German Plains; and, the establishment in West Germany of a puppet government which might call for help of the USSR.

Basically, we separated the two problems which were posed to us. First, the Norway/Denmark problem -- we wanted to keep these nations in NATO, or to encourage them to take those actions unilaterally which NATO was not prepared to take. We proposed to the British that they put a UK commando battalion with mobile radars on Bornholm Island. Second, we wished to encourage unified NATO action to resolve the German problem. We initiated a series of

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blocking actions as described for Norway and used the world forums to bring pressure on the Soviets. Since the NAC failed to act, the creation of a combined inter-Allied command of somewhat tripartite nature, US/UK and FRG forces, was proposed. We hoped also to bring France into this arrangement. Our team sought to use the basic structure of the NATO command organization, giving different hats to the existing commanders, such as the US Commander who is also the SACEUR. Since he could not act as SACEUR, he would be given another appropriate title to exercise control over the forces contributed by individual allies. We also activated US plans to deal with the situation if SACEUR were delayed in his assumption of the operational command by inaction or failure of agreement within the NAC.

As for lessons learned, the principal ones which our team brought out were that, perhaps, we should take more account of the opponent's options, not limiting our consideration to the most likely courses of action. Our initial long-range objectives seemed inadequate. In the end, we reexamined the basis of US policy over the last 15 years and concluded that disillusionment in the United States had encouraged Soviet adventurism. The loss of Western Europe, or its passage to Soviet influence, was intolerable to the United States. The NATO organization, even as a cosmetic, is very important regardless of the weakness and disrepute with which its mechanism may operate. One of our Ambassadors brought out that he has been encouraged to go back to his colleagues in the NATO nations and urge more effort on their part to buck up their defenses in light of the serious implications revealed by this exercise. Three other Ambassadors concurred. One quarter held that there was no real evidence today of any change in the Soviet intentions or operations and thus the United States should not act as though Soviet motivations and objectives are different. Likewise, it was reaffirmed that the United States is the glue of NATO -- the flexible force or power required to sustain the viability of the alliance. US force structures for the future should include forces that can be applied to many places in concert with similar NATO systems so that there are no weak links which would assist the USSR in fragmenting the Alliance.

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The scenario moved fast, and pointed out that political elements must take cognizance that we no longer operate in the age of steamships. In this exercise, diplomacy did not work and surfaced the question: "How may we improve our diplomatic processes under such circumstances?" The scenario provided an example of the failure of the NATO structure and processes, and indicated the need to shore up bilateral arrangements as a counterbalance. It was conceded, however, that NATO continues to provide a useful forum in which we may exert our influence and advance our views. The exercise clearly demonstrated the need for firm and quick US response in crises. Further, it exposed the risks of the detente strands of our security policy, and demonstrated that we do not know in advance which interests will motivate our Allies. As a final point, it also demonstrated the limitations of the NATO machinery in providing instructions, particularly in the military arena.

DIRECTOR. Control also took up the question of alternatives to NATO. Several people commented that the economic aspects of European integration are perhaps a way to begin to achieve more cohesion in NATO. Others weren't sure that the European Common Market would necessarily continue to pledge support to NATO. I wonder if before we discuss the military aspects of the crisis, somebody might comment on some of these increasingly important economic factors.

GREEN. I would like to summarize four basic economic points which will have a great bearing on the military side. Beginning in 1973 through 1976, we are negotiating conditions which might deteriorate relations between the United States and the Common Market. Just this week the US Defense Department announced they won't buy any more steel alloys from non-US sources. The Europeans have retaliated by enormous protest. These frictions are going to become more numerous in the future and, if the scenario is correct, we'll be in a crisis situation by 1976. This would mean a very substantial amount of lobbying on the part of Western investors.

Secondly, the web of East-West trade deals will cement a lot of relationships between Europe and the Soviets.

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This will further serve to weaken the resolve on the part of NATO Allies for continued major military expenditures. Our NATO Allies may, regrettably, place welfare expenditures ahead of defense expenditures. This also may become true in the United States. In this way, economics can play a vital role in laying the groundwork for adventurism on the part of the Soviets.

As a third point, in the scenario projection of May 1976, the Soviets have moved into Norway and are threatening Allied interests in the North Sea. By this time, fields in the Norwegian sector will be producing 10 percent of Europe's oil needs, and the overall North Sea will be producing 20 percent of Europe's oil needs. This capacity will be achieved by only four to fifteen rigs which could be easily destroyed by a few submarines. The Middle East oil pipeline -- coming up by ships -- will supply Europe with 70 percent of its oil needs by 1976, and will also be extremely vulnerable. Economics plays another major role there.

Finally, if Europe falls into the Soviet orbit, it will mean that a tremendous economic and technological capacity will be turned against the United States and the Free World. On the other hand, the Soviets also will be vulnerable because they cannot support their own consumer needs for grains, vegetables, and crops. In the long-range, this deficiency could hurt them.

DIRECTOR. If I remember correctly, it was you who suggested that maybe a more realistic scenario would have been to have the Soviets go in and do whatever was necessary to take over the Middle East oil -- the spigot -- and then just tell NATO what they want them to do.

BLUE. Green has painted a pretty complete picture on the economic problem. I don't necessarily want to argue that we won't have continued economic problems between the United States and the European Community. What discouraged me more was that no matter how hard we tried, Control decided the Europeans had no interest in their own future as a community. I, and some teammates, felt that this may have been an unrealistic assumption -- but then again, it may not have been. If all the economic problems that were

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just outlined are with us, and there's a fair chance that they will be, then there will be no political interest among the European countries in terms of support for NATO. I guess we are in a pretty dismal situation. I would hope for a little more success in getting support from the Europeans for their own program of integration.

GREEN. There's no doubt that economics is becoming and will become over this period a much more important matter which will affect relationships. We see it developing in the Common Market -- pressures building in trade, etc. Also at the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE), economics may provide another avenue through which the Soviets could divide us. We saw this when Dr. Kissinger and the President went to Moscow. There was great concern that US/USSR bilateral trade agreements might adversely affect our Allies' best interests. We're also seeing this in our NATO discussions with respect to military equipment. Now these are factors that are very, very serious. They're not necessarily just in this scenario, they're in any scenario. This is one of the lessons we have to take out of this conference. The United States in 1976 will be strong but Europe will be turning away from us. We've got to provide the economic resources to preserve the military strength necessary for our leadership of the Free World or else we're in trouble. Whatever the scenario is, it is going to be a major task to find the economic equation that will keep the United States in the forefront. European states no longer rely on us for all the equipment and support required for their national well-being. We may find France and other nations pursuing their own economic gauge and making individual arrangements with Russia -- or any other country -- if they think it would benefit them individually as opposed to the whole community. They're not so community-minded yet that they will give up their sovereign rights when it comes to a deal.

GREEN. May I ask for a clarification? Does Blue suggest that greater economic cooperation -- as shown in the EEC -- would inspire a greater European military alliance and military actions?

BLUE. Well, I think it's a combination of economic cooperation and commitments. The present Treaty of Rome

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further development of political interest and cooperation among the Europeans. I wasn't suggesting that they will go as far as having a European military community.

GREEN. The only thing to be expected out of a greater European economic cooperation is a stronger European economic situation. It is a mistake to believe that a stronger economic situation stimulated by economic cooperation is going to result in some political development to create a United States of Europe. This is ridiculous. It is also a mistake to believe that this economic state will create an incentive for members to ally militarily. They may be stronger individually but that doesn't necessarily lead to any stronger military commitment.

BLUE. To the extent that you need economic resources to do both, the community and the military may increase their resources through economic integration.

GREEN. Yes, if they are stronger individually as a result of economic cooperation, they could be stronger together militarily.

BLUE. But, it doesn't follow automatically. . . There have to be some political decisions on the use of economic resources.

GREEN. And it doesn't follow that they will be willing to give up their separate sovereignty just because they are economically stronger.

BLUE. Well, I made predictions as to where we are going to be in 1976. I also made a different assessment on the basis of a very recent summit meeting in which Europeans declared as their objective, a unity, a European union -- although nobody defined that term. Presumably they were going to be moving in a direction of more political consultation and cooperation. I'm not suggesting that they're going to end up with the United States of Europe parallel to the United States of America. That was a part of the original thesis but nobody expects that now. There's no reason, however, why bigger economic interests and cooperation within the European community couldn't also lead to political and ultimately military advantages.

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GREEN. Does economic cooperation between the United States and Russia lead to a military uniting of the two countries into one political situation?

BLUE. It reduces the tension between the two.

GREEN. And also militarily, I guess, if we work it right we'll also be able to get Russia into the EEC.

DIRECTOR. If I interpret correctly, there is obviously some difference in views. The general theme is that if the United States takes firm leadership, and makes the problem clear, we have a better chance of stimulating the kind of actions required. Does anyone want to touch again on the economic aspects or to explore any other questions?

GREEN. I just have one thought on the economic issue. I belong to the generation that was told that neither Japan nor Germany could conduct a prolonged war because of economic considerations. (LAUGHTER)

GREEN. Turning away from the economic side, I would like to make a point concerning NATO's overall posture during the game. It's true that NATO's reaction or inaction was rather impressive. A situation of this kind, even with the relatively-limited build-up which was posed, would require a complete shift of the philosophy and attitudes that the Alliance members have prized for many years. This adjustment would take time. If nothing were done unilaterally, bilaterally, or trilaterally, the situation could be irretrievably lost. By taking decisive action, we (United States) would provide an opportunity for the realities of this situation to be brought to bear on our European Allies. The point is that we should not think of the NATO reaction that we have painted here as being a static and a permanent thing. Action is required until the Europeans pull themselves together and see that indeed, like it or not, their basic interests are deeply challenged. It's not being unduly critical to suggest that their first thought would be to evade those responsibilities and to hope the problem would go away, or that somebody else would deal with it. But if they see that the United States is seriously concerned, the prospects that they would get worried are perhaps greater than our game here has suggested.

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GREEN. Your observations certainly open the way for the discussion of several related questions -- one of the most crucial being: "Are US mid-range security interests in Europe best served through NATO?" Can we find a way in which a multilateral force of some sort could be formed and inserted -- at an appropriate early time -- to involve NATO directly in the crisis? Would anybody like to address that issue or any related part of it?

GREEN. Periodically we propose coordinated military actions which might be taken by those NATO members who wish to do so. Invariably, however, this concept gets fouled up in the dedication of NATO to the theology of unanimity. Generally, opposition is led by the "Doves." These individuals want to make sure that no NATO aegis or command structure can be utilized by those who want to take a stronger line, without the whole policy issue being subjected to NATO consideration and thereby to the veto of any single country. We have come up against this repeatedly. Generally, the consensus has been not to depart from the tradition of unanimity. What this implies is that a multilateral military approach would have to be organized and employed outside the structure of NATO itself.

GREEN. Isn't the only real answer to the theology of unanimity strong and bold leadership by the United States in a crisis?

GREEN. Well, that leadership cuts two ways. There are times when leadership is absolutely essential, there are other times when an attempt to exercise that kind of leadership means that NATO members will just bow their necks or back up on you.

GREEN. That's why I said in crisis only.

GREEN. I wouldn't have confidence that leadership could be depended on to do this job in every case. You have to bolster yourself, with either unilateral capabilities or as our discussion here as suggested, by some kind of bilateral or reduced multilateral activity.

GREEN. I didn't feel that strong US leadership would be in contradiction to any of those. You've got to cover all your bets.

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BLUE. Haven't we been able to get more than one NATO country to work together and adopt a NATO banner for an exercise even though they were reluctant to cooperate with the US forces separately? I am thinking particularly in terms of Greece.

GREEN. You're thinking of the NATO on-call force in the Mediterranean -- but to bring that force together still requires unanimous, favorable action in NATO. To the best of my analysis, that is just about always the case. The only departure from this concept comes in some of the consortiums formed for the development of military materiel. In that instance, only those nations interested join in the activity.

DIRECTOR. I'm going to bring this discussion around to the northern region, since some representatives from that area will be departing soon.

BLUE. The Norwegian situation is not the important one; the central region is. No matter if we send or don't send troops up there, the reaction of the Soviets isn't as important as moving US and United Kingdom troops between the Soviets and the Germans. In that case, if the USSR attack us, "that's a horse of a different color." What happened to a few radar stations in Norway was not really very important to the whole game.

GREEN. I would like to differ with my distinguished colleague from the Northland. Psychologically and morally, the Soviets put themselves in an absolutely indefensible position when they moved into Norway. They had a reason for moving against the Germans because Federal Republic troops had made the mistake of going into the GDR -- but in Norway and Denmark there's no defense in the world for the Soviets. We should have smeared them all over the place, the newspapers, the UN, and any other debating club where we could get to them.

BLUE. Would you fire on them?

GREEN. You bet your boots I'd fire on them. They had nothing to stand on up there. They had no reason in the world for going up there. If you are going to exercise

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force, you're going to have to be willing to use it once in a while. You can't continue to run a big country like ours and always exercise leadership in the world on the basis of debates, committees, and UN sessions.

BLUE. Well, we agreed on our team that we would send troops in there to meet the Soviets.

BLUE. And who would shoot first?

GREEN. We're obliged to maintain and restore the territorial integrity of NATO using individual and collective means, including the use of force, if necessary. Now there are some questions unstated as to when and how you do that, but our treaty commitment obliges us to defend that area.

GREEN. We have to hit them when they are in an indefensible position -- and here they were in one.

BLUE. In Norway?

GREEN. Yes, in Norway -- and in Denmark. They were moving into Denmark (Bornholm Island) on the last report that we had. You don't often get them that nicely off base.

GREEN. What more do you need in Norway? It's like putting a chip on your shoulder and saying, if you knock that off, it means you want to fight. After he does hit you a couple times, you say, I'm not sure you really mean it, I want to put a chip on my shoulder again.

CONTROL. It seems to me that the game illustrated the fragility of the Northern NATO countries. Most people agreed that Norway and Denmark were both nervous and saw NATO not as firm with them as with other countries. What could we do to remedy that situation? What steps could we take to strengthen their relationship to NATO and what might we do in the next four or five years to make less likely the situation in this game?

BLUE. They (Norway) have an army of 14,000 men. I don't know how they can increase the army much. There are only three million people.

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GREEN. In this case, both NATO and the United States have troops which could be flown there in a hurry. It's not the question, as suggested, "Is Norway worthwhile?" We're all a part of the same world. They're a fine people; they're NATO Allies; they're free people; of course they're worthwhile!

CONTROL. No one suggested that they weren't worthwhile.

BLUE. It appears to have been suggested by the comments made here.

GREEN. The point is, and there isn't any question about it, that this now is an invasion. NATO responsibilities make it necessary to react -- not to try and determine whether or not it's an invasion, or to go back to them and say, "Well, let's do something to create some further incident." The point is, from now on, it's strictly a military matter in Norway and pretty soon in Denmark. Now you are going to have to do what military circumstances dictate. Isn't that correct?

BLUE. This is an alliance that is based upon an assumption that each nation will stand with the other if they are attacked. Presumably, this is the whole lesson we learned out of World War II. If you begin making choices as to who's important and who isn't important, you obviously make some judgment in terms of what you do or don't do. When it comes to a question of a nation being under attack and their territory occupied by Soviet troops, the opportunity to make those sorts of value judgments is not present. Norwegian territory is of equal importance to the vitality of the Alliance as that of Germany.

GREEN. I'd like to comment from the military point of view. Norway is important to our control of the Atlantic, for a couple of reasons. One, if based in Norway, Soviet submarines would not have to sail all the way out of Murmansk. Various bases in Norway have access to vital lines of communication to Europe and allow subs a lot more time on station. The other thing is that the airfields which are in Norway could provide the Soviets bases from which to neutralize Iceland. This indeed would be a very serious

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thing if we lost both Iceland and Norway. Our ability to get supplies to Europe would be seriously in question; remember 95 percent of all supplies to Vietnam went by ship and the same thing would occur in the event of war in Europe. There's no question of Norway being important.

BLUE. Could we get enough stuff up there (Norway) to hold it for more than one or two days?

GREEN. If we could air-land troops, a small number of determined people, like the US Marines, might be able to hold the country. (LAUGHTER)

GREEN. In the Finnmark area, it would be very hard to organize any effective defense. Once you get into the Tromso area, however, a pretty tough, time consuming defense could be organized. What you are doing, of course, is "upping" the Soviet's price of admission. This is a significant part of our deterrence. Our tactics should not be to recover the three bases lost to the Soviets; but to establish a strong point in the Tromso area which would represent a positive response and significantly tip the military balance.

While I'm speaking, I would like to say one word on the attitudes of Norway and Denmark. They do, of course, have a great deal in common but there is an awful lot to differentiate the views of those two countries. The Norwegian determination to fight for their country and the strength of the Norwegian sense of association with NATO goes considerably beyond that found in Denmark.

BLUE. A great deal beyond it, no question that they would fight. My only point is that it would be a pretty quick operation . . . two Soviet divisions across the Kola Peninsula, half a battalion on our side of the border.

GREEN. If you are talking Finnmark -- yes.

BLUE. I am. That's where the radar stations are and the fighting will be at the radar stations.

GREEN. But our proposal was to build up and put mobile radars in the Tromso area. . .

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BLUE. Could we hold out a little longer there?

GREEN. It took the Germans six weeks against an even smaller Norwegian Army.

BLUE. Yes, but the Norwegian war was over in a very, very short time.

GREEN. Norwegians in Narvik think that had the British forces not pulled out, they would still be there.

BLUE. Some do; right . . . and they would fight; no question about it.

BLUE. Could someone remark on the strategic utility of those radar stations in Northern Norway?

GREEN. They are vital to the early detection of Soviet long-range aircraft which conceivably could be flying the Iceland Gap.

BLUE. But by 1976 won't we have other means of detection, surveillance, and intelligence gathering? Aren't these radar sites more political than military in their utility?

GREEN. SACLANT recently conducted a study which noted that the first indication of Soviet long-range air operations directed against the Atlantic Fleet would come from the Narvik radars.

BLUE. That same long-range air could go out by the same door toward CONUS too. . .

BLUE. That's not the determining factor! Berlin has an absolutely zero strategic significance but we almost went to war over it once because we recognized the political and psychological significance of not standing and fighting for it. I'm not equating Northern Norway to Berlin but you simply can't cut off a piece of Alliance territory and say, "It simply doesn't make a damned bit of difference."

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BLUE. Neither team considered that Norway was of no significance to the Northern borders. It was a matter of timing as to what action should be taken. Both teams moved forces to Norway.

BLUE. As long as you didn't fight.

BLUE. We didn't stage an attack.

GREEN. That isn't entirely so. . .

BLUE. You permitted them to fly combat air patrol (CAP), that's as far as you went.

BLUE. We agreed that the forces involved at the radar sites were minor and recommended that the Norwegian air forces begin ground attacks and we would cover for them. If the Soviets reacted to that we had them engaged.

BLUE. We also told our fleet units to sink any ships which tried to reinforce the land action -- this would tend to isolate and localize the conflict until we felt we had a viable option.

BLUE. Could I raise a question which I think is of extreme importance? In the Blue Team, we made lots of effort to get US/UK forces involved in the attack in the Central region so that the Soviets did not have the excuse that their action was directed only against the Germans. In that respect, two questions surface: "Are our force deployments right? Should we mix up US/UK German forces along the whole frontier to sharpen up our sensitivities and reactions? One of our major concerns was to involve US forces in the action. We tried to move them in but Control said it wasn't feasible. Would someone remark on that?

DIRECTOR. Control was open. . . but the messages only noted that SACEUR had requested movement of those troops.

CONTROL. Green opted for a somewhat similar move. They wanted to put in other forces -- Italy, France, Brazil and so forth. . .

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BLUE. Brazil?

CONTROL. Yes, they have been involved in somewhat similar UN operations and, consequently, have some experience. However any attempt to have used Brazilian forces would have resulted in an even greater delay in the interposition.

GREEN. Would Blue comment on the mixed forces concept?

BLUE. We weren't talking about a multinational force but, rather, about the two or three NATO battalions in the area. These forces don't have to be mixed in terms of commanders. They just have to be available.

BLUE. The problem with the mixed deployments of NATO units is that the forces still remain a national responsibility -- beyond that you have the practical problem of housing the troops as you change their deployments. Even with the nationally homogeneous deployments now in NATO, we are not really satisfied with the positioning of our troops. If we had sufficient money, we would certainly change the deployment.

BLUE. Blue felt that the game would have been much, much different had there been US forces engaged.

BLUE. This capability exists right now. In fact, our contingency plans provide for multinational forces to be employed in specific contingencies. What we were trying to do was simply project one of these existing contingency plans into this particular situation. The Soviets then had the very difficult decision of deciding whether or not they wanted to broaden the conflict beyond simply a pursuit of the intruding FRG forces or make it a specific attack against the United States.

BLUE. It would have reduced the ambiguity to zero.

GREEN. A lot is being made on this particular point. Did you consider that by putting American forces with German forces or interposing them, it might in itself appear to the Soviet Union to be the next stage of a "put up" deal with the United States having the initiative and urging the Germans to move into East Germany? This was the

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reason we suggested Canadian forces in the first instance, and, hopefully, French forces.

CONTROL. We assumed in Control from the beginning that the key action would be an interposition of other than German forces -- probably Americans. We might have been disposed to work it differently in the Second Move, if, for example, these forces had been put in before the Soviet excursion into West Germany or, if they came in during the next move. Maybe we misread it but we saw Blue's move in the second round as follows: Deploy a UK Army battalion as an adjunct to UK force in Germany, ask the UK to deploy a division behind the FRG 9th Division and so on. We concluded that the time involved in arranging this (gaining British approval and supporting the operation logistically, etc.), wouldn't be allowed in the short period that we projected between moves. I think Control very likely would have said, "All right, you have got US/UK forces there and the Soviets stop." The Soviets would then say, "Let's negotiate now on the question of neutralization." In this case, you would still have the problem of removing the salient.

BLUE. You make a very good point. In fact, if that had happened and if Control decided that the Soviets had stopped at that point, I think that you would have lost the war. You have a Soviet force sitting there; you have no apparent way or will to expel them; and, you are prepared to now sit and talk to them about the neutralization of Germany. That's a pretty tough situation.

CONTROL. I agree and that is just one of the courses that Control might have taken.

BLUE. You know, the best the interposition of US forces could have done was to stop the immediate crisis and then you would lose by negotiation what you might otherwise have lost by fighting. . .

CONTROL. Suppose your action would have been to move American forces up to the border before the Soviets ever crossed it and before the Second FRG Division had been committed. . .

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BLUE. That certainly would have been a possibility. Our team felt that Soviet motivations were still ambiguous but basically justified up to that point. Isn't that correct?

BLUE. I think that's absolutely correct. The Soviets had tempered their operations considerably. They hadn't moved except in that one area -- to a depth of about 18 miles -- and had confronted no one but Germans. They had a rationale for fighting the West Germans. By moving a non-FRG force in there, we would really test Soviet intentions. I disagree that if they stopped and didn't proceed, we had lost the war. Our short-term objective was to terminate, localize, and to prevent this border incident from spreading into a conflagration.

BLUE. Except that by Move Three we were prepared to negotiate the neutralization of Germany. . .

BLUE AND GREEN. No, no!

BLUE. I thought that was certainly implied.

DIRECTOR. We can spend quite a bit of time arguing whether it would or it wouldn't. This discussion, though, on the slowness of NATO procedures and on bilateral procedures is a good lessons-learned point.

BLUE. We should exercise bilaterally and multilaterally, hopefully with, but possibly without, NATO aegis, rather than relying solely on NATO to take action.

DIRECTOR. Well, maybe we have the germ of a constructive idea here which should be considered for the future.

BLUE. We have unilateral contingency plans which conform as far as possible to our NATO plans. But to try and get around this rule of unanimity by adopting a unilateral approach, I think, would have a gravely damaging effect within NATO. We have some of this in our Berlin contingency planning that is conducted on a tripartite basis, but NATO accepts Berlin as a special and separate responsibility. To push this very far, the incidental cost or the side effect would have to be weighed against what you

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really gain in operating efficiency. It would be my guess that the balance would turn out the wrong way.

GREEN. At this stage it would be very serious. The best that we can do, and we have that power and option in the United States, if you have a crisis develop, is to move US forces quickly under a US Command as opposed to a NATO one.

DIRECTOR. Control noticed that at least one team was quite certain of rather prompt and substantial French support in making lines of communications available through France. I know some people back in Washington and other places who have a little more doubt than that. Would anyone address this?

GREEN. The whole French defense posture is designed for war with the Soviet Union and nobody else. They want to maintain independence as long as they can, but I'll never forget what a very senior French officer said in a national war game when we tried to run it without SACEUR. The military went to the political authorities and said this thing makes no more sense. France is trying to get the best of both worlds by being in NATO and by being out of NATO. But in the crunch, and the two crunches of which we have knowledge -- the U-2, and the Cuban crisis -- the French were not among those dragging their feet.

DIRECTOR. I recall General DeGaulle was the first, wasn't he, to say, "Bully, go to it."

GREEN. The fact that we didn't do it was one of the reasons for General DeGaulle's subsequent attitudes.

BLUE. How about the willingness of the French to engage the Soviets militarily as opposed to their willingness to accept, in this scenario, a neutralized Germany?

GREEN. French public opinion is divided on this. They would not be more willing or happier than anybody else, but the French have got an idea in their heads that we Americans can survive the loss of Western Europe for at least a while, but they can't.

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GREEN. I am less confident than my teammate that the French would respond that way. It is conceivable that by 1976 or during the intervening years, there will be political direction in France that will continue to hold them back from any action along our side. Although the military organization in France might be much more disposed to act in concert with us. A situation like this could bring about a serious crisis in France and perhaps a change in government forced by the military.

GREEN. A French general once answered the question as to what he would do in case of war by saying, "Cut the telephone lines to Paris and fight." (LAUGHTER)

DIRECTOR. We have at least partially answered the question that the game was designed to ask, "Are US mid-range security interests in Europe best served by NATO?" The gist of the response is yes, because there really isn't any good substitute that people see at the moment. Certainly, a general agreement is that whatever eventuates, US leadership is essential. An equally forceful point is that the NATO nations, based on experience in Brussels, pretty much fall in line when they get a firm indication of what the United States wants to do. However, it's also been brought out that US leadership in itself is not necessarily the answer in all cases. Sometimes the United States gets a little far out with its leadership and this might have an adverse rather than a favorable effect. Quite a point has been made that we're obligated to take action to defend other NATO nations under attack. I don't suppose anybody here is unfamiliar with Article V of the Charter, which says, in effect, that an attack on one will be regarded as an attack on all, and each will take the action it deems appropriate under the circumstances. It was heartening to see that the general opinion is that we must respond in this vein if we hope to keep the Alliance firm.

GREEN. Article V does not say the action deemed appropriate but the actions deemed necessary to maintain and restore the territorial integrity of NATO.

GREEN. Specifically, including the use of our forces, if necessary. . .

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DIRECTOR. So, is the continued existence of NATO and the perpetuation of its current concepts and strategies vital to the security of Europe and the achievement of US objectives in that region? I'm not sure that we have really addressed that particular question, but our discussions appear to indicate a pressing need to reassess, revamp, or possibly change some aspects of NATO strategy if it is to be compatible with the changes that currently are taking place in Europe and the United States.

With that, I would like to thank each of you, the Control Team, and the staff for your participation and efforts. I would now like to turn the floor over the General Goodpaster.

GEN GOODPASTER. One of the purposes of an exercise like this is to highlight some of the problems, potential and present, which affect our security situation. The interesting thing to me about the scenario was that each of the driving elements contained in that scenario really exists as a problem today -- although we don't know how far that problem will develop or whether it will combine with others as has been depicted in the simulation. Whatever you look at -- the reduction in forces, the shift toward the EEC as the focus of action away from NATO, the fact that the Soviet position in Eastern Europe is militarily strong and politically weak -- all of these possibilities do exist and the exercise has highlighted them in a very useful way.

The second purpose is to trace the impact of these problems on possible defense and policy relationships in a way that develops the interrelationship of the military, the political, the economic, and the psychological factors. We did that and one thing that impressed me was the extent of continuing ambiguity, uncertainty, and on some occasions, the lack of intelligence. Someone stated we would have a lot more intelligence than was provided here, but I would still feel that the margin of ambiguity and uncertainty would still be great, partly because much of that intelligence would be conflicting. (LAUGHTER)

GREEN. It depends on which agency was providing it.

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GEN GOODPASTER. If you got it from two agencies, you could be sure of a conflict. (LAUGHTER) We have had a look at some of the policies, a look from perhaps a little different vantage point. We are moving down the highway of detente with a broad awareness of the risks that are involved. Particularly the risks that can be accentuated if out of this, through euphoria or whatever we call it, come unwarranted reductions of strength. NATO itself has adopted as its policy a combination of defense and detente. The two are not contradictory but complementary. If out of a mistaken perception of detente, the defense strength were to be reduced, the security which is now being furthered by detente -- by a sensible and sober detente -- could be endangered and weakened. We only began to scratch the surface of how the specific NATO organizational mechanisms -- the specific procedures that exist, such as alert procedures, etc., and the condition and limits of action -- operate in circumstances such as this. Also, we saw that in NATO the precise interests and positions that would be taken by individual countries are very hard to estimate. Even the American Ambassadors in those countries, as well informed and attuned as they are, can be caught by surprise and find themselves unable to anticipate in precise detail just what the position of a country will be. We have to allow for that degree of uncertainty and along with that allow for some degree of response to the American leadership of which we spoke. What the European nations will initially tend to do need not necessarily be what they will finally do, after we have had the opportunity to consult and work with them. Our discussions have highlighted how sensitive certain features of our security situation are to the limits of response that the various nations might be prepared to make. To the participants we hope that you have indeed found value in these discussions. Speaking for myself, the conference did illuminate important aspects of our security.

On behalf of Admiral Moorer, I want to express thanks to all of you who made the effort to come and participate in this exercise. On behalf of the participants, I would like to express thanks to the team which prepared and supported us throughout the conduct of this exercise. It is obvious that a lot of work went on, some of it preparatory work, some of it stockpiled before we got here, but there

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was a lot of real time work that also went into the conduct of the exercise. Finally, I express appreciation to our hosts who have made the arrangements here which are delightful in every respect. All the more so at a time when all the rest of Europe is in fog and rain and we have days of sunshine and pleasant activities. Unless someone knows some major points that I omitted unintentionally, we wish all of you safe journeys home.

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