

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. HUNT *W*

Please note Agenda Item 7 and then return  
the attached minutes.

A. W. D. *[Signature]*

5 November 51  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 10-101 OCT 1950

(47)

NSC review(s) completed.

MEMORANDUM TO: GENERAL SMITH

Attached are minutes of the 4th Meeting  
of the Psychological Strategy Board for your  
approval or correction.

JL

3 November 1951  
(DATE)

NSC review(s) completed.

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS  
THE DIRECTOR OF  
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
WASHINGTON

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2 November 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Hon. James E. Webb  
Under Secretary of State  
Hon. William C. Foster  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
✓ General Walter B. Smith, Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency

The attached minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (October 25, 1951) are submitted for approval or for such correction as you think necessary.



Charles W. McCarthy  
Colonel, USA  
Executive Officer

Incl. 2 cys.

NSC review(s) completed.

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Copy No. 7 of 50

MINUTES

PSB M-4

Fourth Meeting of the  
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
October 25, 1951, 2:30 p.m.  
Room 5104, New State Building

**MEMBERS:**

General Walter B. Smith, Chairman; Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State

Mr. William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

**OTHER PARTICIPANTS:**

Department of State

Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett

Department of Defense

Major General John A. Magruder (Retired)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brigadier General Jeomond D. Balmer, USA

Psychological Strategy Board Staff

Mr. Robert Cutler

Captain Richard Antrim, USN (Present for items 1 and 2)

Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA

Mr. Albert P. Toner, Acting Secretary



Charles W. McCarthy  
Colonel, USA  
Executive Officer

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Agenda Item 1. - Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7/6).

Action: The Board approved this paper, as amended at the meeting, leaving to the discretion of the Director any changes in task assignment in section VI, Task Assignments.

MR. GRAY called attention to a few points in the paper upon which agreement had not been reached:

(1) JSPD had expressed the wish to eliminate par. 5 on page 8 on the grounds that the activity described therein was already underway, whereas CIA desired its retention. It was agreed to retain this paragraph amended as follows: "5. Intensification of psychological preparation . . ."

(2) JSPD had felt that par. 6 b, page 8, could be interpreted in several ways. CAPTAIN ANTRIM explained that the provision was included in order to improve the South Korean attitude toward the Japanese and that CIA would coordinate its planning responsibility in this regard with the Department of Defense. GENERAL SMITH said that the paragraph was in effect a directive and should be retained in the paper. Whereas he thought the action proposed should be carried out, the magnitude, timing, and other details would depend upon the availability of funds for the purpose. MR. WEBB asked that caution be observed with respect to any covert activities which might not be consistent with our diplomatic agreements. GENERAL SMITH said that this operation would be handled through careful techniques. He believed that economic and cultural assistance was contemplated by the language of the paragraph.

(3) With reference to par. C 1, page 8, GENERAL BALMER stated that JSPD now concurred in the paragraph as written.

(4) Par. C 2, page 8, was amended to read, "and ceremonies, etc., incident to any redeployment of forces which might occur following a cease-fire . . ."

Agenda Item 2. - Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8)

Action: It was agreed that this paper should be submitted for further consideration at the next meeting.

MR. GRAY introduced the paper, stating that the subject had been given long consideration within the government. He called attention to the urgent need for such a plan in order to allocate responsibilities for operational planning.

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GENERAL SMITH then referred to the just-published NSC 10/5 and to the responsibilities for covert operations now assigned to CIA. He said that the expenditures necessary to finance these responsibilities were approaching such magnitude that it would be difficult to obtain the funds from Congress without detailed justification, a course which might result in a reduction of security sufficient to militate against the effectiveness of CIA as an intelligence agency. He said that he wished more time to consider this paper in the light of the considerations mentioned.

It was agreed that "NSC 10/5" should be included: under "Reference", page 1; in II. DEFINITIONS, page 1; and in VI, 5, Page 4 (following "NSC 10/4"). It was also agreed to insert the word "originating" in the first line of VI, 6, page 5, after the words "psychological operations."

Par. 6, section VI, page 5, was discussed. GENERAL SMITH thought the clause "when such operations will directly affect . . . future military actions" was so broad as to have little practical meaning, and suggested "projected" in lieu of "future." He commented on the delays encountered in existing coordinating mechanisms, the wide inclusiveness of the phrase "psychological operations," and the need for immediate action by commanders in the field in time of war.

It was pointed out that if the word "projected" were substituted in this paragraph, a similar change should be made in the following paragraph.

Referring to the definition of "MILITARY THEATER OF OPERATIONS," page 2, GENERAL BALMER questioned whether this term was appropriate in view of multi-nation military operations and commented on the difficulties of planning for theaters where no American commander had been named. GENERAL SMITH, citing World War II experience, stated that all American troops in wartime must report to an American Theater Commander, although for administrative purposes the American and the Joint Theater might be identical. He thought that the necessity for, and relationship of, a U.S. Theater Commander in current planning for future warfare should be clarified by the JCS.

MR. BARRETT proposed, in view of the length of time the paper has been in draft and because of the serious need for a war contingency plan, that it be approved at the next meeting, subject to future Board amendment if necessary.

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MR. WEBB suggested that the decision be left to the Director, but requested that the State Department be kept informed of any contacts in the field of overt psychological operations; suggesting that CIA be similarly informed in the event of any discussions of covert matters.

Agenda Item 4. - Preliminary Report on Situation with Respect to Repatriation of Prisoners of War (PSB D-10)

Action: Presented for information only.

MR. GRAY stated that after the PSB, in accordance with a request of NSC, had undertaken to investigate the existing situation with reference to the repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea and a memorandum had been prepared by the PSB Staff through panel procedure, it was learned that the Departments of State and Defense and the JCS were undertaking to work out the problem on a mutually satisfactory basis. In view of this situation, which appeared to have been facilitated by the action thus taken by the PSB staff, the Director had sent a memorandum to the NSC, dated October 22, 1951, advising to the changed situation and advising that copies of the Staff memorandum referred to had been sent to the Departments of State and Defense and to the JCS, for information.

Agenda Item 5. - Policy Governing Statements by Senior Government Officials on Novel Weapons.

Action: The Director was asked to have prepared a staff study on this problem for consideration by the Board.

In the discussion, it was observed that while some clearance machinery already exists, certain areas will always remain beyond executive branch control. MR. BARRETT reported that the POC had unanimously agreed to ask the PSB to consider the problem in an affirmative way, feeling that now as in the last war good psychological opportunities were not fully exploited. Material available in this field could be used to deter the Soviet aim and to build Western European morale. Some high-level mechanism would be required to obtain the maximum results. MR. FOSTER felt that the PSB, on appropriate occasions, could provide a focal point for useful, informal clearances and provide affirmative direction for statements to be made. GENERAL MAGRINER cited the need for guidance by operating people, with respect

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both to public information and security considerations. MR. GRAY explained that this item had been brought up because of his desire that the staff should become involved only in problems in which the Board wished to become interested. It was obviously desirable that the PSB should not become a speech-clearing mechanism.

Agenda Item 6. - Approval of 1952 (Revised) and 1953 PSB Budget.

Action: The Board approved the revised budget for fiscal year 1952, as presented by the Director, totaling [redacted] Action on the proposed budget for fiscal year 1953 was deferred until a later meeting.

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MR. GRAY commented on the budget figures for 1952 and 1953. He said that he would like approval of the revised 1952 budget estimate, increasing the total figure from [redacted] but explained that the 1953 budget estimate was a projection only and that approval of the [redacted] staff positions indicated for that year was not now requested.

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GENERAL SMITH referred to increasing difficulties in obtaining budget authorization for new projects. These difficulties would be lessened to the extent that PSB could draw upon the member agencies for personnel, as CIA did in preparing NIE estimates. MR. WEBB said that the question was whether the member agencies could handle the various projects under PSB staff guidance or whether it would be necessary for the PSB staff to do much of the work because the agencies would be unable to handle it.

MR. GRAY pointed out that under the Presidential Directive, the Board has three functions: coordination, and evaluation, as well as planning, and that these follow-up responsibilities appeared to go beyond what was required of the NSC or the NIE system.

GENERAL SMITH explained that he did not mean that the proposed budget envisaged too large a number of personnel. He suggested that [redacted] might be required in the future, but he wondered if they would be all needed at one time under one roof. He suggested the concept of a permanent cadre, to be augmented by draft from the departments as required. He conceived of the Board as providing policy guidance, assisted by a Director at the head of a steering group, with a small coordinating staff. The member agencies should be ready to provide people on call on a contributed basis. In other words, the contributing agencies would provide part in cash and part in kind (personnel).

MR. WEBB expressed his desire to support the Director in anything required to do the job, but wished to be satisfied that the Board had fully checked on the assets already available in the agencies.



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GENERAL SMITH said that if the key positions on the staff were filled by detail from the member agencies, it would not be necessary to include their compensation in the PSB Budget, which it was desirable to keep as low as possible.

MR. GRAY said that the existing procedure for administering and paying the staff of PSB had been worked out by the chiefs of administration of State, Defense, and CIA.

GENERAL SMITH estimated that half of the PSB staff might be permanent in order to provide continuity, with a further 25% on detail from the agencies, and the final 25% obtained by calling upon the agencies as required and by employing outside consultants.

MR. GRAY explained that his primary concern, apart from economical administration, was to make it possible to accomplish effectively the job set forth in the Presidential Directive.

MR. WEBB said his intent had not been to question the funds proposed.

Agenda Item 7. - Report on Psychological Operations Presentation at the American Legion Convention.

MR. CUTLER outlined briefly the presentation made to the Security Committee of the American Legion at the Annual Convention in Miami, 12 October 1951, by a group made up of himself (as Chairman), a Far East civilian expert, and representatives of the Department of State, of the Psychological Warfare Staff of the Department of the Army, and of Radio Free Europe.

Agenda Item 8. - The Question of the Role of the PSB in the Use of Special Funds Provided in the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

Action: In view of the importance to psychological strategic and operational planning, and to obtaining intelligence necessary thereto, of arranging for the care of escapees from the Iron Curtain countries and of developing a program or programs therefor, and methods of financing the same, with minimum confusion and waste-time, the Board approved the following actions, proposed by MR. WEBB:

(1) That the Psychological Strategy Board call a joint meeting of all agencies concerned with the problem of defectors, refugees, and potential guerrillas now resident in the Iron Curtain countries for the purpose of considering what, if any, concrete projects and programs

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
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might be undertaken by the United States Government with respect to such defectors, refugees and potential guerrillas if funds therefor were available.

(2) That the Psychological Strategy Board provide a steering member to a panel which is directed (a) to consider what, if any projects and programs of the foregoing character might further national strategic objectives; (b) to monitor the development of specific projects and programs that meet this requirement; (c) to coordinate any such project or program with national strategic objectives; and (d) to consider all possible sources for the financing thereof.

(3) In the event that the studies contemplated under (2) above should indicate that certain specific programs and projects having merit cannot be financed without recourse to section 101 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, that the Psychological Strategy Board or such of its constituent agencies as may be primarily involved submit such projects and programs for the consideration of the Director of Mutual Security.



NOTE: Further information relevant to this action is contained in PSB D-12.

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Briefing of the Board.

The State Department briefing for Board members was postponed because of the lateness of the hour. MR. WEBB expressed the hope that it could be arranged at a luncheon meeting in the following week.

Adjournment 5:15 p.m.

(End)

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