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COPY NO. 1

30 June 1952

Draft
Next week
10 Jul

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Intelligence Program as of 30 June 1952

1. The following memorandum to the DCI has been received from the Executive Secretary of the NSC:

"The President has requested that the departments and agencies responsible for the programs described in the NSC 114 series prepare for his information and for the National Security Council reports on the status of the programs as of June 30, 1952, in relation to approved objectives.

"Accordingly, it is requested that the Central Intelligence Agency submit by August 1 a report on the status of the foreign intelligence program as of June 30, 1952."

2. Discussions with the NSC secretariat reveal that a fairly detailed report is desired specifically dealing with the various subdivisions of the U. S. intelligence effort. For each of these subdivisions a summary evaluation should be made describing explicitly though concisely how good or poor our intelligence effort is in relation to our goals and, if helpful, in comparison with our situation at the end of FY 1951 or 1950. We should try to tell the NSC the state of our knowledge in the various areas, fields and activities not in substantive terms of what we know, but from the administrator's viewpoint evaluating our relative success in amassing the knowledge and producing the studies and estimates that are needed. What can we do and what can't we do? What can the NSC reasonably expect and how reliable are we in the different aspects of intelligence?

3. This paper is to be a detailed report of the status of intelligence as we begin the "program" we have outlined for ourselves in general terms for FY 1953. (See Annex 7 of NSC 114/3 which was approved by the IAC as IAC-D-29/9.)

4. For the purpose of organizing contributions to this report (which covers all of foreign intelligence but not "related activities") the following headings have been used:

NSC REVIEWED 6/13/07 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND

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- ✓ a. National estimates
- ✓ b. Political, social, and cultural
- ✓ c. Military
- ✓ d. Economic
- ✓ e. NIS and basic intelligence
- ✓ f. Current
- ✓ g. Scientific and technical intelligence
- ✓ h. Psychological intelligence
- i. Collection
- j. Support and collation facilities

5. This organization can of course be modified in the course of preparation of the report if it is agreed that this is desirable. The final draft will be submitted to the IAC for consideration and approval prior to submission to the NSC.



Acting Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

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VI. Current Intelligence

A. Warning of hostile action:

1. Coordination arrangements for pooling information and joint evaluation seem adequate through IAC Watch Committees.

2. Indicator approach provides chief systematic method of analysis - but has serious shortcomings: intentions not deduced from capabilities, vulnerabilities and trends. If capabilities are high and steadily climbing there may be no way of predicting when an attack might come.

3. Reliability: uncertain.

4. Our warning ability - (hedge)

(a) surprise attack on US: 0 hours - 2 days

(b) Berlin *of 2, 4 days*

(c) Yugoslavia *2 - 4 weeks*

(d) Iran

(e) Western Europe, including Greece and Turkey

(f) Scandin

(g) SEA

(h) Japan

(i) Korea

(j) Formosa

B. Current intelligence:

1. We can report important developments promptly, check and give preliminary evaluation quickly on all sources, and subject basis.

2. Quality of evaluations: fair to good.
3. Coordination of evaluations: probably not practicable except in unusual circumstances.
4. Cannot be expected to warn of such things as the Cuban Revolution with more than about a 40% accuracy.

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