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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
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1. Official consciousness of impending anti-Semitic activities in Poland was aroused during the SLANSKY trial in Czechoslovakia. At that time, a fact-finding committee of three Polish UB (Security Police) officials was sent to Prague to report on the trial and the effect it would have on Communist Party policy towards Jews in Poland. The committee consisted of Edmund PSZCZOLKOWSKI, Secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR, Colonel SIEDLECKI, and Colonel MICHALAK of the MBP (Ministry of Public Security).
2. The committee witnessed the SLANSKY trial, and its report was highly critical of the Czech handling of the affair. They said the trial looked like a put-up job and the accused bungled their roles so badly that the proceedings took on a farcical aspect. Also, it was stated that the Czechs deliberately inflated the role of the Jews in the whole affair. The committee, however, did not criticize the basis of the trial (anti-Semitism), which was interpreted by Jews in Polish officialdom as a bad omen presaging Jewish persecution in Poland.
3. Before the SLANSKY trial sentences were passed, General Roman ROMKOWSKI was sent to Prague to assist Polish witnesses in giving their testimony. When ROMKOWSKI came back from Prague, he was visibly disturbed because of the purposeful Czech slanting of the trial. ROMKOWSKI said that many non-Jews deeply involved in the SLANSKY affair were not brought before the court, thus making it appear that the Jews

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were the culprits. He particularly cited the case of ZAVODSKY. ROMKOWSKI also called attention to the fact that, while in Czechoslovakia in connection with the RAJK affair, he learned that Czech Communist officials were called to Moscow and were instructed to proceed more cautiously in the Jewish affair in their country but the Czechs strongly opposed this.

4. ROMKOWSKI feared that repercussions from the strong Czech anti-Jewish stand would be felt in Poland. After the arrest and trial of Jewish doctors in Moscow, Jewish Communists were convinced among themselves that Moscow had given the signal for a universal persecution of Jews occupying Party posts.

5. It was at this time that the Soviet advisor to Department X [] of the MBP SIGACHOV began making inquiries as to how the Zionist affair stood in Poland. This [] was the Soviet way of saying that some action had to be taken against the Jews. BIERUT, on his visit to Moscow, which corresponded with the date of official Soviet interest in Polish Jews, was to receive instructions for the forthcoming purges. STALIN allegedly told BIERUT that a better balance was necessary and that the Jews whom BIERUT would release as a consequence should be given corresponding posts in other government departments. The purges were to be effected so as not to lose the loyalty of those removed in order that the UB could re-employ them if the need arose.

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6. Shortly after BIERUT's return from Moscow, Colonel KRADKO was given another post (UB schools), Colonel CZAPLICKI was demoted, and Colonel BRYSTYGIER was tentatively scheduled for removal. All are Jews. A general UB reorganization followed (two new departments were added), until the percentage of people occupying high UB posts favored the Gentiles. Concurrently, promotions of Jews in the army and the UB were held up and lesser purges were effected on other levels.
7. The chief of Department X was given instructions to formulate a project against Jews in the Party and Zionists. Shortly afterwards, a raid was conducted against the Joint Distribution Committee and on the basis of documents uncovered, the first Jewish arrests began. The early victims were Jakub EGIT, leader of AJAP, a Jewish Communist organization in Lodz; Gitel BARSKI, secretary-general of the Joint Distribution Committee; and General KOMAR, chief of O-2. EGIT and BARSKI were released in a few weeks on orders from Moscow. The KOMAR case was given special handling. The affair did not quiet down until widespread purges were completed, especially in the Polish Army. Other victims included: Leon GEHORSAM, Vice-Minister of Railways; (fnu) FEDER, Department VII (MBP) employee; (fnu) GORDUN of the Ministry of Communications; (fnu) AKIERMAN, a chemical specialist in the employ of the government; (fnu) GRANOWSKA, Personnel Director at the Ministry of Mines; (fnu) KAMINSKY, Vice-Director of Department VII (MBP); (fnu) WERNER, Polish Army Press Chief; Leon PENNER, Director of the General Prosecutor's Office. Jakub BERMAN himself was accused of pro-Zionist tendencies, and it was at this time that he suffered two heart attacks which kept him out of public life.
8. [] the Soviets had two basic aims in their anti-Jewish drive: (1) to endear themselves to the Arab world and raise their political stock in the Mediterranean area and possibly to embarrass the U.S. in Palestine and the British in North Africa (especially Egypt and Sudan); and (2) to settle the Jewish issue in the Party ranks by means of purges which were considered long overdue.

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