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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	Poland	REPORT	
SUBJECT	Polish Cable Project S-34	DATE DISTR.	12 AUG 1958
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ARMY review completed.

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STATE	<del>#</del> ARMY	<del>#</del> NAVY	<del>#</del> AIR	<del>#</del> FBI	AEC	ORR	EV	X		
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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**COUNTRY** Poland

**DATE DISTR.** 22 July 58

**SUBJECT** Polish Cable Project S-34

**NO. OF PAGES** 7

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## POLISH CABLE PROJECT S-34 (C)

Following are locations mentioned in this report, with geographical and UTM coordinates:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Geographical Coordinates</u>	<u>UTM Coordinates</u>
CZESTOCHOWA	N50-48, E19-07	CB-6831
KEDZIERZYN	N50-21, E18-12	CA-0181
KRAKOW	N52-02, E19-58	DA-2447
NOWA HUTA	N50-02, E20-04	DA-3448
TORUN	N53-02, E18-36	CD-4077

### 1. History of Project S-34

The original directive for the construction of cable routes was sent by the Minister of National Defense to the Military Department of the State Economic Planning Commission (Panstwowa Komisja Planowania Gospodarczego - PKPG), in 1950. The PKPG then directed the Minister of Post Telegraph and Telephone (PTT), Wilhelm BILLIG, to incorporate the plans for cable route construction, into the PTT plans for 1952. Simultaneously the PKPG started work on plans for the project; gave it the code name Project S-34; and labeled it TOP SECRET. The code name was used in all matters dealing with the project and it was decreed that only those personnel would have access to its details who had a real need to know. The project was considered mandatory inasmuch as it had originated with the Minister of National Defense and it was to have precedence over all previously made plans for cable and other means of communication then under consideration by the PTT. It was estimated that the project would take approximately three years for completion and it was allotted 300 million zlotys to defray the cost of cable and construction.

### 2. Highways and Planning During the Korean Conflict

During the planning stages by the PKPG a survey was made of all highways in Poland and their over-all importance to the country was established.<sup>1</sup> In some instances certain highways which were not considered wide enough but yet met all other qualifications for strategic classification, were immediately widened

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to the required width of nine meters. [redacted] original planning by the PKPG took place during the Korean conflict when it was believed in Poland that war with the West was imminent. The cable routes were to follow the same routes as those of the designated strategic highways.

3. Purpose of Project S-34

The project, which was strictly military in nature, was for the express purpose of providing direct cable communications with MOSCOW from a number of cities in Poland. [redacted] no [redacted] information concerning the degree to which Project S-34 would augment existing communications facilities to MOSCOW or whether it was to replace any which were then in existence. [redacted] it was forced on Poland by the Minister of National Defense and would have been used only in the event of a general mobilization.

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4. Resistance of the Polish PTT to Project S-34

[redacted] BILLIG was very bitter concerning the forcing of Project S-34 on the Polish economy. He evidenced a great deal of frustration when he learned of the project's magnitude, because it forced him to forego plans already formulated, and he felt that Project S-34 represented no benefit to the Polish people. Although BILLIG voiced little if any opposition to the project when discussing it in official circles, it was a well-known fact that he considered it completely unnecessary. He knew that it would set the existing plans for the PTT back several years because of its enormous requirements for cable and use of technical personnel and equipment.

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5. Start of Construction

[redacted] construction of Project S-34 started in the spring of 1952.

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[redacted] Konrad KOZLOWSKI and Ludwig SKOCZYLAS, also subordinated to JEDRYCHOWSKI, were to maintain surveillance on the project from the viewpoint of technical construction, installations, and equipment. [redacted]

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6. Construction Information

a. Responsibility

[redacted] the PTT controlled all aspects of construction, in that it designated the exact location for all conduit, routes taken, and the exact location for all cable amplifier stations. However, the Construction Bureau in the Government Presidium was responsible for the actual over-all construction in accordance with instructions of the PTT.

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The Construction Bureau delegated the responsibility for construction to each of the Provincial Construction Enterprises making each of them responsible for all construction matters in their own particular Provinces. [redacted]

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b. Conduits and Cables

All conduits were constructed of brick and were placed on the right side of the designated highways as one traveled from WARSAW. The conduits were placed at a depth of approximately 1.80 m and 3 m from the shoulder of the highway. Upon completion of a section of conduit, PTT personnel immediately moved into the area and placed a cable.

c. Acquisition of Construction Equipment

[redacted] there was insufficient heavy construction equipment available in Poland, and it became necessary to import a number of bulldozers and ditch-diggers from [redacted] in order to complete the project in the allotted time.

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7. Cable Information

a. Production

There were three cable manufacturing plants in Poland and two of these, in KRAKOW and TORUN, were designated to produce the cable necessary for Project S-34. [redacted] the plant in KRAKOW was directed to convert its entire production capability to the needs of the Project. [redacted] not know to what extent the plant at TORUN was utilized. This developed into one of the greatest consumers of time in relation to the completion of the project because sufficient copper was not available to allow continual operation of the plants. [redacted] the capacity of the plants was enough to supply the needs, but the shortage of copper nullified this capability, and it often became necessary to close the plants because of it. [redacted] cable production was not allowed to start unless sufficient copper was available for a run of six weeks. He attributed the copper shortage to the fact that it could not be bought from the West, and the fact that considerable trouble was being had with production in the Polish copper mines. The principal difficulty was that the Polish mines were having trouble with excess water and could not be maintained in operating condition. [redacted] in certain unidentified localities PTT cable was unearthed in order to reclaim the copper which it contained.

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b. Amount of Cable Required

[redacted] vague concerning the total kilometeric length of cable used in Project S-34, but after careful consideration [redacted] estimated the figure to be not less than 1,200 km and probably closer to 1,600 km. [redacted]

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[redacted] three plants produced 4,000 km of cable of all types from 1952 through 1954. Of this figure, the Ministry of Power received 1,400 km, Ministries other than Construction received 500 km, about 500 km was exported, and the Ministry of Construction received 1,600 km.

c. Cable Information

[redacted] not know the technical specifications of the so called "special" cable which Project S-34 required. [redacted]

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[redacted] heard it referred to as "long distance low voltage cable". [redacted]

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d. Tie-In with PTT Facilities

[redacted] not know whether the cable of Project S-34 was interconnected with PTT exchanges in various cities. [redacted] it did not detour around any city. [redacted] it would be used only in the event of a general mobilisation. [redacted] BILLIG gave as one of his reasons for aversion to the Project, the fact that it added nothing to existing civilian facilities.

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8. Difficulties Encountered

[redacted] besides the difficulties in cable production, difficulties also arose in the selection of sites for the cable amplifier stations. [redacted] considerable pressure was brought to bear in order to release the funds necessary, but [redacted] this presented no great problem. [redacted] originally there had been a shortage of technical equipment but that this too was quickly corrected.

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As has been stated, the PTT was responsible for the selection of sites for the construction of the buildings which housed the cable amplifier equipment. The PTT stipulated that certain methods of insulation would be employed in the buildings with respect to protection against dampness which would have been hazardous to the technical equipment. [redacted] the degree and type of insulation specified was insufficient when viewed in the light of certain locations which were extremely damp. As a result of these conditions, those amplifier locations indicated on Annex A were the cause of a number of investigations, conferences and delays.

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In the summer of 1954 Vice Premier JEDRYCHOWSKI [redacted] directed [redacted] to determine the exact cause or causes of the trouble at the cable amplifier stations.

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[redacted] A fact-finding commission was also appointed by General POLTORZYCKI, (fmu), the presiding member of the Military Bureau of the PKPG, to determine the cause of the trouble.

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[redacted] told the Vice Premier that responsibility could not be directed at any one person but could be blamed on errors made during geological surveys with respect to location of the amplifier stations. [redacted] the offices in charge of the surveys would stand the necessary expenses in connection with rectifying the mistakes.

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The case never went to the State Prosecutor as General POLTORZYCKI had originally directed. The General Director of the Construction Enterprise of the Ministry of PTT, Teodor ORCIUK, was made the scapegoat and was released from his position prior to completion of the project. In April 1955, [redacted]

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[redacted] Project S-34 [redacted] was completed and made operational in the summer of 1956.

#### 9. Effect on Polish Economy

[redacted] the impact of Project S-34 was felt by all Polish industries that used copper, or wire communication equipment. The power industry suffered most from the loss of copper and much experimentation was conducted using steel and aluminum as conductors for high lines. Open wire production for the PTT was completely stopped; power cable was discontinued, and all consumer products which used copper were discontinued. [redacted] in an effort to make up the shortages caused by the Project, cable production was scheduled for an annual increase of 400 km, and he estimated that by 1960 Poland would be producing about 7,000 km of cable which was determined to be sufficient for the needs of the country.

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Many old copper mines were reopened and the latest techniques employed to extract copper from the ore. [redacted] a new vein of copper was discovered in the southern part of the country, in the Krakow Province (exact location unknown), and after development, should provide a valuable addition to the country's copper requirements. [redacted] a number of placer facilities were constructed where water was abundant, to wash part of the impurities from the ore prior to going to the smelter.

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#### 10. Carrier Telephone Facilities

##### a. Purpose

[redacted] direct telephone connection was available from WARSAW to the capital cities of each of the Provinces of Poland and vice-versa. The purpose of the network was for swift, sure interconnection between Party officials all over the country for purposes of administration and dissemination of information concerning strikes, riots, catastrophes, and for other unidentified purposes, and for acquiring or for disseminating information where time was a very important element.

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##### b. Description

[redacted] no technical information concerning the network except [redacted] it was known as the high frequency telephone network (siec wysokiej czestotliwosci - WC). [redacted] the telephone desk sets were the same as those used on the normal PTT telephone network and that the entire system was controlled from the telephone central in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in WARSAW. There were no lateral lines and it was necessary to use an intermediary in WARSAW if a call placed in one Province was destined for a Province other than Warsaw. [redacted] not explain the lack of inter-Provincial switching facilities on the main switchboard in WARSAW.

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# CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX A

## CONCEPT of SPECIAL CABLE PROJECT in POLAND

