INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This	mate	rial c	ontain	infor	natio	n affecting	the ?	National	Defen	se of 1	he 1	United	States	within	the	meaning	of the	Espionage	Laws,	Title
18. 1	U.S.C.	Secs	. 793 a	nd 794.	the	transmissi	on or	r revelat	ion of	which	ı in	any	manner	to an	una	uthorized	person	is prohibi	ited by	/ law.

	SECRET	50X1-HUM
country:	USSR (Lithuanian SSR)	
SUBJECT:	The Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture	50X1-HUM

1. The Lithmanian Ministry of Agriculture occupied a postwar, four-story building at 19 Prospekt Stalina (formerly Mickiewicza) in Vilnius. It constituted a merger, effected in 195h, of the Ministry of Collection of Agricultural Produce (Min. Zagotovok), the Ministry of State Farms (Min. Sovkhosov), and the former Ministry of Agriculture (Min. Sel-Khozyaystva). The newly-formed ministry dealt mostly with kolkhosy and MTS. It had operated by means of provincial and district agricultural departments until 1956, at which time the departments were abolished and their tasks were assumed by the 135 MTS existing in the republic.

STORT

50X1-HUM

Page 2

- 2. Also in 1956, a Central Administration for Collection of Agricultural Produce, subordinate both to the Lithuanian Council of Ministers and to Moscow, and a Ministry of Sovkhozy were established. No further organizational changes took place up to early 1957.
- 3. The Ministry of Agriculture was headed by Minister
 Augustinaitis (fmu) and the following six deputy minsters:
 - a. First Deputy Minister in charge of general administration of the Ministry. He was a Lithuanian and a "candidate of agricultural sciences" (name unknown).
 - Deputy in charge of personnel, Grigenas (fnu),
 a Lithuanian.
 - c. Deputy in charge of livestock, Glabay (fnu), a Russian.
 - d. Deputy in charge of mechanization and MTS,
 Konevshchinskiy (fmu), a Ukrainian.
 - e. Deputy in charge of industrial crops, a Lithuanian (name unknown).
 - f. Deputy in charge of construction, a Lithuanian (name unknown).



50X1-HUM

Page 3

- 4. Included among the administrations of the Ministry were the following:
 - a. Administration of Propaganda and Agricultural Sciences (Upravlenye Propaganday i Sel-Khoznauk), which came under the first deputy minister. The administration published and distributed literature on agricultural subjects, administrated agricultural secondary schools (sel-khoz. tekhnikumi), of which there were about ten in the republic, including schools in Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaypeda, Paneveshis, and Shyaulyay, and five or six agricultural research stations (locations unknown). The administration included a propaganda and an agricultural exhibition department.
 - b. Administration of Agricultural Mechanisation
 (Upravlenye Mekhanisatsii Sel-Kohs), which
 included departments of agricultural machinery
 (Otdel Sel-Khos Mashin), of fuel (Otdel Po
 Nefte Khoshaystvu), andof tractor and agricultural machinery repairs (Otdel Remonta Traktorov
 i Sel-Khos. Mashin).

all

Medit

50X1-HUM

Page 4

- c. The Finance Administration (Finansovoe Upr.),
 which included a department for financing
 MTS and another for financing agricultural
 schools.
- d. The Accounts Department (Tsentralnaya Bukhalterya), which consisted of two sections: a
 bookkeeping section (otdel ucheta i otchetnosty) and an auditing section (otdel
 kontroli).
- e. Administration of Livestock (Upr. Zhivotnovodstva), which included cattle, pig, and
 horse-breeding sections, as well as a poultry
 section.
- f. Administration of MTS (Upr. MTS).
- g. Administration of Field Crops (Upr. Rastenyov-odstva).
- h. Administration of Planning (Planovoe Upr.).
- Administration of Industrial Crops (Upr. Tekhnicheskikh Kultur).
- j. Veterinary Administration (Veterinarnoe Upr.).
- k. Administration of Agricultural Construction
 (Upr. Sel-Khoz. Stroitelstva).

SFCDET
Page 5

50X1-HUM

- Administration of Kolkhoz Organization
 (Organ. Kolkhos. Upr.).
- m. Administration of Personnel (Upr. Kadrov).
- n. Administration of Domestic Administration (Khosyastvennoe Upr.).
- _/ o. Administration of Supplies (Upr. Sel-Khoz. Snabshenya).

All of the above administrations, with the exception of the Administration of Supplies, were housed in the main building of the Ministry, on Prospekt Stalina. The Supply Administration was located at No. 15 Prospekt Stalina.

	SECRET	50X1-HUM
		50X1-HUM
COUNTRY:	USSR	
SUBJECT:	Stockbreeding in the Uzbek S	SSR

1. In the Uzbek SSR the breeding of livestock was limited almost entirely to cattle and sheep. The livestock raised there were of indigenous breeds exclusively, consisting of small-sized cattle of low weight with poor milk yields and of inferior sheep yielding very little wool. Furthermore, after World War II the total number of cattle and sheep in the republic was comparatively small. Until 1953 the emphasis in stockbreeding was placed on quantitative increases. An oblast plan would call for a certain number of cattle and sheep, and if this target were met, no one inquired about the yield of meat, milk, or wool. As a consequence of the continued adherence to this policy, the quality of cattle and sheep deteriorated further, and

CEORFT	
	50X1-HUM

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/16: 0	CIA-RDP80T00246A053000430001-5
	All
SECRET	

- 2 -

the sovkhozes and kolkhozes found they were unable to fulfill the compulsory meat, milk and butter quotas.

- 2. This situation changed noticeably following Khrushchev's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee in September 1953. Energetic steps were immediately taken in the Uzbek SSR to improve local breeds of cattle and sheep. These included the following:
 - a. A considerable number of Dutch cows were procured for cross-breeding.
 - b. Choice merino sheep were brought in from other regions of the USSR, in particular from the Caucasus Mountains, to replace local breeds.
 - c. Strong pressure was exerted to improve feeding of livestock.
 - d. An energetic campaign was launched to modernize cowsheds.
 - e. Changes were made in the wage calculations of persons in charge of cattle and sheep in sovkhozes and kolkhozes: instead of paying them according to head of cattle in their care, rates were adapted to yields.
- 3. As early as 1955, results from these measures could be felt, not only with regard to quality, the declared objective, but

CERT	
	•

50X1-HUM

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/16:	CIA-RDP80T00246A053000430001-5
---	--------------------------------

all

SECRET

50X1-HUM

- 3 -

quantitatively as well. For example, in 1953 in the Namangan Oblast, one of the largest of the republic's seven oblasts, had had no more than 14,500 head of cattle, of which only 45 percent were milk cows. In 1955 the oblast had 18,500 head of cattle, 50 percent of which were milk cows. The average live weight increased from 180-200 kg per head to 300-350 kg. The average yield of milk per cow increased from 500-600 liters to 1,800-2,000 liters. As for sheep, in 1953 the Namangan Oblast had had 120,000 sheep with an average live weight of 35-40 kg and an average annual wool yield of 1.5-2.0 kg; in 1955 there were 130,000 head with an average live weight of 50 kg and an average annual wool yield of five to six kg.

4. The figures set forth in the preceding paragraph were taken from official statistics, as published by the Soviet Central Bureau of Statistics. These figures, however, overstate the facts by at least 10-15 percent, not through any action of the Bureau, but as a result of falsification on the part of the sovkhozes and kolkhozes. The reports submitted by the latter are deliberately distorted in their favor because they are afraid of Party reprisals. It had become routine to falsify figures on cattle and sheep mortality. Such conduct, which was the rule in all branches of agriculture, was

Stoot	




50X1-HUM

condoned by the local authorities who were also interested in presenting a favorable picture to their superiors - they would not even bother to verify the reports submitted to them.

- 5. There was, then, a considerable improvement in stockbreeding after 1953, although not to the extent claimed by Khrushchev on various occasions. The number of cattle and sheep had certainly increased in the Uzbek SSR and, consequently, also the production of meat and milk. (There was, however, still a serious shortage of meat, milk and butter, particularly in the small country towns.)

 In the light of the rise in the number of cattle and sheep in such a short time, it was decided at the end of 1955 to desist for the time being from further numerical increases, and to concentrate on consolidating the qualitative achievements by continued improvements in feeding and further development of breeds.
- 6. Until 1953 the stockbreeding plans had been worked out at high levels, and the sovkhozes and kolkhozes had to carry them out unquestioningly. Upon Khrushchev's rise to power it was announced that this method would be changed, and there was talk that from then on every sovkhoz and kolkhoz would work out its own stockbreeding plan, exactly as it would draw up its general farming plan. Printed



forms for planning according to the new method were sent to the collectives, but it soon became apparent that no genuine decentralization was intended. Almost all the kolkhozes in the Uzbek SSR submitted plans which completely ignored pig raising, limited cattle breeding to a bare minimum, and concentrated instead on sheep which are the easiest to raise under the geographic conditions of the region and therefore the most profitable. The Party immediately stepped in with the argument that to leave planning to the sovkhozes and kolkhozes would damage the interests of the state, thereby making it impossible to catch up with the United States; the collectives had demonstrated their lack of maturity and they therefore had to be guided. In the end, centralized planning was resumed and nothing at all was changed.

7. In the Uzbek SSR, only a small number of the total livestock were owned by individual holders; in the Namangan Oblast, the number did not exceed 10-15 percent of the total. Those who had their own livestock were workers on sovkhozes or members of kolkhozes. They were permitted to own one cow, one calf, and up to four sheep. Following Khrushchev's appeals that the collectives purchase cattle privately owned by their members, the sovkhozes and kolkhozes tried

<u>creet</u>

SFCOFT 50X1-HUM

to comply, but with little success. Instead of delivering their cow for half its worth to the collectives, members preferred to slaughter it, and the occasional sale of a cow was due to pressure. It is believed that the whole campaign for the acquisition of cattle from private owners did not spring so much from Khrushchev's intention to prevent profiteering, as from anxiety about the precarious state of stockbreeding which resulted from the high delivery quotas. In 1956, for instance, the district of Uch-Kurgan in the Namangan Oblast had to sell to the state 360 tons of meat - 180 tons as "compulsory delivery" (Goszagotovka) and 180 tons as "purchase quota" (Goszakup). At that time the district had a total of 3,200 head of cattle. In order to comply with this demand, the stock of cattle had to be depleted by some 500 head in this one year, an amount which could hardly be replenished by natural increases in the course of the next year.

8. In 1950 a kolkhoz merging drive (Ukrupnienie Kolkhozov) had been undertaken in the Uzbek SSR, aimed at eliminating small and unprofitable collectives. Most kolkhozes fell into this category, since they had been unable to deliver their quotas or to support their members. After years of work the members were receiving little

0. 11 0 De 1. 2 W	

SEUDET	are


more than 300 grams of wheat and 30-50 kopeks per working day (Trudoden). The establishment of the large kolkhozes did not bring about any improvement. On the contrary, the organization or work in large kolkhozes was more inefficient than it had been before, while the granting of loans - actually subsidies - which had previously been given to small, poor kolkhozes was stopped. Moreover, the amalgamation did not improve the cultivation methods and accordingly the fields did not yield more, while depreciation of equipment was even more rapid than on a small kolkhoz. The creation of large kolkhozes was admittedly advantageous to the government inasmuch as it facilitated quota collection, but not to the collectives or their members.

- 9. In 1956 it was decided to convert many kolkhozes into sovkhozes, probably because of the failure to improve the situation by means of the "Ukrupnienie". In the Uzbek SSR this conversion was carried out on a large scale. In the Namangan Oblast, for example, most kolkhozes were liquidated and transformed into sovkhozes in 1956 and 1957. In the Uch-Kurgan District, which had had 56 kolkhozes in 1943, only eleven remained by 1957.
- 10. In the Uzbek SSR kolkhoz members do not like the sovkhoz any more than they did the kolkhoz. In fact, they even preferred

SEPET	

50X1-HUM

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/16: CIA-RDP80T00246A053000430001-5



the kolkhoz because it left them a larger plot of land for their personal use, and this constituted practically their only source of support. Notwithstanding the long years of Communist rule, the Uzbeks have retained a strong sense of private ownership. Although they have lost all hope of recovering their land, they are still unwilling to work in a sovkhoz or kolkhoz. They do so because they have no choice, but it is only their private plot which they work with care and devotion. Collective activities are so inefficient that, during the two months of the cotton-picking season, part of the urban population must be mobilized for work, and all elementary, secondary and high-level schools in the Uzbek SSR are closed down, with the exception of the lower grades of elementary schools.

SEGRET		