TITOISM AND SOVIET COMMUNISM:

An Analysis and Comparison of Theory and Practice

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INTRODUCTION

1. The objective of this study is to compare the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)* with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as to both theory and practice, and then to appraise Titoism and its position in the Communist-Socialist world. Generally speaking, both have the same philosophy, dialectical materialism; the same "theory and practice," Marxism-Leninism; and the same basic objectives: overthrow of "bourgeois" rule, establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, abolition of capitalism, and the creation of a Socialist-Communist society. Moreover, the LCY in its development had to adhere to CPSU modes of operation, thinking and planning, since it was sustained and guided by the CPSU -- of which it was a product or derivative -- until 1948, when it was ejected from the Soviet-dominated community. Until that time it had been one of the Soviet Union's several East European satellite parties, obediently, amenable, and even

* For purposes of simplicity, the Yugoslav Communist organization will be referred to throughout this study as LCY, even when treating of periods when it was still known by its old name, Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). The designation "League" was adopted at the Sixth Congress in November 1952 in order to dissociate the Yugoslav CP from the CPSU and to underline continued allegiance to Marx and Engels, who in 1847 renamed their workingmen's association the "Communist League". The Serbo-Croatian word for "league" is often also translated as "union", "federation", or even "association". The Yugoslavs themselves use the English designation "League of Communists of Yugoslavia" in their publications in the English language (viz. Yugoslavia, published by "Jugoslavija", Belgrade, 1954, p. 70) rather than Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, which is the term used often by Western political observers of the Yugoslav scene.

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enthusiastically traveling in the orbit prescribed by the CPSU, in harmony with the other Soviet satellites. Until the break with the CPSU in 1948, the LCY had no distinctive official interpretation of the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice.

In this comparison of Titoism with Soviet Communism, where, solely for the sake of reducing the mass of data, more emphasis is put on differences than on similarities, one must not lose sight of the basic fact that Titoism, for all its conflict with the Soviet world, is and remains Communism.* The LCY, like all other national Communist parties, is essentially a product of the Russian October Revolution and of the Communist International. What has set it off from other Communist parties is that it dared to breach the rigid system of discipline subordinating it to the CPSU and the Soviet Union. As an entity of thought and practice, Tito's Communism differs in some significant respects from Soviet Communism, especially in the latter's manifestations

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* During his CBS TV interview on 30 June 1957 in reply to a question as to differences between the Yugoslav and the Soviet systems Tito stated: "We have the same aim, the building of socialism; only the ways, that is the methods of realizing this aim, are different."

** One, possibly the most significant, difference is the pragmatic Titoist approach to problems and a slight disrespect for ideological justification for policy decisions taken. In a speech to the First Congress of the Workers' Councils Tito stated: "We have not the least need to justify theoretically, from a Marxist point of view, the correctness and extraordinary efficacy of this system /i.e., the system of the Workers' Councils/, for it has proved its worth in practice." (Tanyug, Belgrade, 25 June 1957) /Note: All underlining and all bracketed interpolation in quotations throughout have been supplied by the author of this study./

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under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. To what extent the post-Stalin brand of Soviet Communism will eliminate or ameliorate these differences remains a matter for conjecture, since the "new line" is yet in the process of crystallization. Tito himself, as indicated in the quotation from Borba cited on page 12, claims to see a tendency on the part of the new Soviet leadership to swing over to his own less rigid views in some important respects. He and his three highest and most vocal associates, Vice Presidents Kardelj and Rankovic and Foreign Minister Popovic, seem to realize quite clearly that Stalinist habits practiced for years and ingrained in the whole fabric of the Soviet Party and government apparatus will be very hard to put aside, given even the best intentions on the part of the Soviet leaders, and he knows that he cannot count on the good will of some of the high-ranking Soviet officials.* He is also fully aware of the fact that Stalinism has permeated not only the whole of Soviet life, but also the whole International Communist Movement, and that Stalinist influences from abroad will continue to reinforce Stalinist habits and inclinations in the Soviet Union.

Domestically, Titoism advocates modification of the dictatorship of the proletariat by reducing the centralization

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* Some of these anti-Yugoslav Soviet officials were removed during the 3 July 1957 purge, i.e., Molotov and Kaganovich. However any Soviet official who is inclined to stress ideology particularly heavily is a potential hater of Titoism.
of power and by curtailing bureaucratic concentration.* It takes exception to the Soviet practice of "state capitalism" and advocates transferring ownership of the means of production to representative bodies of the workers at the working level. It criticizes the role of the Party in the Soviet system and the harsh, arbitrary aspects of Stalinist policies. On the other hand, even sympathetic observers in the European Social Democratic camp concede that there is still a gap between what Titoism advocates and what actually exists in Yugoslavia. They also express doubt as to the validity of Tito's solutions in many aspects. The Party, or rather the self-appointed leadership of the Party, is still the arbitrary ruler of the land, having given very few signs of relaxation, and the style of rule is still repressive and coercive. This repressive character of the Yugoslav system persists despite the official liberal-sounding pronouncements on decentralization of state power -- depriving the Party of its executive function, and turning the administration of the industrial establishments over to the workers. The extent of Titoist liberalism has been recently clearly delimited by the fate of a critic of the regime, M. Djilas, who received a prison sentence for daring to speak his mind and for foretelling the beginning of the end of Communism as evidenced in the Hungarian revolt.

* Since the XXth CPSU Congress, "decentralization" is also on the Soviet agenda. The Soviet "decentralization", however, is coupled with centralization (a) through Party channels and (b) raising of the authority of the Gosplan. Thus the net effect of the Soviet "decentralization" is small and does not approach the actual decentralization of state authority in Yugoslavia. It may, however, come close to it if, as some reports have it, more central control will be introduced in Yugoslavia at the VIIth LCY Congress in April 1958.
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The differences between Titoism and Soviet Communism appear most clearly in the field of international relations and foreign policy. Tito has rebelled against the utilization of national Communist parties and movements as instruments of Soviet policy. He recognizes neither the obligation nor the duty of the individual Communist parties to serve primarily as adjuncts of the CPSU and the Soviet state, and only secondarily as domestic political movements. As a result, Yugoslavia is the only Communist-ruled country with an independent foreign policy. Although this makes for one of the most distinguishable features of Titoism -- and Titoism does unquestionably stand for an independent foreign policy, a policy made in Belgrade and not in Moscow -- this feature should not be overemphasized. For this foreign policy is very often identical or almost identical with the Soviet foreign policy, especially as it pertains to East and Southeast Asia, Near East, Africa, and South America. Just the same, Tito does not recognize the thesis of the "capitalist encirclement" of the Communist heartland, the Soviet Union, and rejects the principle of central direction of the international workers' movement. He advocates that each national workers' party be the equal of its brother parties and be allowed to develop its own policies according to the needs and circumstances of its own working class.

In adapting Lenin's principle of violent revolution to present world conditions, Tito insists (possibly for tactical reasons only) that violent revolution is no longer an absolute and irreducible requirement for the progress of peoples along the road to Socialism and ultimate Communism (in the Marxist sense), and concedes that progressive development in this direction is quite possible (and in some areas indeed a fact) under the bourgeois multiparty system. Tito, in his revolt against Soviet imperialism, has even gone on record against the reduction of the International Communist Movement to a Soviet conspiracy. But (and this must not be overlooked) Tito has not entirely renounced the principle of violent change and he certainly advocates its application if absolutely necessary to socialist development. The fact that he preaches moderation and
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coexistence, even to the extent of accepting the thesis of evolutionary development, is probably based more on his revolt against the CPSU than on basic convictions; that he does not claim for the Yugoslav Communist movement a dominant role in the world revolutionary movement is no doubt due more to a realistic appreciation of Yugoslavia's limited potential at the moment than to any altruistic motives on his own part. With specific reference to his attitude toward the United States, for example, he advocates a change in its form of government, society and economy. He differs from the Soviet stand in essence only in that he does not require that the change be violent--violence is necessary only if change or progress toward change cannot be brought about in any other way.

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

2. In the two years since the first formal step to normalize Yugoslav-Soviet relations was taken on 2 June 1955 (the Belgrade Joint Declaration) it has become clear that the distinctive character of Titoist domestic policy is solidly established and that neither Soviet blandishments nor threats can sway Yugoslavia from its own distinctive "road to Socialism", a road mapped out during the period of Soviet cold war against Tito, 1948-1955.*

* In an interview granted to Dr. Thomas Dehler, member of the West German Parliament, Vice President Vukmanovic stated that while "state relations" with the Soviet Union can be maintained and even improved, the relations "on the ideological front" are expected to continue to be "poor". (Borba, 1 June 1957.) In a speech before the First Congress of the Workers' Councils, 25-27 June 1957, Tito stated: "It is impossible to speak of good and sincere relations between ourselves and some Eastern countries if mere lip service is paid to good relations with Yugoslavia while inside instructions are issued on the other side to party members and the broad masses that Yugoslavia is seething with revisionism, that this country is not socialist, that it cooperates with the imperialists to the detriment of the socialist states...we cannot be lulled by words while practice is different." (Tanyaug, Belgrade, 25 June 1957.)

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3. In tracing the origin of Titoism we have to conclude that ideological differences had very little to do with its emergence as a distinct doctrine. Although ideological reasons were given for Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 and for its condemnation as a "fascist" state in 1949, Yugoslavia's only "sin" was its resistance to Soviet practices aimed at dominating Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia "erred" in 1948 because it did not wish to subordinate Yugoslav interests to Soviet interests and because it did not acknowledge that the Soviet Union was solely responsible for the direction of the International Communist Movement. The Yugoslavs realized this clearly from the very beginning. In their 29 June 1948 "CPY Statement to the Cominform" they rejected the accusation of having committed ideological errors and termed this accusation "absurd", "ridiculous", and "invented". In their 1951 White Book, the charge is made that the Soviet Government was not willing to establish relations with Yugoslavia which would be based on equality and mutual respect for independence and sovereignty. On the contrary, the facts show and the White Book produces these facts in abundance that it was precisely the persistent endeavors of the Yugoslav Government and peoples to establish such relations with all countries that became an obstacle to the Soviet Government in implementing a policy of imposition of its will on the other peoples and subordinating independent socialist countries to its hegemony.*

In 1948 two factors combined to cause a rupture of friendly relations between the LCY and the CPSU, the latter obediently backed by all its other satellites. These factors were (a) an abrupt tightening of the Soviet East European policy, and (b) the unorthodox

tendencies of the LCY leadership, developed during the fight for Yugoslavia's liberation and socialization -- tendencies which came to the fore only in the situation created by the stiffened Soviet policy for East Europe.

a. The old Soviet policy, which applied during the time of friendly Yugoslav-Soviet relations, 1945-1948, was aimed at the establishment of regimes in East Europe fully controlled by the respective Communist parties. Special effort in this direction was unnecessary in Yugoslavia because it already had, since the end of World War II, a regime controlled exclusively by the Communist Party.* By 1948, however, the Communist parties of the various East European satellite states had consolidated their control over their respective countries; they were now ready to enter upon a new, "higher" phase of Communist development involving Soviet domination and coordination of the political and economic structures of the satellite states. This new phase -- the process of Bolshevization -- required that the East European satellite Communist parties recognize more than ever the principle of the "leading role" of the CPSU. This principle, as interpreted by Stalin, required that those who acknowledged its validity, willingly and fully submit to detailed direction of their internal development.

* Although there was no reason for the Soviet Union to interfere to any particular extent in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Communists had been permitted generally to run their own affairs and to solve their own problems, the Soviet Union did interfere frequently in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia in order to check up independently on developments there and in order to show the Yugoslavs that the CPSU and the USSR had a privileged position in the International Communist Movement.
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by Moscow and closely pattern their forms after the Soviet model. This change in Soviet policy evoked some controversy in the satellite Communist parties, where some leaders reacted "nationalistically" against Soviet domination; for example, Kostov in Bulgaria, Xoxe in Albania, Gomulka in Poland, and Rajk in Hungary.*

b. Among the satellite Communist parties, the Yugoslav CP was from the outset the one most likely to resist Soviet interference in its internal affairs, because it (1) had enjoyed a long period of quite loose association with Moscow, **(2) was used to solving its own problems,

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* The statement that the changed Soviet policy for Eastern Europe caused the Soviet-Yugoslav controversy can be (and has been) challenged by some students of Eastern Europe. The point made by those who do not agree with the statement is that the situation in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe caused the Soviet policy on Eastern Europe to change. However, this view is hardly tenable when it is noted that everything that was cited against Yugoslavia in 1948 dates back not only to 1945 but also to the days of World War II. This seems to indicate that the reason Yugoslavia was not accused of "deviation" before 1948 was that the Soviet policy prior to that time tolerated behavior which a changed Soviet policy had to call deviationist.

** This loose association with Moscow dates back to 1937, when Tito became Secretary General of the Yugoslav Party. Between 1937 and the outbreak of World War II, communications between Yugoslavia and Moscow were extremely hazardous and therefore infrequent; between 1939 and 1944 communications were not only infrequent, but almost entirely non-existent; between the end of the war and 1948 Yugoslavia was the least of the Soviet problems in East Europe and was granted a maximum of independence in her development, with a minimum of support and control.

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and (3) had succeeded in liberating and socializing Yugoslavia with but minimal assistance from the Red Army and the CPSU. Cut off from Moscow during World War II, the Yugoslav Communists had to rely on their own abilities and their own knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. When it became obvious that Stalin was concerned more with the defense of the Soviet Union than with the strengthening of the Communist cause in Yugoslavia (so much so, as a matter of fact, that he forbade any strong Communist activity in Yugoslavia in order not to alienate his Western allies), the Yugoslav Communists went against Stalin's orders, and without any advice or control from the CPSU, organized their own ultimately successful program. Having, on their own initiative, achieved independence and control, the Yugoslavs found the Soviet demand for total subordination both unattractive and degrading. Having accomplished so much in such a short time by their own effort, they felt quite capable of exercising autonomy in the affairs and policies of their own country. Moreover, they apparently did not believe that the Soviet Union would go so far as to take any really drastic action against them in retaliation for their defiance. It took two years of Soviet-directed disciplinary reprisals, including economic blockade, the encouragement of internal revolt, and the threat of invasion, before the Yugoslavs finally became convinced that the Soviet Union was ready and willing to destroy Communist Yugoslavia unless it submitted to Soviet direction.

4. The Soviet treatment of Yugoslavia during and after 1948 did not cause the Yugoslav leaders to doubt the validity of
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the basic doctrine of Communism,* however, it did prompt them to undertake a critical appraisal of the body of Communist thought,** in order to set forth those principles to which they themselves subscribed. The appraisal took two years, from 1949/50 to the end of 1952. In November 1952, at the Sixth Yugoslav Party Congress, the results of the study were adopted as the official doctrinal basis of

* According to Communist dogma, Marxism-Leninism leads to the solution of all international problems, including those pertaining to good relations between the various national states. The Yugoslavs point out that it was specifically the Stalinist interpretation and application of Marxism-Leninism, rather than the doctrine itself, which led to the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute. Cf. Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories (Belgrade, 1950), pp. 22-31.

** This appraisal was not a genuine search for final truths: its objective was not to review the essence of Communism, but to find in basic Communist texts ideological support for the Yugoslav position. The Stalinist principle of the "leading role" of the CPSU and of the Soviet Union had to be eliminated even if "justification" of it could be derived from Marxist-Leninist writings. Thus, efforts were made to find a Marxist-Leninist text which would condemn or undermine the "leading role" principle. Even before finding an ideological basis for condemning this Stalinist tenet, the Yugoslavs officially rejected the "leading role" principle. On 26 June 1950 in his speech before the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, Tito had this to say: "We deny the existence of any sort of leading nation. As soon as one allows that such a leading nation does exist, this fact itself inevitably leads to national oppression and economic exploitation by the stronger nation which has a monopoly over leadership." Tito then added, "This is such a simple matter that it is not necessary to talk about it much." (Ibid., p. 15.) Note that Tito does not here condemn the "leading role" principle specifically on the ground that it is contrary to Marxist-Leninist teachings.
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Yugoslav Communism. The principles adopted were amplified in subsequent statements made by Tito, Vice President Rankovic, and three top Yugoslav theoreticians: M. Pijade, E. Kardelj and V. Vlahovic. It should be noted here, however, that rigid, dogmatic ideological positions like those in the Soviet Union do not exist in Yugoslavia. Everything in Yugoslavia, including its version of Communist doctrine, is in "the process of becoming" or is to be "transformed gradually".

5. Titoist Ideological Views Compared with the Soviet Views. A general comparison of the Yugoslav and Soviet ideological views and systems of government was drawn by Tito in answering a question put to him by a member of the Sherwood Eddy Seminar on 2 August 1955. * When asked, "What are the essential differences between Soviet and Yugoslav Communism?" Tito said:

"This matter I would not put here as a question of essential differences between Soviet and Yugoslav Communism. I would rather refer to different systems in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, or the methods in which they are building their internal life and how we do it. Starting from this point, one can discover that there are differences and that they are quite big. However, this does not mean that these differences are of such a nature that a conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union is absolutely inevitable in order to exist. In the Soviet Union, the new leaders who have succeeded Stalin have come to the conclusion that in the world a single type of any system whatsoever

* See the August 1955 issue of Borba, the official news organ of the Socialist Alliance and the leading newspaper of the country.

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cannot rule, that in the world today there are many peoples with different historical backgrounds, and that it is necessary that every people should determine its own roads, and that no system can be forced upon them as a pattern to follow...."

It can be seen from this statement that the establishment of a Communist society is the objective of both states and both Parties, that only the methods of achieving it may differ, and that the sole cause of the quarrel was that the Soviet Union under Stalin did not allow each Communist-controlled country to use its own methods of achieving Communism, but insisted on imposing the Soviet pattern on all of them.

6. The general ideological position of the Yugoslav Communists is determined by the fact that they accept dialectical materialism as the only method by which all phenomena are to be investigated and assessed, and that they believe this to be the only realistic philosophy.* Marxist-Leninist theories are also listed officially as the theories to which the LCY subscribes. However,

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* "We are practical people..., we look for what we see with our own eyes, what has been empirically shown to be good, and we do not rummage through books just to see what is in them. What we find in them serves us as a guide in a dialectical approach to problems." Marshal Tito, in Borba, 3 August 1955.
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Tito's Marxism-Leninism* is described by Titoists as being not a "distorted Marxism, which tries to govern the masses in the name of ideas, but Marxism in its real sense, which understands people in their political activities, in their wishes and in their endeavors and so helps them to change the world."** In 1950 when proposing a new basic law on the management of the State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by the Workers Collectives, Tito had this to say about Marxism-Leninism: "Turning to Marx, Engels and Lenin, one can, in the main, find the answers to all problems in principle". *** Tito then added that the CPSU interprets Marxism-Leninism falsely. The differences between the Marxism-Leninism of the LCY and that of the CPSU will become more apparent as specific elements of Marxist-Leninist theory are compared.

* The term "Marxism-Leninism" is used here in its broad sense. It means the whole array of Marxist doctrines and concrete outlines for specific Communist actions and attitudes as worked out by Lenin. These pertain to: methods of seizing power, establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, economic policy during the transition from capitalism to socialism, utilization of non-proletarian classes (e.g., the peasants) for proletarian aims, combined the national and the colonial question with the question of international proletarian revolution, cohesiveness and discipline of the Party which alone can guarantee successful seizure and retention of power, etc.

** V. Bakaric, member of the Executive Committee of LCY, in a speech to the Croatian Federal Assembly on the occasion of Tito's 63rd birthday, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade, 1 June 1955).

*** Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 28.
7. World Revolution. Marx and Engels believed that the proletarian revolution would eventually assume world-wide proportions. Capitalism was the enemy of the working class throughout the world, and the interests of the proletariat transcended national boundary lines. Solidarity of action was urged by Marx and Engels.* Before the October Revolution in Russia, Lenin expressed the belief that revolution in any one country would be endangered unless supported by the proletarian movement in other countries; moreover, the first nation in which the proletariat came to power would be expected in turn to promote and foster revolution in other parts of the world.** After the establishment of the Soviet state, Lenin expanded on this line to the effect that the Soviet Union was now a powerful support base on which world revolution could continue to develop.*** In providing such a base for the other Communist parties, the Soviet Party itself came to play an increasingly active revolutionary role. The CPSU also attracted the various Communist parties because it was, at that time, the only Communist party continuously gaining practical experience in the development of socialism. It was but a short step, then, for the CPSU to formalize its position in a new doctrinal principle, which accorded to the CPSU and to the Soviet Union the "leading role" in the international workers' movement. In Stalin's ultimate interpretation of this "leading role" principle, the CPSU had the inherent right to direct and control the various national Communist parties.


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Tito and the Yugoslav Party adhered to this principle and apparently were perfectly willing to follow the Soviet Union until after World War II. However, when in 1948 the Soviet Union wanted not only to lead, but actually to push Yugoslavia in the direction and in the manner the Soviet Union wanted Yugoslavia to go, Yugoslavia rebelled. As a result, the Stalinist principle of the "leading role" of the USSR and the CPSU ceased to be a part of the body of doctrine of the LCY. Tito stated, "We deny the existence of any sort of leading nation", and he referred to the Soviet Union as "a so-called leading nation." Starting

* In his report to the National Assembly on 31 March 1947, Marshal Tito had this to say concerning Yugoslavia's willingness to follow the Soviet lead: "Yes, Yugoslavia, and the other countries of the East as well, are going together with the Soviet Union, but they are going with it precisely because they know that it did not threaten their independence..." Whitebook on the Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania Toward Yugoslavia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 1951), p. 13.

** Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 15. Similarly, Vice President A. Rankovic, in commenting on the submission and publishing of the draft of the new Party statutes in all leading Yugoslav newspapers on 14 November 1952, said, "It was necessary to destroy among us the illusion of some leading role of...the All-Union Socialist Party in the international workers' movement."
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with this revision of Stalinism*, the Yugoslav Communists eventually evolved the following position on world revolution and on international cooperation among workers' movements:

What matters is not world revolution per se, but the development of socialism. This development can take place and is taking place to some extent -- in all countries where the working class is not being suppressed outright -- under many diverse political systems. Socialism is often developed by non-Communists, by non-Marxists, and even by non-Socialists. The development of socialism can be speeded up by having all the workers' movements cooperate with each other. The only way in which these movements can be brought together under modern conditions is by free association. Voluntary recognition of a socialist community of interest -- not central direction -- will bring about the broadest unification of effort aimed at the development of socialism throughout the world. Titoism,** in effect, proposes to remove from

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* This term is used to denote the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin as dogmatically interpreted by Stalin, and as imposed by him on the International Communist Movement. The term denotes in particular the theory and practice connected with Stalin's personal dictatorship -- "one man rule" -- over the CPSU, the Soviet State, and -- under the guise of "the leading role" of the CPSU -- over the International Communist Movement as a whole.

** The term "Titoism" used in this study stands for: (1) the Yugoslav Communist revolt against Stalinism and (2) several distinctive doctrines pertaining to methods which are to be used in the building of Socialism and Communism. These doctrines were officially made part of Titoism at the Sixth CPY Congress in November 1952 and are outlined in paragraphs 8 to 16, below.

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Communism the stigma of conspiracy and of serving the interests of a foreign power.*

As a result of the 1955 rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the present Soviet leaders give the appearance of having adopted a new approach to relations with other Socialist states. In effect, they are making what might be described as concessions in the direction of Titoist thinking on the problems just discussed. According to the official declaration growing out of the conference of the heads of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in Belgrade in May-June 1955, the two governments adopted as a principle to guide their future relations "mutual respect and non-interference in one another's internal affairs for whatever reason, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, inasmuch as questions of internal organization, difference of social systems and difference in the concrete forms of socialist developments are exclusively the concern of the peoples of the respective countries."

The Cominform journal, For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, 22 July 1955, carried an article entitled, "For the Development of Friendly Relations Between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia", from which the following pertinent passage

* Cf. for example the Borba account in the issue of 3 August 1955, of the interview on 25 July 1955 between Tito and members of the Sherwood Eddy Seminar. The most concise and clear presentation of this Titoist view has been made by V. Vlahovic, president of the Commission for International Relations of the Socialist Alliance. Cf. "On Forms of Cooperation between Socialist Forces", in the LCY theoretical journal Komunist, Belgrade, No. 6/7, 1950.
is quoted:

"As Lenin pointed out, all nations will come to socialism -- that is inevitable -- but they will not come to it in quite the same way. Each will make its own specific contribution to one or another form of democracy, to one or another variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to one or another rate at which the socialist transformation of various aspects of social life is effected. The historic experience of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies shows that, given the primary and fundamental matter of safeguarding the victory of socialism, different countries can employ different forms and methods of dealing with the concrete problems of socialist construction, depending on their distinctive historical and national features."

That the Titoist stand on these very problems remains adamant, in spite of the relaxation of tension between the two countries, is evident from an article which appeared on 17 November 1955 in Borba under the title, "Wrong Conception". Borba takes strong exception to an article which had appeared on 13 November 1955 in the CPSU organ, Pravda, and quotes the Pravda article in part as follows:

"The workers of Yugoslavia are soon to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The freed people, full of energy, are strengthening and developing great achievements. And they have ample conditions for that purpose. The existence of the political authority of workers and peasants, the industry and transport, the development of friendly ties with the USSR and countries with People's Democracy -- these are the decisive conditions of a successful development of Yugoslavia on the road to socialism."
Borba countered:

"Yugoslavia highly appreciates cooperation with the Soviet Union, considering it to be of great mutual interest as well as of positive significance to peace..., however, this does not contradict the fact that the internal factors are the decisive conditions of further internal development of every country. Consequently, the thesis put forth in the latest Pravda article, according to which the development of friendly relations between Yugoslavia on the one hand and the Soviet Union and the countries with People's Democracy on the other hand, constitutes one of the decisive conditions for the successful development of Yugoslavia on the road to socialism, is mistaken.... In this connection we would like to recall the Tito-Bulganin Declaration in which it was emphasized that the question of internal order, different social systems and different forms of the development of socialism are a matter of exclusive concern to the peoples of individual countries.... From this follows that...socialist development of any country is a matter of its organic internal development."

The Yugoslav communiqué of 3 August 1957 on the Soviet-Yugoslav talks of 1 and 2 August makes it appear that Tito's positions have been accepted by Khrushchev, at least in public statements.

8. Violent Seizure of Power. Stalin taught that violent proletarian revolution was inevitable and that "peaceful" development was conceivable only in "the remote future" after the most important capitalist states had been captured by the
proletariat (i.e., by the Communist Party).* He condemned the "reformist" (evolutionary) approach and praised the revolutionary approach — the use of reforms as a cover for illegal work to prepare the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.** The Titoist approach to this problem, in its realism, is an extension of the basic teachings of Marxism-Leninism adapted to local and prevailing socio-economic conditions and is to a certain extent in direct conflict with the body of rigid "Leninist" interpretation as promulgated and commented upon by Stalin. Tito's biographer, V. Dedijer, says, "No progressive movement should once and for all renounce the philosophy of the revolutionary path..., but no one should make a revolution just for the sake of revolution. If the advancement of society, that is to say, the solution of economic, social and political problems, can be achieved without revolutionary means, so much the better."*** Although Dedijer has since been expelled from the Party, this view has been supported by other leading Yugoslav Communists. R. Colakovic, member of the LCY Central Committee, has this to say on the subject: "In order to achieve its aim as a class, the working class must -- in one way or another -- destroy the power of the bourgeoisie, establish its own rule and transform the means of production into social property. This can be achieved through violent class conflicts -- through civil war -- as has been the case so far wherever the working class has taken power, or through parliamentary methods which should not be excluded as


** Ibid., pp. 103-104.

*** V. Dedijer, Tito Speaks, p. 435.
a possibility under specific conditions in certain countries...."*
This latter point is recognized by Vice President E. Kardelj as
applying to the evolutionary approach used by the workers in
Scandinavia to gain power. In a statement made in February
1952 before the Fourth Congress of the Socialist Alliance of the
Working People of Yugoslavia, Kardelj said:

"The road to power of the working classes and
the Socialist forces is not the same in all countries.
Where strong democratic institutions and firm demo-
cratic traditions exist, every political advance made
by the workers brings them face to face with the ques-
tion of socialist reconstruction. But where internal
tensions and strained political relations render a policy
of compromise impossible, where the ruling classes
will not grant concessions to the workers, the labour
movement may have recourse to revolutionary means
in order to secure its rights and attain its social
objectives. If we were to prescribe one particular
method for every country, irrespective of existing
conditions, we would soon find ourselves in conflict
with reality. Socialists must employ the tactics which
correspond to the actual situation in which they are
conducting their struggle."**

Thus, while Titoism justifies the revolutionary and violent
seizure of power in non-democratic Russia and non-democratic
Yugoslavia, it also accepts the non-violent approach, e.g., in
the Scandinavian countries.


** Socialist International Information, London, 4 April 1953.
9. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat. According to Lenin, a true Marxist accepts the dictatorship of the proletariat as the only form of government under which socialism can be developed. Lenin states that a Marxist is "one who extends the acceptance of the class struggle to the acceptance of the dictatorship of the proletariat." This is what distinguishes a Marxist from a petit bourgeois.*

Titoism applies the same definition of a Marxist when referring to the internal Yugoslav situation. On the other hand Titoism teaches also that, while the dictatorship of the proletariat may be established in some countries, it need not necessarily be established in all countries which are building socialism. Vice President E. Kardelj says:

"It would be senseless to lay down for all countries in which the working class is in power the same course of action to attain socialism. The bourgeois democratic multiparty system is one possible method of advancement. It is suitable for countries with deep-rooted democratic traditions where internal conflicts have not developed to extremes. In countries where conditions in this respect are different, various forms of revolutionary dictatorship may be preferred. This applies in particular to countries with backward social and economic structure. Yugoslavia belongs to a considerable extent to the latter group of countries. In our country internal conflicts used to be very acute, and no other way than the revolutionary one was open to the working class and the progressive democratic forces."**


10. The Bourgeois State. Lenin and Stalin taught* that the workers could not merely take over the bourgeois state and operate it for the establishment of socialism. They taught that the workers must "smash" the bourgeois state and replace it with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Civil liberties, which Lenin recognized as existing in some bourgeois states, were not to be taken as an excuse or basis for renouncing or dispensing with the principles of violent revolution as a necessity on the way to the assumption of power by the proletariat.**

Titoism, on the other hand, concedes that, where the working class has a certain amount of power in "countries with deep-rooted democratic traditions", the advance toward the goal of socialism can be carried out even under the "bourgeois multiparty system". Implied in this statement of Titoist principle is the concession that violent destruction of the bourgeois state is not a basic necessity and that it is possible for the working class to achieve power under a system of parliamentary democracy. It should be noted that this concession in no way implies a renunciation of the need to resort to violence for the accomplishment of Communist aims, if the particular national situation so requires, but it does represent


** Cf. M. Fisher, Communist Doctrine and the Free World (Syracuse University Press, 1952), Chapters VIII and IX, which includes numerous source citations.
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a distinct divergence from the Soviet stand of the Stalin period that violence is required, no matter what the circumstances might be. *

11. The Withering Away of the State. According to Tito, Stalin modified the teachings of Marx and Engels concerning the withering away of the State.

"First of all, Tito says he added two conditions to Engels' formulation on the withering away of the State, saying: 'Is this proposition of Engels correct? Yes, it is correct but only on one of two conditions: (1) if we study the socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of the country...; or, (2) if we assume that socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a Socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist encirclement, that there is no more danger of foreign attack, and that there is no more need to strengthen the Army and the State....' In 1939, it could really be said that the Soviet Union was entirely surrounded by capitalist countries. But after the Second World War, when a whole series of new Socialist states emerged in the proximity of the Soviet Union, there could no longer be any question of the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union. To say that the functions of the State as the armed force, not only of the Army but also the so-called punitive organs, are directed only outward means talking with no connection with the present situation in the Soviet Union. What is the tremendous bureaucratic, centralized apparatus doing? Are its

* This aspect of the Titoist view has already been documented in the two preceding paragraphs.
functions directed outward? What are the NKVD and the militia doing? Are their functions directed outward? Who deports millions of citizens of various nationalities to Siberia and the Far North? Can anyone claim that these are measures against the class enemy...?*  

Titoism avers that the State, the dictatorship of the proletariat, should begin to wither away as soon as it has nationalized the basic means of production and distribution. This view, according to Tito, is in accord with the teachings of Lenin, whom Tito quotes as follows: "The proletariat needs state power, a centralized organization of power, an organized force, for suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and for leadership of the great masses of the population, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, semi-proletariat, and also for the establishment of Socialist ownership. 'But it should not be forgotten,' says Lenin, quoting Marx, 'that the proletariat needs only the state which is withering away.'"** Nevertheless it should be pointed out that Tito has not drawn any substantial practical consequences from this position.***  

12. The Party. Tito criticizes the Stalinist concept of the Party and its role, while indirectly describing the functions of the Party as he conceives them himself, in the following words:

"How does Stalin present the question of the role of the Party in relation to the state?"

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** Marshall Tito, _Workers Manage Factories_, p. 23.

*** According to Milovan Djilas the essence of a Communist system, including the Yugoslav, is the exercise and maintenance of totalitarian power of the ruling Communist "class." The concept of the "withering away of the State" is therefore meaningless. (See Milovan Djilas, _The New Class_, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1957).
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In his works he never determined the role of the Party in the first phase of Communism, i.e., Socialism. He reduces the role of the Party to administration of a state apparatus which still bears the stamp of class society. Therefore, it is no wonder that, in the Soviet Union, the Party is becoming more and more bureaucratic and is growing to be part and parcel of the bureaucratic state apparatus, becoming identified with it, and simply a part of it. It is therefore losing all contact with the people and with those things which should be occupying it. Its duty is to be the organizer and most active participant in all political, cultural and economic actions, to take active part in all fields of social activity and to keep a check on the same, to increase the enthusiasm of the masses by its own example. To reduce the role of the Party to being part of the bureaucratic apparatus, a part of the state machinery of coercion, for the implementation of various enforced measures—all this is contrary to the teaching of Lenin on the role of the Party in the first transitional period as leader and educator, and not as persecutor.

* Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 30. Later statements by responsible Party officials in the same vein are found in the LCY theoretical journal Komunist, and are published as resolutions of the various Party congresses, plenary sessions, and meetings on lower Party echelons. The results of one such session bearing on the role of the Party, namely the Second Central Committee Plenum of the Slovene League of Communists on 17 March 1955, were published in Komunist, No. 4, 1955.
According to Titoism, the role of the Party was defined by Marxism-Leninism only up to the point where it seized actual political power in a country; regarding any subsequent role, only a very general reference is made by Lenin to the Party's having an educational role. But it is logical, the Titoists say, that the power of the Party under the system of a dictatorship or rule of the proletariat, i.e., after the seizure of power, is just as much subject to the process of withering away as is the power of the state. After the dictatorship of the proletariat is firmly established, the "military" power of the Party is to be transferred gradually to the state; the "political" power of the Party is to be transferred gradually to a broad front composed of all the mass social organizations in the country--in the case of Yugoslavia, to the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. Only the "ideological" power is to be retained by the Party indefinitely, or until the country is fully communized.* The ideological monopoly of the Party, however, is a considerable coercive instrument, as Djilas correctly points out in the The New Class. Transference of functions to the state or front organizations can hardly be evaluated as a withering of the Party which controls both the state and the front organizations.

13. Nationalization. In conformity with orthodox Communist doctrine, Titoism holds that the first thing the proletariat should do upon its seizure of power is to nationalize the basic means of production and distribution. In Marxist-Leninist language this is known as "the establishment of Socialist ownership." According to Titoist teaching, nationalization is the lowest form of socialization; the nationalized property has next to be transformed into truly socialized property by allowing the actual

* See Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 30.
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producers to manage and administer that property. Failure to
bring the workers into the administration of the properties on
which they are engaged in productive work, introduces what
Tito calls the system of state capitalism which exists in the
USSR. The opportunity of developing socialized relations
among the workers is afforded only when the workers are
at the same time in charge of the administration of the factories
and mines in which they work. * After the Soviet-Yugoslav
rapprochement in 1955, however, Tito ceased to attack the
Soviet system as state capitalism. Further, the concept of
workers' participation in the management of socialized
means of production needs to be scrutinized closely to
determine whether it is substantive or merely formal.
Djilas, in the book cited, maintains that it is formal.

14. Collectivization. Titoism agrees with orthodox
Marxism-Leninism that collectivization of the farms is an
absolute necessity if Socialism is to develop in the country-
side. According to Tito, the main reason collectivization
is not being pushed in Yugoslavia at the present time is that
Yugoslav industry is not now capable of producing the farm
implements (tractors, combines, etc.) which would make
collective farming profitable. The determination to
collectivize farming eventually was expressed by Tito in
mid-summer of 1955, although he said this would be done
"gradually." ** In distinction from Stalinism, Titoism
professedly desires to induce the development of collectivi-
ization without resort to coercive methods such as have
been employed throughout the Soviet orbit and intends to
push it full speed ahead only when Yugoslav industry is


** Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, August 1955.
able to support it. Strong peasant resistance to collectivization was probably an equally important reason for not pushing collectivization during the difficult period of resisting Stalinist aggression and of cold war tactics. Tito at that time needed desperately the fullest possible support of the broad masses of the Yugoslav population, of which the peasantry is the largest part. He would not have received this support under conditions of forced collectivization.

15. Socialization. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, the economic instrument of socialization of relations among the workers is conversion of private means of production into "common property" or its transfer to "public ownership".* Tito ** and Kardelj *** both criticize the Soviet view that "state ownership" of the basic means of production is the "highest form of social ownership" and claim that such a view misrepresents Marx and Lenin. They insist that nationalization of the basic means of production does not in itself bring about socialist relations among the workers; nationalization alone introduces only "state capitalism", not socialism. "Common property" and "common interest" are introduced into nationalized property only when "every individual worker participates" in the


** Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 25.

management of factories and other economic organizations". Again, the actual extent of worker participation would be the acid test of this position.

16. Democratic Centralism. The Leninist principle of "democratic centralism", which demands of the rank-and-file "iron discipline bordering on military discipline", * is the basis on which the Yugoslav State was organized. Titoists do not quarrel with that principle as such. They contend, however, that once a State establishes its defenses against external enemies, eliminates or disarms internal opposition to the extent that it becomes incapable of organizing counterrevolution, and nationalizes the basic means of production, "the conditions for the victory of socialism" are then achieved. ** The State should then immediately begin to wither away. One of the ways in which this should be done is through the decentralization of its powers. ***

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** Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 17.

*** Vice President Kardelj in his commentary on the meaning of the 1953 Fundamental Law (which is sometimes called the new Yugoslav "constitution"), admitted that this law, which among other things aims at decentralization of State power, would not in itself guarantee that there would be no "revival of the bureaucratic tendencies leading to bureaucratic forms and state-capitalist methods of administration", i.e., as in the Soviet system. A resurgence of the centralized Soviet-type of government can be blocked, according to the LCY principle of "democratic centralism". New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Union of Jurists' Associations of Yugoslavia, 1953), p. 49.
The central power in Yugoslavia, which is vested in the federal agencies, is to be reduced to bare essentials: foreign affairs, national defense, internal affairs (police), federal budget administration, and general national economic planning. The power formerly held at the federal level by such ministries as agriculture, education, industry, etc., is to be transferred to the six component Yugoslav republics. These republics, in turn, are to pass down to lower government levels as much of their power as is consonant with orderly administration and with the capability and responsibility of these organs. These lower organs are: (a) Regional People's Committees, (b) Communal People's Committees ("Communes", which are the basic administrative and social units in Yugoslavia**), and the two bodies of the workers' self-administration: (c) the Workers' Councils and (d) the Management Boards.***

* In addition to five federal secretariats (Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, People's Economy, People's Defense, and the Budget and State), there are numerous other federal agencies called "Administrations" (e.g., Federal Food Administration), "Offices" (e.g., Federal Patents Office), "Establishments" (e.g., Federal Establishment for Economic Planning), "Centers" (Center for the Rehabilitation of Disabled Workmen), "Commissions" (e.g., Federal Commission for Standardization), "Institutes" (e.g., The 'Boris Kidric' Institute for Nuclear Science) and "Councils" (e.g., Academic Council of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia).

** This reform was introduced country-wide on 1 September 1955.

*** This is outlined in a handbook called Yugoslavia, pp. 45-61, published by "Jugoslavija", Belgrade, 1954. The necessity for and the process of decentralization are described by Vice President E. Kardelj in his introduction to the New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia, pp. 5-50.
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The decentralization of administration, the establishment of the Communes and the creation of the Workers' Councils * are the three things which the Titoists claim to be their singular contribution to Communist doctrine on the methods of building Socialism after power is seized by the Party. ** These methods are hailed as superior to what the Yugoslavs used to call the "State Capitalistic Stalinist system". They will, Titoists claim, accomplish the following: (1) prevent the dictatorship of the proletariat from degenerating, as in the Soviet Union, into a dictatorship of bureaucracy, (2) prevent the rise of a bureaucratic class, (3) bring about true socialization of and in the nationalized industries by permitting the workers themselves to run the factories in which they work, (4) solve the conflict between the town and the village (both would be enclosed within a single Commune, which is the basic, i.e., lowest social unit recognized by the state), (5) start the process of withering away on the part of the State—a firm requirement of a true Marxist, socialist state, and (6) train the masses in self-administration, so that in time they will in effect administer themselves as responsible members of the basic social unit, the Commune. ***

* "Workers Councils" are elected by all the workers of each factory for the purpose of selecting the "Management Boards", supervising the management of the factories by these "Boards", and reporting to the workers.

** The Soviet press in reporting on the Yugoslav First Congress of the Workers' Councils, 25-27 June 1957, has treated the Titoist Workers' Councils rather sympathetically, but pains are taken to limit their applicability only to Yugoslavia.

*** This was outlined by Vice President E. Kardelj in the New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia and by Tito in his book entitled, Workers Manage Factories (Belgrade, 1950), pp. 9-43.
17. Conclusions. The preceding paragraphs have presented the more distinctive Titoist theories. Many of them place Titoism ideologically not too far from what might be called a Marxist Social Democracy. They appear to be free of many of those characteristics which Western liberals would find too rigid, overly aggressive, unappealing and disturbing in Stalinism. Life under a regime governed by Titoist theories might seem to be at least tolerable; freedom and democracy under a Titoist system might seem to be retained at least partially. A gullible, "progressive" Western individual who knows Titoism only as a set of certain theories might conclude that it is liberal, progressive and desirable. Even a shrewd liberal Western politician can so preoccupy himself with the Titoist theories and with Yugoslavia's insistence on independence that he may view Titoism with sympathy and consider it to be a system which is trying hard to introduce democracy and social justice.

In an article on "The Yugoslav Experiment" the following statements appeared.

"To put it, perhaps, in somewhat oversimplified fashion, one may say that they /the Yugoslavs/ adopt the opposite /stand on bureaucracy, labor and socialist relations/ to that taken by Russia....While doggedly maintaining the Socialist positions--and in this they are perfectly right, for it would be foolish of them to abandon what they have attained at such great cost--they reject neither the contacts nor the exchange of information, nor even collaboration with those who follow a different course and attempt to move towards progress in different ways....Having definitely broken with the bureaucratic centralism of Russian Communism, and placing confidence in the working masses, having dismantled the
whole structural edifice, they have transferred
to the 'collectives' (work councils) the manage-
ment of the enterprises. Thus, they have carried
out a considerable evolution of responsibility.
From a few isolated officials of the State, re-
spnsibility has been shifted to broad masses
throughout the country. Within the framework
of a Socialist economy, competition between
various nationalized industries plays an important
role....An economic organization of this kind
is bound to have political repercussions and the
most evident is a return to democracy."*

The foregoing appraisal of Titoism made in 1952 does
not reflect reality even now, five years later. The central
"structural edifice" has not been dismantled and the "return
to democracy" is hardly noticeable. LCY's own self-criticism
admits as much. Tito in a speech at Pula on 15 May 1955 tried
to disabuse "those in the West... who have been cherishing any
illusions... that we shall become something different from what
we are". ** LCY members who thought the time had come to
establish a democratic system in Yugoslavia and who stated that
"the only current and permanent goal is the struggle for democ-
rracy", were told by Vice President Kardelj that their concepts
were "foreign to the Socialist system as it is being developed
under our conditions," that such concepts were "borrowed
from the West, which has been developing and is developing
under quite different economic and general political conditions."***

* Socialist International Information, 6 December 1952.

** Borba, 16 May 1955.

*** Speech made at the Third LCY/CC plenum on 16 January 1954.
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Kardelj informed them that the multiparty system will not be introduced in Yugoslavia, even if every one of the proposed parties sets Socialism as its goal. On another occasion Kardelj stated: "Political democratization of a Socialist country presumes... the possibility of a struggle of thought, namely also the possibility of social criticism. But... there can be no doubt that a Socialist state has not only the right but also the duty to stand up against anti-Socialist criticism by administrative/police means". Various articles in the LCY theoretical journal, Komunist, state that Cominformist habits among the Yugoslav Communists are hard to break and that this interferes with the proper implementation of the new decentralization-socialization-liberalization program initiated in 1952.*

Comparison of Titoist theories with Titoist practices shows most strikingly that the theories are meant to reflect long-term goals of Titoism. For example, transfer of federal power to lower administrative units is to be done gradually; democratization to any noticeable extent will only some day be introduced; freedom is granted, but only within certain limits; the workers are at present only learning how they will manage factories in the non-specified future. Thus, much of what is set forth in theory is only perspective, general plan, intention, desirable goal, conditional promise, permitted variation from the pattern. Djilas in The New Class seriously questions the intent of Yugoslavia's ruling clique to alter the totalitarian regime significantly.

The Titoist theories pertaining to international relations were developed in reaction to those Stalinist theories.

* One such article appeared in Komunist, No. 4, 1955, and another in Komunist No. 9-10, 1955.

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and practices which Tito found unacceptable when applied against Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, a small and economically backward country, cannot honestly hope to lead the Communist world; it costs Yugoslavia nothing to reject plans which only the big USSR can have any hope of executing. Disavowal of any ambition to dominate the international workers' movement, to practice subversion, to interfere in the internal affairs of others, has nothing to do with what Titoism may or may not wish, but appears to be the result of a realistic appraisal of Yugoslavia's capabilities, as compared with those of the Soviet Union.

18. Western Socialist Views on Titoism. Among the most avid students of Titoism are Western Social Democrats, who are keenly interested in finding out how far Titoism has pulled away from Soviet Communism and in determining whether Communism of any type can be trusted. The Social Democratic appraisal of Titoism is in effect a comparison of Titoism with Soviet Communism. Thus, it is pertinent to this study to include the findings of representative types of Social Democrats. Given below are four such findings, made by members of the French, the Norwegian, and the Swedish parties. Of significance for the weighing of their commentaries on Titoism is the fact that the three parties concerned maintain good relations with the Titoists and periodically meet with them for the avowed purpose of exchanging 'socialist experiences'. These parties, therefore, have an excellent opportunity of getting to know Titoism in theory and practice.

a. French Social Democratic Appraisal of Titoism.

Albert Gazier, executive member of the French Socialist Party and former Minister of Information, says there are a number of obvious objections to Titoist economic doctrine. First, will the workers' councils be wise enough to appoint the most competent director and to
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dismiss the incompetent one? Will they not seek to distribute the profits immediately and neglect the future of the enterprise they administer? These questions are all the more urgent since most Yugoslav workers have only recently come from the land and are less trained and experienced than the French and the British workers. The second objection refers to the dangers of corporatism which are inherent in a system such as the Yugoslavs are introducing. It is not at all certain that the public interest will be adequately safeguarded by competitive enterprises, each pursuing its own interests. It is also to be feared that these enterprises may combine in order to avoid the disadvantages which might arise out of competition. The third objection is that industrial democracy may fail if at the same time a political dictatorship—or Communist Party domination in another form—is maintained. For instance, when the question arises of appointing a director, will not the Communist group in the enterprise concerned, by its influence and opportunities for action, play the decisive role, leaving the workers merely the semblance of power? In fact, the Yugoslavs are very reticent about the present role of the Party in the enterprises, although for the future they declare that the Party must wither away together with the state. The stated Yugoslav aim to establish a system of workers' control over industrial establishments is very far from being practiced today, despite the fact that Workers' Councils exist on paper at least.

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At present the role of the State in running Yugoslavia's industrial establishment is still predominant.*

Georges Brutelle, Joint Secretary of the French Socialist Party, SFIO, states that the following questions should be asked in assessing the value of Titoism: Was the Yugoslav Communist seizure of power by revolutionary means and the abolition of the former regime of benefit to the community, or did it profit the minority now controlling the state? Have the political leaders the support of the workers, and can they therefore claim to wield power in the name of the workers, or do they impose their dictatorship upon the workers? Is the regime tending toward the elimination of certain features peculiar to the revolutionary period? Do the leaders envisage the preservation of authoritarian power, or do they see freedom of thought and expression as their aim? The new Yugoslav constitution, reflecting the new Titoist doctrine outlined at the Sixth Party Congress in November 1952, should be studied; however, the character of a regime can not be judged by its legal

* "French Socialist View of the Industrial and Social Policy of Yugoslavia", Socialist International Information, London, 26 September 1953. This quote and those from the articles by G. Brutelle, T. Elster and K. Bjork are a condensed paraphrase of the original texts.

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documents, but only by its practices.

In the eyes of the Titoists, Brutelle continues, the retention of the initial revolutionary achievements takes precedence over individual liberties and a democratic structure of government. The Yugoslavs plan a gradual road to socialism involving first, nationalization of private property, second, transformation of society as a result of nationalization, and finally, democratization of society and government. Brutelle admits there are difficulties and obstacles on the way toward

* This "new constitution", called "New Fundamental Law Pertaining to the Bases of the Social and Political Organization of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Federal Organs of State Authority", is not actually a new constitution; it is likewise not a fundamental law; it does not revoke the old 1946 Stalinist Constitution. In effect, it merely indicates the desirable changes away from the Stalinist system which the Yugoslavs propose to introduce gradually. Kardelj describes this planned procedure as "permitting further gradual harmonizing of the whole Constitutional order with the principles which are now being established" ("Introduction" to the New Fundamental Law, p. 12.) For this reason, the "new constitution" does not reflect Yugoslav realities, but only the general aims of the Tito regime.

** In this connection, Kardelj has the following to say on the subject of democracy: "We are not democrats for the sake of democracy. We are democrats because we believe that Socialism is able to develop substance. And therefore our struggle for democratic methods in our social life is an integral part of our struggle for Socialism" (Speech before the Fourth Congress of the Socialist Alliance held early in 1953; "Titoism and the Contemporary World", NCFFE, March 1953). Even clearer expression of the
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Titoist democracy. There are remnants of Cominformist and even of reactionary forces among the Yugoslav Communists. The French know that where they control a community, they influence its members by persuasion and pressure. Often people join 'freely' in an action with which they do not really agree. Prison is not the only way to frighten people into submission. There is the fear of being

meaning of the Titoist type of democracy came from LCY/CC member R. Colakovic: "Democracy is always a form of class rule and its existence is always proof that there are antagonistic classes, one of which oppresses the other. History contradicts those who speak of some kind of pure democracy, above and beyond classes....Proletarian democracy differs in principle from all other democracies....It (proletarian democracy) will have to act 'dictatorial' towards the overthrown bourgeoisie whenever the latter attempts to endanger its rule by plotting or illegal means....Marxists consider democracy as the rule of a specific social class which gives it a specific substance in accordance with its class character. There is no pure democracy, and there can be none; there is no general type of democracy which people can achieve gradually while fighting against those obstructing its development. It is, in the final analysis, always determined by a given class so that its very existence means the oppression and non-freedom of one part of society. Democracy, and even Socialist Democracy cannot therefore be the ideal of the working class. It is only the means of achieving its class aims, of emancipating itself from class slavery, of abolishing all sources of exploitation and social privileges, all oppression of man by man, all rule....Democracy as a political category of class society, withers away with the Socialist State, the last State in history. And that is--to quote Engels--the 'leap of mankind from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom!' ".. ("Yugoslav Communists' View on Democracy", Socialist International Information, London, 20 December 1952.)

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suspect in the eyes of one's comrades or the fear of suffering setbacks at work or in one's career. It is unlikely that after only four years' break with the Stalinists, the Yugoslavs have rid themselves entirely of the influence of Stalinist ideas and methods.

b. Norwegian Social Democratic Appraisal of Titoism.

Torolf Elster, member of the staff of the Norwegian Labor Party's daily, Arbeiderbladet, asks whether Yugoslavia is going towards a democratic form of society. First of all, there has in fact been a development towards greater freedom of opinion and personal security--the atmosphere in Yugoslavia is entirely different from that which prevailed prior to the break with the Cominform. Although the Cominformists in Yugoslavia no longer represent a danger to the regime, the Cominformist mentality is still widespread and this may cause many difficulties. For the real issue today is not so much the direct political struggle for power, as the problem of making the Soviet-like system work under somewhat less rigid rules.

The Titoists are trying to develop a democratic system in an underdeveloped country, a feat not heretofore accomplished in any such country. There is the possibility that the way the Yugoslavs are going about accomplishing this may not further democratic developments in Yugoslavia but result

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in the consolidation of dictatorship.

Although a multiparty system seems practically impossible at present, one day the Yugoslav Communists will have to face the question of whether they are prepared to tolerate a political opposition. In the absence of such opposition, there can be no proper check on the activities of the rulers. Today, the Titoist regime may advance abstract arguments about the "withering away" of all parties as the final solution. But it is a contradiction in terms to proclaim that the need for the parties will disappear, and yet to continue, for any length of time, to prohibit parties other than that of the Communists. To prevent a permanent Communist dictatorship, an increase in the freedom of criticism and opposition is essential. *

c. Swedish Social Democratic Appraisal of Titoism.

Kaj Bjork, International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, observes that there are important differences of opinion on basic issues between the Swedish Social Democrats and the Yugoslav Communists. Although the teachings of Marx and Engels have had an influence upon Swedish Social Democratic thinking, the Swedes reject the rigid interpretation of Marxism represented by the Yugoslav Communists.

The Yugoslav Communists seem to agree that progress towards Socialism may well be possible within the framework of Western democracy and that a

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complete Socialist transformation can be achieved in some countries without resorting to violent class struggle. They even speak about elements of Socialism in some "bourgeois democracies".* This shows a greater flexibility in thinking than is usually met among Stalinists. But they still believe that democracy always represents the power of one class over other classes, and that the victory of the working class will bring about an altogether new form of democracy. Because experience has shown that power within a democratic state can be partly shifted from one class to another, it is incorrect to say that the State expresses simply the rule of one class. When the State limits the power of private capitalists (as it does in Sweden), it certainly does not do so in their interest, and when it becomes the instrument for the redistribution of the national income it does so in the interest of the working class. Also what the Titoists do not take into consideration is that the nature of the State is changing with the changes in power-relationship between classes within the modern democracies. The old means of coercion, such as the army, the police and the prisons, still remain but cannot simply be turned against one class in the interest of another. Furthermore, the Titoists do not realize that the nature of classes is changing by the emergence of new social groups and the improvement of the workers' position, so that one cannot simply speak of a bourgeoisie standing against a large proletariat. The Titoists fail to see that the role of ownership of the means of production is also

* This includes the United States.

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The Titoist regime is a one-party rule. Without denying that a one-party rule may be justified by historical necessities under special circumstances, it is still true that in the long run a one-party rule always implies the danger of suppressing progressive forces, the danger of tyranny and oppression. Economic and social freedoms cannot fully compensate for the lack of political freedom. What is more, it is not at all certain that under the Titoist one-party system the political and economic freedoms can be actually safeguarded. Since it must be difficult to correct abuses of power under such a system, it is hard to understand how the workers can be sure of maintaining their rights, however much the party in power (in this case the LCY) claims to represent their interests. The subjective wishes of the Communist leaders are not in themselves a sufficient guarantee that their judgement of the needs of the workers is the same as the judgement of the workers themselves. It may be claimed that the workers do not always understand their own interests and that the vanguard of the proletariat, i.e., the Communist Party) must take care of them. It may be different in Yugoslavia, but in Sweden Social Democrats have always felt deeply suspicious when the Swedish Communists have claimed to understand the interests of the workers better than the workers themselves. While the Yugoslav Communists are undoubtedly of much higher quality than the lamentable figures at present leading the Swedish Communist Party, it is hard to feel convinced that their point of view always represents the true interests of their following. It must be admitted that the Titoists have the backing of the majority of the people when
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they strive to maintain the independence of Yugoslavia, but it is not certain that they are supported by the majority in all their actions in the social and economic fields.

The Titoists claim that it is necessary to maintain one-party rule as long as large sections of the population could be incited by capitalist elements to resist Socialist reforms. But the crucial problem is this: can reforms retain their Socialist content if they are introduced by force and not by consent? The danger of an oppressive bureaucracy is a consequence of the use of force.

The Titoists claim that the LCY strives to identify itself with the wishes of the people and that the LCY may even withdraw from government administration while still maintaining a leading role in the country. Even so, the results will depend upon the good will of the Communists, which is a highly subjective factor. The assumption that the LCY, which will remain a relatively small group of people, will always strive in the right direction, seems to be based on a belief in the role of personalities which is hardly compatible with orthodox Marxism.

Parallels between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia not intended, the Yugoslav leaders may nevertheless one day find that an open fight between different political forces within the country may be a good corrective to bureaucratic tendencies. What may arouse some pessimism, however, is the fact that the Yugoslav leaders defend the one-party system not only by pointing to the special situation in Yugoslavia today, but
also by ideological arguments, which seem to imply that they regard a Communist one-party rule as the highest form of democracy on condition that it fight against bureaucracy and centralism. It is commendable to fight these phenomena, but it is impossible to regard a one-party rule as democracy, however well-intentioned it may claim to be.

19. The foregoing Social Democratic findings on Titoism are amplified by extensive data from other sources, particularly in the cited book by Milovan Djilas. These sources appear to agree that, while individual statements by the Yugoslav leaders and theoreticians have a certain tone of liberality and often appear to be in accordance with Western concepts of democracy, the Titoist regime in practice is a totalitarian system. This system stands for a firm resolution on the part of a small number of individuals in power that the Soviet concept of Socialism shall remain the objective at all times and under all circumstances and that it will be imposed on the country preferably with the people's consent or non-resistance, but if necessary, by naked power. This power exists for possible use in an extremely concentrated non-democratic form. It is a fact, for instance, that 25 functionaries of the LCY** hold 278 top legislative,

* Kaj Bjork's article was published in the Swedish paper Tiden, the Yugoslav paper Mejdunarodni Problemi, and in the Socialist International Information, London, 27 December 1952.

executive, political and social positions at the federal and republic level. This pre-empts all top positions in the Federal Assembly, all important permanent committees of the Federal Assembly, Federal Executive Council, State Secretariats, military establishment, police, intelligence service, Party, Socialist Alliance, press, trade unions, and all such positions (or similar ones) at the federal and republic levels.

PRESENT RELATIONS WITH SOVIET COMMUNISM

20. From the Western point of view the main characteristic of Titoism in theory and in practice has been its unquestionable independence of the Soviet Union. This held true throughout the whole period of the existence of Titoism and has been, in the opinion of many, its very essence. Four past events may, however, bear significantly on the independence of Titoism and also on its very existence. These events are: The normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav state relations (documented in the joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration made 2 June 1955 at Belgrade), the official Soviet adoption of Titoist policy on peaceful coexistence (adopted at the XXth CPSU Congress in February 1956), the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav Party relations (documented in the joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration made 20 June 1956 in Moscow), and the communique issued after the Tito-Khrushchev talks of 1 and 2 August 1957. All four of these documents describe a large area of common Soviet-Yugoslav and CPSU-LCY interests. Soviet actions, however, such as the September 1956 circular letter warning the East European Satellites not to follow the Yugoslav model of Socialism, proved that the above Soviet statements were only declaratory in nature. Tito recognizes them as such, and demands that they be followed by appropriate deeds.*

* In a speech of 25 June 1957 at the First Congress of the Workers' Councils Tito stated: "It is impossible to speak of good and sincere relations between ourselves and some Eastern countries if mere lip service is paid to good relations with Yugoslavia while inside instructions are issued on the other side to party members and the broad masses that Yugoslavia is seething with revisionism, that this country is not socialist, that it cooperates with the imperialists to the detriment of the socialist states...we cannot be lulled by words while practice is different." (Tamyug, Belgrade, 25 June 1957).
21. Probably the simplest way in which to determine whether Titoism remains independent is to observe its attitude toward certain established key policies. In accordance with these Titoist policies Titoism must:

a. continue to denounce Stalinist practices and forms in the whole Sino-Soviet bloc, particularly the principle of the "leading role of the CPSU and of the USSR";

b. continue to persist in refusing to join the known Soviet-dominated Communist and Communist-front international organizations like the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions; *

* As late as two years ago the Yugoslavs toyed with the idea that a new Socialist international organization may come into existence and Yugoslavia, together with other socialist and workers' parties, would be a member of it; this organization would have to be democratic, each member equal with any other member, and criticisms and suggestions made by the organization would be voluntarily accepted or rejected by the members. (This is in accordance with the "principle of voluntariness".) However, probably as a result of experience of the last two years indicating that the Soviets will continue to try to dominate other Communist parties, Yugoslav theoreticians began to stress the "principle of bilateralism." (Cf. Komunist, Belgrade, 21 June 1957.) Since the 1 and 2 August 1957 Tito-Khrushchev talks, this principle seems no longer to be stressed. Now stressed are "efforts aimed at gradually overcoming the split within the workers' movement and at achieving unity upon new foundations." (Komunist, Belgrade, 9 August 1957.) This should alert us to the danger of Tito rejoining the Soviet-led International Communist Movement. It should, however, not lead us to the conclusion that Tito has already done so. This can come about only "gradually" and on "new foundations", i.e., foundations consonant with rejection of the "leading role of the Soviet Union." "Numerous obstacles remain to be overcome." (Komunist, 9 August 1957.)
c. refuse to become a full member of the three known Soviet bloc integrating agencies; CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance), the Warsaw (military) Treaty, and the PCC (Political Consultative Committee);

d. denounce any foreign Soviet or Western policy which would result in clearly changing the East-West balance of power decisively in favor of either of the two blocs.

The above policies have been observed by Titoism since the 1948 break with the Cominform and were clearly evident during the uprising of the Polish workers in Poznan, during the VIIIth Plenum of the Polish party which brought Gomulka to power, and during the Hungarian revolution. According to a 6 August 1957 Borba article concerning the 1 and 2 August 1957 Tito-Khrushchev talks, Tito is convinced that Yugoslavia is "on the right road" in maintaining an independent policy and that if that policy were changed this would be "harmful not only to internal [Yugoslav] interests but to further socialist development, and would likewise not contribute to an easing of tension in the world."

The 29 June 1957 CC/CPSU resolutions provided a test for Titoism and the Yugoslav separate road to socialism. These resolutions ousted Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich for opposing the implementation of policies outlined in the XXth CPSU Congress and in the Belgrade and Moscow joint Soviet-Yugoslav resolutions. The resolutions of 29 June 1957 state that "Comrade Molotov, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, far from taking, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, measures to improve relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, repeatedly came out against the measures which the Presidium of the Central Committee was carrying out to improve relations with Yugoslavia... He opposed the fundamental proposition worked out by the party... on the possibility of different ways of transition to socialism in different countries, on the necessity of strengthening contacts
between the Soviet party and progressive parties abroad. "* On the surface, this reads like a Yugoslav interpretation of the "correct" international policy for the present time. It seems to indicate that Moscow has retreated from its position outlined in the 30 June 1956 CC/CPSU resolutions (attributing that earlier position to the influence of the Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovich "anti-Party group") in which the Tito-Togliatti idea of polycentrism was denounced. It seems to indicate that the Soviet Union wants to make a fresh start along the line initiated at the XXth CPSU Congress but subsequently impeded by Molotov's anti-Party group which tried to "drag the Party back to the erroneous methods of leadership condemned at the XXth Party Congress." Such a hopeful interpretation of the 29th June 1957 resolution was made by the Yugoslavs immediately after it was published in Moscow on 3 June 1957. **

Titoism as an ideological entity separate from the orthodox type of Communism was generated by the Soviet-Yugoslav power conflict. The realities of Soviet power in terms of relations


** "As regards the prospects of further development of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the latest events (i.e., the CC/CPSU resolutions) fortify the conviction that the changes which have taken place will go far to remove the vacillations and negative manifestations in international relations more rapidly which during various periods and various forms were evident in Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia not only after 1948, but also after the normalization of mutual relations. We expect that the further development of mutual relations will establish even more firmly the principles on which the declaration of the two governments of 1955 and the declaration on relations between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and of the Soviet Communist Party of 1956 were drawn up." (Belgrade, Tanyug, 3 July 1957.)
between East and West in general as well as between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in particular will determine whether Titoism will continue to exist in its present form, whether it will be discarded as an obsolete tactical weapon, or whether a mutual adjustment of Titoism and Soviet Communism will take place. Should the Khrushchev-Tito talks of 1 and 2 August 1957 actually be implemented by the Soviets, Tito would have no reason for refusing to become a member of the "commonwealth of socialist countries," a commonwealth of independent and equal Communist nations, held together by common basic ideology and a community of interests.

Several events since the 1 and 2 August 1957 Tito-Khrushchev meeting indicate that some progress has been made in the direction of Tito's reconciliation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, although it is still too early to state whether it will be permanent and irrevocable.

Diplomatic recognition of East Germany made Yugoslavia the first, and thus far, the only non-Bloc country to have extended diplomatic recognition to East Germany. This action, which only harmed Yugoslavia's political and economic positions in the West, must have been taken by Yugoslavia basically in the interest of the International Communist Movement and of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Tito's recognition of Kadar, who was put in power by Soviet bayonets, was a violation of the once 'principled' Titoist policy of non-intervention in internal affairs of other countries.

The lack of overt Yugoslav press criticism of anything Soviet since the 1 and 2 August 1957 meeting, must have been a result of that meeting. This lack of criticism of the Soviet Bloc has been coupled with sharpened criticism of the West. Although the Western NATO Pact had once been pictured as an unavoidable evil brought about to counter Soviet aggression, now the Communist Warsaw Pact is defended on the ground that it came into being only as a result of the aggressive policy of NATO.

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