

SECRET



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

ACSAN-43-73: sbm  
2 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VERIFICATION PANEL WORKING GROUP

Subject: SALT -- NAC Consultation on FBS

Concur in the message, as amended by the attached  
line-in/line-out comments.

*for H.R. Matthes*  
PAUL R. VON INS  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy ACSAN

Enclosure  
a/s

DISTRIBUTION:

25X1A Mr. Philip Odeen, NSC, 395-4985  
Mr. R.L. Garthoff, State, 632-3302  
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, ACDA, 632-0972  
Mr. Archie L. Wood, OSD(SA), 2E274, x70448  
Dr. James Wade, OSD(DDR&E), 3E120, x57840  
Mr. R.E. Shearer, OSD(ISA), 4D842, x54871

\*JCS and DOS reviews  
completed\*

Regraded Unclassified  
when reported from  
Classified enclosure

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO USNATO

SUBJECT: Consultations on FBS in SALT TWO

REF: USNATO 440 and 444

1. We are prepared to participate in further NAC consideration and discussion of handling of FBS problem in SALT TWO. ~~[out]~~ our posture will be one essentially of listening to and eliciting Allies views on various ways of handling this subject and their respective merits and demerits.

2. USREP should recall how discussion of this subject within SALT has developed and recapitulate position Soviets have taken. You should reemphasize that our fundamental objective in SALT TWO remains to deal in a satisfactory way with central strategic systems (SLBMs, ICBMs and heavy bombers) and to replace interim freeze with agreement which provides for satisfactory <sup>equivalence</sup> ~~[equality]~~ in these systems. ~~[The problem is whether and how we should deal with Soviet position that taking FBS into account is essential element of any agreement dealing with central systems.]~~

3. You should stress that US has not repeat not made up its mind on either substance or tactics of handling <sup>the FBS</sup> ~~[the]~~ question when SALT resumes. Allied views will be an important element in <sup>reaching the</sup> ~~[making up our minds on]~~ position we shall take, since we

~~SECRET~~

2

recognize central importance of FBS problem to our Allies. We do not wish to take lead in <sup>NAC</sup> ~~such~~ discussion except in sense of describing how situation has developed in past negotiations. We do not wish at this time to point to any particular way of dealing with this problem, on which either NAC or we will be frozen. What we wish is general airing of alternatives that our Allies see for handling this matter and their views thereon as general background for our own policy considerations. Needless to say, when, with benefit of this discussion, we adopt a concrete negotiating approach we would bring this before the Council.

*-- with timing and tactics left to our discretion --*

4. FYI. NAC endorsement of trying out a general non-circumvention formula some time in resumed negotiations would appear <sup>not difficult</sup> to ~~be~~ <sup>get, considering indications in</sup> ~~no problem in light of past discussion~~ <sup>but we do not wish to hurry this process.</sup> ~~The timing and tactics of exploring such an approach with the Russians would be left to our discretion~~ <sup>now</sup> We would not wish <sup>to NAC final</sup> to indicate support or rejection of such an approach. In final analysis, we would not rpt not wish NAC discussion to develop in such a way that we could not, should it appear necessary or desirable, come back to NAC with another approach should non-circumvention formula be unproductive in helping us achieve our SALT negotiating objectives. END FYI