

MEMCON DISSEMINATION

Number	Cabled	Touch		Number	Cabled	Touch		Number	Cabled	Touch	
		Touch	Filed			Touch	Filed			Touch	Filed
76	X	X	X	103	-	NODIS	X				
77	-	X	X	104	X	X	X				
78	-	NODIS	X	105	X	X	X				
79	X	NODIS	X	106	X	X	X				
80	-	X	X	107	X	X	X				
81	X	X	X	108	-	NODIS	X				
82	-	X	X	109	-	NODIS	X				
83		X	X	110		X	X				
84	X	X	X	111	-	X	X				
85	X	X	X	112		X	X				
86	X	X	X	113	-	X	X				
87	X	X	X	114		X	X				
88	-	X	X	115		X	X				
89	-	X	X	116	X	X	X				
90	-	NODIS	X	117	-	X	X				
91	-	X	X	118	-	X	X				
92	X	X	X	119	-	NODIS	X				
93	-	NODIS	X	120	-	X	X				
94	-	X	X	121	-	X	X				
95	X	X	X	122	-	X	X				
96	X	X	X	123		X	X				
97	X	X	X	124		X	X				
98	-	X	X ^{SCC}	125							
99	-	X	X ^{SCC}								
100											
101	-	X	X ^{SCC}								
102	-	X	X								

State Department review

SECRET/EXDISSALT TWO
SESSION I
A-125MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: December 20, 1972

TIME: 7:30-11:00 PM

PLACE: Restaurant Mere
Royaume

SUBJECT: SALT/CCD

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Lawrence D. Weiler

O. A. Grinevsky
V. V. Smolin

Grinevsky called in the afternoon and asked my wife and me to have dinner with him that evening. During the course of the evening, which was mostly filled with social conversation, the following items of interest were discussed.

I. NON-SALTCCD

Grinevsky commented that he did not see much of interest developing in the CCD during the next year unless the US changed its position on verification for a comprehensive test ban. He asked if this were likely. I said the US position remained unchanged. Grinevsky said some progress might be made on a chemical warfare treaty but that this would mostly be for the purpose of keeping the rest of the CCD happy and he did not regard it as a very important matter. He commented that when the CCD was in session, members of both SALT Delegations would probably be bothered by CCD Delegations seeking information since many of them regarded SALT as a legitimate subject of their interest. We agreed that it was important for both SALT Delegations to keep CCD delegation members at arms length and maintain the privacy of SALT.

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War Propaganda Convention and Zorin

Grinevsky remarked that US-Soviet disarmament negotiations were in a different stage now than in the early 1960's, with careful steady progress being made, noting that this was much different from the times when "poor Zorin" had to repudiate the agreed US-Soviet text of the draft convention on war propaganda in the early days of the ENDC. I said I had always wondered what had happened on that occasion and had assumed that the agreed text negotiated by Zorin and Authur Dean had been focused on by the Soviet leaders after it had been tabled in the ENDC. Grinevsky said I was wrong about this, that the turn-around occurred because in those days one man could make policy by himself. He said Khrushchev had personally approved the text of the convention the week before but in the following week had changed his mind and ordered Zorin to repudiate his own words of praise for the convention. I said that personally I had had misgivings about the entire effort because it could have raised questions about freedom of expression in the US. Grinevsky observed that no one but Zorin and the Soviet Delegation had really suffered from the Soviet turn-around.

Grinevsky then commented that it was interesting that Zorin had a reputation in Western countries as a somewhat disagreeable hardliner but that this reputation was not deserved. He said that Zorin's reputation was the result of his having been involved in a number of "unfortunate situations" where he had had to do and say things that had created a bad impression in the West but that Zorin, in addition to being very able, was a soft and considerate man and very different from the reputation he had acquired.

II. SALT

During the evening, Grinevsky drew me aside and raised the following SALT matters.

Qualitative Limitations

Grinevsky asked if I were aware of his conversation with Garthoff the previous evening. I said I was. He

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said he wished to re-emphasize his hope that the US would during the recess study very hard the question of qualitative limitations, particularly those relating to MIRVs, and he repeated his comment to Garthoff that he regretted that there had not been more discussion of this area during the current session. I noted that the subject of qualitative limitations was held open and that the US Delegation had indicated willingness to hear any Soviet views, but that we had no considerations to advance at this session. He replied that it was too bad Ambassador Smith or the other Delegates had not, even in mini-plenaries or privately, offered some personal suggestions. I said this would not be helpful since such a procedure could end up being misleading and was not a professional way of conducting negotiations. He said I was probably right but that the Soviet Delegation had been prepared to discuss this area further if the US Delegation had been able to do so at this session, adding that frankly the Soviets were themselves still searching for the best solution, regarding which there were differing views in Moscow.

Grinevsky said that in any event he hoped the US would study the implications of the three possibilities he and Shchukin had indicated, no MIRV limitation, a complete ban and limitations short of a complete ban. He said the first alternative would have unfortunate implications for SALT arms control efforts. (He did not elaborate.) He said the second, which should not be ruled out for consideration, did not seem as likely because the US probably wanted to keep MIRVs and the Soviets could not through national means of verification be sure the US had removed and destroyed its MIRVs. He continued, saying that the third possibility could be explored along the lines of banning MIRVs on certain systems like "the big ones." I asked if he meant SS-9s. He replied that he thought this could be considered but that this was his personal view since many things had not been definitely decided in Moscow.

Grinevsky concluded by saying that while initially he had thought the US Delegation was temporarily holding back on discussion of qualitative limitations, he had concluded that all we were authorized to do was listen

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and that he therefore could only urge that we report what had been said by members of the Soviet Delegation.

I said the US Delegation would of course report Soviet views and noted that it was equally important that the Soviet Delegation report fully the views, and the reasonings, submitted by the US Delegation.

Obligations of Restraint

Grinevsky said he would like to raise one more matter of equal importance, the Soviet proposal that both sides undertake certain obligations of restraint. He remarked that he was not sure the US Delegation regarded this proposal as a serious one and he hoped we had reported it fully so that it could be studied during the recess. I said I could not comment on how serious it was but I could say it had, of course, been reported. I said that, aside from other problems I could foresee, it was hard to know how to consider a proposal as serious when the Soviet Delegation did not suggest any limitations on Soviet programs but had listed, as Shchukin and General Trusov had, practically all on-going US strategic programs including even Minuteman III and Poseidon. Grinevsky said he was aware of what US programs had been listed by the Soviet Delegation. He said the US knew which programs the Soviet Union had underway and that the US should tell the Soviet Government what programs it wished to see stopped and this could be a proper subject for discussion by the two sides.

SCC

During the course of the dinner, Smolin repeatedly looked at his watch, crossed his fingers and commented to Grinevsky on the time remaining before midnight. Grinevsky kept telling Smolin he was too pessimistic and that he remained an optimist. After dinner, I asked Grinevsky what all the finger crossing was about. He said Smolin and others were worried that because of US

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bombing in North Vietnam they would receive instructions not to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the SCC. Grinevsky said that if no instructions were received by midnight they would be in the clear. Grinevsky commented that he personally thought everything would turn out all right since both sides had gone to great lengths in the past to avoid letting outside matters interfere with SALT.

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