

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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August 20, 1975

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
7/2/03.

National Security Decision Memorandum 303

To: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, US SALT Delegation

Subject: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 285 and NSDM 301.

1. The Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that the US is willing to ban the development, testing, and deployment of the following systems:
 - Land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range;
 - Ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater than 600 km carried on waterborne vehicles other than submarines;
 - Installations for launching ballistic missiles which could be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor, including territorial seas or inland waters.
2. The Delegation should propose the following definition of a cruise missile:
 - A cruise missile is any armed, unmanned, self-propelled, guided missile which sustains flight through use of aerodynamic lift over most of its range.
3. The following language should be substituted for the current US version of Article VII of the Joint Draft Text:
 - a. The limitation provided for in Article III of this agreement shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers.

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b. The parties agree that:

- (1) There shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers for heavy ICBMs.
- (2) Construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.
- (3) Operational ICBM and SLBM launchers used for testing or training shall be considered operational launchers.

In discussing the proposed language for Article VII, the Delegation should indicate that it is the US interpretation of Article VII that all operational launchers, wherever located, should be counted in the 2400 aggregate. The Delegation should also state that in the US view an increase of 15% would constitute a "significant increase" within the meaning of paragraph 2a of Article VII and solicit a Soviet response to this statement.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

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Handwritten notes:
to President
at
13-10-74

In accordance with the agreement reached during the meeting between President Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev on November 23-24, 1974, agreed provisions enumerated below will be followed by both sides in working out a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments.

1. A new agreement will be completed as soon as possible, with the objective of signing it in 1975; it will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985, and will incorporate relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.

2. Based on the principle of equality and equal security of both sides, the new agreement will include in particular the following limitations which will apply for the duration of the new agreement:

a. During the time of a new agreement each of the sides will be entitled to an aggregate number of delivery vehicles of strategic arms not exceeding 2400. This number includes land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) launchers, ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs), and heavy bombers if the latter are equipped with bombs or air-to-surface missiles with a range not exceeding 600 kilometers. When a bomber is equipped with air-to-surface missiles with a range over 600 kilometers, each of such missiles will be counted as one delivery vehicle in the aggregate number (2400).

b. Within this overall limitation each side will be free to determine the composition of the aggregate subject to the agreed prohibition on the construction of new land-based ICBM launchers.

c. Both sides will be limited to no more than 1320 ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); within this total number each side will be entitled to determine the types and numbers of missiles equipped with such warheads.


3. The provisions of Articles I and II of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972 will be incorporated into a new agreement. The Agreed Interpretation and Common Understanding dated May 26, 1972, relating to limitations on increasing the dimensions of land-based ICBM launchers by greater than 10-15 percent will also be incorporated into the new agreement.

4. Subject to the provisions of Articles I and II of the Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive armaments, covered by the new agreement, may be undertaken.

5. A new agreement could also provide for additional limitations on deployment of new types of strategic arms during the period of its effectiveness.

6. A new agreement will also include a provision to the effect that no later than 1980-81 negotiations should start on further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms.

7. Negotiations between the delegations of the US and USSR to work out a new agreement will resume in Geneva, in January 1975. A precise date of their resumption will be agreed upon in the near future.


December 10, 1974

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SALT

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