

62N

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

15 November 1978

MEMORANDUM

EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT WITH ANGOLA'S INSURGENTS

UNITA

Jonas Savimbi's leadership of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has kept in the field a force that numbers approximately 18,000 guerrillas. UNITA, the only serious insurgent threat to Angolan President Neto, moves freely within and is supported by the inhabitants of an area of southern Angola that is roughly between a third and a half of the country's territory.


UNITA has demonstrated the ability to survive Angolan/Cuban offensives against it and the insurgents should be able to continue denying southern Angola to Luanda's control. UNITA will not be successful in expanding its territory, but will continue to harrass the central government by various means. Continued attacks on the Benguela Railroad is one example.

*This memorandum was prepared by the African Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and the Office of Strategic Research. Questions and comments may be addressed to the author, [redacted]*

25X1

25X1

RP M 78-10428



25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010063-3

External assistance to UNITA comes from a variety of sources and may be decreasing. Such aid is important but not critical to the insurgent's ability to sustain the pressure on the Luanda government. We have no hard evidence of South African support to UNITA, but believe Pretoria could be supplying limited logistical support, intelligence information, non-lethal military equipment such as radios, and perhaps some funding to Savimbi's guerrillas. It is in Pretoria's interest to keep the attention of the Angolan Government focussed on its internal insurgency so as to limit its support to SWAPO operations in Namibia.

President Mobutu has supported Savimbi in the past, allowing supplies for UNITA to be ferried through Zaire and permitting Savimbi's insurgents to maintain a few small bases in southern Zaire. While the recent Angolan-Zairian rapprochement has lessened Mobutu's support to UNITA, it is unlikely Mobutu would block all arms shipments to UNITA via Zaire. Zambian President Kaunda is an old supporter of Savimbi, as are the West African moderates Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny, but they probably do not provide material assistance to UNITA. Savimbi would look to these and other moderate African states for transit rights in the event an alternate supply route were needed.

25X1

-2-

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010063-3

SECRET

FNLA and FLEC

Neither the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) nor the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) poses a serious threat to the Neto government. Both groups suffer from ineffective leadership, a lack of arms and ammunition, and FLEC has had serious internal problems. While both groups continue to tie down Cuban and Angolan forces, they are unable to engage in large-scale military confrontations.

The FNLA has 2,000 to 4,000 combatants operating mainly within the area of the Bakongo tribe in northern Angola from which it draws its major following. In the past, South Africa has provided some assistance to the FNLA insurgents but this probably was terminated two years ago.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The FNLA has received some military assistance from the Zairians and the French, but we have no recent evidence of such support. Some FNLA leaders reside in Zaire but Zairian President Mobutu claims that his government is no longer assisting the rebels. Recently, the Chinese have shown growing interest in FNLA activities

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Representatives of FLEC's estimated 1,000-man force maintain that they have received no foreign assistance over the past two years. While we have no evidence to disprove this, the insurgents could be receiving some limited assistance from the French or the Zairians. FLEC recently has attempted to reorganize into a more effective military force, but this has not yet been reflected in the insurgents' anti-government activity.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010063-3

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010063-3