




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# International Issues Review

29 June 1979

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
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW



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NUCLEAR POLITICS


SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FOR  
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION



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The Soviet perception of the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation coincides in many instances with US concerns, but reflects specific Soviet experiences and fears. As a result, the Soviets approach nonproliferation policy from the standpoint of their overall foreign policy objectives rather than from a more abstract concern about the global problems posed by growing numbers of nuclear weapons states.



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OECD POLITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

POSITIVE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN  
THE BIG SIX



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Different underlying political factors in the major industrialized countries will continue to result in different national positive adjustment policies to attack structural economic inefficiencies.



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HUMAN RIGHTS

ETHNIC MINORITY CLAIMS AS A HUMAN RIGHTS  
ISSUE



22

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Increasing demands for ethnic self-determination are raising complicated human rights issues for national governments, international institutions, and nongovernmental agencies.



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[Redacted]

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Soviet Perception of the Global Environment for  
Nuclear Proliferation [Redacted]

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Concern over the significance and intricacy of nuclear nonproliferation issues doubtless will increase over the coming months as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) draws to a close and the June 1980 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference approaches.\* The Soviet Union clearly will be an important actor in determining the shape of the global nuclear environment and the success of international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Underlying Soviet actions in multilateral nonproliferation forums is a special appreciation that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states could pose significant new dangers to the USSR. [Redacted]

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
The Soviet Union apparently views proliferation in terms of the specific security implications for itself of a given state's acquisition of nuclear weapons rather than in terms of the increased global potential for nuclear conflict inherent in growing numbers of nuclear weapons states. The Soviets perceive most past and prospective instances of nuclear proliferation as harmful to their security or the security of their allies. Factors shaping this perspective include:


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-- A world in which all other nuclear weapons states--the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China--target their weapons against Soviet territory.



-- Concerns, triggered by experience with the Chinese nuclear program, about the acquisition of nuclear weapons even by currently friendly states. 

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The Soviet perception of the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation coincides in many instances with US concerns, a factor that has led the USSR to support major aspects of US nonproliferation policy. Soviet nuclear exports generally carry at least as stringent controls as do US nuclear transfers. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have supported the imposition of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear activity of nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS). Further, the Soviets have urged signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Finally, they have denied their Warsaw Pact allies opportunities for developing nuclear technology that could lead to an independent weapons capability and have required those allies to sign the NPT. 

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Soviet and US nonproliferation policies do not coincide at all points, however, since the USSR shapes its nonproliferation policy to suit overall foreign and national security goals rather than treating it as an end in itself. During the Soviet campaign for NPT ratification in the late 1960s, for example, the Soviets tried to heighten suspicions within NATO on the issue of potential West German acquisition of nuclear weapons. More recently, however, growing Soviet interest in nuclear exports--enriched uranium and research and power reactors--and the desire to play on emerging strains between the United States and its OECD partners on


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
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
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OECD POLITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

POSITIVE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN  
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
Different underlying political factors in the major industrialized countries will continue to result in different national positive adjustment policies to attack structural economic inefficiencies.



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HUMAN RIGHTS

ETHNIC MINORITY CLAIMS AS A HUMAN RIGHTS  
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economic and some security issues have led the Soviets to mute these public expressions of concern and to take a tolerant attitude toward European nuclear energy development programs. Indeed, the USSR now provides significant amounts of enriched uranium to Western Europe, including more than half of West Germany's requirements. Additionally, at INFCE, the Soviets have expressed sympathy for West European plans to pursue national breeder-reactor and reprocessing programs in the face of strong US objections that the plutonium economy might encourage further weapons proliferation.

[REDACTED]

In their approach to the Third World, the Soviets tailor their nuclear policy to fit their relations with the individual country concerned. While they sharply criticize the nuclear programs of such threshold states

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[REDACTED] they also act as a supplier--albeit under safeguards--to the nuclear programs of Iraq, Libya, India, and Cuba. They have accepted the proliferation risks inherent in supplying nuclear technologies and material to friendly states in order to receive immediate political and economic benefits from these transfers, while gaining some ability to prevent or delay acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by the states concerned.

The Soviets are sensitive to developing countries criticisms of the superpowers for failing to reduce their nuclear forces substantially, as required by Article VI of the NPT.\* To deflect this criticism, the Soviets have partially acceded to the demands of the NNWS for "negative security assurances," which prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against NNWS. The proposed Soviet draft convention on the subject also serves the

\*Article VI of the NPT requires the signatories to negotiate in good faith on "effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" leading to a "treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

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purpose of embarrassing the United States, and if adopted, would undercut the US commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend NATO against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack.\*

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This same selective approach is likely to continue to characterize Soviet nonproliferation policy. Consequently, the extent to which the USSR cooperates, rather than competes, with the United States on the proliferation issue seems likely to depend largely on Soviet perceptions of the global environment, including bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations and the status of Moscow's relations with the United States and with individual developing nations. To the extent that the Soviets judged that a cooperative Soviet-US approach to the proliferation problem offered the best opportunities for attaining their specific security goals, they would continue to emphasize nuclear safeguards and the institutional and legal elements of the emerging nonproliferation regime. In this case, they would be likely to work for increased joint efforts to block the acquisition of nuclear weapons by threshold states in those cases where both superpowers would regard this acquisition as presenting a threat to their own interests and to regional stability. At somewhat greater political costs to themselves, they could also exert pressure on their ally Cuba to sign the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (providing for a Latin American Nuclear-free Zone) and could perhaps join the United States in supporting a nuclear-weapons free zone in South Asia despite India's objections. [REDACTED]

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On the other hand, should the Soviets decide-- perhaps because of a deterioration in overall Soviet-US relations--that a lessening of cooperation with the United States in nonproliferation policy offered greater possibilities for foreign policy gains, they might demand that the United States take tougher action against Israel, South Africa, and perhaps, Pakistan. In addition, they could exploit emerging opportunities for influence in the

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Third World by increasing the level of nuclear exports to favored and potentially anti-US developing countries, while continuing to deny that their exports of nuclear material contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. Even under these conditions, however, Soviet actions would be moderated by their past experience with friendly states that turn hostile--for example, Yugoslavia (1948), Indonesia (1965-66), Egypt (1972), and China (1958-59). In addition, Moscow's actions would reflect concern that, should friendly threshold countries such as India and Iraq acquire nuclear weapons, they might be inclined to pursue a more independent policy, thus further reducing the Soviet voice in regional security.

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### Positive Adjustment Policies in the Big Six

Since the beginning of the current period of slow growth, high inflation, and high unemployment, the OECD countries have been confronted with a choice between two kinds of structural adjustment that have fundamentally different political, economic, and social motives and impacts. Negative adjustment maximizes the short-term welfare of economically threatened groups at the cost of increased inflation and reduced long-term growth in the society as a whole. Positive adjustment is designed to maximize noninflationary growth--and, therefore, the long-term welfare of the majority--at the cost of at least some economic and social harm to certain workers, industries, and regions.

This paper analyzes the political factors underlying the choice of adjustment measures made by the United States' key OECD partners (the Big Six--the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Canada) and describes the policies that they have followed thus far. West Germany, Japan, Canada, and France have all begun to pursue significant positive adjustment policies; the first three countries seem likely to continue to do so, while France's course is more questionable. The new British Government will probably try to introduce positive adjustment measures, but its chances of success appear limited. Finally, Italian policy probably will continue primarily to fit a negative adjustment framework.

\* \* \*

### Response to Slow Growth: Positive or Negative Adjustment

The initial response of most Big Six countries to slow growth was to shore up welfare in the short term in the hope that the economy would pick up, and the need for difficult political and economic choices thus could be

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avoided. Governments strengthened restrictions on layoffs, established job maintenance and creation programs with little concern for the productiveness of the employment created, and dramatically raised government unemployment insurance payments. In addition, governments increased subsidies and trade protection to particularly threatened sectors, firms, and regions.

Such negative adjustment policies had damaging effects on growth, prices, and relations with trading partners (especially the advanced developing countries that have a comparative advantage in much traditional manufacturing). At the same time, these policies did not succeed in stemming the rise in unemployment. As these adverse effects became evident, the Big Six grew more interested in implementing positive adjustment policies--measures that would facilitate the shift in resources, as stated in a recent OECD study, "from producing things in declining to increasing demand (that is, from sectors and industries facing declining demand to those facing increasing demand), from less to more efficient production, and away from production in which other countries have a comparative advantage."

By allowing much traditional manufacturing to shift to the less developed countries (LDCs), a fully implemented positive adjustment policy would help to improve North-South political-economic relations. But it might create new trade tensions among the industrial countries, since it would encourage development of precisely those sectors in which they are most directly competitive.

The concept of positive adjustment aims at preserving individual welfare to the extent compatible with increased efficiency and productivity. Thus, it basically advocates the free play of market forces, but assumes at least temporary government intervention to smooth the transition and to maximize an economy's ability to benefit from the market. Positive adjustment, therefore, could include government assistance that would allow inefficient firms to phase out production gradually, support expanding sectors, and help displaced workers find new employment.

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Such measures inevitably risk becoming a new form of negative adjustment if they offer prolonged support to new production and employment that never becomes fully competitive. Nonetheless, such palliative measures are a necessary part of positive adjustment for political, social, and economic reasons. As long as slow growth continues, government intervention is probably required if major new economic activities are to develop. Moreover, by making the positive adjustment process more acceptable politically and socially, the palliative measures help guarantee that it will continue. They cannot, of course, wholly eliminate the economic and social pain resulting from shifting economic activity from declining to expanding sectors.

### The Political Environment

The economic and social costs associated with positive adjustment present political barriers to its implementation in all six countries, but the strength of those barriers varies considerably from one state to another. Positive adjustment politically appears most difficult in the United Kingdom, Italy, and France, but much less so in Japan, West Germany, and Canada.

Reliance on market forces is contrary to the French tradition of government economic intervention, and thus contrary to popular expectations as well. Because of its fear of adverse political reaction, the Barre government did not implement its recent decision to allow greater freedom for market forces until after it had won the March 1978 legislative elections. The policy has predictably met with considerable criticism from both the French left and right. Although the major leftist trade unions have relatively little influence over government policy formulation, they have been able to use strikes and demonstrations to disrupt the implementation of positive adjustment measures in the steel sector, and could do so in others as well. The negative reaction to positive adjustment by workers and political leaders has been sufficiently severe that the government is considering backing off as it looks toward President Giscard's 1981 reelection campaign. The longevity of the current French positive adjustment policy is, therefore, open to doubt.

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In Italy, as well, positive adjustment would represent a considerable change from former government practice and from popular and trade union expectations. It would thus require a strong government to implement such a policy, and it is questionable whether the new Italian Cabinet will possess the requisite power and will. Somewhat paradoxically, if the Communist Party acquires an increased role in government decisionmaking, it might help to further the implementation of positive adjustment, since it has a definite interest in increasing the competitiveness of the Italian economy. That interest would be balanced, however, against its desire to protect the work force and to advance the use of economic planning.

In the United Kingdom the Thatcher government appears in a better political position to implement positive adjustment policies, having just won office for five years on a conservative, heavily free-market platform. Because of widespread economic inefficiency, however, the economic and social costs of a positive adjustment program would probably be higher in the United Kingdom than anywhere else in the Big Six (with the possible exception of Italy). In addition, individual craft unions dedicated to job protection in declining sectors wield considerable influence over policymaking within the government and within the trade union federation (Trades Union Congress), and especially over policy implementation at the individual firm level. Although the craft unions' influence on government policy formulation will be less under the Conservative government than it was under Labor, the Thatcher Cabinet will, nonetheless, probably be able to implement a positive adjustment policy only gradually.

West Germany, Japan, and Canada have traditionally pursued policies which, by comparison, fit the positive adjustment framework fairly well, because they generally allow the free play of market forces and/or put considerable emphasis on encouraging expanding sectors. In Japan and West Germany positive adjustment generally has been successful. It is supported by the population and consequently seems likely to continue. The major West German trade union federation, the Deutsche Gewerkschaft Bund (DGB), has more influence over policy formulation and implementation than do its component craft unions. Since the DGB's wide sphere of responsibility gives it

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a greater interest in the health of the economy as a whole than in the preservation of any one sector, it generally supports positive adjustment. The major Japanese trade union federations are not as well disposed to the policy, but their impact is relatively limited.

Positive adjustment has had less obvious beneficial economic impact in Canada, but there is probably little the government can do to implement major negative adjustment measures. It has relatively little control over the large numbers of American branch plants in its industrial sector, and it is too dependent on foreign trade to create major new trade barriers. In addition, the newly elected Progressive Conservative government will probably be inclined toward a free-market industrial policy, although its minority status places constraints on how effectively it can act.

Although the political environment for implementing positive adjustment policies varies considerably from one country to another, they all perceive some common political obstacles to the policy. The most effective opposition comes from workers and political leaders in severely affected regions. Most traditional industries tend to be geographically concentrated. Entire electoral regions depend for their livelihood on steel or shipbuilding or textiles. Plant cutbacks or closures in such regions threaten to take away the jobs not just of the industrial workers concerned but also of employees in the local service sectors. The common interest of the populations of those regions in preserving traditional industries can be effectively expressed at the ballot box.

Generally, most Big Six governments fear that the plight of workers and regions hurt by positive adjustment will generate considerable sympathy among the voting public. Yet the broad consequences of negative adjustment policies are not politically popular. Since these policies retard economic growth and exacerbate inflation, they reduce the potential welfare level of most of the population even as they maintain that of the protected groups. Popular unwillingness to accept that situation may help to explain the recent electoral victories of the conservative parties in the United Kingdom, Canada, and last year in France. The West German Social Democratic Party

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(SPD) may soon be the only leftist party in power in the Big Six, but it has pursued a fairly conservative, free-market - oriented economic policy.

This is not to argue that most, or even many, voters would vote against a government only because it pursued a negative adjustment policy. It is questionable whether voters make the connection between the perceived reduction in their own welfare and negative adjustment policies per se. Indeed, many voters, especially in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, might oppose positive adjustment measures during the period when the social costs of these measures were more apparent than their economic benefits and when they were met with disruptive worker reaction. Ideally, voters would probably want both rapid noninflationary growth and negative adjustment policies, which would make everyone happy both in the short and long runs. Unfortunately, that combination does not seem possible.

It is unclear how much political risk the Big Six governments run in pursuing a positive adjustment policy, but the uncertainty adds to the perception of risk. The political costs associated with positive adjustment have limited its implementation in the six countries. But variations in perceived risks and/or government attitudes have made some governments go much farther than others.

### The Adjustment Measures Taken by the Big Six

#### Support for Declining Sectors

Of the Big Six, West Germany has always been the most firmly committed to allowing the market to determine economic activity. The government is actively helping the steel industry, but only while it reduces capacity. The government has also intervened to support major firms in other sectors, but usually only when it expects them to regain economic health or when national security considerations seem to be at stake.

The Japanese Government intervenes continually in the management of the economy, but aims primarily at making it more efficient and competitive. In May 1978, it passed a "Law on Extraordinary Measures for the Stabilization of Designated Depressed Industries," under which capacity will be reduced over five years in steel,

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aluminum, synthetic fibers, shipbuilding, chemical fertilizer, spinning, and ferro-silicon industries. The law is an important first element of an overall Japanese plan to phase out production in traditional industries like clothing and instead concentrate on newer sectors in which Japan has a comparative advantage.

The phasing out of uncompetitive production has caused considerably more political difficulty in France. In the past year, the government has tried to make the economy more responsive to market forces, downplaying (if not renouncing) its earlier calls for protectionism, and phasing out subsidies to declining firms. A few major sectors, such as steel, are to be temporarily assisted to allow for gradual cutbacks in production, but they will not be permitted to exist indefinitely on an uneconomic basis. The government's plans for production and employment reductions in the steel industry have produced violent reactions in the two regions concerned. Although the opposition has quieted somewhat, the government is now treading more warily, and is less vocal about its shift to "organized liberalism."

Positive adjustment is probably more necessary--and consequently more difficult--in the United Kingdom. Problem firms are located not just in the sectors that are declining throughout the OECD--like steel and textiles--but also in industries that elsewhere are fairly healthy--motor vehicles are the most important example. Since an unusually high percentage of industrial production and employment is concentrated in declining firms, freeing market forces in the United Kingdom would carry tremendous short-term social and economic costs, and even the best conceived positive adjustment policy might not succeed in making the British economy efficient and competitive.

The Labor government, therefore, diverted more resources than did any of the other Big Six governments to keep uncompetitive firms afloat. Although the Thatcher government is committed to phasing out such support, it seems unlikely that it could actually let major companies like British Leyland disappear in the absence of alternative employment--and it is questionable whether enough new productive jobs could be created.

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The Italian Government has made an attempt to reduce production costs in inefficient industries, but not to decrease their capacity. The attempt has not been successful even in its limited aim. The 1977 "Act for the Coordination of Industrial Policy, and the Restructuring, Conversion, and Development of the Industrial Sector" calls for the submission of plans to cut energy, ecological, and other production costs in the chemical, steel, paper, and textile industries. Once approved by the government, the plans would benefit from the various public assistance measures envisaged in the act. Only the steel plan has been approved. Although the new government may advance the implementation of the act, it will probably not go beyond it and make any real effort to shift economic activity from declining sectors.

Domestically owned declining industries are relatively less important in the Canadian economy than in those of the other Big Six countries. There are consequent limits on both the scope and the significance of protective measures that the federal government has introduced. The Canadian steel industry is comparatively healthy. The textile industry is protected by trade barriers, but it is too small for those measures to have much international or national political or economic impact. The federal government has recently introduced a loan guarantee program designed to hold off bankruptcies by small and medium firms until mergers or takeovers can be arranged; the funds involved are small--around \$20 million per year. Of the provinces, Quebec has been most active in trying to shore up inefficient firms. Nevertheless, both it and the other provincial and federal authorities have put greater stress on encouraging the development of expanding sectors than on protecting uncompetitive companies.

#### Support for Expansion

Generally, governmental efforts to encourage the development of new, competitive firms are politically acceptable in all Big Six countries. But at least two factors limit governmental freedom in pursuing such policies. First, they make governments vulnerable to charges of favoritism to business. Second, and more important, they conflict with other, more immediate demands on government resources. The ultimate impact of

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such measures as support for research and development is often difficult to predict. Most of the six governments, therefore, were initially wary of pursuing sizable programs of this type which would divert resources from other ends whose economic, social, or political outcome was more predictable. In the past year or two, however, as the governments have become more convinced of the need for positive adjustment, most have significantly increased their promotion of new or expanding firms and shifts among sectors. Many of the measures used, such as investment tax incentives, are available to all industries, but it is assumed that they will be used mainly by more efficient, growing firms, while they help increase the competitiveness of others.

The French and the Japanese are probably the most active in encouraging the development of economically promising industries. The French have instituted a number of measures to stimulate investment. They have introduced several new tax incentives, including exempting new firms from income or corporate taxes on profits during their first three years of operation. New low-interest loans are given to a variety of investment projects. Finally, in what may be the farthest reaching measure, the government has started gradually freeing prices.

The French Government is also overseeing and financially assisting the restructuring of several sectors deemed to be actually or potentially profitable; motor vehicles, data processing, and machine tools are the most important ones. In addition, it has increased its efforts to help establish new firms in depressed regions. Public research and development expenditures have recently risen, after several years of relative decline. Whereas French research and development was once heavily directed toward national defense, the current emphasis is on short-term projects that are most likely to be commercially successful.

Although not as far reaching as those in France, Japan also has introduced several new tax incentives for industrial investment, but the continuation of high Japanese investment levels lessens their need. In addition, Japan has increased loans and grants to small and medium businesses and to firms located in depressed regions.

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Finally, it has significantly raised its expenditures on publicly and privately conducted research and development. In the commercial sector, most government research and development funds are allocated to a few industries, such as computers and consumer electronics, which have been marked by the government for growth and export potential.

Thus, the research and development system is part of the much broader system of "administrative guidance" employed by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to channel economic activity, which is the major means by which the Japanese Government encourages new production. It relies for its considerable effectiveness on a number of formal and informal mechanisms, ranging from habit, expectation, and personal networks, through manipulation of domestic demand, to direct funding of favored industrial projects.

By comparison, the West German Government relies more heavily on market forces to shift resources to expanding sectors. Like most of the other Big Six governments, it has increased investment tax incentives, but only to a limited extent. The main West German efforts have consisted of: increased public support for industrial research and development, especially in small and medium firms; a program introduced in February 1979 to provide long-term start-up loans to new small and medium businesses; and greater assistance to new enterprises in depressed regions, especially in the coal- and steel-producing Saarland and Palatinate.

The United Kingdom has devoted more effort to shoring up existing industry than to encouraging new productive activities. The Thatcher government will try to redress that situation, at least initially, through indirect more than direct means. The major existing investment tax incentives effectively eliminate corporate tax on reinvested profits. The recently proposed reduction in personal income taxes aims at encouraging increased savings and investment.

Substantial financial assistance available under the Industry Act of 1972 was designed to increase the international competitiveness of British firms; however, it was used to support investment projects in traditional

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sectors more than in new or expanding ones. An exception is the \$32 million Microelectronics Support Program introduced in 1978. Although it is not yet known what projects will be affected, the Thatcher budget provides for a decrease in the support available under the Industry Act.

Throughout the postwar period, the percentage of GNP devoted to industrial research and development has been higher in the United Kingdom than in any other OECD country except the United States. Research and development funds, however, have been heavily devoted to defense and aerospace and have not had any obvious beneficial effect on growth and productivity. Partly because of the disappointing economic effect of expenditures for research and development, a few years ago the Labor government decided to dramatically scale down its effort in this area. Later it changed course, planning to raise relative research and development expenditures, but to concentrate significantly more on commercial product development and less on defense and aerospace.

Italy is the only member of the Big Six not to have introduced new tax incentives for investment. It has taken a more direct route by providing sizable interest subsidies and grants to selected investment projects. Generally speaking, enterprises in new sectors benefit from government assistance only if they locate in the economically less developed southern part of the country. The 1977 Restructuring Act explicitly states that the creation of employment in the south has priority over any other industrial policy objective. Although the act concentrates on preserving declining industries, it does include provision for development of two sectors with significant growth potential--electronics and machine tools.

Canada has introduced several measures designed to encourage expanding Canadian-owned firms. New tax incentives for investment include accelerated depreciation, a 5-percent credit on plant and equipment investment, and substantial (up to 150 percent) deductions for increased research and development expenditures. In addition, small and medium firms benefit from deferral of capital gains tax on reinvested profits and exemption for the cost of new production machinery. Small and medium enterprises

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are also the chief beneficiaries of a major increase in industrial research and development support that was decided upon in 1978.

### Policy Toward Labor

At the beginning of the period of slow growth, the labor policies of most of the Big Six governments were designed primarily to maintain income. All countries raised unemployment compensation and most implemented job retention schemes that would protect workers employed in declining firms. In the past few years, a greater effort has been made to permit and encourage workers to move into more profitable jobs. Several problems, however, confront policymakers as they try to devise effective positive adjustment policies in the labor area.

The success of such policies depends on the willingness of displaced workers to change occupation or residence, and on the provision of enough new employment possibilities to absorb both the displaced workers and the new entrants into the labor force. Although intersectoral mobility has traditionally been low in Western Europe and Japan, retraining should help to increase it. However, it is difficult to devise industrial training programs that will definitely prepare workers for future jobs, since governments cannot generally predict what sectors will expand. France and Japan are partial, but not complete, exceptions to this rule because of their governments' comparatively important role in determining the direction of economic activity. Because geographical mobility cannot be easily induced, there is a high premium on locating new, productive industries in regions that have been hit by restructuring. Finally, the inevitable time lag between labor force reduction in declining sectors and job availability in expanding ones means that there is strong pressure on governments to continue income maintenance programs, especially unemployment compensation.

In keeping with their industrial policies, West Germany, Japan, Canada, and France all pursue active positive adjustment policies in the labor field. Each has significantly expanded its retraining and job creation efforts and has worked to improve the functioning of its labor exchange. Japan, Canada, and France also offer

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subsidies to employers who hire unemployed workers. Negative adjustment measures, such as subsidies for part-time employment, are being gradually phased out.

Although the Labor government in the United Kingdom introduced many of the same positive adjustment measures, it continued to stress negative adjustment in its manpower policy. Its main effort was in job maintenance, primarily through the Temporary Employment Subsidy (TES), granted for a maximum of one year to employers who would otherwise be forced to declare workers redundant. In the fall of 1978, the government announced that the TES would end in 1980; whether and how it will be replaced has not yet been decided. The Conservative government will probably devote fewer resources than its predecessor to negative adjustment policies in this area, and it remains to be seen what type of positive measures it might implement.

Italy appears to have the most limited labor adjustment program of the Big Six. The government offers some financial assistance to firms that hire young people and has also reduced employer social security contributions for low-wage workers; that measure benefits primarily low-productivity sectors like textiles. While the 1977 Restructuring Act provides for assisting the relocation of workers displaced by restructuring, it does not spell out how that will be accomplished.

### Outlook

The recent record of most of the Big Six countries in introducing positive adjustment measures has been quite good--the United Kingdom and Italy have been two exceptions. None of the policies have been in effect long enough or on a large enough scale, however, to provide a firm basis for judging their long-term viability.

At this stage, West Germany, Japan, and Canada, in about that order, seem to have the best chance of continuing and deepening their positive adjustment policies. The political and economic environment is especially favorable in Japan and West Germany. France is more questionable, since the government is under severe pressure from both the political left and right to return to more traditional forms of government intervention.

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The outlook for Italy remains basically negative. The new British Government has already announced a major change in approach, but in practice the economic and social barriers to positive adjustment will probably allow only a gradual shift in policy.

The four governments that have embarked on the positive adjustment process have passed only the first and easiest stage in that process. They have decided to phase out inefficient production, but they have not yet had to pay most of the political and economic costs of doing so. Relatively few workers have been displaced, and many of those are still enjoying the benefits of their severance pay.

As more jobs are lost, the governments will have to rapidly accelerate their efforts to retrain workers, create jobs in expanding sectors, and devise adequate welfare systems for the permanently unemployed. This will cost money and require sacrifices from the employed population that it will not readily make and could also create unacceptable inflationary pressures, unless growth accelerates enough to generate sufficient government revenues.

If the governments indeed take the risk of implementing a more fully developed positive adjustment program, growth will have to pick up and inflation slow down during the implementation period for the program to remain politically, economically, and socially acceptable. Positive adjustment policies can do something to encourage the needed increase in industrial investment. Broader factors, however, will probably be more important in determining investor decisions--price and exchange rate stability, energy supply and cost, and prospects for national and international expansion. Those factors extend well beyond the reach of positive adjustment policy and are only partially subject to government control and influence.

The prospects for OECD-wide action in positive adjustment are limited to joint discussion and technical, relatively apolitical projects like research and development devoted to reducing production costs. All governments are determined to retain national control of the positive adjustment process, in part because of the economic, political, and social uncertainties surrounding

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that process. Governments want the freedom to shift policies as they see fit. Perhaps more important, the social and economic measures associated with positive adjustment lie at the core of national sovereignty, of a government's rights and responsibilities relative to its citizens. Finally, the expanding sectors which positive adjustment is designed to promote are the very ones in which the OECD countries are actually or potentially most directly competitive with one another.

Prospects are better for joint action among members of the European Community. Chances are only slight, however, for a common EC positive adjustment policy that would cover several industries. Recent efforts by EC Commissioner Etienne Davignon to devise an overall Community textile policy failed dismally. He was more successful in winning acceptance by member countries of a plan for the steel industry. The "Davignon Plan," however, is only in its first stage, involving agreements on trade and price levels. The second stage--restructuring--will touch national sensitivities much more and will be correspondingly more difficult to implement. The second stage of the Davignon Plan will be particularly complicated by the fact that national governments are already devising and executing their own steel restructuring plans, often with little prior consultation with the EC Commission.

In the case of France, at least, national sensitivities in regard to positive adjustment extend to an unwillingness even to discuss specific national policies within the OECD. Part of the reason undoubtedly lies in traditional French reserve toward international organizations, especially those that group the advanced industrial countries. A more important reason, however, probably is that France is under such domestic attack for its policies that it cannot risk their being criticized within the OECD, or, conversely, letting itself open to the charge at home that its policies were being dictated by the other OECD members.

Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made within the OECD in discussing structural adjustment as a problem common to all members, and, in many cases, of

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informally discussing the specific policies pursued by individual states. Although there is little chance for joint action, the fact of common consideration of the issues does at least allow the possibility of some de facto policy coordination and cooperation.



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Ethnic Minority Claims As A Human Rights Issue

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The increasingly assertive political demands of ethnic minority groups against their national governments raise particularly nettlesome human rights issues not only for state-dominated organizations such as the UN, but also for nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International (AI). This is especially the case when the claims and governmental reactions to them spawn violence and international publicity. The UN largely ducks the issue of ethnic minority claims and rights, reflecting both the sensitivities of member governments and institutional concerns about encouragement of still greater violence and of the regional and international consequences of possible fracturing of countries. AI, the largest and most prestigious nongovernmental human rights organization, has paid only grudging attention to ethnic minority problems. AI tends to emphasize individual as opposed to group rights, to see some contradiction between the two, and to regard the use of violence by minorities as undercutting their case for greater self-determination. The response of the United States to minority group claims is complicated by concerns similar to those of both the UN and AI, as well as by evidence that foreign governments tend to react even more negatively to criticism of their performance regarding ethnic groups than regarding individuals.

Yet, ethnic minority problems seem almost certain to grow worse--attended by greater violence, more publicity, and perhaps more difficult choices for the United States. This message is strongly if implicitly reflected in the work of an international organization called the Minority Rights Group (MRG) that operates on the premise that national and international attention to the demands of ethnic minorities is much more likely, in the words of an MRG report, to "seed disasters" than are significant concessions to greater self-determination.

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This article represents a first attempt to define the character, dimensions, and implication of ethnic minority claims as a human rights issue. The author will be addressing this and other aspects of ethnic divisions and tensions in subsequent articles and would welcome critical comments.

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### The Growing Problem

The potential of ethnic minorities to provoke (or at least to be involved in) political turbulence is considerable, in view of their size, distribution, and recent history. According to available data, of some 90 minority groups outside the United States each numbers at least one million people and together total nearly 700 million. While most states have a dominant ethnic group forming 50 to 90 percent of the population, barely a dozen can be described as ethnically homogenous and in only twice that number does the largest ethnic group comprise more than 90 percent of the population. In nearly 40 states, the largest ethnic group accounts for less than half of the state's population. Within the past 30 years, 25 minority groups have warred against their governments, and the level of violence and potentially disruptive political tensions involving ethnic minority claims appear to be on the increase. Several possibly volatile instances flow from the Islamic Revival. It should be a matter of concern to many governments that 30 ethnic minority groups, comprising some 200 million people, are Muslims living in either secular or non-Islamic states.\*

Among the numerous factors stimulating worldwide impulses toward minority self-determination over the past decade, two general ones are worth noting. First, it has become clear with regard to the less developed states that the transfer of sovereignty from a colonial regime to an

\* See chart for a list of selected significant ethnic minorities outside the United States. Religious minorities are included only if they have a widely recognized ethnic identity as well, and if their ethnic identity is the primary basis for distinguishing them from other groups. Thus, Palestinians, Tamils, and Kurds are included; Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Muslim sects as such are not.

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independent one has been more than a mere shift of power from alien hands to native ones. In most states it gradually transforms the whole pattern of political life. Whereas the colonial governments stood outside the societies they ruled, and acted upon them arbitrarily, the governments of new states, even authoritarian ones, have usually sought to be popular and attentive because they are, after all, located in the midst of the societies they rule. Over time, they have acted upon those societies in a progressively more continuous, comprehensive, and purposeful manner, and have increased their political consciousness. The members of such societies, however, have tended to behave politically not only as individuals but as groups. Some of these groups are ethnic or religious minorities that were cleaved by the original state boundaries, or incorporated with traditional rivals.

As the self-identity of such groups within the state has become more pronounced, the sense of being politically suffocated by the dominant ethnic group has increased. Government interference that was bearable during periods of repression by the colonial regime gradually becomes intolerable after independence has been achieved.

The second factor operates in states with a relatively high level of development, where central governments increasingly intervene in local affairs and are thus held responsible even for problems which they have only a limited capacity to solve. This results in a backlash of demands for decentralization from regional ethnic groups who not only can marshal evidence of discrimination in the distribution of benefits but also fear the loss of their own identity.

As ethnic minority claims have been pressed more broadly and frequently, parties more disinterested than the targeted governments have begun to consider the merits of these claims in general terms, that is, as a human rights issue.

The more the UN has focused on the issue the more it has qualified its earlier endorsements of self-determination. For example, two UN covenants issued in 1966 posited that "all peoples" were entitled to self-determination, by which they were entitled to "freely determine their political status" and pursue their economic, social,

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and cultural development. The majority of UN delegations made clear, however, that this wording was intended to apply only to the liberation of colonial peoples and territories. Four years later, both the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Declaration on Friendly Relations not only excluded secession as an option for "ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities" but also implicitly denied their right to any political change, for example, to new federal arrangements. Since the mid-1970s, when the UN Economic and Social Council's (ECOSOC) Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities began to focus on the human rights aspects of its agenda, considerable attention has been given to those cases where ethnic differentiation seems to thwart "legitimate" human rights aspirations. Thus, the South African Government has been accused in UN forums of making artificial ethnic distinctions in order to divide the black majority and thereby perpetuate white rule. UN treatment of human rights in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia has been along the same lines.

The UN position on ethnic self-determination has become less supportive and more critical in recent years. This position ultimately reflects the consensus of its member states who are willing to endorse self-determination selectively, that is, with regard to "pariahs" such as South Africa and then only in terms of replacing minority with majority rule. They fear the application of the principle to their own territories, and the UN has at least informally embodied this concern as a ground rule for discussion of the subject. These factors become clearer when measured against the views of nongovernmental organizations which are not obliged, when considering ethnic minorities, to protect the interests of a particular state or group of states.

Amnesty International and the Minority Rights Group, each based in London, and each possessing consultative status with the UN ECOSOC since the mid-1970s, are the two main organizations that fit into this category.

#### The Role of Amnesty International

Amnesty International's endorsement of minority rights has been cautious and selective. Its basic statute pledges to defend those deprived of human rights because of their "ethnic origin" or "religious beliefs,"

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among other reasons. There are more minorities mentioned in AI's Annual Report for 1978 than in previous editions, perhaps indicating increased AI concern on this score. It is AI's policy, however, not to endorse separatist demands and to withhold support from individuals who have used or even advocated violence for any reason. This makes many ethnic organizations permanently ineligible for AI support. Except for the Basques and Catalans in Spain, AI refuses to support demands of minorities for increased political autonomy. Even in the case of the Basques and Catalans, AI commends the Spanish Government for offering autonomy rather than the minorities for seeking it.

In presenting the cases for the Tamil in Sri Lanka and the Kurds in the Middle East, AI does not fault the respective governments for resisting demands for autonomy or even meting out some punishment to the autonomists. AI's criticism is that those governments have resorted to methods which the organization condemns under any circumstances, whether or not ethnic demands are involved--notably the death penalty, torture, detention without trial, and trial without jury.

Moreover, where ethnic issues are considered, AI's judgment on behalf of persecuted minorities is at times remarkably lacking in vigor. For example, in commenting on the massacre of up to 1,400 Comorian migrants in Madagascar in December 1976 followed by the hasty repatriation of 60,000 Comorians, AI simply notes that "human rights were severely infringed for a time."

In an increasing number of recent cases, however, AI describes the predicament of minorities in a way suggesting that they need protection as groups rather than as individuals. For example:

- Albania is scored for singling out Turkish, Greek, and Montenegrin minorities for imprisonment.
- Romania is accused of attempting forcible assimilation of the Hungarian minority and of persecuting ethnic Germans for seeking to emigrate to West Germany (emigration in this instance being a form of self-determination).

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- Within the USSR, AI singles out the Lithuanians and Ukrainians as groups liable to reprisals for expressing national sentiments and Germans imprisoned for trying to emigrate. Other nationalities are mentioned mainly in identifying individuals associated with more general human rights activities (for example, dissidents monitoring the Helsinki Accords).
- AI alleges that judicial discrimination is applied by central governments against such minorities as Tuaregs in Mali, Lunda in Zaire, and Muslims in Burma (in the case of Burma, AI omits mention of Shan, Karens, and Katchins).
- AI reports that Indians in Colombia and Guatemala are particularly liable to be cheated out of land ownership.
- Considerable weight is accorded the proposition that American Indians particularly are subject to criminal prosecution because of their ethnic origin. AI describes this as currently the main human rights problem within the United States. Blacks in the United States are given less attention in this regard than Indians.

AI probably will identify other ethnic minorities sympathetically in the near future and is likely to expand somewhat the discussion of each case. The rights of ethnic minorities, however, are not likely to become as fundamental a concern for the organization as its other human rights interests. Of the 70 or so international news releases AI publishes annually, 10 percent, at most, have a marked ethnic dimension.

#### The Minority Rights Group

Less than a decade in existence, with no formal membership and only a small staff and budget, MRG's prestige, though not nearly as great as AI's, continues to grow. Its present director, Ben Whitaker, became the senior British member of the UN Human Rights Commission in 1975. At about the same time both AI and MRG were given consultative status with UN ECOSOC. MRG's sponsors and council include past and present British Members of Parliament, Swedish socialist Gunnar Myrdal, Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas,

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and veteran human rights activists from Ireland (Sean McBride, one of the founders of AI) and India (Jayaprakash Narayan). It has produced 40 well-researched monographs on various minority groups; its material is circulated in more than 100 countries and has been cited in most major newspapers in the West and the Third World.

MRG prefers not to acknowledge that its general approach to the problem of ethnic minorities differs significantly from that of recent UN discussions or the bulk of AI publicity on human rights, but the differences nevertheless exist. As its name implies, MRG operates on the premise that minority problems in themselves are among the gravest and most widespread in the world today. It quotes with approval Gandhi's dictum that "civilization is to be judged by the treatment that is shown to minorities." MRG characterizes the problems of minorities as "violations of human rights," and sets forth its goal of increasing "international understanding" of these problems in order to promote "the growth of a world conscience regarding human rights."

In nearly all of its published monographs, MRG presents certain general propositions about ethnic minorities that most UN spokesmen on human rights and many AI activists would dispute. First, MRG tends to regard ethnic minorities as impervious to assimilation. In the MRG's view, this is because they almost always do not wish to be assimilated, but when they do, sometimes their efforts are rejected by other ethnic groups within a given country (for example, India). Secondly, ethnic minorities are as eager to assert their self-identity in developed as in less developed countries. Moreover, as MRG appraises the ultimate goals of most ethnic minorities, peaceful outcomes more often than not will require political rearrangements: either a considerable increase of autonomy; or, as implied in MRG's exposition of the Kurdish case, a redrawing of existing state boundaries to establish a new state. The MRG contends that cultural and economic concessions in most cases would not ultimately solve the problem, and in others would only stimulate political demands. Finally, in human rights terms, nearly all minority claims for self-determination are justified in MRG's view, and the political authorities are therefore at fault for resisting these claims and are mainly to blame for whatever violence occurs. On this point in particular the MRG differs with the present consensus in the UN and with AI.

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So strongly does MRG press this view that the three clear exceptions, involving Asians in sub-Saharan Africa, seem all the more striking. In these exceptions MRG exhorts the Asians to resist their (unfortunate) "predilections for communal exclusiveness"; to be "seen to be participating in the liberation struggle" as the "only way by which they can safeguard their future"; and, over the long term, to strive "to disintegrate as a distinct racial minority."

### Implications

Over the next several years the subject of ethnic minorities is likely to earn wider attention and call for more definite policy choices. The increased demands for ethnic self-determination may force the UN to reconsider its position on minority rights as a human rights issue. As a rule, however, the peaceful resolution of minority demands through UN mediation is not to be expected.

The fact that the UN and central governments are becoming more aware of minority group claims does not imply that, either singly or collectively, they are likely to embrace these claims as worthy human rights issues. Many governments are likely to become more repressive than they have been in this regard. Governments not willing to make political accommodations (for example, federalism, devolution) to ethnic minority demands are left with few options other than repression.

Governmental concessions to minority demands at the expense of majority groups may excite new tensions among both minority and majority groups. Governments of states with more than one ethnic group will be afraid of setting precedents. For example, if the Spanish Government concedes to Basque demands, can it do less for the Catalans? Can the French Government ignore the Corsicans while placating the Bretons? If the Kurds gain autonomy in Iran, can other minorities there be made to settle for less?

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\* MRG quotes a Spanish official as warning: "Give the Basques an inch and the Catalans would take several miles."

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Governments attempting to accommodate ethnic demands will also have to face the problem of large minorities within minorities, such as the non-Basque population of the Basque provinces.

Moreover, in some states where minorities are relatively small, governments may seek "final" solutions. One factor underlying the current plight of refugees worldwide is the desire of some governments to preserve or enhance internal ethnic homogeneity as an essential element of political stability. The Vietnamese and Cambodian regimes are thus "encouraging" ethnic Chinese to leave, and other Southeast Asian governments with ethnic Chinese minorities of their own resist accepting them.

The rise of ethnicity and of international attention to it may have some aspects that governments would consider benign. Contrary to the general contention of the MRG presentations, not all ethnic groups insist on major political rearrangements. The Welsh and Scots, for example, having fully and publicly discussed the issues affecting their ethnic identity, seem to have decided that their present political configuration within the United Kingdom is satisfactory. These cases may, however, be the exception.

For US human rights policy, which is based essentially on regard for individual rather than group rights, the demands of ethnic minorities are likely to pose further complications. As conflicts between minorities and their respective central governments become more frequent, and both sides use violence--or otherwise commit human rights violations--to solve their differences, the issues of the validity of ethnic demands will be difficult to ignore. Other governments will be far more resentful of US efforts to judge their performance in this category of human rights than they are of US attention to individuals who do not pose the same threat as ethnic groups to the integrity of the state's territory. One likely response of these states to such US judgments will be an attempt to focus much greater international attention than has been given to date to the status of ethnic minorities in the United States.

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Selected Ethnic Minorities <sup>1</sup>

Name	Number	Percent of Total Population	Country	Degree of Self-Determination	Comment
Achehnese	2 million	1	Indonesia	high	Armed separatist movement.
Arabs	1.5 million	30	Chad	high	Involved in civil war.
Armenians	2 million	less than 1	USSR	high	AI/MRG reporting. <sup>2</sup>
Assamese	10 million	1.5	India	medium	No strong sense of being oppressed.
Aymara	1 million	20	Bolivia	medium	Minority Rights Group reporting.
Azerbaijani	4 million	1.5	USSR	medium	Trying to protect their language;
	5 million	14	Iran	high	Recent friction with Kurds.
Baluchi	2 million	1	Pakistan, India	high	Separatist movement, not well armed.
Bamileke	1.5 million	22	Cameroon	medium	Not likely to be troublesome in near term.
Bantu	14 million	69.9	South Africa	medium	AI/MRG reporting.
Bashkir	1 million	less than 1	USSR	low	Quiet, but resisting assimilation.
Basques	3 million +	9	Spain	high	Armed separatist movement/terrorism.
Batak	2.5 million	1.9	Indonesia	medium	Divided along religious lines.
Berbers	5 million	28	Algeria	low	Tribal rather than ethnic loyalties.
	5 million	28	Morocco	low	Tribal rather than ethnic loyalties.
Biharis	2 million +	2.6	Bangladesh	medium	MRG reporting.
Bosnian Muslims	1 million	4.5	Yugoslavia	medium	Relatively protected by central government vis-a-vis other ethnic groups.
Bretons	1 million	1.9	France	high	Armed separatist movement/terrorism.
Buginese	3 million	2.2	Indonesia	low	Very little information at present.
Burakumin	2 million	1.8	Japan	high	MRG reporting.
Byelo-Russians	7 million	3	USSR	low	Apparently not resisting assimilation with Russians.
Catalans	5 million	14	Spain	high	AI/MRG reporting.
Ethnic Chinese	3.3 million	26	Malaysia	high	AI/MRG reporting.
	2.8 million	2	Indonesia	high	MRG reporting.
Chuang	8 million	less than 1	PRC	low	Post-Mao regime less aggressive in promoting assimilation.
Croats	4.5 million	23	Yugoslavia	high	AI/MRG reporting; some terrorism.
Edo	3 million	4.5	Nigeria	medium	Fear being drawn into conflict between larger ethnic groups.
Eritreans	1.5 million	5.8	Ethiopia	high	Armed separatist movement; AI/MRG reporting.
Estonians	1 million	less than 1	USSR	high	Retain feelings of cultural superiority to Russians, but violence unlikely.
Ganda	2 million	16	Uganda	high	Status should improve under post-Amin regime.

**Selected Ethnic Minorities <sup>1</sup> (Continued)**

Name	Number	Percent of Total Population	Country	Degree of Self-Determination	Comment
Georgians	3 million	1.2	USSR	medium	AI/MRG reporting.
Gujerati	25 million	4	India	high	Recent communal tensions.
Harijans	80 million	12	India	low	MRG reporting; aspire to escape "untouchable" stigma.
Hui	4 million	less than 1	PRC	high	Resisting assimilation.
Hungarians	1.7 million	8	Romania	high	AI/MRG reporting.
Ibibio	3.5 million	5.2	Nigeria	medium	Fear being drawn into conflict with larger ethnic groups.
Ibo	14 million	21	Nigeria	high	Recent secessionist movement; unless integrated, will remain threat for disunity of Nigeria.
Ilocanos	4 million	8.8	Philippines	low	Very little outside attention to date.
Kannada	25 million	4	India	medium	Potential problem in view of size.
Kanuri	4 million	6	Nigeria	medium	Strong sense of past glory.
Karens	3 million	9.4	Burma	high	Armed separatist movement.
Kazakh	4.5 million	2	USSR	medium	May be influenced by Islamic Revival.
Kirghiz	1.5 million	less than 1	USSR	low	May be influenced by Islamic Revival.
Kongo (Ba-Kongo)	2 million	9	Zaire	high	Most politically conscious group in Zaire aside from Shabans; a key threat to Mobutu.
	1 million	12	Angola	high	Separatist movement (FNLA).
Kurds	2 million	18.3	Iraq	high	Separatist movement; AI/MRG reporting.
	2 million	4	Iran	high	Separatist movement; AI/MRG reporting.
	3 million	7	Turkey	medium	Separatist movement; AI/MRG reporting.
Latvians	1.5 million	less than 1	USSR	high	Quiescent.
Lithuanians	2.5 million	less than 1	USSR	high	AI reporting.
Luo	1 million	7	Kenya	medium	Vocal and oppressed.
Makassarese	2 million	1.5	Indonesia	low	Very little information on attitudes.
Malays	20 million	3	India	high	No strong sense of being oppressed.
Marathi	45 million	7	India	high	No strong sense of being oppressed.
Mayans	3 million	41	Guatemala	low	AI reporting.
Mende	1 million	37	Sierra Leone	medium	Potential for trouble based on size.
Miao	2.5 million	less than 1	PRC	low	Government is emphasizing ethnic heritage of even this small group.
Minahassans	1 million	less than 1	Indonesia	medium	Some antipathy to central government.

Selected Ethnic Minorities <sup>1</sup> (Continued)

Name	Number	Percent of Total Population	Country	Degree of Self-Determination	Comment
Minangkabu	5 million	3.6	Indonesia	high	Highly individualistic/resent outside control.
Moluccans	1 million	less than 1	Indonesia	high	Terrorist movement in Netherlands.
Montagnards	1 million	2	Vietnam	high	MRG reporting.
Nilotics	4 million	21	Sudan	medium	AI/MRG reporting.
Nkole	1 million	8	Uganda	low	New regime may improve status.
Nupe	1 million	1.5	Nigeria	medium	Try to avoid entanglements with larger ethnic groups.
Oriyan	20 million	3	India	medium	Not likely to cause problems in near future.
Ovimbundo	2.3 million	36	Angola	high	Armed separatist movement.
Palestinians	1 million	32	Israel	high	Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
	1 million	33	Jordan	high	Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
	250,000	10	Lebanon	high	Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
	150,000	2	Syria	high	Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
Pampangans	1.5 million	4.4	Philippines	medium	Very little information on their attitudes.
Papuans	1 million	less than 1	Indonesia	high	Armed separatist movement.
Punjabi	17 million	2.7	India	low	Sense of group superiority.
Quebecois	5 million	22	Canada	high	Separatist movement; AI reporting.
Quechua	6 million	21	Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador	low	AI/MRG reporting.
Scots	5 million	9	United Kingdom	high	Rejected offer for more home rule.
Shan	1.5 million	6	Burma	high	Armed separatist movement.
Sidamo	2.5 million	9	Ethiopia	low	MRG reporting.
Sindhis	9 million	14	Pakistan	medium	May cause problems for central government.
Slovaks	4.5 million	30	Czechoslovakia	high	Greater hostility toward central government than toward Czechs.
Slovenes	2 million	8.2	Yugoslavia	high	AI reporting.
Soga	1 million	8	Uganda	low	New regime may improve group status.
Sundanese	16 million	14	Indonesia	medium	Group size may pose problem over long term.
Tamil	40 million	6.1	India	high	Some communal tensions, stimulated to some degree by situation in Sri Lanka.
	2.5 million	21	Sri Lanka	high	Communal tension AI/MRG reporting.
Tatars	4 million	1.6	USSR	medium	MRG reporting.
Telego	50 million	7.7	India	high	Very little outside information to date.
Teso	1 million	8	Uganda	low	New regime may improve group status.

**Selected Ethnic Minorities <sup>1</sup> (Continued)**

Name	Number	Percent of Total Population	Country	Degree of Self-Determination	Comment
Tibetans	3 million	less than 1	PRC	high	May cause problems in near future.
	2 million	less than 1	India, Pakistan, Nepal	high	Potential for renewed violence against PRC.
Tigrinya	3 million	10	Ethiopia	high	Separatist movement; AI/MRG reporting.
Timorese	2 million	1.6	Indonesia	medium	Separatist movement.
Tiv	8 million	12	Nigeria	medium	Some involvement in Biafran civil war.
Turkmen	1.5 million	less than 1	USSR	medium	Nomadism causes problems for government.
Uighur	4 million	less than 1	USSR	medium	Group divided between PRC & USSR.
Ukrainians	35-40 million	16	USSR	high	AI reporting.
Ulster Irish	1 million	2	United Kingdom	high	Terrorism AI/MRG reporting.
Uzbek	9 million	3.5	USSR	high	Muslim group experiencing population growth; probably most assertive ethnic group in Central Asia.
	1 million	9	Afghanistan	high	Involved in current revolt.
Visayans	10 million	22	Philippines	low	Fear loss of language.
Welsh	2.5 million	5	United Kingdom	high	Rejected offer of more home rule.

<sup>1</sup> Includes groups over 1 million which are not the dominant ethnic group in their country. Does not include religious groups per se. Thus, Palestinians, Tamils, and Kurds are included; Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Muslim sects as such are not.

<sup>2</sup> AI (Amnesty International); MRG (Minority Rights Group).



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