

# The Nonaligned Movement: Dynamics and Prospects

An Intelligence Assessment

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
# The Nonaligned Movement: Dynamics and Prospects

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

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**The Nonaligned Movement:  
Dynamics and Prospects** [redacted]

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**Key Judgments**

The Nonaligned Movement (NAM), a loose political association with no real power, has nonetheless been able to influence the priorities and tone of the international agenda through sustained iteration of the positions of the less developed countries. For the most part, the Movement's pronouncements have been anti-Western, indeed, anti-United States, because of the Third World's resentment of its colonial legacy and perceived continued economic subordination to the industrial countries. The Movement has also been critical of the USSR, especially on issues of the great power arms race and inadequate economic assistance to LDCs. While such criticism is intended to demonstrate the "evenhanded" pursuit of the interests of the Movement's members, it has not been as vocal as that directed at the West. [redacted]

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The NAM's sixth summit—in Havana in September—could prove to be crucial to the future direction and even the survival of the Movement.

- The Movement's activities and public positions largely reflect the preoccupations and policy orientation of its most active members. Cuba, which is to be titular leader of the NAM for the three years starting with the summit, will attempt to give the Movement a more pointedly anti-US and pro-Soviet edge than have such traditional leaders as Yugoslavia.
- Iraq seems likely to be named to succeed Cuba as chairman, thus giving the more radical NAM members an edge in directing the Movement over the next six years.
- Heightened Sino-Soviet rivalry, as well as the more heated contest for leadership between radical and moderate members, are exacerbating endemic regional, economic, and ideological factionalism, at a time when members are increasingly questioning the Movement's utility to their foreign policy interests. [redacted]

We expect the Havana conference to be highly contentious even by the NAM's traditional standards, with such issues as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, local wars in East Asia, and jockeying for power within the organization certain to cause discord. Nonetheless, the forces for compromise and at least rhetorical unity—essential to the survival of the Movement—are likely to prevail. Cuba will do all it can to radicalize the proceedings, but Yugoslavia and other moderates will probably succeed in imparting some balance to the proceedings. The United States will suffer sharper insults but not necessarily more substantial injuries than in the past. The summit will thus probably be considered a "success" by most members, in that unity on issues of common concern will be preserved, while more contentious issues will be shelved or the differences papered over. [redacted]

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More important than the Havana summit will be the direction the Movement takes during the three years that it will be under Cuba's tutelage and leadership. We expect a more active involvement of the NAM in international forums and issues, similar to that during Algeria's chairmanship (1973-76):

- The Movement will pay greater attention to issues related to alleged political domination and economic exploitation of the Third World by the industrialized West, such as foreign military bases (Guantanamo, Diego Garcia); unequal trade relations; and national liberation movements and the role of Communist states in helping these movements.
- Events in southern Africa could adversely influence US relations with the NAM. If efforts to achieve an internationally accepted settlement of the current conflict in Namibia and Rhodesia fail and armed struggle ensues, further Cuban and Soviet assistance will be sought by the liberation forces. Anticolonial sentiment could reach fever pitch and drown out voices

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for moderation and compromise in the Movement. Such a development could, in turn, facilitate Cuba's efforts to radicalize the Movement.

- The death of Yugoslavia's Tito during Cuba's tenure as chairman would mean loss of a major opponent of Cuban domination of the Movement, albeit it also might force other moderates to play a more active role.

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Despite endemic internal strains, we believe the Movement will maintain a fairly high degree of cohesion for the next several years because it will continue to serve the interest of both radical and moderate leaders, as well as of the rank and file. Most members view the Movement as one of the most effective means they have to represent their interests with the more advanced countries, particularly the superpowers. For its part, Cuba will be constrained as titular leader not to force the Movement toward extreme positions that would threaten its unity, lest this diminish the NAM's utility to Havana's foreign policy.

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**The Nonaligned Movement:  
Dynamics and Prospects** [redacted]

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**Origins and Growth**

The concept of nonalignment originated in the 1950s as one of several efforts by the less developed countries (LDCs) to promote their interests in what they perceived as a dangerous and exploitative bipolar world. The major goals of what became the Nonaligned Movement were to mediate the Soviet-US Cold War conflict, to urge the superpowers to disarm, to decolonize the world, and to obtain a larger share of global economic resources for the LDCs. [redacted]

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The conditions that fostered and nurtured the concept of nonalignment have changed. The Cold War thawed the anticolonialism, which once provided the binding force for the Movement, now represents no more than a common heritage for most of the members. The energetic pursuit of economic equality with the industrial countries was launched at the Movement's 1973 summit. Since then, however, implementing this objective has been taken over by the LDCs UN caucus, the Group of 77, which acts as the Third World's economic negotiating bloc with the industrialized countries. As a result, the Movement at present has no one issue around which it can regenerate itself and for which it is either the sole or the best spokesman for its membership. Moreover, fundamental differences in political outlook and stages of economic development, as well as regional conflicts and interregional jealousies, plague the group. Indeed, the Movement is characterized only by a series of meetings and declarations, and has no internal mechanism to implement its declarations or resolutions. [redacted]

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Despite the Movement's lack of focus, it still has an important impact, especially in North-South relations. Its summits and numerous meetings spawn ideas that are often translated into resolutions and proposals that incrementally advance the interests of developing countries in various multilateral forums. [redacted]

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Indeed, at times the Movement's impact has been impressive, especially in view of the obstacles that members must overcome to reach consensus. For example, the Movement initiated the drive that led to

greater LDC representation in various UN bodies, such as the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); it originated the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO); it was the driving force in the creation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); and it is the originator of the present drive to create a New World Information Order (NWIO). Its long-term interest in disarmament issues sparked the recent UN Special Session on Disarmament, which resulted in the LDCs' gaining more influence in multilateral disarmament debates. [redacted]

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**Internal Tensions**

The increase in the membership of the Movement and the diverse ideological composition since its first meeting in 1961 has heightened internal tensions over the direction—and the very meaning—of nonalignment. Of the influential national leaders who had the drive and competence to organize and direct the Movement, only Yugoslavia's Tito remains. Those who are now most forcefully aspiring for leadership view the concept of nonalignment in narrower terms than do the surviving traditional leaders. Cuba, the current threat to Yugoslavia's influence, sees the Movement exclusively as an anti-imperialist (that is, anti-US) force that should be closely aligned with its "natural" ally, the Soviet Union. To Yugoslavia, Cuba's attitudes represent a direct and unacceptable Soviet attempt to exert influence through the Movement. This threat comes at a time when Yugoslavia may be faced with succession problems and may not be able to thwart Cuba's effort to transform the Movement. [redacted]

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Cuba is particularly assertive in defending Soviet interests within the NAM, but it is not the only member that over the years has depended on the military and economic patronage of one of the superpowers. Those who at one time or another have taken a pro-Soviet approach include Egypt, in 1956 when it

turned to the Soviets to build the Aswan High Dam; India, after the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962; and Ethiopia since 1977. The states that lean toward the West—such as Saudi Arabia, Zaire, Liberia—are reluctant to openly support Western aims. [redacted]

**Charting a New Course**

Yet, the Movement continues to exist and even to grow, because it provides a forum for newly independent states, as well as small and middle-size states, to reaffirm their sovereignty.<sup>3</sup> It also serves domestic needs, by giving leaders of member countries a third foreign policy option which, because it sidesteps favoring US or Soviet positions, avoids arousing the antagonism of pro-Western or pro-Communist internal political factions. The most important factor in maintaining NAM strength and influence is the persistent appeal of the Movement's underlying objective; that is, to improve the political and economic positions of Third World states. Both the nonaligned members and the other LDCs generally believe that the present international structure is inherently biased and serves the interests of only a few industrial states. Furthermore, they see themselves still in bondage to the developed countries because political sovereignty in many cases was not accompanied by economic viability. The members thus view the Movement as a useful means to enhance their ability to effect what they see as crucially needed changes in the international political and economic system. [redacted]

Sustaining such relationships with the superpowers, however, raises the basic conflict between the ideals of nonalignment and superpower client status, an issue that causes acerbic debate at nonaligned gatherings as members attempt to define the role and meaning of nonalignment. To reduce divisiveness on the issue, members have dealt with it on the official level by restating the vague principles of nonalignment, ignoring its inconsistencies, and rarely directly attacking any member for its alignment with either superpower.<sup>1</sup> [redacted]

The long-running Sino-Soviet struggle for influence within the NAM has surfaced again in the context of the Kampuchea-Vietnam conflict. The issue of which government represents Kampuchea is a divisive one within the Movement, with the pro-Soviet faction pitted against most other members. The members were able to avoid the issue at the most recent meeting of the NAM's Coordinating Bureau<sup>2</sup> in Mozambique by agreeing to seat without the right to speak both the already-present representative of the Pol Pot regime and representatives of the Peoples' Revolutionary Council. The latter, however, did not send a delegation. [redacted]

Other political issues continue to strain the unity of the nonaligned states. Regional conflicts—such as those between Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria; Somalia and Ethiopia; Kampuchea and Vietnam; Tanzania and Uganda; Egypt and the rejectionist Arab states—divert attention from the Movement's major long-term objective of bringing about a radically different international system. [redacted]

<sup>1</sup> Cuba has recently come under direct attack. At the Belgrade Foreign Ministers meeting in July 1978, Egypt delivered a slashing attack on Cuba for its involvement in Africa and called for changing the venue of the summit from Havana. Similar attacks were delivered by Somalia, Zaire, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, and Tunisia. [redacted]

<sup>2</sup> See annex B, pages 13 to 17 for a description of the Coordinating Bureau. [redacted]

Cuba's intentions toward the Movement are not fully clear. As titular leader of the NAM for the three years following the Havana summit, it can be assumed that Cuba will continue its attempts to redefine non-alignment as an anti-imperialist force, more closely allied with the Soviet orbit. It has, however, shown a great deal of flexibility and is not likely to risk pushing to the point of endangering the unity of the Movement. [redacted]

Cuba's efforts to transform and redefine the character of the Movement are likely to be constrained by the very nature of Castro's goals. If it pushes these goals too energetically, even some radical members may join an expected anti-Cuban backlash. Algeria, although currently preoccupied by its internal succession problems, may not willingly agree to Cuban control of the Movement, and some of the other radicals—for

<sup>3</sup> Iran applied for admission in early March 1979, following its withdrawal from CENTO. Pakistan, which also withdrew from CENTO, is expected to seek membership before the Havana summit. [redacted]

example, Iraq and Libya—do not necessarily share Cuba's view of a natural alliance between the NAM and the Soviets. If Cuban actions were to result in a conversion of the NAM into a smaller, clearly revolutionary and anti-Western group, the loss of membership would greatly reduce its international influence. [redacted]

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How polemical the declaration and resolutions of the Havana summit will be depends on several factors—the international environment at the time of the summit; Cuba's exemplary skills at parliamentary procedures; and willingness of the majority to acquiesce to the special interests of a few. [redacted]

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Important external factors that could seriously erode the moderate faction's ability to temper the radicals in the years ahead are a sharp decline in the international economy, failure of the Western initiatives in southern Africa, a Middle East war, and the death of Tito. A prolonged international recession could bring about increasing attention to economic affairs, perhaps in a more confrontational atmosphere. Events in southern Africa or the Middle East could force countries to turn to the Soviets and their allies for assistance, thus muting the voices of pragmatism and moderation. Tito's death would probably divert Yugoslavia's attention inward to the succession problem, and, at least temporarily, reduce its influence in the Movement. Without Tito as a counterforce to Cuba's efforts to dominate the Movement, other moderates might be prompted to play a more active role. [redacted]

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Iraq is slated to assume the chair in 1982. The direction that Iraq will pursue is open to question, but it will not likely be as pro-Soviet as Cuba's orientation. It can be assumed that the Middle East will be Iraq's prime focus. [redacted]

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In sum, although the Movement will probably retain its "anti-imperialist" approach, it will not necessarily assume a more pro-Soviet stance. Such a reorientation would come only at the expense of the NAM's existence, which neither the "radicals" or the "moderates" want. The tensions generated by the clash of opposing forces on the meaning of nonalignment and other issues will continue to test the Movement's unity. Even so, there is no other Third World forum quite like the Nonaligned Movement through which the diverse membership can express its interests. Thus, as long as the members of the Movement retain a shared sense of being ill-treated by the industrial and military powers and a belief in the need to speak with one voice to correct the perceived imbalances, the nonaligned will probably continue to patch over their immediate differences to pursue their long-term goal of restructuring the international system. [redacted]

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## Annex A

### Evolution and Goals

#### Origin and Principles

The Nonaligned Movement has its antecedents in the April 1955 Afro-Asian conference held in Bandung, Indonesia. Twenty-nine states—mostly newly independent—gathered to discuss ways to achieve economic, cultural, and political cooperation in order to secure their own independence at a time when the Cold War seemed to polarize the world into two antagonistic blocs. The conference made no mention of “non-alignment” (a term coined by Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito), but it did incorporate the basic principles of the concept of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence and was viewed by Tito as a milestone in the evolution of the concept. [redacted]

The principles of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence were contained in a 1954 bilateral communique between Yugoslavia’s Tito and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru.<sup>4</sup> These two leaders envisaged nonalignment as the active pursuit of political and economic independence, peaceful ideological coexistence, and military nonalliance, which could exert a considerable influence on the course of world affairs. Each approached the concept from a different perspective. Nehru saw it as a means to exert a moral force for peace between the United States and the USSR while Tito, for his own geopolitical reasons, saw it as a way to help Yugoslavia out of its diplomatic isolation and to form and lead a third force in international affairs. Egypt’s Nasser and Indonesia’s Sukarno embraced the concept in 1956.

Nasser, who at the time was preoccupied with Algerian independence, predicated his acceptance of the principles of nonalignment on the condition that colonialism

<sup>4</sup> This communique noted that Yugoslav-Indian relations were based on the “Panchsheel” principles and further asserted that these principles should govern international relations. The principles, prefaced in a 1954 Sino-Indian agreement on Tibetan border traffic, are mutual respect for each others’ territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual nonaggression; mutual noninterference; equality and mutual benefits; and peaceful coexistence. Belgrade viewed the concept of active coexistence as a blueprint for a new and radically different system of international relations that would eventually do away with alignments and free the world of political, military, or economic abuse of power. Realizing that achievement of these goals would take a long time, Tito saw the policy of nonalignment as the best way to hasten the process. [redacted]

and related issues be given high priority. Tito thought these issues merited less urgent treatment, but acquiesced both because of his respect for Nasser and the need to garner Afro-Asian support for the concept. [redacted]

The Movement was slow in starting, partly because Yugoslavia was reluctant to apply the concepts to concrete issues or developments sensitive to either the East or the West. However, such events as the Suez crisis and Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, and the Congo and Berlin crises in 1960-61 led Yugoslavia to postulate that the existence of two military blocs and the armaments race between them were the primary threats to peace. The unstable world situation led the Movement’s founders to call for a summit meeting of like-minded states to develop a strategy that would avert an open confrontation between the United States and the USSR.<sup>5</sup> Four major foreign policy tasks were established at the 1961 nonaligned summit in Belgrade: to mediate between the East and West; to secure a general and complete disarmament, or at least a halt in the US-Soviet race; to bring an end to colonialism; and to restructure the international system to decrease the perceived abuses of the military and industrial powers. The issue of decolonization offered the most promise for effective small-state collective pressure and became the motive force for the Movement. [redacted]

#### Membership

Expanding the membership, which the founders—particularly Yugoslavia—believed was necessary to give the Movement the necessary influence, forced a flexible application of the criteria for entry into the Movement. In theory, nonalliance with military blocs is a requisite for membership. In practice, acceptance of new applicants is based more on subjective factors.

<sup>5</sup> Although Cuba has questionable credentials as a nonaligned country, it was invited to attend because of its image as a small country facing US hostility as reflected in the Bay of Pigs invasion and the US economic blockade. [redacted]

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Thus, even countries with clear military alignments have been allowed to become members. (See table 1 for a list of members.) For example, with the strong backing of the active and increasingly influential socialist members, North Korea was able to secure membership in 1976, while South Korea was not. The fact that North Korea's ties to the Soviet Union were at that time as strong as South Korea's ties to the United States made little difference. Membership criteria have also been frequently relaxed on the assumption that affiliation will strengthen a country's independent posture. Malta's membership reflects the NAM members' recognition of the difficulty in terminating base agreements. And even though the Movement has not granted full membership to any country with formal military alliances to either superpower, the participation as guests of Portugal (NATO), the Philippines (US bases), and Romania (Warsaw Pact) shows the flexible nature of the NAM's membership criteria. [redacted]

By contrast, certain countries have been discouraged from applying for membership, or their requests have been blocked at nonaligned meetings. For example, India had successfully lobbied against Pakistan's full membership, citing Islamabad's membership in CENTO. Besides its own reasons for keeping Pakistan out of the Movement, it may also have been seconding the Soviet view, which portrays Pakistan as a conduit of Chinese influence. Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO removes the excuse India has used to prevent Pakistan from joining the Movement. A second example is Cuba's self-assigned role as the arbiter for admission of Latin American states, which has thus far prevented countries not to Havana's liking from gaining membership. For example, it successfully blocked discussion of Bolivia's application for membership in 1978. [redacted]

"The NAM has two categories for nonmember participation—guest and observer. Both are allowed to attend plenary meetings, but cannot participate in drafting and generally have no voice. The difference between the two is vague—some members define criteria for observer status as meeting all necessary requirements for membership. Procedurally, the observer category is a permanent position, while the guest category pertains only to a particular meeting. Guests must be granted permission to attend each meeting. [redacted]"

Diversity has increased as membership has grown. This has heightened the tensions over priorities, policy direction, and the very meaning of nonalignment. Although there are various factional alignments for different issues in the Movement, two forces are the most dynamic in seeking to define the NAM's role. [redacted]

The small, but very active group, described as "progressive and revolutionary" (for example, Afghanistan, Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, and Vietnam) generally define the NAM strictly as an "anti-imperialist" entity—claiming the ills of the world are caused by the capitalist states. Cuba, the current leader of this group, is attempting to push the Movement in that direction while stressing the natural affinity of the Movement to the "socialist," that is, Communist, countries. Within the grouping, the ideological differences and mutual suspicions among those countries who identify with the Soviet Union (Cuba, Vietnam), or China (North Korea, Kampuchea) and those who are anti-Communist (Libya) prevent adoption of a common definition of the role of the Movement. [redacted]

Yugoslavia, and the "centrist" members (India, Sri Lanka, and Egypt) continue to express the principles of nonalignment in the terms established in 1961—opposition to all forms of foreign domination and independence from all blocs. In addition, some members of this core group want the Movement to focus on economic and disarmament problems, rather than on the political issues (seemingly favored by the more radical members) that tend to divide the NAM. Within this more moderate core there are also divisions between some members who are Communist and those who have a pro-Western orientation (termed "reactionary" by Cuba). Yugoslavia, above all, stresses the need for unity and solidarity of the entire Movement and fears that labeling the members "progressives" or "reactionary" only serves to exacerbate the divisions inherent among the members and reduce the NAM's effectiveness. In addition to its political diversity, the broad economic spectrum of the membership represents every level of national development, from bare subsistence to relatively diversified and advanced economic structures. [redacted]

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**Table 1**

**Members of the Nonaligned Movement <sup>1</sup>**

|                               |  |   |
|-------------------------------|--|---|
| Afghanistan (1961)            | Indonesia (1961)                         | Peru (1973)                             |
| Algeria (1961)                | Iraq (1961)                              | Qatar (1973)                            |
| Angola (1964)                 | Ivory Coast (1973)                       | Rwanda (1970)                           |
| Argentina (1973)              | Jamaica (1970)                           | Sao Tome and Principe (1976)            |
| Bahrain (1976)                | Jordan (1964)                            | Saudi Arabia (1961)                     |
| Bangladesh (1973)             | Kampuchea (1961)                         | Senegal (1964)                          |
| Benin (1964)                  | Kenya (1964)                             | Seychelles (1976)                       |
| Bhutan (1973)                 | Korea (Pyongyang) (1976)                 | Sierra Leone (1964)                     |
| Botswana (1970)               | Kuwait (1964)                            | Singapore (1970)                        |
| Burma (1961)                  | Laos (1964)                              | Somalia (1961)                          |
| Burundi (1964)                | Lebanon (1961)                           | South-West Africa People's Organization |
| Cameroon (1964)               | Lesotho (1970)                           | Sri Lanka (1961)                        |
| Cape Verde (1976)             | Liberia (1964)                           | Sudan (1961)                            |
| Central African Empire (1964) | Libya (1964)                             | Swaziland (1970)                        |
| Chad (1964)                   | Madagascar (1973)                        | Syria (1964)                            |
| Comoros (1976)                | Malaysia (1964)                          | Tanzania (1964)                         |
| Congo (1964)                  | Maldives (1976)                          | Togo (1964)                             |
| Cuba (1961)                   | Mali (1961)                              | Trinidad and Tobago (1970)              |
| Cyprus (1961)                 | Malta (1973)                             | Tunisia (1961)                          |
| Djibouti <sup>2</sup>         | Mauritania (1964)                        | Uganda (1964)                           |
| Egypt (1961)                  | Mauritius (1973)                         | United Arab Emirates (1973)             |
| Equatorial Guinea (1970)      | Morocco (1961)                           | Upper Volta (1973)                      |
| Ethiopia (1961)               | Mozambique (1976)                        | Vietnam (1973)                          |
| Gabon (1973)                  | Nepal (1961)                             | Yemen (Aden) (1970)                     |
| Gambia (1973)                 | Niger (1973)                             | Yemen (Sana) (1961)                     |
| Ghana (1961)                  | Nigeria (1964)                           | Yugoslavia (1961)                       |
| Guinea (1961)                 | Oman (1973)                              | Zaire (1961)                            |
| Guinea-Bissau (1976)          | Palestine Liberation Organization (1976) | Zambia (1964)                           |
| Guyana (1970)                 | Panama (1976)                            | Zimbabwe Patriotic Front <sup>4</sup>   |
| India (1961)                  |  |   |

<sup>1</sup> Chile dropped out after being heavily criticized at the 1976 Colombo summit. Although still a member in a formal sense, since there is no mechanism for expulsion, it is not invited to attend meetings and, under the present government, probably would not attend if it were invited. Malawi joined the Movement in 1964. President Banda denounced nonalignment in 1970, following criticism for its relations with Israel. Neither are counted in the total of 88 members.

<sup>2</sup> Admitted at the NAM foreign ministers' conference in Belgrade in July 1978. It must be confirmed at the Havana summit.

<sup>3</sup> Admitted at a ministerial meeting of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau (NACB) in New York early in the 33d (1978) UN General Assembly. It must be confirmed at the Havana summit.

<sup>4</sup> Admitted at the ministerial meeting of the NACB in Mozambique in February 1979. It must be confirmed at the Havana summit.



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In sum, the Movement is so filled with contradictory interests that organizing for a sharply focused approach to issues is often impossible. Nonetheless, it does maintain an appearance of unity, especially in general statements about the evils of "imperialism" and the economic needs of the developing states. The source of this cohesion is the firm belief of the members that to improve their position in the international political and economic system, they must remain united. [redacted]

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**Relationship to Group of 77**

Although the Nonaligned Movement includes most of the LDCs, it is not identical with the Group of 77, which has 117 members (see map, page 11, and tables 1 and 2).<sup>7</sup> The Group of 77 came into being in 1964 in the context of the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It continues to be, in the framework of the United Nations, the principal caucus of all LDCs, for matters of collective economic interests. The Movement represents a majority in the Group of 77, and perceives itself as a catalyst within that body to give it effective political direction. The shared values of both groups often make it impossible to distinguish where the influence of one ends and the other begins. The Movement, however, transcends economic concerns and offers militarily weak and economically underdeveloped nations a forum in which to develop joint positions on noneconomic issues as well. [redacted]

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Particularly in UN forums, the Movement thus speaks to such issues as national self-determination, non-adherence to multilateral military pacts, disarmament, noninterference in the internal affairs of states, strengthening of the United Nations, "democratization of international relations" (read greater Third World representation), and such development-related issues as individual and collective self-reliance. [redacted]

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<sup>7</sup> Countries in the Group of 77 that are not members of the Nonaligned Movement either have not met membership criteria (for example, Romania) or, for their own national policy reasons, have not asked for membership (for example, Brazil, Mexico). [redacted]

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**Leadership and Direction**

The Movement has both a formal and an informal leadership structure. The NAM foreign ministers recommend to the summit, the NAM's major organ, the country that will serve as the next President in Office (a three-year term that begins with the hosting of the summit). The procedure usually is to accept a country's offer to act as host. This year the NAM Foreign Ministers meeting at Belgrade accepted Iraq's offer to assume the presidency in 1982. That offer must be confirmed at the Havana summit in September 1979. [redacted]

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The hosts of the NAM summits are accorded an important opportunity for influence and control. The Movement does not have a secretariat and consequently has adopted the practice of allowing the summit host to prepare the first draft of the agenda, communiques, and resolutions, which are generally based on previous NAM documents. The host, as the summit's chairman, wields a substantial amount of power in meetings through such parliamentary procedural maneuvers as deciding the rules of order and sidetracking amendments. The latter tactic, which constitutes the greater control over the outcome of the meeting, often means that members are pressured to accept the original text drafted by the host. During its tenure, Algeria was most successful in sidetracking amendments and steamrolling declarations and resolutions by deciding the rules of procedure. Sri Lanka, the present chairman, also employed this tactic at the 1976 summit, but not so blatantly. [redacted]

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The ideological and political leadership of the Movement is not always reflected in the election process; indeed, such leadership depends on national dynamism and individual charisma. A small number of countries dominate the Movement through the influence they exert by their membership on the Coordinating Bureau and by active bilateral contacts with a large number of members. This leadership shifts when key members—such as India, Egypt, Indonesia, and Algeria—periodically turn their attention to their own national needs, or when strong leaders die or their attitudes toward the Movement change. [redacted]

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**Table 2**

**Members of the Group of 77**

|                        |                   |                                   |
|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Afghanistan            | Guinea            | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| Algeria                | Guinea-Bissau     | Panama                            |
| Angola                 | Guyana            | Papua New Guinea                  |
| Argentina              | Haiti             | Paraguay                          |
| Bahamas                | Honduras          | Peru                              |
| Bahrain                | India             | Philippines                       |
| Bangladesh             | Indonesia         | Qatar                             |
| Barbados               | Iran              | Romania                           |
| Benin                  | Iraq              | Rwanda                            |
| Bhutan                 | Ivory Coast       | Sao Tome and Principe             |
| Bolivia                | Jamaica           | Saudi Arabia                      |
| Botswana               | Jordan            | Senegal                           |
| Brazil                 | Kampuchea         | Seychelles                        |
| Burma                  | Kenya             | Sierra Leone                      |
| Burundi                | Korea (Pyongyang) | Singapore                         |
| Cameroon               | Korea (Seoul)     | Solomon Islands                   |
| Cape Verde             | Kuwait            | Somalia                           |
| Central African Empire | Laos              | Sri Lanka                         |
| Chad                   | Lebanon           | Sudan                             |
| Chile                  | Lesotho           | Suriname                          |
| Colombia               | Liberia           | Swaziland                         |
| Comoros                | Libya             | Syria                             |
| Congo                  | Madagascar        | Tanzania                          |
| Costa Rica             | Malawi            | Thailand                          |
| Cuba                   | Malaysia          | Togo                              |
| Cyprus                 | Maldives          | Trinidad and Tobago               |
| Djibouti               | Mali              | Tunisia                           |
| Dominican Republic     | Malta             | Uganda                            |
| Ecuador                | Mauritania        | United Arab Emirates              |
| Egypt                  | Mauritius         | Upper Volta                       |
| El Salvador            | Mexico            | Uruguay                           |
| Equatorial Guinea      | Morocco           | Venezuela                         |
| Ethiopia               | Mozambique        | Vietnam                           |
| Fiji                   | Nepal             | Western Samoa                     |
| Gabon                  | Nicaragua         | Yemen (Aden)                      |
| Gambia                 | Niger             | Yemen (Sana)                      |
| Ghana                  | Nigeria           | Yugoslavia                        |
| Grenada                | Oman              | Zaire                             |
| Guatemala              | Pakistan          | Zambia                            |



25X1

Another group—Vietnam, Iraq, Jamaica Guyana, and Syria—have been influential on particular issues. Only Yugoslavia, which considers the Movement an extension of its foreign policy, has consistently played a major role, albeit sometimes from the wings rather than from center stage (as it did during Algeria's forceful tenure as chairman). [redacted]

25X1

Since 1970, Cuba, the first Latin American member of the Movement, has been challenging Yugoslavia's influence within the Movement. Rejecting the founders' view that membership is based on adherence to a policy of peaceful coexistence and independence of power blocs, Cuba believes the NAM should be a "revolutionary" force aligned with the Soviet orbit. The Cubans also seek leadership as a means of increasing Fidel Castro's and Cuba's international prestige. [redacted]

25X1

The conflict over the role and direction of the Movement has been hotly debated at the summits. Although several members made speeches at the 1973 summit denouncing the irrelevance of the founding principles, Castro's speech proposing an alliance of the NAM with the Soviet Union clearly went too far for most members. Libyan President Qadhafi, at that time fervently anti-Communist, walked out, and Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk rebutted Castro from the floor. The issue will be addressed again at Havana and probably at every succeeding nonaligned gathering—without resolution. [redacted]

25X1

Such setbacks have not diminished Castro's efforts. As host of the next summit and president for three years following, Havana might succeed in pushing a more confrontational line with the West on certain issues and will certainly try to sharpen the rhetoric. Nevertheless, the NAM is too large, diverse, and unstructured for any one state or faction to control it for long. In the end, the overriding concern for "solidarity" should bring about compromise of the major conflicting interests. [redacted]

25X1



### Annex B Structure and Organization

The Nonaligned Movement has evolved an elaborate, although informal, organizational structure (see chart). Much of the existing structure has developed since 1973 and reflects the Movement's belief that it could be more successful as an offensive rather than defensive entity. [redacted]


ranks as a result of formal voting, members have adopted the principle of decisionmaking by consensus. By operating in this fashion, the members maintain anonymity and the fragile unity of the group is maintained, albeit at the price of many serious unresolved differences. Adding to the strain is the differing view that many of the members have on the consensus principle. Cuba, Vietnam, and Guyana want to retain the loose definition agreed to at the 1973 Kabul Preparatory Committee meeting—that is, that consensus simply means a convergence of views.<sup>1</sup>

The large, diverse membership has hindered the NAM's ability to organize itself formally, adopt a charter or other set of rules, or establish a permanent secretariat. It has also made it difficult to reconcile members' special interests in the pursuit of common objectives. To avoid both domination of the Movement by any one special interest group and splintering of its

<sup>1</sup> The Preparatory Committee evolved into the Coordinating Bureau. [redacted]

#### The Nonaligned Movement: Dynamics and Prospects

##### Organizational Structure



1. The Coordinating Bureau at the Level of Permanent Representatives also functions as preparatory committee for summits, foreign minister conferences and meetings at the ministerial level.  
 2. If no competent expert group exists, these meetings may report to any other body of the non-aligned movement.

Source: The Third World Without the Superpowers, Jankowitsch and Sauvart (1978)

[redacted]  
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Indonesia, Yugoslavia, India, Peru, Singapore, and others want a more precise definition, leaving less discretion to the chairman. Yugoslavia also argues that decisions adopted with many formal reservations do not carry weight, while Cuba argues that reservations cannot veto or obstruct consensus. The issue will be addressed at Havana, but probably will not be completely resolved. [redacted]

25X1

The Movement has evolved a three-year cycle of meetings, which builds upon itself. In each of the three years, the 25-member Coordinating Bureau meets at the level of the foreign ministers. In the second year, the Bureau ministerial meeting is followed by a plenary meeting of all nonaligned foreign ministers, while in the third year these two gatherings are followed by a summit meeting of the heads of state and government. [redacted]

25X1

The principal organ of the Movement is the conference of the heads of state and government, that is, the summit.<sup>9</sup> The leader of the country hosting a summit becomes a President in Office or nominal head of the Movement until the next summit. He is responsible for maintaining continuity and contact with member states, implementing the decisions and directives of the summit and coordinating all NAM activities. [redacted]

25X1

Summit conferences are immediately preceded by a conference of foreign ministers, which prepares the final agenda and drafts of the declaration and resolutions for the summit. The foreign ministers also meet at other times to review and coordinate the work of the Movement or to deal with special questions. They have recently initiated the practice of meeting in New York just before General Assembly sessions to coordinate NAM actions. The plenary Foreign Ministers meeting thus constitutes the second structural element of the Movement [redacted]

25X1

The third element is the 25-member Coordinating Bureau (see table 3 for a list of members) which is the fulcrum of nonaligned activities in the United Nations and the coordinating center for the Movement between  
<sup>9</sup> Costs for organizing a summit meeting are largely borne by the host. There is, however, a formula for cost-sharing which is based on contributions made by the member countries to the United Nations, subject to a prescription that no member pay more than 10 percent of the expenses. Expenses for hiring technicians and staff assistance from the UN secretariat staff, translation services, and printing are some of the common costs. [redacted]

25X1

Table 3

Members of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau

|                                   |
|-----------------------------------|
| Afghanistan                       |
| Angola                            |
| Algeria                           |
| Botswana                          |
| Cuba                              |
| Chad                              |
| Guinea                            |
| Guyana                            |
| India                             |
| Indonesia                         |
| Iraq                              |
| Jamaica                           |
| Liberia                           |
| Niger                             |
| Nigeria                           |
| Palestine Liberation Organization |
| Peru                              |
| Syria                             |
| Sri Lanka <sup>1</sup>            |
| Sudan                             |
| Tanzania                          |
| Vietnam                           |
| Yugoslavia                        |
| Zaire                             |
| Zambia                            |

<sup>1</sup> In the chair until the summit.

[redacted] summit conferences. Through its coordinating function the Coordinating Bureau is able to exert a certain amount of influence over the Movement's positions. The Bureau evolved from a compromise concept adopted at the 1973 Algiers summit, when Houari Boumediene, Algeria's forceful leader and host for that meeting, attempted to establish a permanent secretariat but was blocked by India and Yugoslavia. Other attempts by various members to institutionalize the Movement also have been unsuccessful. The unenthusiastic response to bureaucracy from most members probably reflects their concern that in addition to the costs involved, such a body would be dominated by one or a few countries. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Seats on the Bureau are apportioned on the basis of geographical distribution, in the same way that UN bodies apportion seats. The Bureau, which may be enlarged by 10 additional members at the 1979 summit, has a present allocation of 12 seats for Africa, 8 for Asia, 4 for Latin America, and 1 for Europe. Membership selection is made at each summit. Generally, the more active, influential members are revalidated by their regional groups, with rotation occurring among the less active NAM members. Egypt failed to retain its seat on the Bureau at the 1976 Colombo summit, which reflected a drop in stature for Egypt in addition to giving the radicals (especially Arab states) more influence within the Bureau. The Bureau is roughly divided between "moderates" and "radicals," but the radicals display more unity. Increasing the number of Bureau seats is not likely to change the tone of Bureau pronouncements significantly. [redacted]

The Coordinating Bureau's annual foreign ministers meetings prepare a communique dealing with issues of concern to the Movement—international peace and security, disarmament, and economics—which is then circulated to the membership. The Bureau meets regularly at the ambassadorial level at the United Nations in New York and sometimes at the UN headquarters in Geneva (on economic matters) and, claiming to speak for all nonaligned, issues statements or communiqués on various topics.<sup>10</sup> [redacted]

Although Bureau pronouncements are sometimes more radical in tone than those issuing from plenary meetings of all the nonaligned foreign ministers, the tone varies depending on where the meeting is held, how focused the attention of the "moderates" is, the degree to which one or more countries wish to push a particular view, and the prevailing international climate. [redacted]

That the Bureau's decisions may not represent the inclination of the entire membership was brought home at the May 1978 ministerial meeting in Havana.

<sup>10</sup> The contentious issue of whether the Bureau has the right to issue any communique without plenary approval arose again following the Bureau's release of a communique on the Middle East on 7 March 1979. A hastily arranged plenary meeting of all NAM ambassadors at New York decided, after spirited debate, that the Bureau could issue communiqués in its own name. This action sets a precedent that Cuba may be able to exploit when it assumes the chairmanship of the Bureau. [redacted]

By tradition, as the host, Cuba had much latitude in drafting the final communique and dictating the rules of order. Cuba appointed its allies to key committee chairmanships and restricted the participation of observers (which are full members of the Movement, but not of the Bureau). The result was a harsher, more confrontational approach to the issues than had been the case at the first meeting of the Bureau in New Delhi in 1977. [redacted]

In addition to the three main elements of the Movement, there are numerous expert and working groups that report to the Movement through the Coordinating Bureau. The economic activities of the Movement are carried out under the aegis of the Coordinator Countries of the Action Program for Economic Cooperation Among Nonaligned Countries, which was established at the 1972 Georgetown Foreign Ministers Conference (see table 4). The program represented the codification of attempts by the nonaligned countries to cultivate the spirit of self-reliance and to agree on a policy to promote their own socioeconomic development. The program laid out ground rules in the fields of planning, trade, cooperation and development, the improvement of infrastructure, and the application of science and technology. These groups meet periodically, but their recommendations have had limited impact on the Group of 77. Cuba is pushing to increase the activity and influence of these, as well as of the Nonaligned Movement's political, groups (see table 5). [redacted]

In certain areas the Coordinator Countries draw on the results of expert groups that were created after 1973.<sup>11</sup> These groups are important because their work—which is politically fine-tuned by the Bureau—to a large extent determines the substantive economic

<sup>11</sup> They include the Group of Experts on Science and Technology, the Group of Experts on the Information and Research System in the Field of Economic Cooperation; the Committee of Experts on Private Foreign Investment; the Intergovernmental Group of Nonaligned Countries on Raw Materials; the Group of Experts on the Establishment of a Council of Association of Developing Country Producers-Exporters of Raw Materials; and the Expert Group on the Establishment of a Fund for the Financing of Buffer Stocks of Raw Materials and Primary Products Exported by Developing Countries. The latter three groups were created at the 1975 Raw Materials Conference in Dakar. [redacted]

Table 4

Coordinator Countries of the Action Program for Economic Cooperation

| Field of Activity  | Coordinator Country  |
|--|--|
| International cooperation for economic development                       | Egypt, Nigeria, Panama   |
| Trade, transport, and industry   | Afghanistan, Guyana  |
| Financial and monetary cooperation                                       | Cuba, India, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia  |
| Scientific and technological development                                 | Algeria, India, Peru, Somalia, Yugoslavia  |
| Technical cooperation and consultancy services                           | India, Panama  |
| Food and agriculture   | Ethiopia, Korea (Pyongyang), Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Vietnam   |
| Fisheries  | Angola, Cuba, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam   |
| Telecommunications   | Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Empire  |
| Insurance  | (None designated)  |
| Health   | Central African Empire, Cuba, Yugoslavia   |
| Employment and human resources development                               | Bangladesh, Cuba, Nigeria, Panama, Sri Lanka, Tunisia  |
| Tourism  | Cameroon, Cyprus, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen (Sana)   |
| Transnational corporations   | Algeria, Cuba  |
| Sports   | Algeria, Cuba  |
| Raw materials  | Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, Cuba, Indonesia, Iraq, Panama, Peru, Senegal   |
| Research and information system  | India, Peru, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Yugoslavia  |
| Ad hoc group for the solidarity fund for economic and social development | Bangladesh, Kuwait, Sri Lanka  |
| Role of women in development   | Angola, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Empire, Cuba, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Korea (Pyongyang), Liberia, Yugoslavia                 |
| Peaceful uses of nuclear energy  | Algeria, Argentina, Central African Empire, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Indonesia, Libya, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia |

25X1

[Redacted]

content of nonaligned declarations. In addition, all LDCs are invited to participate in the meetings of these expert groups, thus intermeshing the economic work of the Movement with that of the Group of 77.

25X1

[Redacted]

Substantive preparatory work on political matters to be raised at a summit is usually carried out by working groups that operate within the framework of the main political organs of the United Nations. They evolved in a formal manner after the Algiers summit and have the specific purpose of defining a common position for the Movement and of suggesting appropriate courses of action in the General Assembly. Members of the working groups initiate resolutions, organize support for them, and generally perform a management

function for members of the Nonaligned Movement at the United Nations. [Redacted]

25X1

The nonaligned have also held a number of ad hoc and specialized ministerial meetings. Principal among the former were the Conference on the Problems of Economic Development in Cairo in 1962, and the Conference of Developing Countries on Raw Materials in Dakar in 1975. The Cairo meeting led to the creation of UNCTAD. The Dakar meeting gave impetus to the economic work of the Movement that culminated at Algiers in 1973—the emergence of development and related economic issues as principal objectives of the Movement. Specialized ministerial meetings began in 1977—at Sarajevo, Yugoslavia,

**Table 5**

**Composition of Working and Related Groups of the Nonaligned Countries in the United Nations <sup>1</sup>**

| Group   | Members  |
|---|--|
| Working Group of Korea  | Algeria, Cuba, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria   |
| Working Group on Disarmament and International Security                                       | Algeria <sup>2</sup> , Argentina <sup>2</sup> , Bangladesh, Brazil <sup>2,3</sup> , Cyprus, Egypt <sup>2</sup> , Ethiopia, India <sup>2</sup> , Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia <sup>2</sup> , Mali, Mexico <sup>2,3</sup> , Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria <sup>2</sup> , Peru <sup>2</sup> , Sri Lanka <sup>2</sup> , Yugoslavia <sup>2</sup> |
| Working Group for the Solidarity Fund for the Reconstruction of Vietnam and Laos <sup>4</sup> | Algeria <sup>5</sup> , Angola, Cuba <sup>5</sup> , Guyana, India, Iraq, Laos, Libya, Panama, Sri Lanka <sup>5</sup> , Tanzania, Vietnam, Yugoslavia  |
| Working Group on Southern Africa  | Angola, Botswana, Chad, Cuba, Guinea, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Liberia, Nigeria, Palestine Liberation Organization, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, Yugoslavia  |
| Working Group for Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa <sup>6</sup>          | Algeria, Cuba, Guyana, India, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia  |
| Working Group on Palestine and the Middle East  | Algeria, Chad, Cuba, Guinea, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Mali, Niger, Palestine Liberation Organization, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, Yugoslavia   |
| Working Group on the United Nations   | Algeria, Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Libya, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Zambia  |
| Contact Group on Cyprus   | Algeria, Guyana, India, Mali, Sri Lanka <sup>7</sup> , Yugoslavia  |
| Drafting Group on Interference in International Affairs of States                             | Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Botswana, Guyana, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Zambia  |

<sup>1</sup> The Working Group on the Admission of Vietnam to the United Nations ceased to exist upon the admission of Vietnam in 1977. Its members were Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Guyana, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Drafting Group for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

<sup>3</sup> Observer in the NAM.

<sup>4</sup> After the establishment of the Solidarity Fund for the Reconstruction of Vietnam and Laos, the Working Group converted itself into the Administrative Council for the purpose of operating this fund. Originally, this fund was also planned to be earmarked for Kampuchea; however that country declined any foreign assistance.

<sup>5</sup> Coordinator.

<sup>6</sup> After the establishment of the Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa, the Working Group converted itself into the Administrative Council for the purposes of operating this fund.

<sup>7</sup> Ex officio.

Source: *Third World Without the Superpowers*. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, 1978.

[Redacted]

dealing with information and mass media, and at Havana dealing with cooperation in fisheries. Since then, there have been more frequent meetings at this level to deal with specific issues, and perhaps to avoid the political infighting that usually occurs at the plenary or Bureau meetings. Such specialized meetings of the NAM are in some ways analogous to the UN specialized agencies, which were created to carry out specific mandates with relatively little interference from political rhetoric. [Redacted]

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| SUMMIT   | ISSUES IN DESCENDING ORDER  | LEADERS   | OUTCOME   | ATTITUDES OF SUPERPOWERS   | SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS   |
|--|---|---|---|--|--|
| — 1961 (Belgrade)<br>Cold War tensions prompted meeting. Soviets broke atmosphere nuclear testing moratorium on eve of conference.<br>25 members<br>3 observers  | Mediating Cold War, disarmament, anticolonialism, noninterference in internal affairs of states, greater LDC representation in world bodies, economic equality.   | Tito (Yugoslavia)<br>Nasser (Egypt)<br>Netru (India)<br>Sukarno (Indonesia)   | LDCs obtained greater representation in UN bodies (Security Council, ECOSOC, Disarmament Commission).<br><br>Convened conference of 31 developing countries which led to creation of UNCTAD.  | West generally hostile or indifferent. Found it difficult to reconcile professed neutrality of Movement and seemingly pro-Soviet bias.<br><br>Soviets apprehensive; nonalignment is a concept which the Soviet Union found difficult to reconcile with its political doctrine.   |  |
| — 1964 (Cairo)<br>Conference prompted by China's attempt (with Pakistan and Indonesia) to organize 2nd Afro-Asian conference. Chinese threat for influence threatened Yugoslav and Indian influence in region. Heightened tension within Movement among pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese factions. Membership criteria relaxed to allow broader representation.<br>47 members<br>13 observers | Anticolonialism (to include approval of liberation by force), racial discrimination and apartheid; reference to "a new international economic policy" appeared for first time in nonaligned declaration.  | Nasser. Tito played large role, but bowed to pressures from militant African leaders—recipients of Soviet aid. Ben Bella (Algeria), Kenia (Malii), Toure (Guinea), Nkrumah (Ghana). India's provocation with China following Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 almost led to open cleavage between it and other members. | Disension within the group, aggravated by lack of achievement at Cairo, left Movement moribund for 4 years. Not even Middle East war in 1967 sparked enough interest to convene meeting.  | West still not favorable in attitude. Its attempts to influence group not successful.<br><br>Soviets, partly because of leadership change, partly because of Chinese challenge, declare a "consistency of views" between nonaligned and themselves.  | 1968 - Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia prompted Tito to call for another meeting. India and Egypt, now heavily dependent on Soviet aid, were reluctant to irritate Soviets, who made known their opposition to meeting. Tito kept up pressure and by late spring of 1970 Africans, who were aroused by the prospects of British arms sales to South Africa, gave support for another summit.   |
| — 1970 (Lusaka)<br>By this time, major world problems had lost urgency—Czechoslovak crisis cooled, Vietnam conflict wound down, Middle East had tensions cease-fire in effect.<br>53 members<br>13 observers (UN represented)<br>7 guests  | Anticolonialism, apartheid, economic equality (first separate declaration on economic issues—emphasized self-reliance).   | Kaunda (Zambia), Tito (Yugoslavia), Indonesia, Kenya, Ethiopia  | Latin American states began to show more interest in Movement. At Lusaka, 4 were members and 8 attended as observers.<br><br>The Movement began to expand its institutional layers. The Preparatory Committee was entrusted with responsibility for coordinating activities of the Movement between summits. Foreign Ministers began meeting at New York to coordinate issues before UN General Assembly. | West concludes it is fruitless to attempt to influence group. US press takes generally uncondescending approach to NAM.<br><br>Soviets continue public support of nonalignment. Warn NAM of "imperialist" attempts to set the members against each other.  |  |
| — 1973 (Algiers)<br>Algeria was chosen over rival Sri Lanka in continuing jockeying for power between African and Asian countries. Summit attracted largest attendance of heads of state (50) up to that time.<br>75 members<br>28 observers<br>3 guests   | Economic restructuring (a South vs. North view), Middle East, southern Africa, disarmament, Law of the Sea.   | Boumediene (Algeria), Yugoslavia (in the wings), Cuba active  | NAM began a strong offensive through the UN. Internally, a Coordinating Committee with expanded functions was created as a compromise to secretariat issue.   | Soviets irked over Boumediene's "two imperialisms" theme, which started all developed countries, whether Communist or capitalist, were economic oppressors of Third World.   |  |
|  |   |   |   |  | 1974 - Boumediene called for UN special session on raw materials in wake of Washington consumers meeting. This brought about a head-on collision between US and LDCs, with US isolated even from many Western allies. Change in attitude of US from neglect of Movement to confronting NAM and answering charges. This approach dropped by US in 1975 in favor of quiet diplomacy at UN and in bilateral contacts.   |
|  |   |   |   |  | 1975 - Conference of Developing Countries on Raw Materials in Dakar. Attended by 86 countries, including non-NAM LDCs. Affirmed LDC conviction that they needed to control marketing of their products to gain greater revenues, but not successful in forging commodity agreement programs that could be implemented effectively by LDCs themselves.  |
|  |   |   |   |  | 1975 - Foreign Ministers' meeting in Lima, Peru (focused on forthcoming 7th Special Session on Development and International Economic Cooperation). Conference approved three important economic measures—creating a Solidarity Fund for Economic and Social Development; Special Fund for financing buffer stocks of raw materials and primary products exported by LDCs; and Council of Association of Developing Country Producers Exporters of Raw Materials. Meeting sharply focused on "action program" originated at Algiers on measures to be taken to achieve economic goals. |
|  |   |   |   |  | 1975 - 7th UN Special Session. Meeting took place at time of world recession characterized by high petroleum prices, industrial countries' slowdown in production and employment, which affected LDC commodity markets and foreign exchange earnings. Nevertheless, industrialized countries agreed to consider LDC demands, helped US approach led to restraint of LDC rhetoric in campaign to restructure international system.  |
| — 1976 (Colombo)<br>Movement marked 15th anniversary.<br>86 members<br>19 observers<br>7 guests  | Tension over direction Movement should pursue. Traditional political issues discussed—southern Africa, Middle East, detente, disarmament, decolonization. Detailed attention to Indian Ocean peace zone proposal raised at Lusaka. Economic declaration emphasized action nonaligned could take to further their own development. | Bandaranaike (Sri Lanka), Yugoslavia, India, Cuba active  | Conflicting tensions and international realities made it difficult for NAM to forge unified approach. Role of Group of 77 in negotiating with industrial countries left NAM without role in forging economic policy. Emergence of a moderate leadership coalition—Yugoslavia, India, and Sri Lanka.   | US begins to take a more open approach to nonaligned. Bilateral discussions with key countries discuss nonaligned issues of concern to US.<br><br>Soviets continue attempt to ingratiate themselves with members, especially to compete with increased US attention to NAM. Main concern of Soviet comment is to stress NAM principles that fit in with Soviet foreign policy objective—particularly anti-imperialism. |  |

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