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ROUTING SLIP

| TO | NAME AND ADDRESS | INITIALS | DATE |
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| 1. | Art Lundahl (Att. [redacted]) | | |
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REMARKS [redacted] requested [redacted] to prepare a draft memorandum along the lines of the attached. Any comments or suggestions you may have would be appreciated before the end of the week. If you would like to discuss aspects of the draft with me, call the girls in Bill's office, [redacted] and they can get in touch with me.

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| FROM | |
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| NAME AND ADDRESS | PHONE NO. |
| [redacted] | [redacted] |

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FORM 1-59 158Z

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Security Handling of Satellite
Reconnaissance Material

1. This memorandum is for your information and alerts you to probable increasing pressure, in the near future, from civilian agencies for relaxation of controls on covert satellite photography or for substantial expansion of billets and secure centers to accommodate anticipated needs of these agencies in exploiting T-KH photography.

2. You are aware of the long and complicated history of relevant events.

a.

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requested the Secretary of State, in a letter of 4 April, 1966 that the NSAM 156 ad hoc committee review security restrictions on reconnaissance activities and consider conflicts in satellite reconnaissance that might arise between the NRP and unclassified programs. COMOR was requested to study recommendations of that Committee's report of 11 July 1966. On 29 August 1966 you approved COMOR's recommendation that NASA be invited to select a panel representing scientific and technical disciplines of interest to NASA to be cleared for access to T-KH information in order they study these materials and make recommendations concerning the desirability of increased NASA participation in the T-KH program.

b. Prior to receiving the NSAM 156 committee's report, you had appointed an ad hoc group, chaired by to study the problems involved in the decontrol and downgrading of T-KH material. As a result of the group's suggestions, the USIB agreed in principle to acknowledge the fact of a U.S. satellite photographic reconnaissance program at the Secret level and to permit use of intelligence derived from exploitation of satellite photography (but not the film itself) in Secret or Top Secret publications, while identifying the source as "satellite photography."

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c. At the Board's request, COMOR on 23 May 1967 submitted proposed guidelines for the use of intelligence derived from satellite photography in Secret publications, along with a draft letter amending the President's Letter of Instruction of 26 August 1960 regarding strict security handling of NRP products within the T-KH system. In responding to the request for concurrence on views on the guidelines, the Deputy Director of DIA stated that the Secretary of Defense "feels that the advantages are not clear at this time and that acceptance of this proposal may erode the advantages which might be gained at some future time of the surfacing of U.S. and Soviet satellite photography." You, as chairman of the USIB, with other Board members ^{then} non-concerned with the
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revision of the Sanitization Manual as a way to obtain greater liberalization in the use of T-KH products. This is where the subject of control of covert reconnaissance photography stands at the present time.

3. By January 1967 no final action had been taken by NASA to establish a panel, as requested by you (paragraph 2a), although some scientists had been cleared. Finally, [redacted] took the bull by the horns. You will recall that he, with your concurrence and that of [redacted] took steps to initiate a program for using individuals from civilian agencies to undertake the evaluation of existing satellite photography for economic, social, and earth resource surveys. The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior provided the team members for the program, called Project ARGO, and representatives from NASA and AID assisted as necessary. NPIC and the Corps of Engineers provided essential support. The work has been conducted in the secure center at [redacted] in Alexandria.

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4. The report of Project ARGO is now in final stages of preparation and will be published early in February 1968. In monitoring the Project, we conclude that the interested civilian departments and agencies will exert very substantial pressure for renewed consideration of means whereby T-KH photography can be more effectively used to their benefit. Their representatives at Project ARGO anticipate possible

"spin-offs" for the intelligence community. In distributing the ARGO report, [] can be expected to address letters to you and to other heads of departments and agencies concerned, asking for their views on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

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5. To place Project ARGO in full context, the objectives provided to you by [] in his memo of 26 January 1967 are repeated here:

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"(1) To evaluate the existing satellite photography and describe its usefulness for physical resource surveys and its bearing on the design of future systems.

"(2) To develop a small cadre of civilian agency personnel who will know what information is available and how the photography can be used.

"(3) To produce a resource inventory of a particular area of interest to AID to show what might be done with the existing photography and to determine whether the work should be extended."

6. Everyone connected with the Project is aware of the strict controls that now pertain to T-KH photography and of the possibilities of controlled sanitization of information derived from this photography. The usefulness of T-KH photography to the civilian agencies would be limited if it were restricted to existing controls. There appears to

be a consensus that it would be very useful for preliminary study of foreign areas, particularly those of difficult access, and for the planning and management levels in giving a synoptic view of large areas. For detailed investigations, the value of various types of T-KH photography vary greatly with the individual problems of the separate disciplines. The scientists who participated in Project ARGO feel strongly that full use could not possibly be made of the photography unless it were to be declassified on some selective basis or a large number of scientists in and out of government were to be cleared into the system with several secure work centers established.

7. There was discussion of the possibilities of using the U-2 and conventional aircraft as platforms for earth-oriented sensors for detailed resource surveys in the United States. Nevertheless, civilian interest in the potentials of satellite reconnaissance for earth resources study remains high. The scientists recognize the potential of unclassified satellites as platforms for a variety of earth-oriented sensors not currently being developed for use in the NRP. Much interest has been expressed in use of improved color film, repetitive coverage at selected periods, and near real-time receipt of imagery and other sensor data.

8. There has been a recent intensification in planning the development of unclassified satellites and sensors responsive to the needs of scientists and others engaged in earth resources surveys. Representatives of NASA expect that some of their decisions will be influenced by findings and conclusions of Project ARGO. On 18 December 1967 several senior officials of NASA visited NPIC in order to acquire some understanding of the problems they face in planning for equipment, research and development, and personnel for the interpretation of imagery and other sensor data in an unclassified exploitation center at a site yet to be selected.

9. It would appear to be in the U.S. interest to reduce the need for the development of unclassified satellite photographic systems to collect some of the information that can be acquired now and in the future by the NRP. No actions should be taken in this regard that would compromise essential national and military security; nor should satellite systems of the NRP be adapted to collect data not now planned for future acquisition within the Program where cost would be unacceptable or the efficiency of a system in conducting its primary mission would be unduly impaired.