

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000400290001-9



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Second Version of Communist  
Violations Memorandum

1. On 10 May, per your request relayed by Ambassador Sullivan, we sent General Scowcroft three papers for your briefing book. One of these was a TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE memorandum entitled, "Communist Violations of the 27 January Vietnam Agreement" (TCS No. 3242/73, 10 May 1973). As requested, this memorandum drew on the full range of our collection resources. In cataloguing direct or presumptive Communist violations of the 27 January Agreement, the memorandum identified the sources on which individual items were based and was explicitly candid about our areas of doubt or uncertainty.

2. After that 10 May Communist violations memorandum had been received, Mr. Stearman (on your behalf) asked that we rewrite it in a version that, if you so desired, could be handed to the North Vietnamese during the course of your session with Le Duc Tho. Attached is our response to this request.


3. Preparing this second version was not an easy task and required the exercise of a good deal of discretionary judgment. We naturally wanted to keep the memorandum sufficiently explicit and detailed to meet your needs. At the

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5a(1), (2), (3) or 5a(4) (check one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Date Impossible to Determine
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same time, we had to avoid undue risk of compromise to our collection sources and methods, which would prejudice our ability to serve you in the future.

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


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To the best of our ability we have tried to meet both requirements.

4. Though the document carries no classification and was designed for passage to the North Vietnamese, we would still urge that it be given no wider circulation than you deem absolutely essential.

25X1D0cl



25X1D0c

Despite the fact that the North Vietnamese may get this text and can easily pass copies to the Soviets and the Chinese, this text (in its present form) should not be put into the public domain.

25X1D0c

5. In revising the original 10 May memorandum to make it suitable for possible passage to the North Vietnamese, we also made several other types of editorial change. We decided to eliminate all statements we considered "against interest," i. e., language that the North Vietnamese could turn against us or exploit (out of context) to score debating or propaganda points. Hence, we excised all indications of doubt or uncertainty and all references to GVN evidence or activity that could be debatable. If you use this text, we would respectfully suggest that you term it a catalogue of representative examples of the kind of Communist activity we are protesting, leaving its recipients in some doubt about just how much more we know.

6. We are sending five copies of this revised memorandum to you for your and your staff's use. We are also sending one copy to Ambassador Sullivan. We plan no further distribution unless you instruct otherwise. If you desire any further changes or editorial modifications to make this document optimum for your needs, please let us know.

/s/  
James R. Schlesinger  
Director

Attachments

cc: Ambassador Sullivan w/att  
25X1A9a

O/DCI/SAVA [REDACTED] /mee

Orig - Dr. Kissinger w/5 copies of attachment

1 - Ambassador Sullivan w/attachment

1 - DDCI/ER

1 - DDO

1 - C/EA

1 - C/VNO

1 - ADDI 25X1A9a

1 - ONE [REDACTED]

1 - D/OCI

1 - C/OER/D/I