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78-1656

13 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: John H. Waller  
Inspector General  
SUBJECT: Inspector General's Survey, Office of  
Logistics, Directorate of Administration

1. Action Requested:

None; for your information.

2. Background:

This memorandum forwards the Inspector General's Survey of the Office of Logistics. An Executive Summary is attached.

This Survey contains 32 recommendations which are summarized in Attachment 2. The Director of Logistics, whose comments are appended at the end of the report, has accepted the recommendations and has already initiated action on the majority of them.

[Redacted Signature Box]

John H. Waller

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Attachments: 3

- 1 - Executive Summary
- 2 - Recommendations
- 3 - OL Survey Report

cc: DDA w/atts  
D/OL w/atts

[Redacted Box]

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Executive Summary

Introduction

25X1A The Office of Logistics (OL), a major component of the DDA with some [ ] employees and an operating budget of over [ ], 25X1A exists to support all Agency elements worldwide. A majority of OL employees were interviewed in the course of this survey and excellent cooperation was received at all levels. We found OL personnel intensely service-oriented.

This report is organized by components, beginning with the Office of the Director of Logistics (D/L) and moving through the branches, staffs and divisions. We conclude with three special attachments.

Our findings led us to conclude that OL is a competent, well run organization. It is beset with problems but OL management is aware of them and attempting to solve them.

Office of the Director of Logistics (D/L)

OL is headed by a dynamic, experienced, well synchronized, three-man management team dubbed "the troika" by OL employees. The DDA and his deputy, both former Directors of Logistics, continue interest in and support for the office.

We found the OL management team somewhat isolated from the rank and file and suggested that they circulate more to give their workers attention and recognition.

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Budget and Fiscal Branch (B&F)

This small branch handles B&F matters for OL, processing over \$1 million a year. Its workload builds up heavily at the end of the fiscal year but the branch manages to keep up.

We found some concern in the branch that overtime costs in OL are excessive and that payments are made to GSA for services not performed. OL expenditures for overtime in the current fiscal year are expected to exceed over \$1 million unless some curtailment can be effected. OL management is aware of this problem and has made a special study with a series of recommendations regarding overtime expenditures.

Records and Services Branch (R&SB)

This branch serves as a standard "registry" and is performing well. Morale is high owing primarily to the supervisory talents of the seasoned branch chief

We found some hunger for recognition in this small shop and suggested that the Executive Officer be more demonstrative in recognizing the work of this smoothly integrated, highly motivated team.

Systems Analysis Branch (SAB)

This branch is the focal point for development and maintenance of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) applications and serves as a bridge between the Office of Data Processing (ODP) and OL. Its primary activity is computer software maintenance and branch people deal principally with OL employees in an advisory capacity.

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We found a high degree of job satisfaction but encountered some unhappiness owing to perceived pressure from the Procurement Division to advocate an ADP system which SAB could not in good conscience support. This situation was subsequently resolved but we suggest that OL management ensure that pressure not be brought to bear on SAB to support preconceived solutions.

Interviews in SAB produced information and views on ADP proliferation which are included in the attachment at Tab C.

#### Security Staff

This staff is responsible for the security of offices occupied by OL and for the Office of Security Industrial Security Program, the latter activity occupying most of its time.

In conducting the Industrial Security Program the staff arranges for clearances and reviews contracts. Staff representatives or security officers assigned to the decentralized procurement contract teams inspect contract facilities and establish protective procedures. The staff also schedules inspection of industrial plants, dealing with some 580 firms.

This staff maintains security files on companies involved in classified work for the Agency. We found the description of these records in the Federal Register to be inaccurate and recommend that D/L take steps to amend this description.

The main problem of this staff is a shortage of personnel. We have, accordingly, recommended a review of its responsibilities and assignment of sufficient personnel to carry them out.

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Security officers with the contract teams feel isolated from the Office of Security. To address this problem we have recommended that the Chief, Security Staff, comment in Fitness Reports on the performance of these officers.

Personnel and Training Staff (P&TS)

This staff handles routine personnel matters and is charged with supervision of the OL personnel panel system. This system, as seen by OL employees, presents one of the most serious morale problems in OL.

Our inspectors were assured by P&TS that most OL personnel see the panel system as fair and efficient. Our interviews failed to support this assertion. Rather, OL employees feel that panel findings are ignored and tinkered with by management. Despite the recent issuance of a Headquarters Notice which makes panel rankings and promotion recommendations subject to change only by the Director, we have suggested action by OL management to clarify what appear to be personnel misperceptions.

P&TS is also concerned with (career counseling) another problem area. We have recommended issuance of an updated instruction concerning career counseling and more attention to supervisor compliance with career counseling responsibility. We have also suggested that OL management improve its system for advertising job vacancies.

We found OL management strongly committed to training and suggested reiteration of its policy that only the D/L can turn

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down a training request. The OL training budget for FY 78 is only \$46,000, down from \$60,000 the year before. We suggested that an effort be made to increase this budget.

Plans and Programs Staff (P&PS)

This staff acts as an advisory body to the D/L on matters affecting the overall mission of OL and performs a wide variety of functions. Turnover on the staff is quite high since it is looked upon as a holding area. This lack of continuity reduces staff efficiency and is the main problem facing its chief.

Procurement Management Staff (PMS)

This small staff is one of the most undermanned and over-worked offices in OL. It is assigned a bewildering list of tasks related primarily to guidance on procurement policy matters. Despite the high calibre of its personnel, they cannot perform the many tasks assigned to them with any degree of depth or consistency. Additionally, personnel assigned to PMS have often been reassigned elsewhere in short order creating a lack of continuity and "know how."

PMS has an important role to play as the D/L's center of expertise on procurement law, policy, inter-Agency coordination, and guidance to contract teams. We have recommended reinforcement of this staff and greater continuity of service for those assigned to it.

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#### OL Contract Teams

Decentralized contracting teams, assigned to major Agency components to expedite contract and procurement activity, were established in 1966. There are four such teams. Three are assigned to DS&T (one each in OSO, ORD, and OTS) and one in NFAC. A fifth team, handling only national program procurement, is located in OD&E.

These teams, numbering from two to five officers plus clerical personnel, have an exceedingly heavy workload. In some cases they work in substandard offices and in almost every case we found them overworked. Some officers are responsible for as many as 100 contracts and are thus unable to give more than superficial attention to individual contracts and contractors.

Because of their huge workload, most negotiating officers are unable to travel with any frequency to see contractors in their plants. The same situation applies to security officers assigned to these teams. We have recommended a study of the workload of team members with a view to increasing the size of the teams -- to include contract negotiators, secretaries, and security officers. We also suggested that D/L provide for greater continuity of service for contracting team personnel.

In view of many complaints and observations we received regarding late payments, we have further recommended action by

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the DDA to improve processing of payments to Agency contractors. Elsewhere, in our discussions of these teams, we recommend action focused on possible discretionary elimination of detailed audits of firms given contracts less than \$100,000.

We found security officers assigned to the contracting teams troubled by the present system of security clearances and have recommended a company-by-company survey to determine which clearances are valid in order to arrive at an accurate listing of persons holding valid clearances. We further recommend formation of a unit of security personnel to visit contractors to give security guidance to contractor personnel.

Procurement Division (PD)

The Procurement Division of OL is the Agency's primary purchasing and procurement agent, spending [ ] for goods and services each year. With but [ ] persons it is performing its tasks competently but under conditions requiring attention and redress by OL management.

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We found a personnel management problem which OL has since addressed. We also found problems of "churning" (rapid transfer in and out) of personnel, especially in the General Procurement Branch and we recommend greater continuity of service for PD personnel.

We found a need for more experienced personnel, especially with proven mechanical and technical abilities, and formulated an appropriate recommendation.

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In PD, even more than elsewhere, we found employee dissatisfaction with a lack of career counseling. We have suggested institution of automatic career counseling.



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Competitive bidding requirements are increasing the PD workload, in some cases as much as 300 percent. Furthermore, dealings with GSA and compliance with the Freedom of Information Act tend to increase the workload. Despite these problems, PD manages to continue its solid performance albeit with a considerable amount of overtime. We suggest the D/L take cognizance of the escalating PD workload with a view to increasing the staff accordingly.

Some problems were found in the Automatic Data Processing and Engineering Branch (ADP&EB) of PD which handles the processing and procurement of ADP equipment -- some [redacted] in 1977. Business for this branch is increasing and the employee workload is extremely heavy. We have recommended an inquiry into the apparent manpower shortage and improvements in guidance to and support of this branch.

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A more thorough examination of ADP problems is appended as Attachment C.

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Supply Division (SD)

25X1A The Supply Division is the second largest element of OL with  
[ ] authorized positions, in addition to [ ] supply careerists  
assigned elsewhere. SD is in a personnel surplus situation and  
the division chief spends most of his time on personnel matters.  
SD is organized into four branches [ ]

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Supply Management Branch (SMB)

25X1 This branch oversees the stocking of 15,000 line items at  
Agency storage facilities. It is the principal user of the  
Inventory Control System (ICS), an ADP system which keeps tabs  
on the [ ] stock inventory.

We made special inquiries here about the possibility that  
materials might be stored in contravention of law or regulation.  
We found no evidence of illegal or questionable material in  
Agency hands.

25X1 The branch has problems with unrealistic customer deadlines  
and with lack of information about some purchases being made by  
the [ ]. In this latter connection we recommend  
that D/L arrange for such information to be available to SMB.  
We also suggested familiarization trips between SMB [ ]

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We found the branch chief of SMB to be highly regarded by  
those he supervises.

Operations Support Branch (OSB)

25X9 This [ ] person branch is a catch-all office which functions  
essentially as a staff. One section deals in ordnance, air drop

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supply and related matters. Another deals with writing and revision of Agency regulations and notices. A third deals with budgetary matters, periodic reports, employee suggestions and other disparate matters.

Interdepartmental Support Branch (IDSB)

This branch handles all requisitioning of supplies from or through other U.S. Government agencies. With the exception of its dealings with GSA, where there is some friction because of what GSA considers to be excessive Agency demands, the branch gets its job done smoothly owing to close personal relationships developed with officers in other agencies.

We suggest that the Chief, SD consult with OL legal officers to ensure that reports to Congress on loans and reimbursable sales to other agencies or individuals are being handled properly.

Data Control Branch (DCB)

This branch runs the Inventory Control System, mentioned earlier, and catalogs supply items. It is overstaffed and is used as a holding area. We found sentiment here and elsewhere in SD in favor of transferring the identification function, now handled by Supply Management Branch, back into this branch. We suggest that SD reexamine the rationale for the present location of this function.

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Requisitions for Non-Standard Items

Logistics personnel have difficulty accepting personally, although they accept bureaucratically, justifications they receive in connection with requisitions for non-standard, deluxe items.

We suggest some guidance may be in order to curb appetites for such items and point out that the Agency makes itself vulnerable when it caters to such requests.

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Careful attention was given to possible storage of question-  
able materials at ☐ but no problems were found. Storage and is-  
surance of sensitive items and drugs are carefully handled. In-  
ventory procedures appear adequate.

Allegations of improper use of automotive maintenance  
facilities at the depot were investigated. It was determined  
that these facilities had been abused. OL management has taken  
action to halt such practices.

In view of past problems with -- and high cost of -- fork  
lift maintenance, we have recommended development of an in-house  
capability to perform this work.

In our inspection of the Freight Traffic Branch we found  
two employees exercising responsibilities which seem beyond  
those normally associated with GS-05 positions. Accordingly,  
we have recommended an examination of these slots with a view  
to upgrading.

In the belief that better planning by component logistics  
officers can reduce overseas shipment costs, we have suggested  
issuance of an appropriate notice by OL urging maximum lead time  
for arranging transportation.

Inspection of the Small Purchases Branch revealed that  
security practices concerning Agency-sterile purchases need

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tightening. It is recommended that the security staff of OL insure that purchases and deliveries are effected in a secure manner.

We found some evidence in this same branch of by-passing SMB to take advantage of quick buying services. No recommendation was required since OL management was already examining these practices.

25X1 Safety at the

25X1  has an admirable safety record but there is some concern for the safety of new hires who lack training. We have suggested that steps be taken to train such people.

Personnel, Policies and Practices

25X1 Employees generally give  management good marks for EEO policies. We found no evidence of problems in this area despite high levels of minority and female employment. Some complaints of discrimination in favor of college educated personnel were received, as were isolated charges of favoritism. We were not able to verify the validity of these but did bring them to the attention of  management.

25X1 Morale at  is generally good, although it could be improved if suspicions of being considered "second class people" could be dispelled. A sense of isolation and we/they thought patterns do exist. We believe that greater efforts should be made to make  feel a part of the Agency. More attention and recognition would help.



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Real Estate and Construction Division (RECD)

This division handles real property matters throughout the world and provides engineering support for the Headquarters Building and other Agency-managed facilities. It has a higher proportion of professionals -- engineers -- than any other OL division.

Management is of high quality and well respected by division personnel. Relationships are open and friendly but some dissatisfaction exists among technicians who are blocked from progressing beyond GS-11. We suggest discussion of this matter further with these valued employees. We have also suggested additional attention to future technician requirements.

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The Field Engineering and Real Estate branches seemed to be working smoothly but some problems exist between the Headquarters Engineering Branch (HEB) and GSA. While HEB has kept these relationships fairly amicable, GSA performance has not been satisfactory. By default, HEB has taken on work which falls within GSA's purview. The attachment at Tab A goes into some detail regarding relations with GSA.

Logistics Services Division (LSD)

This division consists of a collection of unrelated functions grouped under a common command to support overt Agency components in the Washington area. Separate branches deal with maintenance and operation of buildings, stocking and issue of supplies and disposal of materials, mail and courier services, architectural design, and dining facilities.

Morale is generally good, a tribute to the quality of division leadership and team spirit. There is some grumbling about slowness of promotions and a feeling of isolation on the part of those who maintain the pneumatic tube system.

Two legal questions regarding the Executive Dining Room, a well run facility, have been referred to OGC.

Some security problems were noted in the Mail and Courier Branch, but we were apprised of an ongoing Office of Security investigation of this branch and deferred to OS for specific recommendations.

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It is suggested that safety shoes be issued to branch personnel whose duties require lifting and moving of heavy material.

In the belief that new techniques might be learned to enhance the security of Agency personnel, we recommend that D/L consider sending at least one Agency automobile armoring technician to visit commercial facilities.

During the inspection of LSD, relations with GSA again came up for discussion.

Printing and Photography Division (P&PD)

This is the largest division in OL, employing  people and spending  each year. The P&PD runs printing plants in its own building and in the basement of the Headquarters building. Known for its outstanding graphics and printing work, P&PD handles some 2,700 job orders each month. It is operating with fewer employees than it did 15 years ago.

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A recommendation is included regarding Agency copier machines in view of the obvious need to control proliferation of these machines. Another recommendation concerns the volume of material now being processed by P&PD.

In connection with the Graphics and Visual Aids Staff, we recommend another look at consolidation of this and similar units in the Office of Training and in DS&T. Better working space and working conditions for this staff are also recommended.

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Problems in the Supply and Services Staff, regarding shortcomings in stockage and provision of materials, have resulted in a management decision to name a new unit chief. We suggest this person be assigned better office space.

Because some supervisors are earning less pay than those they supervise, it is recommended that the D/L look into the possibility for raising supervisory salary levels.

P&PD has requested its own mini-computer system for inventory controls, costing information, and tracking of job orders. The ADP unit of the Audit Staff, OIG, will check on the need for this system. In connection with ADP application in this division, we suggest additional training in computer management.

In terms of compliance with Title 44 of the Federal Code, covering U.S. Government printing and photography policy, the division has been conscientious and has obtained required approvals from the Congressional Joint Printing Committee.

The division has had several EEO cases and feels the need for more feedback on the status of such cases.

Manning levels, especially in the production manager's office and the special printing plant, seem tight and may merit attention lest a critical situation develop with the absence of key personnel.

#### Relations with the GSA

A special attachment (Tab A) concerns relations with GSA, also touched on earlier in this survey. We have recommended that

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D/L bring to GSA's attention reports of lack of cooperation and incompetence and, where appropriate, insist on transfer of GSA personnel. We have also included a recommendation that the D/L require periodic accountings on GSA's performance. A third recommendation addresses the need for meeting with the GSA Regional Administrator to arrange for the granting of more leeway to OL in contracting for equipment maintenance.

Elsewhere in this attachment we suggest a priority effort to clean up the emergency power house.

#### Destruction of Material

Another special attachment (Tab B) concerns the destruction of material, giving a few examples and concluding with a recommendation that such activity be revalidated if it is to continue.

#### Problems in Procurement and Use of Automatic Data Processing Equipment

A third special attachment (Tab C) concerns ADP problems and concludes with a series of suggestions.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY  
OF THE  
OFFICE OF LOGISTICS  
AUGUST 1978

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Director of Logistics take steps to amend the section in the Federal Register which concerns the Logistics Security Clearance Records System so that it describes accurately the holdings in this system.
2. That the Director of Logistics, in cooperation with the Office of Security, review the responsibilities of the Security Staff and arrange for the assignment of additional personnel in sufficient strength to carry out those responsibilities.
3. That the Director of Logistics, in concert with the Director of Security, arrange for the Chief, Security Staff, Office of Logistics, to comment in Fitness Report attachments on the performance of security officers assigned to the procurement contracting teams.
4. That the Director of Logistics reissue an updated version of Logistics Instruction LI-20-24 with an introductory acknowledgement of employee concern about lack of career counseling, and that this LI be circulated once yearly to all OL personnel.
5. That the Director of Logistics remind all supervisors of their career counseling responsibility and include in Fitness Reports, where applicable, appropriate comment on supervisor compliance with this important duty.
6. That the Director of Logistics reinforce the Procurement Management Staff and provide for greater continuity of service for those assigned to this Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd):

7. That the Director of Logistics institute a team-by-team personnel study of contract teams to determine the workload of team members with a view to increasing the size of teams where the workload is unrealistically high, not only among OL contract negotiators and secretaries, but among security officers assigned to the Security Staff of OL and to the teams.
8. That the Deputy Director for Administration arrange to survey the Audit and Certification Division, Office of Finance, with a view to improving processing of payments to Agency contractors.
9. That the Director of Logistics and the Director of Security arrange for the newly formed Industrial Security Branch of Office of Security to make a company-by-company survey to determine which clearances are invalid for reasons of death, disability, departure from employment or other reasons, in order to arrive at an accurate listing of persons holding valid Agency clearances. Further, that at semiannual intervals industrial clearance lists be checked with the companies concerned in order to update the names and numbers of those holding valid clearances.
10. That the Director of Logistics, in conjunction with the Director of Security, arrange for the formation of a small unit of security personnel to visit the plants of selected contractors to give security talks and guidance sessions to contractor personnel handling Agency materials and documents, concentrating initially on contractors whose security record is weak.
11. That the Director of Logistics initiate a study of the present contract process focused on possible discretionary elimination of detailed audits on firms being given contracts of less than \$100,000 if those firms have a history of prompt and reliable performance for the Agency.
12. That the Director of Logistics provide for greater continuity of service for persons assigned to the Procurement Division.

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RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd):

13. That the Director of Logistics review the recruitment procedures of the Procurement Division with a view to hiring persons with proven mechanical and technical abilities.

14. That the Director of Logistics institute an inquiry into the apparent manpower shortage in the Automatic Data Processing and Engineering Branch and that he examine the unique procurement problems of that branch in its dealings with Agency requestors and ADP contractors.

15. That the Director of Logistics ensure the prompt replacement of all [redacted] Office personnel and see that timely overlap of those soon to be departing with their replacements is arranged so that maximum continuity is achieved.

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16. That the Director of Logistics prepare suitable commendations for the two women employees (one since resigned) of the [redacted] Office who assisted at the scene of the January 1977 fire.

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17. That the Director of Logistics study the possibility of increasing the logistics complement [redacted]

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18. That the Director of Logistics, together with the Director of Security, study the possibility of increasing the security complement [redacted]

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19. That the Director of Logistics arrange for the delivery of periodic summary reports of purchases by the Small Purchases Branch of the [redacted] to the Supply Management Branch (SMB) of Supply Division in order to enable SMB to make informed decisions on whether to stock particular items.

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20. That the Director of Logistics study the feasibility of training one or more employees at the Central Depot in maintenance of fork lifts in order to save money and insure more timely maintenance of these machines.

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RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd):

21. That the Director of Logistics request the Position Management and Compensation Division of the Office of Personnel to examine positions AV68 and AV72 in the Freight Traffic Branch, [REDACTED], with a view to upgrading these positions.
22. That the Director of Logistics have his Security Staff perform a security inspection of Agency-sterile purchasing practices of the Small Purchases Branch, [REDACTED] with a view to insuring that purchases and deliveries are effected in a properly secure manner.
23. That the Director of Logistics examine the feasibility of sending at least one Agency automobile armoring technician to visit commercial armoring facilities with a view to improving Agency armoring techniques.
24. That the Office of the Comptroller, assisted by the Systems Staff, Printing and Photography Division, Office of Logistics, be tasked to look into the numbers and use of Agency copier machines, to recommend specific control mechanisms governing the purchase or rental of these copiers, and to arrange for their most efficient use (e.g., copier centers) consonant with security.
25. That the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence create an ad hoc group to examine the volume and value of intelligence information and graphics now being printed and bound by Agency printing plants in order to determine whether elimination or reduction of some of these materials might be made without denying essential information to intelligence customers and the community.
26. That the Deputy Director for Administration study the possibility of amalgamating the separate graphics and visual aids units in the Agency with the aim of consolidating them into the Graphics and Visual Aids Staff of the Printing and Photography Division, to derive the benefits of the talents of the now dispersed units and to save money.
27. That the Director of Logistics arrange adequate working space and conditions for the Graphics and Visual Aids Staff of the Printing and Photography Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd):

28. That the Director of Logistics study the situation of Printing and Photography Division supervisory personnel to determine whether a request to Position Management Control Division for raising these supervisory salary levels is in order.
29. That the Director of Logistics bring to the attention of an appropriate officer of the General Services Administration reports of lack of cooperation and incompetence on the part of General Services Administration personnel assigned to the Headquarters Building and, if appropriate, insist on their transfer.
30. That the Director of Logistics require periodic Accounting from Logistics Services Division and Real Estate and Construction Division of the performance of the General Services Administration so that he can decide whether problems should be raised with senior General Services Administration officials.
31. That the Director of Logistics meet with the General Services Administration (GSA) Administrator for Region 3 with a view to developing an agreement allowing the Office of Logistics greater flexibility in contracting for maintenance and repair of special use equipment and, in critical cases, equipment which is clearly GSA's responsibility under the SLUC arrangement.
- 32. That the Deputy Director for Administration investigate the destruction of materials by the Office of Logistics and revalidate this activity.

*Log to take action*

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