

31 AUG 1978

DD/A Registry

File Security

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

1. Action Requested: This memorandum recommends that you task all elements of the Agency and the Office of the DCI to institute immediately a strict control system over the storage and accountability of acutely sensitive classified documents.

2. Background: In response to your request the Office of Security is in the process of conducting a comprehensive review of all Agency security practices. This review will predicate recommendations for the improvement of our overall security posture.

3. Staff Position: The Office of Security in the initial stages of its review of Agency security practices has already concluded that our accountability practices with reference to sensitive material are wanting. This deficiency will require more detailed study, before long-range resolution can be defined; the solution is complicated by the continuing need for rapid dissemination of intelligence material among operating components of the Agency.

In our view, however, the issue cannot be totally ignored pending completion of the ongoing study. As a first step, therefore, certainly to be supplemented by the review's final recommendations, it is felt that a system of positive accountability and segregated storage should be instituted immediately over the select kernels of Agency sensitive documents.

Since it is recognized that security is both a responsibility and function of the command channel, implementation of such a system must be pursued through the chain

of command. The attached memorandum, prepared for your signature, to the Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent Offices tasks these individuals to institute such controls immediately. The thrust of the tasking is designed as at least a temporary fix on one aspect of the recent case, viz., the loss of a critically sensitive document without its coming to Agency attention for almost a year and then, in a sense, only fortuitously.

4. Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign the attached memorandum tasking the Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent Offices as described in paragraph 3 above.

25X1A



Robert W. Gambino

Attachment

Distribution:

Original - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DDA

CONFIDENTIAL

DDA 78-3468/2

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

Executive Registry

78-2534/8

15 SEP 1978

DD/A Registry
File Security

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCE: Your multiple addressee memo dtd 1 Sep 78,
same subject (ER 78-2534/1)

1. (C) As required in reference, I have had each of the offices and staffs in this directorate review its classified holdings to identify categories of material which may meet the criteria established in paragraph 3 of reference. Their holdings vary widely in size and substance and several offices have collections of data unique to their missions (e.g., OP's agent payroll, OP's locator file). In each case the control exercised appears to be commensurate with the sensitivity of the information, with access limited according to need-to-know. Where feasible the documents are being segregated.

2. (U) I am charging my office directors and staff chiefs to accomplish the following, with a deadline date of 1 November 1978:

a. Except as provided in b below, segregate all collateral Top Secret and other documents judged by my office directors to meet the criteria of paragraph 3 of reference, in specifically designated safes or vaults.

b. Where working requirements make segregation per paragraph a impracticable, identify the category of information, briefly describe the reasons why document segregation is impossible, and describe the alternate arrangements to protect the information.

c. For each collection of highly sensitive information, identify a custodian and alternate custodian who have been formally tasked to maintain continual control over the individual sensitive documents.

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 008564

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

d. Prepare written procedures governing access to all such collections of sensitive information.

e. In carrying out this document security program it is essential that we not destroy the integrity of our records systems and records schedules. This is a Records Management problem as well as a security problem and component Records Management Officers should be involved in the process from the outset. Please consult with Records Administration Branch, ISAS, to obtain appropriate guidance and instructions.

3. (U) Step e in this program is especially important. We have achieved much in recent years in the development of an orderly system of records in CIA, and have won the praise of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) for our efforts. It is important that we not destroy these achievements in our pursuit of greater security for certain of our records. With your permission, I will take steps to call this aspect of the problem to the attention of the other Deputy Directors.

25X1A
4. (C) There is another large collection of information for which this directorate has custodial responsibility. I speak, of course, of our Records Center [REDACTED]. Here we store, for components of all Agency directorates, all kinds of documents including many which fall under compartmentation controls. Access is controlled by the "owners" of the records, which are released by Records Center personnel only after receipt of proper authorization. Our Records Center personnel have the necessary clearances to permit them to handle the materials stored there.

/s/John F. Blake

John F. Blake

Recommendation in paragraph 3: APPROVED (X) DISAPPROVED ()

/s/ Frank C. Carlueet 18 SEP 1978

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

CONFIDENTIAL

- Original - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - C/ISAS
- 1 - C/RAB/ISAS
- ✓ 1 - DDA Subject
- 1 - DDA Chrono
- 1 - AI Subject
- 1 - AI Chrono

AI/DDA [REDACTED] ydc (15 Sep 78)

25X1A

DD/A Registry

File Security

DD/A Registry

78-3468/4

26 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications
Director of Data Processing
Director of Finance
Director of Logistics
Director of Medical Services
Director of Personnel
Director of Security
Director of Training
Chief, Information and Privacy Staff, DDA
Chief, Budget Staff, DDA
Chief, History Staff, DDA
Chief, Management and Assessment Staff, DDA
Chief, Equal Employment Opportunity Staff, DDA
Chief, Career Management Staff, DDA

FROM : John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCE : DDCI memo dtd 1 Sep 78, same subject (ER 78-2534/1)

1. In establishing new systems for segregating and controlling our highly sensitive information, it is important that we recognize we are addressing a records management problem as well as a security problem. We have achieved much in recent years toward developing an orderly system of records in the Directorate, and it is essential that we not destroy the integrity of our records systems and records schedules.

2. I have requested that the Information Systems Analysis Staff (ISAS) take the initiative to ensure that Records Management Officers are involved from the outset in establishing our new sensitive document control systems. To facilitate coordination of the security and records management aspects of this process, please submit the name of the person who will be involved with the security requirements within your area to the Chief, Records Administration Branch (RAB), ISAS, by 28 September 1978. RAB will notify this individual and your Records Management Officer of the time and place for the initial meeting to coordinate the Directorate's installation of sensitive document controls. These controls will be established as outlined in the following paragraph.

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

3. The categories of information requiring special control have tentatively been identified in your response to the requirement in paragraph 3 of the reference. From this starting point, in accordance with paragraph 4 of the reference, we should accomplish the following by 1 November 1978:

a. Except as provided in b below, segregate all of the collateral Top Secret and other documents judged to require special control, in specifically designated safes or vaults.

b. Where working requirements make segregation per paragraph a impracticable, identify the category of information, briefly describe the reasons why document segregation is impossible, and describe the alternate arrangements to protect the information.

c. For each collection of highly sensitive information, identify a custodian and alternate custodian who have been formally tasked to maintain continual control over the individual sensitive documents.

d. Prepare written procedures governing access to all such collections of sensitive information.

RAB will provide appropriate guidance and instructions for accomplishing these steps.

4. One aspect of our approach to sensitive document control may also tie in with our efforts to implement Executive Order 12065, National Security Information, by 1 December 1978. The Executive Order specifies that the classification designation "Top Secret" be applied only to information "the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security." As we identify our highly sensitive information, we may also be identifying that information which is truly Top Secret. Therefore, it may be helpful to provide data on the categories of information that have been identified as requiring special control to the individuals who are developing the Classification Guides required by EO 12065.

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake

cc: C/ISAS
SSA/DDA

Distribution:

- 1 - Each Addressee
 - 1 - DDA Subject
 - 1 - DDA Chrono
 - 1 - AI/DDA
 - 1 - C/CRG
 - 1 - RAB Subject: Agency Records Management Program/
Sensitive Document Control
 - 1 - RAB Chrono
- DDA/ISAS/RAB/[REDACTED] ad (22 September 1978)

25X1A



26 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Resource Management
Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI

FROM : John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCE : DDCI memo dtd 1 Sep 78, same subject (ER 78-2534/1)

1. As the Agency establishes new systems for segregating and controlling its highly sensitive information, it is important that we recognize we are addressing a records management problem as well as a security problem. We have achieved much in recent years toward developing an orderly system of records in CIA, and it is important that we not destroy the integrity of our records systems and records schedules.

2. The Information Systems Analysis Staff (ISAS), DDA, is responsible for Agency records management. With the approval of the DDCI, I have requested that ISAS take the initiative to ensure that Records Management Officers are involved from the outset in establishing new sensitive document control systems. To facilitate coordination of the security and records management aspects of this process, would you please submit the name of the person who will be involved with the security requirements within your area to the Chief, Records Administration Branch (RAB), ISAS, 5B2828 Headquarters, by 28 September 1978. RAB will notify this individual and your Records Management Officer of the time and place for the initial meeting to coordinate an Agency approach to sensitive document control by 1 November 1978.

3. One aspect of the Agency's approach to sensitive document control may also tie in with our efforts to implement Executive Order 12065, National Security Information, by 1 December 1978. The Executive Order specifies that the classification designation

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

"Top Secret" be applied only to information "the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security." As we identify our highly sensitive information, we may also be identifying that information which is truly Top Secret. Therefore, it may be helpful to provide data on the categories of information that have been identified as requiring special control to the individuals who are developing the Classification Guides required by EO 12065.

John F. Blake

John F. Blake

cc: DDCI
GC
IG
LC
A/DCI/PA
Compt
D/EEO
D/Sec

Distribution:

- 1 - Each Addressee
 - 1 - DDA Subject
 - 1 - DDA Chrono
 - 1 - AI/DDA
 - 1 - OGC [REDACTED]
 - 1 - OGC [REDACTED]
 - 1 - C/ISAS
 - 1 - C/CRG
 - 1 - RAB Subject: Agency Records Management Program/
Sensitive Document Control
 - 1 - RAB Chrono
- DDA/ISAS/RAB/[REDACTED] ad (22 September 1978)

STATINTL

STATINTL

DD/A Registry

78-3468/1

Executive Registry

78-2534/1

1 Sept. 78

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Resource Management
Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

FROM: Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

1. Because of recent events I have directed a total and comprehensive review of all personnel security, physical security, and information control activities in the Agency. While this review will focus on our entire security program, its final conclusions and recommendations will take some time to develop.

2. Recognizing that the results of this review may produce significant changes in our security policies and procedures, there are certain actions in the security area that are being pursued immediately without waiting for the comprehensive study to be completed. One of these actions involves moving toward positive accountability for those classified documents uniquely and especially deserving of tight security controls due to the breadth of their contents or to their unusual sensitivity.

3. I hereby task each of you to review immediately your classified holdings to identify your extraordinarily comprehensive and sensitive materials, those obviously warranting especially strict controls. I am talking about that classified material, mostly Top Secret including some Sensitive Compartmented Information, which by its nature, if compromised, would be especially revealing, would have extraordinarily adverse impact on our national security or which would deliver a staggering loss of sensitive intelligence capability.

OS 8 2404/1

DD/A Registry
78-3468

4. Having identified such materials within your purview I would expect you to institute immediately a system of personal accountability and segregated storage for such materials.

5. I also expect you to report to me on the actions you have taken on this matter no later than 15 September 1978.

/s/ Frank C. Carlucci

Frank C. Carlucci

cc: GC
IG
LC
A/DCI/PA
Compt
D/EEO

Distribution:

Orig & 5 - Addressees
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
① - DDA
1 - D/Security



Security

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Resource Management
Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control Program

REFERENCE: Multiple addressee memo from DDCI dtd 1 Sep 78,
Subject: Sensitive Document Control

1. As you are aware, by reference the DDCI directed the establishment of a Sensitive Document Control Program. The objectives of the program are:

- To identify the most sensitive of each component's document holdings, those clearly related to source and method protection or to the survival of programs and projects.
- To cluster these component holdings, insofar as practicable, within the best possible physical security setting.
- To assign personal accountability for each of the documents contained in these collections.
- To effect inventories of the collections at least annually but more often if possible.

2. Soon after the reference was issued, a number of meetings and discussions were held with RMOs and others to work out the details of the program. We now feel that follow-up consultation would be helpful to answer questions and give any guidance that may be necessary. At the same time we seek to assure ourselves that this program is functioning properly and to surface areas where changes or improvements may be necessary.

STATINTL

3. Accordingly, I have asked [redacted] Deputy Chief, Records Administration Branch, to contact appropriate RMOs to discuss their activities with respect to this program. [redacted] will be assisted by Office of Security personnel who will be prepared to answer any questions the RMOs may have regarding physical security of documents and information systems. [redacted] will begin making contact during early January. I would appreciate it if you would so alert appropriate personnel in your component.

STATINTL

STATINTL

/s/John F. Blake

John F. Blake

STATINTL

AI/DDA: [redacted]:ydc (22 Dec 78)

Distribution:

- Original - DDRS
- 1 - Each other addressee
- 1 - D/OC
- 1 - D/ODP
- 1 - D/OF
- 1 - D/OL
- 1 - D/OMS
- 1 - D/OP
- 1 - D/OS (Attn: [redacted])
- 1 - D/OTR
- 1 - C/ISAS
- 1 - DC/RAB (via C/RAB)
- 1 - C/MAS
- 1 - DDA/RMO
- ✓ 1 - DDA Subject
- 1 - DDA Chrono
- 1 - AI Subject
- 1 - AI Chrono

STATINTL

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

DD/A Registry
78-3468/6

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

31 OCT 1978

DD/A Registry
File *Security*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCES: (a) Memo dtd 1 Sep 78 to multiple
addressees from DDCI, same subject
(ER 78-2534/1)

(b) Memo dtd 25 Sep 78 to D/Security
from DDCI, same subject
(ER 78-2534/15)

1. Action Requested: None; this memorandum is for your information only.

2. Background: In reference (b), you requested the Office of Security to review the component responses to your 1 September 1978 tasking for a system of segregated storage and personal accountability for extraordinarily comprehensive and sensitive materials. You also noted your approval of a suggestion by the Executive Secretary with reference to identifying additional materials warranting such storage and accountability.

With the agreement of the Director of Security, I have concluded that sensitive document control is essentially a records management activity requiring the functional support and guidance of the Office of Security. Based on this conclusion, I have directed the Information Systems Analysis Staff (ISAS) to take the lead in fully implementing the program launched by reference (a). At the same time, I have asked the Office of Security to provide guidance to the records management personnel responsible for the program.

The responses to the reference that were forwarded to the Director of Security reflect a degree of unevenness in interpreting the tasking instructions. This was apparent in

OS 8 2404/3A

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

Administrative - Internal Use Only

the selection of documents considered by the various components as worthy of inclusion in the program.

As a first step in resolving this unevenness and in implementing a uniform program, on 20 October 1978, ISAS held a meeting of records management and security personnel representing all Agency components. At this meeting the concept and the purpose of the program were explained in detail to those attending. The central theme dealt with the selection process, i.e., identifying the "cream of the crop" from among Agency sensitive holdings, effecting segregated storage apart from documents of routine sensitivity, and above all, assigning positive personal accountability. Within this framework it was emphasized that the practicality of day-to-day operations required flexibility in implementing these concepts.

Feedback received from this session indicates that the Agency components now have a better appreciation for the objective in mind. Discussions with several participants suggest that implementation of the program has been adequately initiated.

The Information Systems Analysis Staff will continue to assist individual records management officers in the implementation of the sensitive document control program. The Office of Security will continue to assist. In addition, details are being worked out to allow Office of Security representatives to periodically check on the progress and status of individual component implementation in the future.

/s/ Michael J. Malanick

for John F. Blake

Distribution:

Orig - DDCI

1 - ER

1 - C/ISAS

2 - DDA ~~Info~~ Subject

1 - D/Sec

Administrative - Internal Use Only

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

STATINTL

ORIGINATOR:



R. W. Gambino


ROBERT W. GAMBINO
Director of Security

30 OCT 1978

Date

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0



DE/1078-5606

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Resource Management
Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

FROM: Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

1. Because of recent events I have directed a total and comprehensive review of all personnel security, physical security, and information control activities in the Agency. While this review will focus on our entire security program, its final conclusions and recommendations will take some time to develop.

2. Recognizing that the results of this review may produce significant changes in our security policies and procedures, there are certain actions in the security area that are being pursued immediately without waiting for the comprehensive study to be completed. One of these actions involves moving toward positive accountability for those classified documents uniquely and especially deserving of tight security controls due to the breadth of their contents or to their unusual sensitivity.

3. I hereby task each of you to review immediately your classified holdings to identify your extraordinarily comprehensive and sensitive materials, those obviously warranting especially strict controls. I am talking about that classified material, mostly Top Secret including some Sensitive Compartmented Information, which by its nature, if compromised, would be especially revealing, would have extraordinarily adverse impact on our national security or which would deliver a staggering loss of sensitive intelligence capability.

4. Having identified such materials within your purview I would expect you to institute immediately a system of personal accountability and segregated storage for such materials.

5. I also expect you to report to me on the actions you have taken on this matter no later than 15 September 1978.

/s/ Frank C. Carlucci

Frank C. Carlucci

cc: GC
IG
LC
A/DCI/PA
Compt
D/EEO

Administrative Registry
78-2534/15

25 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
FROM : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE : DDCI Memo dated 1 September 1978, Same Subject,
(ER 78-2534/1)

Please review the responses to the referenced memo and provide recommendations as appropriate. I approved the suggestion of the Executive Secretary to "review the submissions of others with a view toward identifying additional materials." That report is due by 15 October and it should be coordinated with your office.

25X1A



Frank C. Carlucci

cc: Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Responses to DDCI's memo

Administrative-Internal Use
Only Without Attachment


0582404/3
46371

78-2534/37

14 September 1978

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : 
Associate Director-Management
National Foreign Assessment Center

SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

In response to your memorandum of 1 September, I issued the attached memorandum to all Office Directors, Staff Chiefs, and NIOs. Upon the completion of the survey requested in my memorandum, the NEAC Security Officer and I will review the responses and establish a regular system of segregated storage and personal accountability for documents warranting this treatment. It is my expectation that the new system for sensitive document control will be in full operation by the end of the month.

STATINTL

cc: NEAC Security Officer

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

8 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: All NFAC Office Directors, Staff Chiefs, and NIOs

FROM : [REDACTED]
Associate Director-Management
National Foreign Assessment Center

SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

1. The attached memorandum from Mr. Carlucci directs us to establish more effective document control procedures for specific types of documents which have an extreme sensitivity or would result in unacceptable levels of security damage if compromised. The type of document Mr. Carlucci has in mind is defined in his paragraph 3.

2. I would like each of you immediately and on a priority basis to institute a survey of your component to identify by title and document number those documents which you believe meet the test of Mr. Carlucci's memorandum. These lists should be forwarded to the NFAC Security Officer by 22 September.

3. The NFAC Security Officer and I will review your submissions and develop standards for the special handling, accountability and storage procedures applicable to these documents. It seems imperative that each component must have a system of personal accountability for each such document and that these documents must be stored separately from other classified materials. I want to emphasize this last point, particularly in regard to the many vaulted areas in NFAC where it has become the practice for all kinds of documents, classified or unclassified, to be inextricably intermingled. Even within areas which are vaulted, the requirement for segregated storage for materials identified in response to this memorandum must be met.

4. The NFAC Security Officer, [REDACTED] (R-1908; B-5611), should be contacted for additional information or if a further definition of types and categories of documents is necessary.

Attachment
Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

STATINTL

AD-M/NFAC: [REDACTED] tb (8 Sept 78)

Distribution:

D/NFAC
DD/NFAC
AD-SS/NFAC
EO/NFAC
NFAC Registry Chrono
NFAC File
NFAC Chrono
AD-M/NFAC Chrono

D/OGCR
D/OCR
D/ORPA
D/OER
D/OIA
D/OSR
D/OWI
D/OSI
D/CIA Operations Center

C/CRG
C/PPG
C/Academic Relations
C/Coordination Staff
C/Congressional Support Staff
C/SALT Support Staff
C/RES
C/Action Staff
C/NFAC Admin
C/Plans & Programs Staff
C/NFAC Registry

Acting NIO/CF
NIO/SP
NIO/PE
NIO/NP
NIO/SS
NIO/USSR-EE
NIO/WE
NIO/NESA
NIO/Africa
NIO/EA
NIO/China
Acting NIO/LA

cc: NFAC Security Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/O78:560611

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

78-2534/4

15 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCE: DDCI Memorandum to all Deputy Directors,
dated 1 September 1978; Same Subject
(ER 78-2534/1)

1. Inside the Directorate of Operations, there have existed for a number of years procedures for the control and accountability of Top Secret and codeword materials, as well as procedures for compartmenting documents which identify sensitive sources or methods. Top Secret and controlled codeword materials are centrally handled with individual accountability for distributed materials. Some compartmented operations have a restricted, explicit list of individuals ("bigot list") who alone may have access to reporting on that activity.

2. While the procedures described above are time-tested, they need constant policing. In answer to your specific concern for especially sensitive materials, we are working on better methods to police the entire sequence of personal accountability from the time the information is received in the DO until it is destroyed or leaves the DO, including storage while in the DO.

3. In the summer of 1977, we began to review our procedures and accountability for compartmented and sensitive information as well as the indexing of information into the DO counterintelligence index without violating special handling requirements. New procedures were published in July 1978. In this connection our computerized Badge Authorization Table limits access to the Central Files and Main Index, records each transaction by individual, and charges

CONFIDENTIAL

EXEMPT CL BY 059687

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0


an individual or office with accountability for any material leaving the Central Files. It is worth noting also, that a principal feature in our planning to introduce word processor/computer technology at Headquarters and overseas is to eliminate as much paper as possible by distributing information while it is still in machine language form and under strict control.

4. Limiting the dissemination and controlling sensitive Directorate of Operations information outside of the Directorate does cause us special concern because of the comprehensiveness of some of the information involved. For example:

a. To improve compartmentation in 1977 we asked the Office of Communications to stop routing DO electrical traffic through the ODP Ruffing Center, given the possibility of spillage, and to henceforth route it to the Special Center which supports the DO and is electrically compartmented from other ADP nets.

b. Following discussions between the ADDO and Chief, OTS early this year, we now limit and sanitize

25X1A



CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

DDS&T-4507-78

15 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : LESLIE C. DIRKS
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 1 September 1978,
Same subject (ER 78-2534/1)

1. In response to reference, I have directed each office in this Directorate to review all classified holdings in order to identify all "extraordinarily comprehensive and sensitive materials." Owing to the great number of classified documents, both collateral and compartmented, a complete review will take some time. The initial review indicates, however, that only a relatively small proportion of the classified material would meet the stated definition or if compromised "would have extraordinarily adverse impact on our national security or which would deliver a staggering loss of sensitive intelligence capability."

2. The "extraordinarily sensitive" documents already identified fall in the following specific categories according to the consequences of their being compromised:

- a. Extreme impairment of the United States to collect foreign intelligence.
- b. Severe damage to U.S. foreign relationships with foreign governments.
- c. Revelation of the most sensitive sources and methods.
- d. Loss of highly advanced technologies not possessed by other countries.

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0


DDS&T-4507-78
Page 2

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

3. Examples of documents already identified in these categories are as follows:

- a. Some selected documents from bigot-listed R&D projects.
- b. Research and development notebooks.
- c. The Agency and Directorate (not individual office) budget documents.

25X6

- 
- e. Technical collection system manuals.
 - f. Technical collection system mix studies and simulations.
 - g. Clandestine technical collection operational plans.

4. Examples of classified documents that we feel do not fall into these categories are:

- a. Most cable and dispatch traffic.
- b. Most contractual documents and final reports.
- c. Most staff studies and internal correspondence.
- d. Most satellite imagery reports.

5. As classified documents so described are identified, plans are being made to isolate, store, restrict access, and maintain a strict system of personal accountability. We will complete this effort as promptly as possible given the scope and magnitude of the problem.


25X1A



for LESLIE C. DIRKS

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

~~SECRET~~



DCI/IC-78-0059
19 September 1978

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: [REDACTED]
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE: Your multiple addressee memo dtd 1 September 1978,
same subject (ER 78-2534/1)

1. As required in the reference, I plan to implement the following procedures for the protection of extraordinarily comprehensive and sensitive documents. As I am sure you are aware, the IC Staff deals with a tremendous volume of Top Secret Codeword documents--at least half of our daily traffic involves Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented Information. The measures I have outlined below are designed to protect the most comprehensive material using the criteria you set forth in paragraph 3 of the reference. Such material includes, but is not limited to, National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget decision letters, Congressional Justification Books, and congressional authorization and appropriations classified reports.

a. By 20 October, each office director and staff chief will segregate material judged to be extraordinarily comprehensive in specifically designated safes or vaults.

b. A custodian and alternate custodian will be formally tasked to maintain continual control over these comprehensive documents. The segregated safe space will remain locked when not being used, and access to it will be with the permission of the custodians only.


c. In order not to destroy the integrity of our records management system, when a document is judged to be extraordinarily comprehensive and designated for segregated storage as well as custodian control, an appropriate identifier cross-referencing it will be placed in the regular file.

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

d. An inventory of this segregated material will be taken every 90 days.

2. I believe these measures are consistent with the letter and the spirit of your memorandum.

STATINTL



CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

Executive Registry
78-2534/1

15 SEP 1978

14 Sept 78

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE: Your multiple addressee memo dtd 1 Sep 78,
same subject (ER 78-2534/1)

1. (C) As required in reference, I have had each of the offices and staffs in this directorate review its classified holdings to identify categories of material which may meet the criteria established in paragraph 3 of reference. Their holdings vary widely in size and substance and several offices have collections of data unique to their missions (e.g., OF's agent payroll, OP's locator file). In each case the control exercised appears to be commensurate with the sensitivity of the information, with access limited according to need-to-know. Where feasible the documents are being segregated.

2. (U) I am charging my office directors and staff chiefs to accomplish the following, with a deadline date of 1 November 1978:

a. Except as provided in b below, segregate all collateral Top Secret and other documents judged by my office directors to meet the criteria of paragraph 3 of reference, in specifically designated safes or vaults.

b. Where working requirements make segregation per paragraph a impracticable, identify the category of information, briefly describe the reasons why document segregation is impossible, and describe the alternate arrangements to protect the information.

c. For each collection of highly sensitive information, identify a custodian and alternate custodian who have been formally tasked to maintain continual control over the individual sensitive documents.

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

D-1,442

E-2 IMPDET

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY 003564

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

d. Prepare written procedures governing access to all such collections of sensitive information.

e. In carrying out this document security program it is essential that we not destroy the integrity of our records systems and records schedules. This is a Records Management problem as well as a security problem and component Records Management Officers should be involved in the process from the outset. Please consult with Records Administration Branch, ISAS, to obtain appropriate guidance and instructions.

3. (U) Step e in this program is especially important. We have achieved much in recent years in the development of an orderly system of records in CIA, and have won the praise of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) for our efforts. It is important that we not destroy these achievements in our pursuit of greater security for certain of our records. With your permission, I will take steps to call this aspect of the problem to the attention of the other Deputy Directors.

25X1A 4. (C) There is another large collection of information for which this directorate has custodial responsibility. I speak, of course, of our Records Center [REDACTED]. Here we store, for components of all Agency directorates, all kinds of documents including many which fall under compartmentation controls. Access is controlled by the "owners" of the records, which are released by Records Center personnel only after receipt of proper authorization. Our Records Center personnel have the necessary clearances to permit them to handle the materials stored there.

/s/ J. F. Blake

John F. Blake

Recommendation in paragraph 3: APPROVED (X) DISAPPROVED ()

/s/ Frank G. Carlucci 18 SEP 1979

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, DCI

98-2534/14

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

15 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Administrative Officer, DCI
SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control System
Status Reports - DCI Area

1. Attached are the responses of each DCI Area Office (and the Executive Secretary) to the DDCI memo of 5 September requesting a report on the actions taken to improve sensitive document control. I have summarized what I believe are the salient features of each office system (except Executive Secretary) together with an indication of problems beyond the control of the office concerned.
2. As you can see the approaches vary and some appear better than others. It would appear that a basic uniform system or its requirements is needed.
3. For what it is worth I will comment on what I think are the major weaknesses in the Agency document control system and which carry over to ours:
 - a.) No consistent requirement for frequent inventory and report certifying possession of all documents charged.
 - b.) No Agency-wide system to register sensitive documents not classified Top Secret or Codeword.
 - c.) No system requiring return to originator of sensitive documents after a certain time period for reissue or disposal as needed (a "library" system?).
 - d.) A variety of internal receipt control procedures.

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

- e.) Lack of discipline in completing Top Secret and Codeword cover sheets to show recipient and record individuals who have seen the information contained therein.
- f.) Lack of understanding by PMCD and the consequent low-grade structure of the real responsibility and vital nature of registry jobs rendering it difficult to make these jobs much more than interim/trainee jobs for ambitious able people.

STATINTL

- g.) The reluctance of managers to assign sufficient manpower resources to registry functions and to give registry personnel authority to insist upon proper handling of sensitive documents.
- h.) The wide dissemination of certain registered intelligence publications (NID, Exec. Summary, etc.) with no receipt system whatever.
- i.) No sanctions for the unauthorized duplicating of Top Secret, Codeword, cable and other sensitive documents by Xerox process. Reproduction machines will always be a problem no matter what devices are applied. However, certain measures might be considered to constrain unauthorized duplication. For example, it would seem that if three security violations within two years (which can be charged by leaving three confidential documents unsecured) can be punished by a one-week suspension (the equivalent of a \$500 fine for a GS-12) unauthorized reproduction of sensitive controlled documents should provoke at least as severe a response from management.

STATINTL

Attachments

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

SENSITIVE DOCUMENT CONTROL SUMMARY
DCI AREA

15 September 1978

| <u>OFFICE</u> | <u>SENSITIVE DOCUMENT CATEGORIES</u> | <u>INTERNAL HANDLING CONTROLS</u> | <u>PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS</u> | <u>PERIODIC INVENTORY</u> | <u>ISSUE BEYOND CONTROL OF OFFICE</u> |
|-----------------|--|---|---|---|--|
| O/DCI O/DDCI | | NO REPORT REQUIRED | | | |
| Ex Sec | | SEE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SUBMISSION | | | |
| OGC | Top Secret (Legal Issues) Compartmented (Codeword) DDO Sensitive Case Documents "Restricted (AEC) Data" | - Computer Controlled - Index (Registry) Card Controlled - Registry Controlled - No Internal Office Receipt System | None - Unique-Documents are Stored in Registry or in "Case" Officer Safe | No Periodic Inventory Reported | - Grades of Registry Personnel - Inadequate Registry Facility - Inadequate Registry Personnel |
| OLC | Top Secret Compartmented Codeword | - Registry Log Controlled - Internal Document Accountability Record System to be Imple- mented | Registry Access Controlled and Restricted Registry Vaulted Some Storage in Individual Safes | None Reported <i>Annual</i> | - Receipt of Sensitive Documents for which No record is re- quired (NID, Exec Summaries, etc.) - Grades of Registry Per- sonnel limits the availability of experienced personnel |
| O/EEO | Top Secret Compartmented | - Controlled Personally by Director and Secretary - No Internal Receipt System | Stored in D/EEO Safe | Monthly | - No Receipt Records required for receipt of certain publica- tions |

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

Administrative - Internal Use Only

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

SENSITIVE DOCUMENT CONTROL SUMMARY (CONT.)
DCI AREA

| <u>OFFICE</u> | <u>SENSITIVE DOCUMENT CATEGORIES</u> | <u>INTERNAL HANDLING CONTROLS</u> | <u>PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS</u> | <u>PERIODIC INVENTORY</u> | <u>ISSUE BEYOND CONTROL OF OFFICE</u> |
|---------------|--|---|---|---------------------------|---|
| O/PA | Top Secret Compartmented Codeword | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Controlled Personally by the D/PA and his Staff Assistant- No Internal Receipt System | Stored in Staff Assistant Safe - Returned to Originator when no longer needed | None Reported | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- No Receipt Records Required for NID or "The Executive Summary" |
| OIG | Top Secret Compartmented Codeword Sensitive Component Surveys Sensitive Special Studies Sensitive Audit Reports Sensitive Grievance Cases | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- All Categories controlled by Registry system- Internal Sensitive documents will have special indicator- All Sensitive documents retained by designated custodians only- Internal individual receipt system in effect | All Sensitive documents retained designated custodian (6) safes only | Semi-Annual | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- None Reported |
| COMP | Top Secret-Budget Related Codeword-Budget Related DDO Project Documents | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- All Categories are Registry controlled- Internal document control system in being- File locations recorded- Receipts required on externally transmitted documents- Agency Budgets will be returned annually- Inventory now underway- Employee departures will stimulate additional checks | Storage in Designated safes only Area may be vaulted in future | Monthly Verification | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Certain DDO Project documents are hand-carried through Comptroller with no record whatever maintained in O/Compt. |

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

SECRET

Executive Registry
78-2534/5

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

8 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Executive Secretary

SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum dated 5 September 1978, Subject as above

1. Action Requested: Endorse my interim identification of materials listed at Tab A as particularly sensitive, approve our approach to accountability and periodic checks of same, and task me to review other responses to reference with a view toward identifying additional materials we may be holding as reference documents for DCI and DDCI retrieval.

25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A

2. A. General. I was on leave in North Carolina when the Kampiles case broke. Immediately upon my return on 22 August I convened a meeting attended by AO/DCI [redacted] Deputy/ [redacted] Chief/Executive Registry [redacted] and DCI Security Officer [redacted]. I subsequently met with EA/DCI [redacted] with a view toward identifying categories of material in the immediate office of the DCI that may require periodic checks. I directed [redacted] to augment the current annual inventory of Top Secret documents by calling for periodic checks on the presence of particularly sensitive documents and outlined a means for identifying same. Whereas in many cases particularly sensitive materials are recorded and returned to the originator after they have come to the attention of the DCI and DDCI, the originator frequently provides a copy for DCI or DDCI retention which is retained in the Executive Registry for future background and reference material for DCI, DDCI, and ES. This retention of materials originated elsewhere serves a critical need in identifying what action the DCI or DDCI has taken and what is called for if new, but related, correspondence arrives for action. As you know, our current ground rules are that, with rare exceptions, the DCI and DDCI file room (Executive Registry) retains a copy of any document bearing DCI or DDCI approvals and/or other instructions.

B. DCI/DDCI-originated Materials. It is in this category that we have a clear responsibility to focus on additional controls in response to reference. Tab A reflects those we have identified, and a schedule for their periodic inventory has been developed. If we consider, as we must, that files most frequently contain an accumulation of singleton sensitive documents, the only way to detect the absence of a document is to serially number them in the file. This extraordinary measure seems warranted in specific holdings as indicated in Tab A.

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
C1 By 064696

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

25X1A
25X1A

C. Special Security Considerations. I have confidence in the security consciousness and deportment of all personnel in Executive Registry and Executive Secretariat [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If I did not, they would not be here for duty. You should be advised that we take some extra steps in selecting and approving assignments to the Executive Secretariat and Executive Registry, plus the staff personnel of the immediate offices of the DCI and DDCI. These involve:

a. Prior to approval of assignment, I task the Director of Personnel to do a "supergrade check" which involves a D/Personnel call upon the Office of Security, Inspector General, and Office of Medical Services to see if there is any questionable area in their background. This procedure was more or less standard in the "DCI Area," but when former EA/DDCI Victor Marchetti went sour in 1969, the then Executive Director, Colonel White, instructed that all personnel in the DCI, DDCI, and ExDir area be subjected to this additional check prior to assignment. To my knowledge, there has been only one "hit," i.e., check made and assignment disapproved (see sealed envelope at Tab B).

b. When the Registry was under the immediate supervision of DCI Helms, he permitted personnel to be assigned to Registry as their first Agency assignment. I discontinued this practice upon his departure.

c. At every opportunity it is emphasized to Registry personnel that it is a privilege and honor to serve in the DCI's file room. If for any reasons they find it unattractive, I encourage them to leave and offer to assist in relocating them without prejudice.

3. Upon your issuance of reference, I convened another meeting and expressed concern that we were not an action addressee to your call. However, I assumed this was sheer oversight and instructed that we continue our efforts. I advised the Director of Security of same in writing, telling him that upon the submission of other offices, we would review materials identified as particularly sensitive in the context of those which are retained here by virtue of a copy being furnished for DCI/DDCI retention and any action material described in paragraph 2A above. Previously I had thought that we would be harnessed with identifying as particularly sensitive, materials created by others. The originating office is in a better position than we to label them as documents falling within your definition of sensitive as outlined in paragraph 3 of reference.

4. Recommendation:

a. That you approve Tab A's identification of particularly sensitive materials requiring periodic checks.

b. Authorize me to review the submissions of others with a view toward identifying additional materials.


Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

2
SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0


c. Endorse the above approach subject to further refinement and to be reported on by 15 October.

d. There is an additional step one could take which might inhibit repetition of a Kampile. Specifically state as a precondition to assignment in offices where there is a high degree of access to particularly sensitive materials, 

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A


I am not pushing for this at the present time; but given the quality of people we have in our offices, I would have no problem in implementing such a procedure and raise it here as a recommended consideration.


B. C. Evans *ms*

25X1A

Attachments

APPROVAL:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

- 1 - EA/DCI w/o Att. B
- 1 - AO/DCI w/o Att. B
- 1 - C/ER w/o Att. B
- 1 - ES

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

c. Endorse the above approach subject to further refinement and to be reported on by 15 October.

d. There is an additional step one could take which might inhibit repetition of a Kampiles. Specifically state as a precondition to assignment in offices where there is a high degree of access to particularly sensitive materials,

[Redacted]

I am not pushing for this at the present time; but given the quality of people we have in our offices, I would have no problem in implementing such a procedure and raise it here as a recommended consideration.

[Redacted]
D. C. Evans

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

For overall survey

25X1A

25X1A

Attachments

[Redacted]

APPROVAL:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

14 Sep 78
Date

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee
- 1 - EA/DCI w/o Att. B
- 1 - AO/DCI w/o Att. B
- 1 - C/ER w/o Att. B
- 1 - ES

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

OGC-78-6008
14 September 1978

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Administrative Officer, Office of DCI

25X1A FROM : [REDACTED]
Executive Officer, OGC

SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

1. Because of the nature of its business, the Office of the General Counsel faces the possibility of having to deal with all of the Agency's sensitive document categories. However, since the office is a support unit which reacts to external requirements, the numbers and types of documents handled vary greatly from time to time. In general terms, OGC does not deal with a large number of purely "intelligence sensitive documents," and of the sensitive categories encountered, Top Secret and CODEWORD are the most prominent. The control of these categories is outlined below.

a. TOP SECRET

Upon receipt, Top Secret documents are logged into a computerized data base and recorded upon a listing which is forwarded to the Agency Top Secret Control Officer (TSCO) on a weekly basis. When the document is logged in, an input menu (see Attachment A) is produced to provide internal control of the item. This menu includes the following information: OGC's document control number, document subject, date the document was prepared, the date the document was received by OGC, the date that internal action is due (if any), the date the document was forwarded (if applicable), the office of origin, who within OGC the document was assigned to, the security classification, the internal routing path of the document to the final recipient, the status of the document (if reassigned, given to another office, etc.) and finally special remarks.

The input menu gives OGC the ability to recall or track down any Top Secret document held by the office providing internal record procedures and document control policy have been maintained. For

this reason, internal receipts and inventories have not been used. In addition, a copy of all OGC-originated TS documents and those incoming TS documents which are retained by OGC are maintained in the OGC subject files with other collateral material. Depending upon subject content, TS documents may be indexed and the index cards are filed in the OGC index system. A separate listing of TS documents is maintained of all retired OGC subject files. TS documents are readily identifiable within each OGC subject file by the green control sheet.

b. CODEWORD

An incoming codeword document is logged on a 3x5 index card (see Attachment B) which is attached to the document and given to the proper attorney. A copy of this card is maintained in a separate codeword box until final disposition of the document. At this time, the final disposition is indicated on the original index card and filed in the codeword box. If the document is retained in the OGC subject files, it may be indexed depending upon the subject matter. These index cards are maintained in the OGC index system and the document is retained in a separate five-drawer safe. The index card gives OGC the same ability as the menu to track down and recover codeword material.

c. Other Categories

Special categories of documents such as "restricted data" material receive special handling as required by security regulations. Material of this type is held only for a specific case or problem and then returned to the proper office.

2. OGC does have a number of existing problems which are outlined below:

a. Inadequate Registry Personnel: During the last two and a half years, OGC has quadrupled in size; however, the registry has not kept pace. The result has been that OGC's registry is understaffed and overworked. This problem will be alleviated somewhat with the addition of a new GS-05 Information Control Asst. slot this month.

b. Low-Graded Registry Personnel: While OGC's present staff is quite good, it has proven very hard to attract, much less retain, qualified registry personnel due to the low grades available to that profession. (In OGC, we have one GS-08 and one GS-06, and the

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

new slot is a GS-05.)

OGC has requested upgrading, only to be told that this is not possible.

c. Inadequate Registry Organization and Space Facility:

OGC's present registry organization, equipment (computer capacity), and space facilities have been antiquated by the increase paper flow and the general growth of the office. This problem is being solved thanks to a long-range program which began this summer in which the Office of Data Processing and the Information Systems and Analysis Staff have jointly initiated a comprehensive review of OGC's registry policies and procedures. It is anticipated that the results of this review will lead to a better registry and hence, better document control. Physical facilities will be upgraded once this review is completed for until then, actual space requirements will not be known. This will include the request for a special purpose vault which our registry does not presently have.

3. Interim Actions: OGC will shortly issue an internal notice to all of its personnel reminding them of present document control policies and the necessity of observing them. In addition, we have recently changed the combination to the codeword safe and have reduced the number of personnel with access. Finally, OGC has appointed document control officers who are awaiting further instructions on this new segment of Agency policy.

25X1A

Attachments A & B

- A. Input Menu
- B. Index Card

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

IDENTIFICATION OF FILES FOR SPECIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY

- * 1. DCI Memoranda of Conversation with President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor, Dr. Brzezinski.
- * 2. Volume containing DCI memoranda (T-grams) on particularly sensitive topics.
- * 3. DCI/DDCI memoranda pertaining to NSC/SCC/PRC meetings they have attended.
 - 4. NSC/SCC/PRC Minutes.
 - 5. NSC/SCC/PRC directives, to include PD's and PRM's.
- * 6. DCI/DDCI Staff Meeting Notes.
 - 7. Community and Agency Budget and Program Call.
- * 8. CIA/NSA/Justice Electronic Surveillance Materials.
 - 9. SALT Delegation - Presidential Guidance and Instructions.
 - 10. Prisoners - Exchanges.
 - 11. Defectors.
 - 12. [REDACTED]
 - 13. Selected National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's)
 - 14. Sensitive Nuclear Matters.
 - 15. Selected Personnel Actions.
 - 16. Selected Congressional Investigative Files.
 - 17. [REDACTED]
 - 18. Sensitive DDO Designated Papers in EYES ONLY File (labeled as such by DDO).

* To be serialized for ease in inventory.

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
C1 By 064696

13 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Administrative Officer, DCI
FROM: Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE: Your Memo, Same Subject, dtd 1 September 1978
(ER 78-2534/1)

1. In response to referent memorandum, the Office of Legislative Counsel, on 6 September 1978, instituted a complete and thorough inventory of all Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) material in our possession. This inventory will take some weeks to complete. We intend to do such an inventory at least once each year in the future. We are limiting it to Top Secret and SCI material because they are, by virtue of their classification "sensitive." It would be an almost impossible task to identify other "sensitive" material in our files, unless the originating office notified us of their existence.


2. In the past all Top Secret and all SCI material received in OLC was logged using Form #312 "Top Secret Posting." At present, all of this material is logged using Form #516 "Top Secret Control Card."

3. Since receipt of your memorandum, we have restricted access to our Registry to OLC Registry personnel only. We are in the process of installing "railings" at the doors to the Registry in order to facilitate the control. We are investigating the feasibility of installing separate safes in the Registry for the filing of all Top Secret and SCI material. The Registry, which is a vaulted area, is equipped with open shelf filing and there are no safes in the room at present.

4. We are also tightening controls internally. Effective immediately, all OLC files will contain a "document accountability sheet" which will be used as follows: When a file is borrowed from Registry and it contains Top Secret and/or SCI material, the sheet will be filled in with the control number, document number and date of any and all such material. The person borrowing the file will sign the sheet. When the material is returned to the Registry, the sheet will be marked "returned" and dated. The

sheet will be kept with the file. In this way, we will know at all times who has seen a particular file containing Top Secret and/or SCI material. Also, all of this material will have the appropriate cover sheets on them. OLC Registry personnel will ensure that these cover sheets are properly signed and dated. We feel with all of these controls, we should have a very efficient control system.

5. One problem we cannot control concerns documents coming to OLC from other offices, e.g., the NID, the Executive Summary, and other summaries, reports, etc., which come to OLC with no receipts or other controls. We feel all of these documents should have receipts to be signed by OLC and OLC should be able to get receipts signed when the documents are returned to the originator.



FREDERICK P. HITZ

STATINTL

13 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Administrative Officer, DCI
FROM : Omega J. C. Ware, Jr.
Director, Equal Employment Opportunity
SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

1. A review of the classified holdings of the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity revealed that it has very little Top Secret or "sensitive" compartmented information in its files. That which it has is related to the business of the EAG and the Current Intelligence Weekly Review. EAG materials are hand carried by my secretary, who receipts for them to the office of record. The documents are stored in my safe, the combination of which is known only to my secretary and me. When I no longer require the documents my secretary returns them to the office of record and obtains a receipt for them.

2. The Current Intelligence Weekly Review is hand carried to the Office once each week. Each time a new issue is received the oldest issue is destroyed, always retaining the four most current issues. The security control number of the destroyed document, and the date of destruction is annotated in a log kept for this purpose.

3. The sensitive file holdings of the OEEO are inventoried monthly at which time documents no longer needed are returned to the office of record and a document receipt obtained.


Omega J. C. Ware, Jr.

STATINTL

15 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: DCI Administrative Officer
FROM: Herbert E. Hetu
Director of Public Affairs
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
Dated 5 September 1978

1. The Public Affairs Office deals extensively with unclassified documents due to the unique nature of our business. However, we do have reason to receive Top Secret, compartmented information from time to time. These documents are signed for by my staff assistant, reviewed by the D/PA and stored in her safe. If the D/PA feels that his deputy or branch chiefs (all of whom have the appropriate clearances) should be aware of the material, it is handcarried to them and handcarried back to my staff assistant at the end of each day for secure storage. The documents are returned to their originator when the subject matter is no longer of current interest. No sensitive documents are permanently stored in the Public Affairs Office.

2. The Director of Public Affairs each day receives "The Executive Summary" and the "NID." After review each is retained by my staff assistant in her safe until picked up each afternoon.


Herbert E. Hetu

STATINTL

INSPECTOR GENERAL
78-1690

1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Administrative Officer, DCI

FROM : John H. Waller
Inspector General

SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCE : ER 78-2534/1, 5 September 1978, Same Subject


In accordance with your instructions, I have reviewed our holdings and procedures for accountability and storage of especially sensitive documents and have initiated the following:

1. In addition to those Top Secret, Codeword, or other sensitive documents originated by other components which are in our files, I am including all Component Survey Reports and selected Special Studies, Audit Reports, and Grievance Case Reports in the category of especially sensitive information. These documents will carry a special indicator in their OIG registry number to indicate this degree of sensitivity and control.
2. Certain safes under the personal control of the OIG Records Management Officer, the Chief of the Audit Staff, Chief of the Grievance Group, Special Assistant to the IG, Deputy Inspector General, or myself are designated for segregated storage of such materials. These officers will be personally accountable for these materials and will be required to conduct an inventory every six months.
3. Other OIG personnel may remove such material from these safes only on permission and by signed receipt.
4. OIG documents now in the Records Center will be considered for application of these special measures only when they are retrieved from the Records Center for some other purpose.

ILLEGIB

STATINTL

I believe that these procedures will provide the proper degree of identification, control and accountability of especially sensitive materials.



John H. Waller

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : James H. Taylor
Comptroller

SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCE : Memo for Multi frm DDCI, dtd 5 September 1978
Same Subject

1. In response to reference, the following is a brief description of the Office of Comptroller's current document control procedures for Top Secret, codeword, and sensitive material, and some changes we are implementing to ensure more strict control.

A. Current Procedures

1. Controlled documents are logged into our Registry and a document control slip is attached which each person signs as having seen the document. As the document is passed on to another person, a copy of the control slip is returned to Registry so that the location of the document is known at all times. When the document is filed, the exact file location is noted on the central control card maintained in Registry.

2. Document receipts are prepared for all controlled documents leaving the Office. The duplicate is held by Registry until the original is returned to ensure that the document reached its destination.

3. Budget Documents--Copies of all Budget documents sent outside the Office are properly wrapped and document receipted. Those copies going to the Directorates are transmitted with a note from the Comptroller concerning the sensitivity of the document, the fact that it should not be reproduced by whatever means, and a request to return the previous year's budget.

B. Current Plans and Actions

1. A document-by-document review of all files is underway to reconfirm the filing location of all controlled documents.
 2. The logs of documents resulting from that review will be verified against the central control cards in Registry.
 3. All material will be reviewed to ensure that only that sensitive information needed on a regular basis is retained outside the Registry (a special purpose vault).
 4. That material deemed essential to daily operations of the various Office groups will be stored in designated safes.
 5. Individual logs of the material stored in the designated safes will be maintained by each group. The logs will be updated when any new document is filed and will be verified on a monthly basis.
 6. The log of a particular group will be reviewed when any employee from that group is reassigned to assure that all documents are properly secure.
 7. Duplicates of documents prepared in multiple or reproduced because of a time-sensitive situation will be recalled by Registry and destroyed after necessary action is complete.
2. In addition to the above, I am also requesting that the entire Office be made a special purpose vault--understanding that vaulting will not alleviate the need for continuing and improving our security practices. However, the physical layout of the Office, the inordinate amount of overtime worked during the Budget exercise, and the volume and sensitivity of the types of material with which we deal lead me to believe that, given the current security climate, the benefit fully justifies the expense. There are very few offices in the Agency, if any, that have the concentration of sensitive information that exists in the Comptroller's Office. This Office substantively cuts across every component and every function in the Agency and to a very substantial degree--in the Community. Physical security is integral to the whole spectrum of good security. The recommendation that the entire Office be made a special purpose vault just makes good sense.
3. Personnel assigned to this Office are, and will continue to be, thoroughly indoctrinated regarding proper security procedures and the impact of their responsibility as an employee of this Office and the Agency.

STATINTL


7 SEP 1978

| |
|------------|
| 78-2534/18 |
|------------|

DCI/IC-78-4750

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:


Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

STATINTL

SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control

REFERENCE: Your Memo Dated 1 September 1978, Same Subject
(ER 78-2534/1)

In response to the reference, the Collection Tasking Staff intends to implement the same sensitive document control procedures as outlined in the memorandum from the Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management dated 19 September 1978 (DCI/IC-78-0059). Both staffs share a common registry and administrative support unit.


STATINTL

Distribution of DCI/IC-78-4750:

Orig - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - CT Registry
1 - AD/DCI/CT
1 - [REDACTED] CTS
1 - [REDACTED] CTS

STATINTL

CTS/[REDACTED] cjh (26 Sep 78)

STATINTL

SENDER AND RECIPIENT CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

| | | |
|--------------|--------------|--------|
| UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET |
|--------------|--------------|--------|

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

| TO | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS |
|----|----------------------|------|----------|
| 1 | Director of Security | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | | | |
| 6 | | | |

| | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

| | |
|--|-------------|
| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE |
| DDCI | 25Sep78 |



| | | |
|--------------|--------------|--------|
| UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET |
|--------------|--------------|--------|

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

| | | | |
|---|--------------|--------------|--------|
| SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM | UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET |
|---|--------------|--------------|--------|

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP


STATINTL

| TO | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS |
|----|---|-------------|---|
| 1 |  | 26 DEC 1978 |  |
| 2 | MR. BLAKE | 26 DEC 1978 | 7 |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | | | |
| 6 | | | |

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |

Remarks:

The attached is in response to a suggestion by Bob Gambino that follow-up action be taken to ensure that the objectives of Mr. Carlucci's Sensitive Document Control Program are being achieved. This will also give us a basis for answering any questions that might be raised as to what has been done since Carlucci's memo.



STATINTL

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE |
| AT/DDA | 22 Dec 78 |
| UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL |
| SECRET | |

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

UNCLASSIFIED
 INTERNAL ONLY
 CONFIDENTIAL
 SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

STATINTL

Sensitive Document Control Systems Status Reports - DCI Area

FROM:

[Redacted]

Administrative Officer, DCI

EXTENSION

5750

NO.

DATE

15 September 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DDCI

9/18/78

[Handwritten initials]

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

DT
See me

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

78-2534/18

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Sensitive Document Control

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|--------------|
| FROM: STATINTL [REDACTED] D/DCI/CT | EXTENSION | NO: STATINTL |
| | | DATE |

| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |
|--|----------|-----------|--------------------|---|
| | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | | |

| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |
|--|------------|-----------|--------------------|---|
| | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | | |
| 1. ER | 29 Sept 78 | | J.C. | Originator - [REDACTED] green phone: 1121 |
| 2. DDCI | | | | |
| 3. | | | | |
| 4. | | | | |
| 5. | | | | |
| 6. | | | | |
| 7. | | | | |
| 8. | | | | |
| 9. | | | | |
| 10. | | | | |
| 11. | | | | |
| 12. | | | | |
| 13. | | | | |
| 14. | | | | |
| 15. | | | | |